Debates between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Fox during the 2019 Parliament

Tue 9th May 2023
Wed 29th Jun 2022
Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure Bill
Lords Chamber

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Committee stage: Part 2
Wed 29th Jun 2022
Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure Bill
Lords Chamber

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Committee stage: Part 1

Computer Systems: Independent Testing

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Fox
Monday 12th February 2024

(2 months, 2 weeks ago)

Lords Chamber
Read Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Sharpe of Epsom Portrait Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
- View Speech - Hansard - -

My noble friend raises some good points and, as I said, the Government are considering the right way to do that. If I talk about some of the difficulties, it might illustrate this point to the House. Amending legislation to enable cybersecurity activities involves accessing computer systems, and the data is complex. This needs a lot of thought. We would need to establish what constitutes legitimate cybersecurity activity and the boundaries of such activity. We would need to consider who should be allowed to undertake such activity, where the professional standards would need to be complied with and what reporting or oversight would be needed. We cannot make changes that would prevent law enforcement agencies and prosecutors investigating and prosecuting those who commit cybercrimes. It is right to consider this carefully and that is what we are doing.

Lord Fox Portrait Lord Fox (LD)
- View Speech - Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, the Minister set out a long list of things that need considering. I understand his point, so could he perhaps tell us the timetable for this process, when we might hear the verdict on all these considerations and perhaps see some legislation before your Lordships’ House?

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Portrait Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
- View Speech - Hansard - -

My Lords, the public consultation on this process concluded only in November 2023, so we have not had a huge amount of time to consider all the responses. As I have explained, we will be reviewing how to take forward the recommendations and will update Parliament in due course.

Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Fox
Lord Sharpe of Epsom Portrait Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
- View Speech - Hansard - -

My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Ponsonby and Lord Fox, for their remarks in this debate. I reassure the noble Lord, Lord Fox, that any cheek-blowing he witnessed was more a reflection of the previous marathon speech than a reflection on his amendments.

Amendment 21, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, would require that the enforcement of data retention notices—DRNs—would apply only to UK recipients of those notices. DRNs and technical capability notices—TCNs—can be given to a person overseas, but only TCNs are currently enforceable overseas. Clause 16 seeks to amend Sections 95 and 97 of the IPA to allow the extraterritorial enforcement of DRNs in order to strengthen operational agility when addressing emerging technology, bringing them in line with TCNs. It is vital to have this further legal lever, if needed, to maintain the capabilities that the intelligence agencies need to access the communications data they need to, in the interests of national security and to tackle serious crime.

The Government therefore oppose Amendment 21 as it goes fundamentally against what the Government are seeking to achieve through Clause 16 and would not provide any additional clarity to telecommunications operators. As DRNs are already enforceable against UK recipients, there is no need to re-emphasise that in the Bill.

I turn to the amendments to Clause 17 concerning the notice review period. This clause is vital to ensure that operators do not make changes that would negatively impact existing lawful access while a notice is being comprehensively reviewed. Maintaining lawful access is critical to safeguard public safety, enabling law enforcement and the intelligence community to continue protecting citizens during the review period.

Let me be clear: operators will not be required to make changes during the review period to specifically comply with the notice. Rather, under Clause 17 they will be required to maintain the status quo so that law enforcement and intelligence agencies do not lose access to any data that they would have been able to access previously. The review process is an important safeguard, and that right of appeal will remain available to companies.

On Amendment 27, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, the Government have noted the strength of feeling from parliamentarians and industry regarding the current uncertainty over the timeframe for conducting a review of a notice. We have therefore tabled Amendments 26, 32 and 33 to Clause 17 to address that uncertainty and provide further clarity and assurances regarding the notice review process.

The existing powers within Sections 90 and 257 of the IPA do not give the Secretary of State the power to specify in regulations the time period within which a review of a notice must be completed. The Government are therefore introducing a new regulation-making power to enable the Secretary of State to specify in regulations the length of time the Secretary of State can take to reach a decision on the review of a notice upon receipt of the report by the judicial commissioner and the Technical Advisory Board, and the overall length of time that a review can take.

The amendments will also make provision for a judicial commissioner to issue directions to the Secretary of State and the person seeking the review, as they see fit, to ensure the effective management of the review process. That will give the judicial commissioner the power to issue directions to both parties, specifying the time period for providing their evidence or making representations, and the power to disregard any submissions outside those timelines. These amendments will provide operators the certainty they require regarding how long a review of a notice can last, and therefore how long the status quo must be maintained under Clause 17. They will also provide further clarity on the process and management of that review.

Specifying timelines will require an amendment to the existing regulations concerning the review of notices. The Government commit to holding a full public consultation before the amendment of those regulations and the laying of new regulations relating to Clause 20, which provides for the introduction of the notification notices. Representations received in response will be considered and used to inform both sets of regulations, which we have clarified in the Bill are subject to the affirmative procedure.

Amendment 35, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, seeks to specify in statute who the Secretary of State must consult before laying regulations relating to Clause 20 and the introduction of notification notices, and the factors that the Secretary of State must have regard to when making those regulations. I hope the commitment that I have just made to hold a full public consultation provides the necessary reassurance to the noble Lord that all relevant persons will be consulted before making the regulations, and that he will agree that is it unnecessarily prescriptive, and potentially restrictive, to put such details in the Bill.

Amendments 22, 25, 28 and 31, also tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, seek to limit the extraterritoriality of Clause 17 and ensure that operators can make changes to their services and systems for users in other jurisdictions during a review. To be clear, the Bill as currently drafted means that companies can make changes to their services during a review. They could choose to roll out new technologies and services while the review is ongoing, including in other jurisdictions, so long as lawful access is built into them as required to maintain the status quo. Furthermore, the status quo will apply only to whichever of their systems and services are covered by the notice in question. Naturally, anything outside the scope of the notice is unaffected by the requirement. I also emphasise that the control of telecommunications systems used to provide telecommunications services in the UK does not stop at borders, and it is highly likely that any such arbitrary geographical limitations would in fact be unworkable in practice.

