Piracy

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Wednesday 24th October 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup]

My Lords, I am delighted that we are able this evening to be able to debate such an important topic. I, too, thank and congratulate my noble friend Lord Luce for his persistence in securing us the opportunity. We have already heard a number of wise and powerful contributions, which have made many of the points I might myself have made but will not now seek to repeat. I would, though, like to say a few words about the maritime security mission and about Operation Atalanta in particular. It has been a great success. It has been demonstrably successful in contributing to a reduction in pirating. Not all of that reduction can be attributed to naval activity alone, of course, but Operation Atalanta has, nevertheless, made a significant contribution. It has been successful in fostering maritime co-operation with nations that have little experience in working with partners and with little previous incentive to do so. The most significant example of this is China.

We must not make too much of China’s participation in anti-piracy operations. It remains, after all, a difficult and uncomfortable bedfellow on a great range of international issues. Nevertheless, the role that China has played is, to my mind, a healthy and positive development in the context of wider global security. A China that plays its part in multilateral efforts to foster peace and security must be a good thing. The longest journey starts with one step.

Operation Atalanta has also been successful in demonstrating that the EU can have an important role in certain kinds of military operations. I spent too long sitting in EU military committee meetings to be under any illusion about the organisation’s capacity for the harder, more complex kind of operations. Too often, discussions were dominated by political manoeuvring and demarcation disputes with NATO. Unlike NATO, the EU has no proper, effective military strategic organisation or process. Nevertheless, when it works in concert with NATO, when it makes use of shared resources rather than trying to duplicate structures, and when it focuses on operations that make use of its political strengths and avoid exposing its military weaknesses, then the EU can be a very valuable player on the global security stage. Operation Atalanta has clearly demonstrated that.

Having said all that, we must remember that, as the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, said, Atalanta was set up with a very limited objective: to protect World Food Programme shipping. Anything else it might be able to do to counter piracy more widely was subject to it having the spare capacity, and there is not very much of that.

The area of sea space that has to be covered is immense, particularly when wide-area surveillance capability, such as that provided by maritime patrol aircraft, is so scarce. Of course, the pirates inevitably react to and counter tactics that are employed successfully against them. They have ranged ever further from shore, for example, through the use of mother ships. We should therefore expect further innovation from them. It would be dangerous to assume that any reduction in the number of successful pirate attacks will necessarily be permanent.

The military operation is an essential tool in addressing piracy but, as other noble Lords have observed, it will not provide a lasting solution. It is a truism that in the long run piracy is dealt with not at sea but on land. That is why the wider issues of Somali governance are crucial. The fact that Somalia as an entity does not really exist makes the problem even more challenging and reinforces the need for us to continue our efforts to understand and influence, for example, Puntland, which is home to so many pirates.

Finally, this is not a problem that will be resolved quickly. It has been with us for a number of years already. Operation Atalanta itself has been running for four years and we must expect that the need for the current multi-strand approach to security in the region will continue for some considerable time. That will require patience on our part and it will require persistence, but it will also require sustained investment in the kind of diplomatic and military effort which is often taken too much for granted but which does not happen by accident.

Middle East: Recent Developments

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Friday 13th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup]

My Lords, this is a timely and most welcome debate on an issue of great importance to us in this country. We do, though, face a difficult problem of prioritisation. We are considering recent developments in the Middle East. Well, that is a very large area, and it faces a very large range of challenges. We, on the other hand, have somewhat limited resources. While of course we can and should talk about and take a view on developments across the board, we as a country need to think about where we should focus our efforts.

For all the difficulties in Egypt and the unfolding tragedy in Syria, the most pressing problem remains the Iranian nuclear programme. It is the most pressing in terms of the security of this country and its interests, and it is made doubly difficult because, in large measure, the way in which events develop is beyond our direct control. The international community has made valiant efforts to resolve the whole question but without much effect. It is perfectly true that sanctions are having a significant impact on Iran’s economy, but it is also true that affected nations find ways of adapting to and living with sanctions if they must, and there are signs that Iran is doing just that. The talks between Iran and the P5 plus one over the course of this year seemed for a time to hold out the promise of a way forward. However, the only good thing about the Moscow round was that expectations by then were so low that no one was particularly surprised or disappointed when they got nowhere. The ongoing technical discussions at least keep the process alive, but that is about all.

