Employment Rights Bill

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 3rd June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

I thank my noble friend for his powerful and clear speech; he has said it all. I just want to add that this issue has arisen from the P&O scandal that took place three years ago. The maritime unions are particularly concerned about this, and I hope that my noble friend the Minister will be able to provide some comfort for the arguments that have been presented. The issue of pre-emptive injunctive relief for seafarers and other workers is a crucial issue and it is possible that we will need to return to it on Report.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I appreciate the intent behind Amendment 143. After all, we are all familiar with the high-profile cases, such as P&O Ferries, to which the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, referred in his introduction.

I cannot pretend that I was au fait with the case details that the noble Lord explained, but we have some concerns about the practical and legal consequences of what is being proposed here. It seems to us that the amendment would allow employment tribunals to declare dismissals void and as having no effect; therefore, in effect, reinstating employees regardless of circumstances.

That is a major departure from the current legal framework, where the remedy for a breach is compensation, not nullification. That obviously raises serious questions. What happens if a dismissal is declared void months later? Is the employee reinstated, and are they entitled to back pay? What if the role no longer exists or has been filled? For many businesses and many workers, that would create uncertainty and not protection.

There is also the issue of enforcement. Giving tribunal decisions the force of the High Court, and allowing contempt proceedings for breach, risks confusing two fundamentally different judicial systems. Tribunals are meant to be accessible and the High Court is not.

I also question whether this change would meaningfully deter bad-faith employers. Those who already factor in the cost of breaking the law may simply budget for this risk too. Meanwhile, small and medium-sized employers acting in good faith could face disproportionate legal exposure for administrative or technical errors. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

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[Lord Watson of Invergowrie (Lab)]

My Lords, I am pleased to speak in support of my noble friend Lady Warwick on an issue that, as far as I am aware, has not appeared anywhere else but is of some importance. There is growing unease in the higher education sector about the potential implications of Clause 30. Universities UK has said it is frustrated that its letters to both officials and Ministers—they would be the same thing, I imagine—remain unanswered. UUK is probably being a bit polite in saying that it is frustrated; I suggest that it is unacceptable for a letter from any UK-wide organisation not to receive a response. If nothing else, I hope my noble friend will be able to give an assurance in her reply that she will ensure that Universities UK receives a considered response to its very legitimate concerns.

As my noble friend said, the higher education sector is concerned at the potential impact of measures proposed in Clause 30, which relate to outsourcing, on current arrangements within the sector and on the viability of steps that universities have taken or are planning to take in order to stabilise their financial position. Many universities consider themselves as falling within the definition of contracting authorities and may therefore be inadvertently caught in this clause of the legislation.

As originally introduced, the public sector outsourcing provisions applied to contracting authorities in England only. However, Ministers introduced an amendment in Committee in another place, and provisions now apply to contracting authorities in England, Scotland and Wales. Again as my noble friend said, the major point on which clarification is essential is whether and in what circumstances universities will be considered to be contracting authorities for the purposes of this legislation.

There is also the question of whether the planned separate outsourcing rules for different UK nations will or even might create complex and prohibitive arrangements for universities. As an example, if an institution is working across the UK nations—a good example would be the Open University—that could mean it is subject to two or more sets of outsourcing rules, potentially providing a conflicting legislative framework for its operational practice. I hope my noble friend will be able to clarify how the Government envisage such separate outsourcing rules will operate, and that in doing so she will provide reassurance to many in the higher education sector who, as my noble friend Lady Warwick said, are very supportive of the Bill in general but fear that universities could become victims of unintended consequences.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank both noble Lords for their contributions, and I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Warwick of Undercliffe, for her introduction to her Amendment 143B. We think it is important to recognise the unique position of higher education providers when considering worker protection in public sector outsourcing. Because universities and similar institutions operate outside the traditional public sector framework, they possess a level of autonomy that sets them apart from government bodies, so applying the same regulatory requirements to these institutions clearly risks imposing unnecessary burdens that could affect their ability to focus on their core missions of education and research.