Amendments 23, 24 and 29 seek to raise the threshold with regard to relevant changes that an operator must not make during a review period to a change that would “substantially limit” their ability to maintain lawful access. This would not make the position any clearer as “substantially” is a subjective test. Moreover, it would constrain Clause 17 in a way that would fundamentally prevent it from achieving its objectives: to ensure that the same level of lawful access available before the notice was issued is maintained during a review period.

Lawful access provides critical data to law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Constraining access to data that was previously available, in a limited capacity or substantially, may seriously undermine investigations and the ability to protect our citizens. It is therefore vital that the status quo is maintained during the review period. It would also be difficult to define “substantially limit” without referring to a “negative effect on” a capability.

Amendments 36 to 38 to Clause 20, also spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, seek to raise the threshold and provide more proportionality. As I have emphasised on every occasion we have debated the Bill, necessity and proportionality constitute a critical safeguard that underpins the IPA. Authorisations are approved by an independent body and all warrants and notices must be approved by a judicial commissioner. There is considerable oversight of authorisations, meaning that the threshold is already high. Necessity and proportionality justifications are considered for every request for a notice, warrant or authorisation and, by extension, whether it is reasonable to issue that request to the operator. Once operators are in receipt of such a request, they are required to provide assistance. The proposed amendments are therefore not required.

Finally, government Amendment 34 is a consequential amendment necessitated by the introduction of Clause 19, which amends the functions of a judicial commissioner to include whether to approve the renewal of certain notices.

I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate—

Lord Fox Portrait Lord Fox (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Before the Minister sits down, winding back to the point about territoriality, he spoke of national boundaries as being arbitrary. It would help me to understand what kind of activity the Government envisage reaching across those boundaries, which he refers to as arbitrary; in other words, what would the Government be seeking to do extraterritorially?

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Portrait Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
- Hansard - -

If it would help, I am happy to write to the noble Lord with some sensible and practical scenarios because I do not think it is appropriate to make them up at the Dispatch Box, if that is acceptable.

I was just about to thank the noble Lord for the time he has taken to talk me through his concerns ahead of Report and at various other stages of the Bill on various other issues. However, I hope that I have provided reassurances through my comments at the Dispatch Box and the government amendments that we have tabled. I therefore invite the House to support these amendments and invite the noble Lord to withdraw Amendment 21 and not move the others he has tabled.

Lord Fox Portrait Lord Fox (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Fox
Lord Fox Portrait Lord Fox (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am anticipating the Minister sitting down shortly. I remind the Minister that I asked a specific question on directly elected regional mayors, their rise, and the role that they play in democracy, which is so different to when the IPA was originally conceived. The Minister may not have an answer now, but a written answer would be very helpful.

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Portrait Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
- View Speech - Hansard - -

I am happy to acknowledge that the noble Lord is right: their powers have expanded, as have their influence and celebrity over the years. I do not have an answer now, but I will come back to the noble Lord on that.

The objective of these clauses is to provide greater resilience in the process. It is critical that we do not undermine this from the off. I therefore hope noble Lords feel reassured by the explanations given, and the information set out in the draft code of practice, which is the appropriate place to set out the detail of this alternative process.

--- Later in debate ---
Lord Fox Portrait Lord Fox (LD)
- View Speech - Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, I shall be brief. Just on the subject of suspicion, which I think I raised it, I was thinking—perhaps I did not articulate it well—that it was at the political-class level. It is not hard to construct a suspicious scenario where a Westminster-based Executive are hacking an Edinburgh-based politician—I am sure that suspicion would apply there. However, the noble Baroness is right about the public.

The amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, is important, not because this sort of thing needs to go into primary legislation, but because his point around emphasising public understanding and support which has come out is really important. He picked out the fact that a number of officeholders have worked hard at generating a positive profile for the services, and for that they should be thanked and congratulated. I would add GCHQ, the public profile of which probably did not even exist a decade or so ago. I have several very sad friends who can hardly wait with excitement for the annual GCHQ quiz to arrive. Things like that essentially draw attention to the nature of the work that such organisations do. I laugh at those friends but then I cannot solve it and they can, so perhaps they are the winners there. Those sorts of things do not shed light and throw open the doors on the things the noble Baroness and others fear should not be public, but they create an ambience around those services which is important.

Nobody has mentioned the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, which I guess is exactly what he wanted, and I have nothing to add to them either.

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Portrait Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
- View Speech - Hansard - -

My Lords, I thank the Committee very much indeed for the points raised in this short debate, which eloquently explained the fine balance that needs to be struck in this area. As this is the last group, I take this opportunity to thank all the men and women in all the security services, who do so much to keep us safe.

Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Fox
Lord Fox Portrait Lord Fox (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

That is exactly the case.

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Portrait The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)
- View Speech - Hansard - -

My Lords, I am grateful for the contributions to this debate, which have been very interesting. I thank all noble Lords for the points raised. I shall do my very best to address all of them and apologise in advance for going into significant detail. I also thank everyone in the Committee for their broad support for the Bill.

I will start with the low/no privacy factors on bulk personal datasets, which I will henceforth call BPDs, and the various amendments relating to the test set out in Clause 2, to be applied when an intelligence service is considering whether a particular dataset is one that can be retained, or retained and examined, under new Section 226A in the new Part 7A. This test requires that regard must be had to all the circumstances, and that particular regard must be had to the factors set out in new subsection (3). The list of factors is not exhaustive and other factors may be considered, where relevant.

Schedule 10 to the Data Protection Act is related to Section 86 of that Act, which is concerned with sensitive processing of personal data by the intelligence services. Schedule 10 sets out a list of conditions which must be met for such processing to be lawful for the purposes of the Data Protection Act. There is a risk that applying these words here, in a different context and for a different purpose, may be seen to create a link, albeit fallacious, between the type of datasets that will be retained and examined under new Part 7A and sensitive processing under the Data Protection Act. For that reason, their inclusion here risks doing more harm than good, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, noted.

