Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Strasburger Excerpts

Monday 9th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 374 seeks to place statutory guardrails on the use of live facial recognition, echoing the recent calls from the Equality and Human Rights Commission. We recognise that this technology can assist the police in tackling serious crime, but it must be used responsibly. Its rapid spread into everyday policing before essential safeguards or parliamentary scrutiny are in place raises profound constitutional concerns, particularly in the policing of dissent. Amendment 374 addresses the most contentious use of this technology, at protests and public assemblies. It would prohibit live facial recognition when police impose conditions under the Public Order Act unless and until Parliament had approved a new statutory code of practice. These are moments when people exercise their fundamental rights to free expression and peaceful assembly; rights which depend on participants feeling safe from tracking or retrospective profiling.

This Bill already tightens protest offences and curbs anonymity; layering unregulated facial scanning on top of those restrictions risks further shrinking the space for lawful dissent. Many people will have perfectly legitimate reasons to think twice before attending a demonstration if they know their face may be scanned. Without clarity on how watch-lists used at protests are compiled, people have no way of knowing whether they are being flagged for genuine risk or for the views they hold. At a protest, the chilling effect is not just about being scanned; it is the fear of political profiling. If the Government cannot clearly define who is a legitimate target for facial recognition at a peaceful assembly, then such deployments are, by definition, arbitrary and cannot meet the legal test of necessity and proportionality.

Operationally, the emerging concerns around false positives and the significantly increased risk to those from minority-ethnic backgrounds are a real headache for policing large public gatherings. Deployment without a code of practice will likely result in dozens of wrongful stops to verify identities, with confrontations that divert officers from real security threats and de-escalating crowds. We have already seen how damaging these errors can be. Just in the last few weeks, an innocent south Asian man was arrested at his home in Southampton for a burglary 100 miles away in Milton Keynes. He was handcuffed and held for nearly 10 hours because he was wrongly matched to CCTV footage by a Home Office algorithm that its own research shows produces significantly higher false positives for black and Asian faces. Last month, a man was publicly ejected from his local supermarket after staff misinterpreted a facial recognition alert.

These are not minor glitches to be shrugged off. They are serious violations that erode public trust, particularly in communities already wary of state power. The Government’s consultation is welcome, but it is far too slow for the pace of change we see on our streets. Until Parliament has set clear rules, Amendment 374 is both necessary and proportionate. We must ensure that Parliament, not oblique algorithms, decides the limit of state power. I beg to move.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

My Lords, we are talking today about live facial recognition at protests and why the police must not be allowed to use it until Parliament has agreed a clear and democratic code of practice. At its heart, Amendment 374 is about power and trust. Live facial recognition is not just another camera on a street corner; it is a mass surveillance tool that can scan every face in a crowd, compare people in real time against a watch-list and permanently change what it feels like to stand in the public square. Once you normalise all that at protests, you change the character of protest itself.

If people think that simply turning up at a demonstration means that their face can be scanned, logged and potentially mismatched to a suspect list, some will decide that it is safer to stay at home. That is a direct, chilling effect on the right to protest, to assemble and to speak out against, or for, the Government. We should not let that happen by stealth through a patchwork of local decisions and internal guidance that most citizens will never see. That is what is happening at the moment.

The technology itself is far from neutral. We know that facial recognition systems can and do get things wrong. They perform differently across age groups and ethnicities. A false match in the context of a protest is not a minor inconvenience. It can mean being stopped, questioned, detained or stigmatised in front of your friends, your colleagues or your community, not because of something you did but because an algorithm made a guess. Allowing that at political protests without proper rules and oversight is an invitation to injustice.

It is not enough to say, “Trust the police. We have internal policies”. The question here is not whether any particular chief constable is well-intentioned; it is whether the state should be able to scan and track people at political gatherings without Parliament having debated, defined and limited that power. In a democracy, if the Government want tools that can alter the balance of power between citizen and state, they must come to Parliament, set out the case and accept constraints.

That is why a publicly debated statutory code of practice matters. It is where we answer basic questions that are currently left in the grey zone. In what circumstances, if any, is live facial recognition at a protest justified? Who sets the watch-lists and on what criteria? What happens to images of people who are not of interest? Are they actually deleted? If so, how quickly? Who can access them and for what purposes? What independent oversight exists when things go wrong? Until those questions are answered openly, the use of live facial recognition at protests rests on unpublished risk assessments and technical documents that ordinary citizens cannot challenge and that elected representatives cannot easily amend. That is the opposite of how intrusive powers should be operated in a liberal democracy.