Meanwhile, the Iranians continue to enrich uranium. There has been much debate about when they will have enough material for a sustainable weapon programme, should they choose to continue down that route, and views differ on the timescale involved. However, there is only one clock that really matters on this, and that is the one in Israel. For us, the Iranian nuclear programme is a matter of wider security concerns within the Middle East and the future of the non-proliferation treaty. For many Israelis, it is a matter of their continued existence. It is therefore important that we try to see the question through Israeli eyes, as far as that is possible.

In that context, there are two fundamental propositions that we should seek to bear in mind. The first is: “Don’t try to tell us it could never happen. That’s what people said about the Holocaust”. The second, somewhat related idea is: “You can only rely on Jews to look out for Jews”. It seems to me unimportant whether we think these are sound propositions or not; the important thing is that they underpin the calculus of a number of key Israeli politicians.

It is perfectly true that opinion in Israel is divided on the wisdom or utility of a military attack against Iran’s nuclear facilities. We and most of our colleagues in the United States think that this would be a very bad idea, and some Israelis share that view. But some do not. The latter would certainly prefer a non-military solution but believe that military force should be used if all else fails. They believe that a bombed Iran is a better outcome than an Iran with a bomb. This of course ignores what many of us consider to be a more likely outcome of a military attack, which is a bombed Iran with a bomb. However, again we have to try and see things through Israeli eyes, given that it is their calculus that matters, not ours. That said, it seems likely that even the most hawkish of Israelis would want to postpone an attack for as long as possible to give the maximum time for some other solution to be found.

Therefore, the key question for all of us is: when does the Israeli clock stop? Unfortunately, we do not really know the answer to that question. However, there seems to be a view gaining ground in this country and one or two others that it will not happen before 2013. I hope that that is right, but I am not convinced. It is important that the Government do not allow themselves to be convinced simply because this is the outcome they would prefer.

Some people say that the Israelis would not want to attack in the run-up to an American general election. Why would they not? After all, it is very hard for any presidential candidate, even an incumbent, to take too hard a line against Israel in the shadow of an impending election. In any event, if the Israelis really felt that they had run out of time, I am not sure that they would let such considerations deflect them from securing, as they saw it, the future existence of their country.

I therefore hope the Minister can reassure the House that, whatever assessments are made on this score, we acknowledge the high degree of uncertainty that pervades our knowledge of Israeli decision-making, and that we do not for one moment take our eye off this particular ball. I say that because, for all our lack of control, there are two things to which we could and must bend all our efforts. The first, of course, is to continue to pursue a non-military solution with sufficient vigour and seriousness to offer at least some prospect of progress to the Israelis—and, again, it is their perspective that matters here, not ours. The second is to prepare fully for the potential consequences of failure.

We all hope that the Israelis will not attack Iran. But, as I have said in previous debates, hope is not a viable plan of action and we have to be prepared for the worst. If Iran is attacked, it is likely to blame us to some degree, no matter how loudly we protest our innocence. We should not forget the previous form we have in that country; the Iranians certainly do not forget. They could as a consequence decide to retaliate against us and our interests. The Majlis in Tehran has recently made noises about closing the Straits of Hormuz. I do not think that this is a high probability given that nothing could be better designed to draw in the Americans, which is something that the Iranian leadership would surely want to avoid. However, the scope for miscalculation here is huge, and it would not be the first time in history that a regime did something that in the cold light of day looked irrational.

We have to be prepared for a wide range of eventualities. Following an Israeli attack, our aim ought to be to de-escalate the situation and to restore calm as quickly as possible. That would be in everyone’s interest, including Iran’s, but it might not be an achievable aim, and we have to be prepared to defend our interests and to respond if attacked. I would not expect the Minister to talk about operational issues in this forum, nor would I question him on them. However, I would ask him whether he can reassure the House that the Government are engaged in serious discussions with the Americans on this issue so that we are able to respond at short notice in a co-ordinated way if worst comes to worst.

I also ask him to confirm that the Government have reviewed the status of contingency forces that the UK would have available in such circumstances. By this, I do not just mean numbers of platforms and people. If, for example, we needed to clear the Strait of Hormuz of mines, we would require not just the mine countermeasure vessels that are deployed but sufficient numbers of, for example, the SeaFox systems that those vessels deploy against the mines.

Weapon stocks, logistic support, force protection—all these are essential elements of any capability that we might need, but they are all too often neglected in planning, not least when the contingency for which they would be required is one that the Government would rather not contemplate.

Queen’s Speech

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 17th May 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup]

My Lords, it is quite clear and quite right that the Government’s main effort over the coming Session will be on the economy, in particular the search for growth. I intend to speak today about the wider security concerns that were touched on last week in the gracious Speech, but I am in no doubt that in the long run our ability to respond to those concerns depends very much on our economic strength, and that is likely to be slow in building, given the continuing levels of public and private indebtedness. Nevertheless, there are some difficult near-term challenges that loom large on the international scene and, despite our straitened circumstances, we must be prepared for them.