In any case, the safeguards in new Part 7A are already sufficient to ensure due regard for privacy. Every dataset proposed to be retained, or retained and examined, must be individually authorised. In addition to the test at new Section 226A, as new Section 226B makes clear, an individual authorisation may be granted only if it is both necessary and proportionate.

The factors have been chosen because they are most relevant to the context in which the test will be applied and have been drawn from existing case law. They provide a guide to the decision-maker in reaching a conclusion as to the nature of the dataset. Furthermore, a form of prior judicial approval will apply to all authorisations so that there is independent oversight of the conclusions reached.

Amendment 1, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, seeks to replace factor (b) with language drawn from Schedule 10 to the Data Protection Act 2018. Factor (b) is concerned with the extent to which an individual has made public the data in the dataset, or has consented to the data being made public. The Government do not consider the amendment necessary. I am sure the noble Lord’s aim is to improve the safeguards in the Bill, and he has drawn inspiration from existing precedent to do so in an effort to bring consistency across statute. However, the amendment fails to achieve that aim, and risks creating an unclear and unnecessary link between this Bill and the Data Protection Act, which I have already explained. I will return to the Data Protection Act in due course.

Amendment 2, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, probes the inclusion of factors (d) and (e), relating to publicly available datasets that are already widely known about or are already used in the public domain—for example, in data science or academia. As I mentioned, the test in new Section 226A is one in which

“regard must be had to all the circumstances”.

The removal of factors from new subsection (3) would not, therefore, fundamentally change the test; it would mean simply that the decision-maker would not be bound to have particular regard to the absent factors. This amendment would, in fact, result in less transparency in the considerations the intelligence services apply when assessing expectation of privacy in relation to Part 7A authorisations.

The Government consider it important that particular regard is had to these factors. I know that noble Lords particularly enjoy the example of the “Titanic” manifest. It is a useful example of where such factors would be relevant, as it is a dataset that is widely known about and widely used, and contains real data about real people who would, unfortunately, no longer have an expectation of privacy. I also point to the helpful example in the independent review by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson: the Enron corpus. This is a large dataset of emails that came into the public domain following the investigation into the collapse of the Enron Corporation. Although initially sensitive, the dataset has been available in various forms for almost 20 years and is widely used in data science. It is right that such datasets are in scope of the new regime.

The noble Lord, Lord Fox, asked specifically about the extent to which these factors depart from existing privacy laws. The law concerning the reasonable expectation of privacy is likely to develop over time, and new Section 226A is intended to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate future changes. Rather than departing from the law, new Section 226A is intended to ensure that the intelligence services can continue to apply the law as it develops.

On Amendment 3, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, for tabling this helpful probing amendment. I am afraid the Government do not think it is necessary in order to achieve what we understand the intended effect of the amendment to be. The amendment does, however, provide an opportunity to better explain the difference between what the Bill calls “individual authorisations” and “category authorisations”. An individual authorisation will authorise the retention, or retention and examination, of a dataset under the new Part 7A being inserted into the Investigatory Powers Act—which I will henceforth refer to as the IPA—by this Bill.

All datasets that are to be retained under Part 7A must have an individual authorisation. Individual authorisations are subject to prior approval by a judicial commissioner unless the dataset described falls within an existing category. A category authorisation will not authorise the retention, or retention and examination, of a dataset. Instead, it is a mechanism through which a judicial commissioner’s permission may be sought in order to depart from the normal rule on prior approval, but only in respect of datasets that meet a particular description.

--- Later in debate ---
Lord Fox Portrait Lord Fox (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

If the Minister and indeed the noble Baroness had listened to what I said, they would know that I do not think it is forgettable; I just wanted the Minister to confirm that point.

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Portrait Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
- Hansard - -

Thank you; point taken.

Section 226D provides a mechanism to achieve what I understand the intent of the amendment to be. It is clear that remedial action must be taken if it is discovered that Section 226A does not apply or no longer applies to part of a dataset authorised under Part 7A. Anything in the process of being done must be stopped as soon as possible, and that part of the authorisation is treated as cancelled. The effect of that part of the authorisation being treated as cancelled is that the data to which it relates must be deleted unless there is some other lawful basis for its retention. It may well be that it is appropriate for the intelligence service to continue to retain the data. That is why subsection (3), in effect, puts that part of the dataset back into the decision-making machinery in Section 220 of Part 7 of the IPA—so that such a decision can be made. We provide a fuller explanation of that in the draft code of practice for Part 7A, at paragraphs 4.26 and 5.39.

In conclusion on this amendment, if the noble Lord is suggesting that any actionable intelligence that has been identified while the agency was operating on the basis of that retention and examination being lawful under Part 7A should not be acted on, I am afraid I must playfully suggest that it is he who ought to forget his amendment.

I turn now to the various amendments on reporting on BPDs, including several that seek to amend the provisions set out in Clause 2, under Section 226DA, which require the heads of the intelligence services to provide an annual report on Part 7A to the Secretary of State. The first amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, Amendment 11, seeks to mandate that certain statistical information in a given year—specifically, the numbers of authorisations sought and granted—be provided to the relevant Secretary of State. This amendment is not necessary or appropriate. First, those Secretaries of State who are politically accountable for the intelligence services will have in place arrangements to that end and may demand of the relevant intelligence service any additional information he or she feels necessary. This may go beyond the level of detail the noble Lord has proposed be included in the annual report and may be more frequent. This is not a matter for the Bill, because the exact information the Secretary of State requires may evolve over time. Secondly, if this sort of specific reporting requirement is found to be necessary or desirable, it is more appropriate for inclusion in a code of practice, rather than being in the legislation. Indeed, the draft code of practice for Part 7A sets out some relevant details under paragraph 7.4.

I turn now to Amendments 10 and 12, proposed by the noble Lord, Lord West, and I take this opportunity to reassure him and the noble Lord, Lord Murphy. On behalf of the Security Minister, we thank them for their valuable work on the ISC and for the constructive engagement with the Bill Committee to date. I am pleased to see the noble Lord, Lord West, in his place today, and I am glad that he is on a more or less even keel.