We should also be honest about the precedent. If we accept live facial recognition at protests now, without a code, it will be used more often and for more purposes later. Once the infrastructure is there and the practice is normalised, it will be very hard to row back. The time to set limits is before the rollout, not after the abuses. Police should not have, without parliamentary approval, the ability to quietly turn every protest into a data-harvesting exercise, watching not just the few who pose a risk but the many who are simply exercising their rights.

The principle is simple: if live facial recognition is to be used at all in the context of political protest, it must be under a clear and democratically approved code of practice, debated in Parliament, tested against our human rights obligations and subject to real oversight and redress. Until that is in place, the police should not be allowed to deploy this technology at protests.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

This is another context where there has to be a fair balance between competing interests. One can easily see that the use of live facial recognition is a vital policing tool. However, as has been explained, it has an adverse impact on privacy. What concerns me is that the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act require not merely that steps taken are necessary and proportionate, which the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, rightly referred to, but it is a requirement that any restrictions or provisions in such a context must be prescribed by law.

I am very concerned that having police authorities and police officers exercising a pure discretion, without any statutory guidance or code of practice, may well fail that legal test of prescribed by law, because of the uncertainty and the excess of discretion. Therefore, the Government would be well advised in this sensitive context to ensure that there is statutory guidance and a statutory code of practice. The Minister may be unable to accept this amendment, but I hope he will be able to tell the House that steps will be taken to provide clear guidance to police authorities as to the use of this technology.

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[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for tabling these amendments and to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, for supporting some of the arguments that I will make in response to them. The noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones, Lord Strasburger and Lord Pannick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, have all put their finger on their concerns around the use of this technology.

I will begin by providing a view of what live facial recognition does. It allows for real-time location of individuals of interest to the police. It scans the faces of those passing a camera in real time, comparing faces against a predetermined, specific watch-list of, potentially, wanted criminals, vulnerable missing persons or individuals posing risks to public safety. If no match is made—this goes to the point that the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, made—currently, the scanned face is deleted instantly. Every deployment and every specific bespoke watch-list for that deployment must have a defined policing objective, be supported by clear intelligence and ultimately be determined by humans.

Noble Lords will be aware that the use of facial recognition technology in all circumstances, including in live facial recognition, is already subject to safeguards, including those provided in the Human Rights Act and the Data Protection Act. I agree that there needs to be a framework, which is the nub of what I think all noble Lords have said in this debate.

The noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, will know that the Government had a 10-week consultation for that very purpose—to look at the issues of a legal framework where law enforcement use of biometrics, facial recognition and similar technologies could be used. The consultation ended on 12 February. I give the House an assurance that the Government intend to respond to it by the summer; we have more or less a 12-week deadline from the end of its closing, but it will be by the summer. The consultation is clear that the Government need to design a new framework and assess how the police use technologies such as facial recognition. It needs to ensure that there are safeguards, as noble Lords have mentioned, around the rights to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly, that we protect these rights and that facial recognition technology is demonstrably proportionate to the seriousness of the harm being addressed.

We are currently considering the consultation and, as the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, said, that should take its course. However, we intend to set out our proposals in due course, which will be subject to scrutiny by both Houses of Parliament. I hope noble Lords accept that it would not be appropriate to pre-empt the outcome of the consultation or the proposals that Government will bring forward, which we will ensure have new legal framework for the use of facial recognition technology by law enforcement agencies.

While I think that the points made by noble Lords have real merit, I hope that, with the comments I have made and the reassurances I have given, we will save the difficult debate about regulation, how it operates and what the proposals mean for a proper legal framework for another day, which will come very soon. I hope the noble Baroness will—

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

Before the Minister sits down, could he give the House some indication of when the day will come when we have a debate on some meaningful proposals? Could he also tell the House whether those proposals will cover the use of this technology by the private sector—which is happening a lot already in retail—as well as the public sector?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

As I have tried to indicate to the noble Lord, we have had a consultation that finished on 12 February, and we intend to respond to it by the summer. Currently, what that response will be is to be formulated, so I will not give him chapter and verse on when and how. However, if legislation is required, we will look at that at the earliest opportunity, as we always do.