In many cases, the press of events is likely to deny us the luxury of delaying our response until more prosperous times. First, there is the unfinished business of Afghanistan. The next two years will see a decline in our contribution to combat operations, with the Afghans assuming the lead across the country by 2014. This is in my view still the best option for achieving long-term stability. It was never possible for us to solve Afghanistan’s problems. The only people who can do that, if anyone can, are the Afghans themselves, and the sooner they take on the responsibility, the better.

However, I am concerned at the growing sense, not just here but more widely in the international community, that after 2014 we will pretty much be able to wash our hands of Afghanistan. This, I think, is wrong on two counts. First, the Afghans will continue to need expert support in many areas, not least militarily. We may end our direct combat role in 2014 but that does not mean that the Afghan national security forces will be able to operate entirely unaided. The number of people we have deployed will of course reduce dramatically, but we must be prepared for a long-term engagement with the Afghans. We will have brought them to the start line, but they have a long race yet ahead of them, and they will need our help in running it.

Secondly, and even more importantly, we have to resolve the issue of long-term funding for Afghanistan. People often talk of the collapse of Afghan governance following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, but what they sometimes miss is that the Najibullah Government managed reasonably well after the withdrawal of the troops. It was the collapse of the Soviet Union and the consequent end of foreign aid that brought about the regime’s downfall. If the international community fails to put Afghan funding on to a sustainable basis post-2014, I suspect that a similar collapse will be inevitable.

It will of course be difficult to persuade many nations that they should go on footing the bill for Afghanistan when their own financial position is so uncertain. That will no doubt be true here in the UK too. However, having expended the lives of so many of our own people and so much of our national treasure in Afghanistan, it behoves us to sustain the necessary financial commitment to turn that sacrifice into lasting benefit. I would not say that if I thought that progress in Afghanistan was a lost cause; I do not. Indeed, I think that progress will become slightly less difficult once we disengage from combat operations and the Afghans become ever more responsible for their own destiny. It will not be pretty, and it may follow political paths that we did not foresee or would not have chosen, but continuing economic development and increasing levels of education will, in the long run, be good for Afghanistan and good for the region.

That means that they will also be good for us because although we might just feasibly be able to ignore Afghanistan, we cannot ignore Pakistan. The ties that bind us—and there are nearly a million of those ties in the form of UK citizens with family links to Pakistan—are simply too strong. Pakistan’s future is connected, inter alia, with that of Afghanistan. The challenges in Pakistan are to my mind even greater than those in Afghanistan, but neither can be viewed in isolation from the other. So Afghanistan will remain a long-term security interest for the UK, and we must treat it accordingly. With that in mind, I hope that over the coming months the Government will bend every effort to get international agreement on adequate long-term financing for Afghanistan.

The other issue that I want to address is Iran. I do not know whether the ongoing diplomatic efforts to persuade the Iranians to forgo highly enriched—that is, weapons-grade—uranium will be successful. What I am sure of is that a military attack on Iran’s facilities is unlikely to delay the programme for very long and that the consequences of such an attack are unpredictable but likely to be extremely unpleasant for everyone. I know that the Israelis see the issue through a rather different prism, and I have some sympathy with their concerns, but many Israelis would agree with the assessment that I have just put forward. I am also clear that sanctions against Iran are having a real and serious effect, and that this stick, if combined with suitable carrots, may just be enough to cause the Iranian regime to change course. Therefore, I hope very much that we see some substantial progress coming from the imminent talks in Baghdad.

However, in the line of business that I have followed for most of my life, we always reminded ourselves that hope is not a plan of action. No matter how much we might be against an attack on Iran, such a decision is not in our hands, so we need to be prepared for all eventualities. We need to remember that Iran views us with considerable suspicion, which is not entirely unreasonable given our previous form in that country, and that, if attacked, it could retaliate against us and our interests, no matter how loudly we protest our innocence. We must be able to respond if challenged in this way, and the more obvious it is that we are able and willing to respond, the less the chance that we will actually have to do so.

There are of course many other serious challenges to international order and stability, such as in the Yemen and the Horn of Africa, that could affect us here in the UK. Our first response in each case should be through diplomacy and aid. Indeed, I would resist strongly any suggestions that we should increase our military involvement unless such an option were inescapable. We should always be cautious about committing forces, bearing in mind that the outcome of such commitment is always unpredictable.