The amendments the noble Lord has tabled would require the intelligence services to provide the same annual report that they provide to their Secretary of State, on the operation of Part 7A, to the ISC and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. I do not believe that this additional requirement would provide the enhanced oversight of the regime that the amendments purport to provide. The annual reporting requirement is a formal statutory mechanism by means of which the Secretaries of State will receive information from the intelligence services about their use of Part 7A on an annual basis. This is a mechanism intended to ensure effective political oversight by the Secretary of State.

The ISC is a committee of Parliament. Oversight by the ISC is neither of the same nature as, nor a replacement for, the oversight of the Secretary of State. The ISC, as a committee of Parliament, already has a long-standing and well-established role in the oversight of the intelligence services to which these provisions will apply, and that role will continue here.

Sending the annual report to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner will not increase the level of independent oversight provided, for the following reasons. First, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner will be required to keep this new regime under review, as he does with the current Part 7 regime, and he will continue to report annually on his findings. Secondly, the information these amendments seek to include in the annual report is already information that the draft code of practice will require the intelligence services to keep, as is clear from paragraphs 7.1. and 7.2. The commissioner, and anyone acting on his behalf, has access to all locations, documentation and information systems as necessary to carry out a full and thorough inspection regime. The intelligence services are legally obliged to provide all necessary assistance to the commissioner, or anyone acting on his behalf, including by providing documents and information.

The noble Lords, Lord Fox, Lord Murphy and Lord West, asked about the continued engagement with the ISC. On both the policy proposals informing the Bill and the Bill itself, through a combination of ministerial, operational and official engagement, we have maintained continual engagement, which includes recent sessions with the Security Minister and the agency heads. As I said earlier, we are grateful to the committee for its engagement and scrutiny of the Bill. We will continue to involve it throughout the Bill’s passage, and I am more than happy to take the noble Lords’ comments back to the Home Office and make sure they are widely understood.

Amendment 13 would see the intelligence agencies notify the Investigatory Powers Commissioner every time an individual authorisation is granted in reliance on a category authorisation. I have already set out the distinct processes for individual and category authorisations under new Part 7A. As I set out earlier, categories will be authorised only with the prior approval of a judicial commissioner. IPCO inspectors will then be able to review the individual authorisation granted in reliance on a category authorisation during their regular inspections of the intelligence services throughout that time. Category authorisations will expire at 12 months and will then need to be renewed and that decision reapproved by a judicial commissioner.

Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Fox
Lord Fox Portrait Lord Fox (LD)
- View Speech - Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, I am pleased to support the amendment in the name of my noble friend. If I do not speak at length, it is not because I do not think it a very important amendment but because I am trying to infect the rest of the House with some brevity—unsuccessfully, I suspect. This is an important amendment and we have seen movement in other regimes. We have seen movement in the United States; we are seeing movement in the European Union; and I think we have seen movement in the House of Commons on the Procurement Bill, to which we have started to see changes in attitude. I hope we will hear from the Minister shortly that the Government are prepared to move, in order that we can bank a step in the right direction along this path. I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say, and I hope this amendment will not have to be pressed if we hear what we want to hear.

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Portrait Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
- View Speech - Hansard - -

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, for this amendment, for his constructive engagement throughout the passage of the Bill through this House and, of course, for his typically thoughtful and powerful introduction. I also pay tribute to noble Lords from all sides of the House, and Members in the other place, for continuing to pursue this important issue and engage with the Government on a cross-party basis, not least the APPG on Anti-Corruption and Responsible Tax. I can reassure the noble Lord that the Government are supportive of mechanisms to deprive sanctioned individuals, where appropriate, of their assets, with a view to funding the recovery and reconstruction of Ukraine. More broadly, the Government want to drive further transparency on assets held by sanctioned persons in the UK.

On 19 June, the Government announced four new commitments which reaffirm that Russia must pay for the long-term reconstruction of Ukraine. This includes new legislation, laid the same day by the Foreign Secretary, to enable sanctions to remain in place until Russia pays compensation for damage caused. In this announcement the Government also confirmed that we will lay new legislation requiring persons and entities in the UK, or UK persons and entities overseas, who are designated under the Russia financial sanctions regime to disclose any assets they hold in the UK. The Government are firmly committed to bringing forward this secondary legislation, subject to the made affirmative procedure, and to introducing this measure before the end of 2023, subject to the usual parliamentary scheduling. This will strengthen transparency of assets and make it clear that the UK will not allow assets to be hidden in this country.

Sanctioned individuals who fail to disclose their assets could receive a financial penalty or have their assets confiscated. This demonstrates our continued commitment to penalising those who make deliberate attempts to conceal funds or economic resources. The new power builds on and strengthens the UK’s existing powers around transparency of designated persons’ assets. HMG already use the annual review of the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, known as OFSI, to collect and detail assets frozen under UK financial sanctions. Additionally, relevant firms such as banks, other financial institutions, law firms and estate agents have an ongoing obligation to report to OFSI if they know or reasonably suspect that a person is a designated person or has committed offences under financial sanctions regulations, where that information is received in the course of carrying on their business. Those firms must provide information about the nature and amount of any funds or economic resources held by them for the customer.

The designated person reporting measure will act as a dual verification tool by enabling the comparison of disclosures against existing reporting requirements that bite on relevant firms. This will tighten the net around those who are not reporting and are evading their reporting requirements.

On asset seizure, prosecutors and/or law enforcement agencies can currently apply to confiscate or permanently seize assets where someone has benefited from their offending, or the assets have links to criminality, by making use of powers under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. Importantly, the new measures will also give His Majesty’s Government the ability to impose fines. Overall, this designated person reporting measure will be focused on strengthening the UK’s compliance toolkit while giving options for penalising those who seek to hide their assets.