The amendment seems to us to thoughtfully acknowledge that difference by excluding higher education providers from the scope of these specific worker protection provisions. Such an approach would allow the focus of these protections to remain on core public sector organisations, where procurement processes are more standardised and closely tied to government accountability. At the same time, it would respect the operational independence of universities.

The fair treatment of workers remains an essential principle across all sectors, including higher education. Encouraging good employment practices within universities should continue through other means, but the amendment recognises the practical realities faced by these institutions. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s answer.

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Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

145: After Clause 32, insert the following new Clause—
“Use of positive action in the workplace(1) In this section—(a) “P” is a public sector worker who reasonably thinks that the application by P’s employer, in relation to P’s employment or a working practice, of sections 158 and 159 of the Equality Act 2010 has caused or risks causing detriment to P,(b) “R” is P’s public sector employee, and(c) P reasonably thinks that R is responsible for the detriment in subsection (1)(a).(2) A Minister of the Crown must by regulations make provision for—(a) forms through which P may anonymously question R on any matter relevant to subsection (1),(b) forms through which R may answer questions by P, and(c) such forms to be made publicly available.(3) Within six months of the passing of this Act and every three months thereafter, R must publish a report setting out―(a) the number of forms received under subsection (2), and(b) a summary of the nature of the complaints to which they relate.(4) A Minister of the Crown may by regulations require R to report on the use of sections 158 and 159 of the Equality Act 2010.(5) This section does not apply to activities undertaken by R under paragraph 1 of Schedule 9 of the Equality Act 2010.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment introduces a mechanism for public sector employees who believe they have been disadvantaged by their employer’s use of positive action under sections 158 and 159 of the Equality Act 2010. It would require the Government to create a process allowing such employees to anonymously question their employer and requiring employers to respond.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 145 standing in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral. This amendment introduces a mechanism for public sector workers who reasonably believe that they have been subjected to detriment as a result of their employers’ use of positive action under Sections 158 and 159 of the Equality Act 2010. It does not seek to outlaw such action, nor does it obstruct efforts to promote fairness. Rather, it seeks to ensure that fairness extends to all employees, not only those whom the state or the employer happen to deem underrepresented.

We must confront the uncomfortable truth that some public bodies have begun to apply positive action in ways that no longer reflect the careful balance envisaged by Parliament when the Equality Act was passed. We have now entered territory where lawful positive action shades into unlawful positive discrimination —where the scales of justice have been not merely tipped but turned. For example, let us consider West Yorkshire Police, a force whose conduct in this area raises urgent and serious concerns. It has come to light through both media investigation and internal whistleblowers that recruitment processes have been operated in a manner which in practice delays, restricts or even excludes applications from white British candidates. Candidates from certain ethnic minority backgrounds were allowed to apply early and, in some cases, were mentored through the process by dedicated positive action teams. Meanwhile, white British applicants were told to wait until a general window opened, often for as little as 48 hours. This, we are assured, is not discrimination but rather the fair operation of the law. I do not agree. This is not the spirit nor, arguably, even the letter of the Equality Act. It is a distortion of the law, and it demands redress.

What makes this all the more troubling is that these actions are being taken not by private corporations but by the state, or at least by institutions that act in the name of the state and are funded by the public purse. The taxpayer in this case is being forced to subsidise policies that they might find discriminatory and from which they may be excluded. There seems to be something especially perverse, indeed, almost Orwellian, about that.

This is not merely an abstract concern. West Yorkshire Police, for example, reportedly spent over £1.4 million in recent years on equality, diversity and inclusion staff—more than any other force in the country. That is public money. It is money earned by ordinary citizens, some of whom now find themselves effectively barred from entry into public service not because they lack ability but because their ethnic background does not satisfy an internal diversity target. When questions are raised, when whistleblowers from within these forces speak up, what happens? We hear of them being silenced, reprimanded or warned not to interfere. We hear of secret job listings marked “hidden” in the system, visible only to certain candidates. We hear of candidates greeted with hugs and reassurances that their interviews are merely a formality. That is not recruitment, and it is not equality. It is institutional manipulation.