Nevertheless, the use of military force is sometimes necessary. Our military capabilities have been stretched very thin in recent years, and continue to be so. Of course, at present the Armed Forces are putting a lot of effort into containing costs and managing redundancy programmes. I do not deny the need for this. Balancing the MoD’s books was a necessary task, but defence does not exist merely to keep the books balanced. It exists to serve the nation in times of need, and this requires not just the right equipment and numbers of people but commensurate levels of training for the wide range of contingencies that those people may be called upon to face, none of which can be secured quickly or at no cost.

So, even at a time of such financial stringency, it is crucial that the Government keep their eye very firmly on the international scene and the risks that we face, on the responses that we may have to make to those risks and on the capabilities that we will require to underpin those responses.

Syria

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Monday 6th February 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

That is absolutely true. My noble friend is completely correct that both Governments have problems—shall we put it like that—with certain areas that are seeking either secession or a degree of autonomy that they do not want to accept, and they have this fear of fragmentation of their own national boundaries. That is a very strong motivation. On top of that, as I said earlier, Russia has huge interests in Syria, including its colossal naval base at Tartus.

[Lord Stirrup]

My Lords, the terrible events in Syria may have consequences well beyond the borders of that country. Can the Minister say what discussions the UK has had, both internally and with its international partners, on the potential implications for the Lebanon, and how these might be mitigated?

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

Yes, we keep in very close touch with partners, and indeed the Lebanese authorities and the Lebanese Prime Minister, Mr Najib Mikati, over the situation. It is a delicate and very difficult one for the Lebanese Government, who have problems internally with Hezbollah and with their relationship with Syria, which is complex and has been in the past extremely difficult. These matters are under very close review at all times.

Pakistan

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Thursday 1st December 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

Yes, my Lords, as regards condolences, I certainly join the noble Lord. In fact, my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary spoke to the Foreign Secretary of Pakistan only the other day to offer his deepest condolences. A full investigation of that really tragic and dreadful incident is, of course, under way. I hope Pakistan will participate fully in that investigation. The United States has expressed its regret at the loss of life.

As regards the suffering faced by Pakistan, I think we all acknowledge the colossal strain on Pakistan, its society and all its citizens, with the conditions they face not only on the terrorist side, but also through the visitations of floods and other challenges, all of which add great difficulty to Pakistan’s administration. As for our aid, I can assure the noble Lord that all our aid is independently evaluated and scrutinised under our UK Aid Transparency Guarantee, and that certainly applies to all aid to Pakistan as well.

[Lord Stirrup]

My Lords, will the Minister agree that the most telling contribution Pakistan could make to global security would be to improve levels of effective governance, economic growth and employment within its own borders, and that the international community should not allow its frustration over other issues, however understandable, to divert it from this strategic focus in its engagement with Pakistan?

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

Yes, that is an extremely wise observation, and I think that Her Majesty’s Government would totally agree with it.

Libya

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Friday 1st April 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stirrup]

My Lords, it seems to me remarkable how often over the past couple of decades names and places that only a short while before we had thought consigned for ever to our history books have come back to haunt us. The Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq, Tripoli and Benghazi were all rather exotic and ill understood reminders of a colourful and imperial past but we could not conceive how they might relate to our national security as we approached the latter years of the 20th century. How wrong we were. The nature and scale of our mistake must give us pause when anyone seeks to tell us what they think the next couple of decades will look like. However, today we must deal with today’s problems—and Libya is most certainly one of those.

Public debate on Libya so far has been characterised by often rather ad hoc and isolated consideration of individual events rather than by an appreciation of the situation as a whole. The media ask whether Gaddafi should be a target or whether we should arm the rebels, and so on, to which the answer must be, “Well, it all depends”. It depends obviously on the legality of various actions but it also depends on whether and how such actions contribute to the achievement of our goals. What are those goals?

The rationale for the international military intervention was to protect civilians, and the military objectives are set out fairly clearly in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973. One understands the political and moral imperative to safeguard civilians, as far as that is possible, and the urgency of the requirement. One understands that in such circumstances it is not always possible to have thought through every single possible consequence before acting. But before committing our forces we should always think about how such commitment would end, the political objectives we are pursuing, and how military force is linked to these. In the case of Libya, it seems to me clear that the political objective has to be the removal of Gaddafi. I say this not because of the nastiness of his regime or because of a desire to spread democracy around the world—we were, after all, quite content to treat with Gaddafi when he seemed secure in power—but because of the logic of the Security Council resolution. It enjoins us to protect civilians. Those civilians need protection because they are under threat from Gaddafi. It seems to me inconceivable that Gaddafi would now forgive and forget those who have come out in opposition to his regime, so they will continue to be under threat, and therefore continue to need protection all the while Gaddafi remains in power. Therefore, our military intervention, although not designed to oust Gaddafi, can end only with his removal.