The noble Lord’s amendment includes a specific provision which would require the designated person also to report assets which were held six months prior to the designation. The Government are still fully developing the non-disclosure measure and I can assure the noble Lord that we are carefully considering this suggestion. Although not retrospective in terms of regulating or criminalising conduct that occurred before the measure came into force, requiring designated persons to provide a snapshot of their assets at a historical point in time is necessarily more onerous than a forward look requirement. The Government will need carefully to consider the design of the measure and the proportionality and additional value of so-called retrospective reporting to ensure that it is operationally deliverable and legally robust. This will include working with relevant law enforcement agencies to determine how such information would be used.

Before laying these regulations, the Government will complete their ongoing evaluation of possible operational or implementation challenges to help ensure the successful delivery of this measure. For example, investigating non-compliance will require significant resources from the enforcing agency. We want to ensure that it has all the capability, skills and resources to succeed.

I note the interest in and strength of feeling on this issue. The Government will continue to work collaboratively and constructively with interested parties in the lead-up to bringing forward the legislation, including on reporting assets which were held prior to a designation. We will continue to engage with the civil society organisations that have campaigned for this measure, and I would be happy to work with the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and other parliamentarians to keep them informed of progress ahead of it being formally introduced.

Again, I am grateful to the noble Lord for bringing this issue forward for debate and for the continued interest and engagement of many stakeholders. I hope that, given the reasons I have outlined and the action the Government are already taking, he will consider withdrawing his amendment.

Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Fox
Lord Sharpe of Epsom Portrait Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
- Hansard - -

My Lords, these government amendments concern commencement and cut across several clauses. Amendments 106F, 106H and 107A are consequential on the regulation-making powers introduced by the new clause headed, “Fraud offences: supplementary”, which is one of the Government’s new clauses introducing a failure to prevent fraud offence. Amendments 106G and 107B, and the proposed new clauses to be inserted by Amendments 109 and 110, replace Clause 191 with a new commencement clause and a separate transitional provision clause. The clauses are being separated into two to make the commencement provisions easier to follow and avoid having one long and complex commencement provision.

They include a number of small, technical changes to ensure that the commencement provisions in the Bill work as effectively as possible and bring the devolution aspects of the commencement powers into line with previous similar legislation. They also bring into force, on Royal Assent, procedures in the Bill about the codes of practice which will govern the strengthened information order powers. This will ensure that those powers can quickly start to be used. Certain money laundering reporting measures are also being commenced on Royal Assent: the exemption for “exiting and paying away” and the new defence against failure to report, which we debated earlier in Committee. That will give certainty to businesses about their reporting duties as soon as the Bill is passed.

I hope noble Lords will support these amendments. I beg to move.

Lord Fox Portrait Lord Fox (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, I will speak very briefly—I am sure the Minister will be glad to know that. I am intrigued by Amendment 109 because it complicates the process of bringing the Bill into being quite a lot. There are a lot of moving parts set out in Amendments 109 and 110 for the Bill to start to be effective. The simple question is: from start to finish—from Royal Assent to when everything is working and all parts are moving—what is the Government’s estimate as to long it will take to fulfil all the steps set out in these amendments?

Baroness Blake of Leeds Portrait Baroness Blake of Leeds (Lab)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I too will speak very briefly. I note the comments about consultation with devolved authorities. Given concerns about the extent of consultation in other areas, can the Minister reassure us that it is adequate, and deemed adequate by the devolved authorities? That is a clear theme running through some of the legislation.

We have discussed—we will revisit it, I am sure—the issue of failure to prevent and the specific mention of large organisations. We understand that keeping it to large organisations will not capture a broad enough spectrum of the businesses that we are covering. Having said that, I recognise that this is a tidying-up exercise. With further amendments we might revisit some of the issues at a future stage, but I would be grateful if the Minister could respond to those comments.

Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Fox
Lord Fox Portrait Lord Fox (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The Minister set out some interesting statistics. It is clear that UWOs have been accountable for a very small proportion of the total amount of money recovered. The Minister referred to them as a powerful tool. Is he satisfied that UWOs are reaching their potential, in which case we would conclude that they are relatively insignificant compared to the other tools in the hands of enforcement, or are UWOs failing to meet their potential and not as powerful as they could be? Clearly, they are not generating very much money compared to all the other tools available to the enforcement agencies.

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Portrait Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
- Hansard - -

I am not sure that the question is entirely valid with regard to generating money. The fact is that, since their introduction in 2017, four of these have been issued in relation to assets with a combined value of £143 million. In October 2020, property worth an estimated £10 million was recovered, following the use of a UWO, as I have already said. As for whether the scheme is succeeding or failing, it is not for me to say. I am unable to do so, because I do not have access to the operational decision-making that goes into issuing them, and so on. These are operational matters.

Lord Fox Portrait Lord Fox (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I accept that it is not for the Minister to say; who does say whether they are succeeding or failing?

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Portrait Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
- Hansard - -

I have already said that we will publish a number of reports on this on 1 September, so I would hope for some more clarity then, but I shall endeavour to find out more information and report back to the noble Lord.

--- Later in debate ---
Lord Sharpe of Epsom Portrait Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
- Hansard - -

I would say that it is the same thing; perhaps we can debate that as well.

The Serious Fraud Office investigates and prosecutes the most complex cases of fraud, bribery and corruption. That is a very challenging remit. It has delivered some outstanding outcomes. For example, last year, it secured the conviction of Glencore for bribery and corruption in five countries, with the company ordered to pay £280 million—the highest ever ordered in a corporate criminal conviction in the UK—as well as eight convictions for five cases of fraud and bribery worth more than £500 million. It consistently recovers some of the largest amounts of proceeds of crime, despite being a fraction of the size of many other national agencies.

It is also important to note the SFO’s role in fighting economic crime globally. In the last financial year, the SFO took steps to assist overseas jurisdictions in their investigations by working on more than 60 incoming money-laundering requests. I think that the statistics answer the question—yes, we have faith, and yes, it is working. I hope that my explanations have provided some reassurance. I therefore ask the noble Lord not to press his amendment.