The amendment before your Lordships seeks to restore a measure of transparency and accountability. It proposes a system by which a public sector worker who reasonably believes that they have been harmed by the operation of positive action can submit a formal question anonymously to their employer. The employer, in turn, must respond. Moreover, employers will be required to publish data on such queries, allowing Parliament and the public to monitor the use and potential abuse of these provisions. This is not a punitive or burdensome requirement; it is the most basic form of procedural fairness.

Let us be clear. This amendment does not challenge the principle of inclusion; it does not deny that discrimination has existed; but it says unequivocally that the answer to past unfairness is not the imposition of new unfairness, that the pursuit of diversity must not come at the expense of justice, and that inclusion must include everybody. Equality before the law is not a suggestion or a secondary consideration to be weighed against modern ideological preferences. It is a constitutional principle that underpins this very Chamber. When we allow it to be weakened quietly and gradually by well-meaning policies that turn into arbitrary practices, we invite division, resentment and, ultimately, more injustice.

The Minister may say that everything that I have described—the delays, the exclusion of white British applicants, the unequal mentoring and the hidden vacancies—is perfectly lawful under existing legislation. He may say that this is precisely how the Government intend for positive action to operate in the public sector. However, I sincerely hope that is not the argument that is to be advanced. Alternatively, the Minister may offer reassurance to the Committee and to the public that existing law already contains sufficient safeguards, and that what we have heard from West Yorkshire Police, Thames Valley Police and others would not and should not be permitted under any reasonable interpretation of the Equality Act. If that is the case, I would welcome that clarification. I would also welcome assurance that there is already a functioning system of redress for individuals who believe that they have been mistreated on the basis of how positive action has been applied.

If the Minister agrees with the points that I have made—that West Yorkshire Police should not have discriminated against white applicants and that there is no mechanism to stop this—then I very much look forward to the Government accepting this amendment. I beg to move.

[Lord Liddle (Lab)]

I came into this debate by chance, but it seems to me that this is part of a very undesirable development: an attack on the principle of equality, diversity and inclusion policies. These principles are at the heart of my politics. I have fought for racial equality ever since I was a student, when I went on marches against Enoch Powell and what he stood for. I thought that the response of the Labour Government in the 1960s—to make racial discrimination illegal—was very important. In more modern times, when I was chair of Lancaster University and looking at the question of student admissions, I always thought that we should make allowance for the fact that some working-class people had not had the best chance in life and take this into account in admissions procedures Therefore, I rather regret what the Opposition Front Bench is trying to do, which is to undermine the political acceptability of these policies.

There is a danger here. I have seen it from some people in my own party who say that, in response to the alleged great Reform upsurge, we should start abandoning EDI. That would be catastrophic for a social democrat like me, who has always believed in these things. I hope that the Members opposite will withdraw their amendment.

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[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank the Minister for that comprehensive answer, and I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this quite lively debate. I have to say I was disappointed that the greatest lady of them all who did not need a helping hand did not get a mention, so I will mention her: Margaret Thatcher.

I say to the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, that we are not seeking to undermine anything in this; I was very clear about that. I want to make it clear that, as I said in my opening remarks, this amendment does not seek to outlaw such action, nor does it obstruct efforts to promote fairness. It just seeks to ensure that fairness extends to all employees, not only to those whom the state or the employer happens to deem underrepresented.

I am grateful to the Minister for his extended quote from the Yorkshire case, but I also mentioned the case in Thames Valley. A tribunal there ruled that the three white police officers who won a claim after they were passed over for promotion were overlooked by Thames Valley Police because of their race and an ethnic-minority sergeant was promoted—this is the killer line—

“without any competitive assessment process taking place”,

which is precisely not the spirit of the laws that we have just been discussing.

[Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)]

And that is illegal.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

That is why we were asking these questions and laying this amendment. It is good to have it out in the open. The amendment sought not litigation but clarity. It sought not courtroom battles but a simple mechanism for transparency and accountability. It would have been a route for asking questions and a structure for reporting. It would be a reminder that positive action must remain within the bounds of the law and fairness, and not become a euphemism for sanctioned discrimination. However, I have heard the arguments from the Minister and, not least because of the lateness of the hour, I am content to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 145 withdrawn.