Since the protection of civilians forms the limit of our military involvement, the removal of Gaddafi—the political objective—must be achieved by other means. What are those means? That is exactly the question that the international community should be—and I hope now is—addressing. I am not able to stand here and set out the answer. It will depend on careful analysis of the power structures in Libya; on the motivations of key actors, particularly those currently supporting Gaddafi; on the various incentives and disincentives that might be effective in such circumstances; and then on the careful application of such means as recommend themselves. Some will work, some will not, and some will work better than others. There will inevitably be an element of trial and error, but each move should be part of a coherent approach to achieving the objective—the removal of Gaddafi. I hope that the recent defection of Moussa Koussa will have helped to deliver some valuable insights on this score and so contribute to the international community's handling of the situation.

One important strand will be the effect of the rebel forces. They form one—but only one—factor in the calculations that are no doubt being made by members of Gaddafi's regime. Not because they are going to take Tripoli by force—that seems unlikely in the extreme—but because their very existence gives rise to the need to choose sides. So what they do does matter. Should we, therefore, give them arms, as some have suggested? The answer, I would venture, depends first, as I said, on the legal basis for such action, but then on the degree to which it is likely to contribute to the achievement of the political objective. It is not, fundamentally, a military question. The rebels have very limited combat power not just because of a shortage of weapons, but because of a lack of training, a lack of discipline, a lack of structure, a lack of command and control, a lack of planning capacity, a lack of logistic support—I could go on. Giving them better weapons will make a difference, but it will not make up for these other deficiencies. The important consideration is what effect such a decision would have on the process of undermining Gaddafi.

Meanwhile, we have to think very carefully about the consequences of our continuing military involvement in Libya. Although Afghanistan has been pushed off the front pages for the moment, it still consumes a great deal of our military capacity. What little we have had left in the locker over the past couple of years for dealing with other contingencies has consisted mainly of air and maritime capabilities. These have largely been consumed by the Libya operation, so that locker is now looking pretty bare. Yet we still face huge risks. To cite just one example, the possibility of an Iranian miscalculation in the Gulf, whether provoked by a third party or otherwise, is something that we must continue to guard against. The potential consequences of such an event could be very severe, in an area where our vital national interests are concerned in a way that they are not in Libya. I am not suggesting that we should never use our military forces just in case we need them for something else: that would be a logical absurdity. What I am saying is that before committing our forces we should always take into account and weigh up the relative risks to our national interests elsewhere. Failing to do so could leave us strategically unbalanced.

This is academic in the case of Libya, since we are now committed there. Once again, our military personnel have demonstrated the courage, skill and thoughtful determination that make them rightly the pride of this nation. But let us be in no doubt: we are spreading our Armed Forces very thin. They will do what is asked of them, but for all their can-do attitude, they are a finite resource—and ever more finite by the month.

Having committed to Libya, we must see the endeavour through to a successful conclusion. However, in view of the risks elsewhere, in view of the grave dangers to us should such risks materialise and in view of the degree to which we have now drawn down on our military account, we have yet one more reason for placing the very highest degree of urgency on finding a political resolution to this crisis as soon as possible.

Shipping: Piracy

Lord Stirrup Excerpts

Tuesday 15th March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

I have certainly heard of these reports and there are a great deal of rumours surrounding the whole question of the relationship between pirates, pirate finance and terrorism in the region, but we have no firm evidence of this particular pattern of transaction. It is, however, something that we are investigating and watching very carefully indeed.

[Lord Stirrup]

My Lords, the Minister said quite rightly that the causes of piracy as opposed to the symptoms must be dealt with on land and cannot be dealt with at sea. Could he therefore tell us what progress is being made in engaging with, and building capacity within, what passes for the authorities in Puntland?

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

In Puntland, Somaliland and Somalia itself we are making efforts to reinforce the facilities for both the prosecution and the imprisonment of pirates, so progress is being made. Frankly, Puntland is a rather more difficult region than Somaliland, which is very co-operative. In Somalia itself the transitional regional Government are working to build prisons and improve facilities. There is, of course, the wider problem in Kenya with which the noble Lord will be familiar. Some progress is being made, but it is not very easy.