I turn to the final amendment in this group, Amendment 106EA, again tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. I come to this amendment last as it seeks to bring into one amendment much of what the other amendments in this group also attempt. I will not repeat myself too much here, especially considering how long I have gone on so far. The amendment would require the Government to issue a report on the performance of agencies and departments in tackling economic crime. However, I can assure noble Lords that this is already being done. As I have mentioned, the Government, regulators and law enforcement already regularly give evidence to parliamentary committees. The National Crime Agency is required under the Crime and Courts Act to publish an annual report and lay it before Parliament, further adding to the available scrutiny of operational bodies. The Government already conduct a range of threat and risk assessments to develop our understanding of economic crime. The NCA’s national strategic assessment assesses the economic crime threats facing the UK on an annual basis. As required under the money-laundering regulations, the UK also conducts periodic national risk assessments of money laundering and terrorist financing, which provide an overview of the risks and likelihood of an activity occurring. We have already discussed in detail the establishment of a fund to tackle economic crime so I will not repeat that debate again.

Regarding the amendment’s calls for a strategy on tackling economic crime, this March, the Government published Economic Crime Plan 2. Through 43 actions, it sets out how the public and private sectors will work together to transform the UK’s response to economic crime. Obviously, the fraud strategy is a part of that overarching economic crime strategy.

As regards the quality of the data in the fraud strategy, which was referenced by the noble Lord, Lord Browne, I have just had a quick flick through and it is more recent than six years. I should also reassure the noble Lord that one of the commitments in the fraud strategy is to improve the quality and collection of data, so this can be regarded as a baseline.

There are numerous ways in which the Government report on their performance with regard to tackling economic crime. This amendment is duplicative of them and therefore unnecessary. I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

Lord Fox Portrait Lord Fox (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, we are indebted to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for his amendments because they have inspired an interesting debate. The Minister has made a spirited defence of the Government’s position on this issue, but the very fact that these questions are being asked—and by a lot of people, not just the people in this Room—indicates that there is a lot of work for the Government to do in order to placate, explain or perhaps improve what is going on out there. The key element, which was highlighted earlier, is the alphabet soup of different agencies all interlinking in what is going on. The Minister has made a big effort in trying to calm nerves but I do not think that those nerves are calmed. Although the amendments will undoubtedly be not be moved, there is work to do; hopefully, the Minister has got that message from the nature of this debate.

I refer back to Amendment 102. Clearly, it ruffled some feathers. I note that in 2022 it was the Conservative Government who saw fit to withdraw this scheme because they felt that there were serious issues. We know that of the 6,000 such issues, a minority were problematic, but we still do not know exactly how many. I want to address the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Leigh that there is some use to encourage inward investment. This scheme clearly went off the rails, but by publishing the report properly, we would know how to encourage it without causing the issues that the Government clearly felt were sufficient to close the scheme. I am comfortable that I was not overstating the problem. The problem was there and the Government identified it, but now we have an issue in that we do not know the full scope of the problem.

In his response on party finance, the Minister referred to national security. The fact that there are issues is well covered. The Minister should know—I am sure that he does—that amendments to the National Security Bill that sought to enhance the scrutiny of the source of political donations have been thrown out by the Commons, so some of the things that the Minister said are not strictly there. There is still an issue between this House and the Commons when it comes to the National Security Bill and party funding, and it remains ongoing. I think that was the issue that my noble friend was anxious to state.

On the subject of the report and the reference to party funding, I remind noble Lords that I said that it makes it difficult not to conclude that there are embarrassing issues to hide because the report was not published. If there is no problem, as I am sure noble Lords believe, there is no reason not to publish the report. It is the non-publishing of the report that causes suspicion. That is the point that I was trying to make.

With that, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 102.

Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Fox
Lord Sharpe of Epsom Portrait Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
- Hansard - -

I thank the noble Lord for that information; I will come back on that.

Lord Fox Portrait Lord Fox (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Will the Minister go and count them again?

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Portrait Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
- Hansard - -

Absolutely; I shall get my abacus out. I turn to Amendment 101 on senior managers’ liability for failing to prevent economic crime, also tabled by my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier.

I agree that it is important that individuals, particularly the most senior ones, do not go unpunished for their involvement in committing economic crimes. Prosecutors already have a range of powers at their disposal to pursue decision-makers who enable or commit criminal offences in a corporate setting. This includes the power to prosecute individuals for substantive offending. For example, last year an individual was jailed for 12 years following a Serious Fraud Office investigation into a £226 million fraud.

Additional powers also exist which enable senior managers and directors to be prosecuted where they consent or connive in fraud, theft, money laundering or bribery. A director or manager who is convicted on the basis of their consent, connivance or neglect can be dealt with accordingly by the courts, including being sentenced to imprisonment. Also, under the Serious Crime Act 2007, a person, including a senior manager, is liable for encouraging or assisting the commission of a criminal offence. That includes fraud, false accounting or money laundering—the offences captured by the amendment tabled by my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier. The individual found to be encouraging or assisting the commission of the offence can be prosecuted in the same way as if they commit the offence itself.

This amendment seeks to extend liability for senior managers on a lower basis for culpability than is normally provided for. It would allow a senior manager who takes a decision to be imprisoned for taking that decision, even if the offence is the action of a rogue employee. That would place a disproportionate burden on corporations and their senior management, which is likely to deter legitimate business from seeing the UK as a fair and safe place to conduct business. This amendment is therefore not appropriate.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked about extraterritoriality. Our approach is focused on cutting crime in the UK and protecting UK victims. As he noted, the powers have sufficient extraterritorial extent to do this, even if the perpetrators or the organisation is based outside the UK. Other countries can take steps to prosecute fraud under their own law. As for the precise mechanics of how it would work, it would be on a case-by-case basis, so it is pointless to speculate.

The noble Lord also asked for more detail about guidance. As he knows, we intend to publish guidance setting out reasonable prevention procedures before the offence of failure to prevent fraud comes into force. It will give organisations clarity about what they need to do. It is important that we engage and consult the right stakeholders in this process and that we engage further with the organisations this will impact. Once the Bill has received Royal Assent, we will start engaging with law enforcement, prosecutors, relevant government departments, public sector organisations, trade associations for businesses, other organisations in scope and other experts to draft the guidance.

We anticipate that the guidance will follow similar themes to those seen in many regulatory regimes—albeit that in this case they are not requirements—and to guidance for existing failure to prevent offences. This includes regular risk assessments to establish the level and type of fraud risks to be addressed; establishing fraud controls and due diligence processes designed to prevent fraud or spot it in the early stages before the offence is carried out; leadership and training to ensure that employees implement controls and create a culture within the organisation that does not accept fraudulent practices as a route to boosting performance and profits; and monitoring and review to ensure that procedures remain effective. I am happy to hold further discussions on this subject at the noble Lord’s convenience.

--- Later in debate ---
Lord Sharpe of Epsom Portrait Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
- Hansard - -

Yes, I am happy to give that reassurance.

Lord Fox Portrait Lord Fox (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, I think I was right at the very beginning not to speak for long on this set of amendments. Your Lordships filled in for me very adequately and expertly.

The Minister came back with a couple of points that I want to refer to. He explained that aspects of the amendments from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, were not necessary because there would be duplication. It would be helpful for us to understand that duplication. Perhaps between now and Report he could provide a list of all the prosecutions that have happened with the existing legislation, proving that the new legislation would not be necessary, so that we can understand that his point is correct.

He also talked about the chilling effect on small companies. This legislation is designed to chill fraud. Taking up the challenge set by the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, about his perfectly innocent sweet shop, legislation that excludes that sweet shop will also exclude all the other small companies that are perpetrating fraud. The skill is in the proportionate application of this legislation. To pick up the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, it is also about the proportionate advice that is being given. Not all companies are getting the same level of advice on how they should approach this legislation. There is no one-size-fits-all approach, as my noble friend Lady Bowles said.

Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Fox
Lord Fox Portrait Lord Fox (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Incredibly briefly, I will speak to Amendment 46, which I have signed. The Government’s aim, Her Majesty’s loyal Opposition’s aim, and our aim is to speed up the rollout of infrastructure. This amendment as crafted by the noble Baroness, Lady Merron, and the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, which I was pleased to sign, is a very simple measure to help in that objective. If the Government have not already thought of it, they should embrace it. Whether it requires primary legislation or otherwise, an undertaking from the Dispatch Box that this will be done would be a very good way of speeding up infrastructure implementation.

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Portrait Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
- Hansard - -

My Lords, this was a brief debate. I turn first to Amendment 43. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, and the noble Baroness, Lady Merron, for raising this important subject.

The Government are committed to delivering policy which helps rollout for everyone, and support the entire telecommunications sector in delivering connectivity. Ensuring that local authorities are ready to facilitate rollout as quickly as possible is a key part of this. It will benefit people across the UK in receiving the best possible service and ensure that all operators are able to compete to provide that service.

Local authorities should have autonomy to serve their communities in the way that they see fit. The difficulties faced by urban communities are likely to be very different from those faced in the highlands, for example. The Government believe that local authorities are best placed to decide how to lead and foster digital rollout in their local area.

Mandating local authorities to designate a particular officer responsible for digital connectivity would be too prescriptive. However, we recognise the considerable benefits of having a dedicated lead on digital infrastructure in local and regional authorities, which is why we strongly recommend this approach in our digital connectivity portal, DCMS’s official guidance for local authorities concerning connectivity. The portal provides a huge amount of practical information for local authorities—for instance, on debunking myths around 5G, making assets available for hosting equipment, and the application of the Electronic Communications Code and planning regulations. The digital connectivity portal is a vital enabler for local authorities to facilitate digital infrastructure deployment.

In May last year, the then Minister for Digital Infrastructure also wrote to all chief executives of local authorities to encourage them to appoint a digital champion and to engage with DCMS. I understand that as many as 80 authorities have responded and officials have been able to offer support to them. We have also provided £4 million of funding for the Digital Connectivity Infrastructure Accelerator programme, designed to foster increased collaboration between local authorities and the telecommunications industry. Local authorities can take advantage of these tools and funds to take the steps most appropriate in their area to encourage and facilitate rollout. I hope that gives reassurance on how seriously the Government take local authority engagement, and that the amendments will not be pressed.

If I might anticipate a possible comeback, it sounds like we very much agree with the noble Lord, so to be consistent about my inconsistency, we are not going further and mandating this because the Government seek to balance the national objective of accelerating digital infrastructure rollout with the need to allow local authorities to make the best choices for their communities. Each local authority will have a different approach to its specific local challenges. We feel that further imposition of rules from central government in these spaces risks disrupting environments that are already encouraging investment in infrastructure rollout.

Amendment 46 asks whether the Government intend to introduce a streamlined subsidy scheme for telecommunications infrastructure to reduce administrative burdens on public authorities. To provide some context, the new Subsidy Control Act, which has not yet fully come into force, gives the Government the ability to create streamlined subsidy schemes for all public authorities to use. The streamlined schemes are intended to provide a way of granting subsidies quickly, with little administrative burden, while also providing legal certainty to both the public authority awarding the subsidy and the beneficiary of the subsidy. The Government intend that these should facilitate the award of low-risk and uncontentious subsidies in areas of policy that are strategically important to the United Kingdom. Streamlined subsidy schemes will be considered for categories of subsidy where they will add clarity for public authorities and make the assessment of compliance simpler.

Although the Government currently have no plans to create a streamlined subsidy scheme for the installation of telecommunications infrastructure, we remain committed to delivering and supporting the rollout of such infrastructure as soon as possible. BDUK’s Project Gigabit is delivering gigabit-capable broadband across the UK, working closely with public authorities, including the devolved Administrations and local authorities, to help refine procurement boundaries, validate the market’s local investment plans and stimulate demand for gigabit vouchers.

The work we have undertaken so far has shown that the model is effective at responding to changing market conditions by refining or combining procurement boundaries to reach efficient scale and secure value for money for public subsidy. DCMS will continue to engage and consider how to support public authorities as best as possible to reduce administrative burdens, including on any considerations on subsidy control or future streamlined subsidy schemes.

I hope that explains why the Government consider that a streamlined subsidy scheme for telecoms infrastructure is not needed at this time. However, this will be kept under review. I ask noble Lords not to press their amendments.

Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure Bill

Debate between Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Fox
Lord Fox Portrait Lord Fox (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, even more briefly, the Minister said in responding to the last group that the Government are clear that the cost of rent is too high and the purpose is to drive it down. In different comments, he stated that he felt these costs will eventually find their way to the consumer—I doubt that, but time will tell. What is the purpose of the retrospectivity and who will benefit? When will I receive my refund on my mobile phone bill for the retrospective repayment of this money? The answer is that I will not, so who will benefit from this and why are the Government causing it to happen?

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Portrait Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
- Hansard - -

I thank all noble Lords who have spoken to this group, which concerns both compensation and backdated payment. I shall start with the former. One of the main aims of the Bill is to ensure that where an agreement to which the code applies is renewed, there is a consistent approach in calculating the financial aspects and terms of that agreement.

Before I get on to the details, I will answer my noble friend Lady McIntosh, who strayed back into the general valuation principles. I note that my noble friend Lord Parkinson has committed to see what else can be distributed in terms of the evidence that she seeks. I reassure her that we have had extensive engagement with the NFU, but I will write to her with details of that.

The last group dealt with how Clause 61 does what I have just described in England and Wales, through changes to the 1954 Act that replicate the code valuation regime. This means that, when agreements are renewed under the 1954 Act, the new rent will be calculated in the same way as agreements renewed under the code. However, the 1954 Act deals solely with the rent that a landowner should receive from an operator. Under the code, this is not the only sum landowners can receive. The code also allows landowners to receive compensation from an operator. This compensation stands separately to the “rent” or consideration payable, and should cover any loss or damage resulting from the code operator exercising the rights that have been agreed or imposed.

There is no equivalent right to recover compensation within the 1954 Act. Clause 63 therefore inserts provisions into the 1954 Act that reflect the code provisions on compensation. This clause ensures that the amounts that landowners receive in compensation will be calculated in the same way, regardless of which statutory renewal mechanism is used and where in the UK that agreement was entered. Although the compensation provisions we are introducing will directly apply only if a renewal agreement is imposed by the court, it is inevitable that consensual negotiations can—and should—be influenced by the terms that might be imposed in those circumstances. This will influence consensual negotiations for agreements regulated under the 1954 Act, through which the parties can make adequate provision for compensation.

It was always the policy intention that the compensation provisions in the code should inform consensual negotiations for compensation in this way, and the same principle should apply to compensation provisions for the 1954 Act. We therefore want Clause 63 to stand part of the Bill.

Before I get on to the various amendments, I should say that the noble Earl, Lord Devon, referred to case law, on which I will expand a little. The courts have dealt with various points in connection with the Electronic Communications Code and the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 and the matters we are discussing, and I do not think it would be necessarily helpful to discuss them in detail. We are happy to write to noble Lords or arrange a meeting if there are particular matters relating to case law that they would find useful to discuss, including in respect of the key judgment that was recently handed down by the Supreme Court, which is being considered carefully by department officials and legal advisers at the moment.

--- Later in debate ---
Lord Sharpe of Epsom Portrait Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
- Hansard - -

I am afraid that the answer to both of those questions is that I do not know. It would be remiss of me to anticipate the sorts of concerns we are listening to and the subjects they may raise. I will have to write to the noble Lord on that.

Lord Fox Portrait Lord Fox (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

Sorry to labour the point, but the Minister just introduced the concept of transitional provisions. Where are these transitional provisions made clear? How will we know what they are going to be? Where will they be planned? Are they coming through by statutory instrument, or are they just going to be sprung on us by the department?

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Portrait Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
- Hansard - -

I read my brief very carefully, and I said “any transitional provisions in respect of the Bill”—I did not say that there will be transitional provisions—after listening to the various concerns I just outlined.

I now turn to Amendment 34 tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Fox, the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, and the noble Baroness, Lady Merron. This is an amendment to the 1954 Act which seeks to prevent interim rent being backdated where an agreement is renewed under that statute. As we have discussed when talking about Clauses 61 and 62, it is the Government’s intention that the various statutory mechanisms for the renewal of agreements to which the code applies is as consistent as possible, and this amendment would increase inconsistency.

First, the amendment would create inconsistency within the 1954 Act itself. The ability to seek backdated payments of interim rent would be prevented only where the site provider had given notice to the operator under Section 25 of the Act. Where an operator had served notice under Section 26 of the Act, the ability to seek backdated rental payments would remain. Secondly, it would create inconsistency between the 1954 Act and the code. Clause 67 will allow payment of a modified rate of consideration to be backdated to the date of the application, whereas I understand that the noble Lords’ intention is to prevent rent from being payable at the backdated interim rent rate. It is difficult to justify such inconsistency.

Finally, the ability to seek an interim rent which is backdated is not a new concept. The parties would have been aware of this when entering into those agreements to which the 1954 Act applies. There is always a risk that the market will have adversely changed between the date on which the agreement was entered into and the time when the agreement is ready for renewal, and that the interim rent will be less than the amount currently paid. I appreciate that this may be exacerbated by the imposition of the code valuation framework on these agreements, but the Government will look at this impact when drafting any transitional provisions.

Absolutely finally, the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, about picking and choosing, was covered by my noble friend Lord Parkinson on the first day of Committee in relation to Amendment 17, but if there are any outstanding questions on that, we would be very happy to discuss them separately. In answer to the question from the noble Earl, Lord Devon, about general valuations, my noble friend will deal with that in the next group. Under the circumstances, I hope that noble Lords will not press their amendments.