I cannot pre-empt the King’s Speech and I cannot give a timetable on that, but I will give a timetable when we respond to the consultation. We should remember that the Government initiated the consultation—we were not forced into it—to get to a position whereby the very issues that noble Lords have mentioned today are considered. With those comments, I hope the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendment.

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[Lord Pannick (CB)]

There is no question, as I understand Clause 154, of a blank cheque, and there is no question here of underhand methods. What the clause requires is that the Secretary of State produces regulations, and the regulations must specify the circumstances in which information may be made available under this section. I am assuming that in due course, the Government are going to bring forward regulations to implement this provision. Those regulations will have to be laid before Parliament, and there will be an opportunity, if any noble Lord wishes to do so, to debate those regulations. I suggest that that is the time to assess whether the regulations contain a fair balance between the rights of the individual and the public interest.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

My Lords, the DVLA driver database must not be turned into a ready-made line-up for facial recognition systems. This is about more than data protection; it is about the basic relationship between citizen and state. People did not hand over their photographs to the DVLA so that the Government could quietly repurpose them for mass identification; they did so under legal compulsion to get a driving licence.

Using those images to power facial recognition searches fundamentally changes the deal after the fact. It turns a compulsory single-purpose database into an all-purpose surveillance tool, without anyone ever having given meaningful consent. Once you allow the police to run facial recognition matches against the DVLA database, you create the possibility of identifying almost anyone, almost anywhere, from a single image. That goes far beyond investigating named suspects. It enables trawling through the entire driving population to find possible matches, with all the risk of false positives that facial recognition systems already carry. A bad match here is not an abstract error. It is a real person, wrongly flagged, questioned or even arrested, because a machine thought their face looked similar.

The DVLA database is also nearly universal for adults. That makes it uniquely tempting. If we normalise using it for facial recognition in one context, it will not stop there. Today, it might be justified for serious crime. Tomorrow, it could creep into protests, public events or routine inquiries. Once the precedent is set that every licence holder’s image is fair game for search, the barrier to expanding that use becomes paper-thin.

There is also a democratic principle at stake here. When the state wants new investigative powers that are this sweeping, it should come to Parliament and ask for them openly, with clear limits, safeguards and independent oversight. What must not happen is a quiet, technical integration between the facial recognition system and the DVLA database, introduced by secondary legislation and governed mainly by internal policies and obscure memoranda of understanding. This is legislation by the backdoor, not by debate.

If we allow the DVLA database to be searched with facial recognition, we are not just making investigations a little more efficient; we are rebuilding the basic infrastructure of our democracy so that the state can, in principle, put a name to almost any face. We are doing that using images people had no real choice about providing, and for a completely different purpose. So, the line we should draw is simple and firm: the DVLA driver database is for licensing drivers, not for powering facial recognition line-ups. If any Government want to change that, they must come back to Parliament with primary legislation, make their case in public and accept strict statutory constraints. Until then, we should say clearly that turning a compulsory licensing database into a de facto national ID gallery is a step too far for a free society. That is what Amendment 380 does and I commend it to the House.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I do not support the amendment. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, made the point that there will obviously be regulations, because people do have fears about accessing the DVLA database.

At the moment, the only database that facial comparisons are made against is that of suspects, which is a substantial database of people the police have arrested in the past. It would be a bizarre outcome if the technology existed to find a serial rapist and the only way we could find them was on the DVLA database, but we buried our head in the sand and said that we were not going to look. This is just the start of an investigation, not a conclusion. No one would get charged as a result of being identified by this process, but it may well start an investigation that might exclude or include them. To not take up the possibility that you could identify them, either through the DVLA or other databases, is the wrong way forward.

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[Lord Herbert of South Downs (Con)]

Okay; that is helpful. I thank my noble friend, and I am sure the Government will respond to that. But if part of the purpose of this is to ensure that it meets the concern my noble friend set out—that people may, to use his words, be prevented from getting a job because of the release of a non-crime hate incident in an enhanced DBS check—I should point out that the review has not been able to find a single example of a non-crime hate incident being disclosed in an extended DBS check and preventing someone from securing employment. We therefore think the risk of that is very low. The release is a matter for the chief constable’s discretion. Of course, the risk could be made even lower if the new, higher threshold were applied to any future decision, but again, that would be within the Government’s gift to agree. What is already a negligible risk could be made even more negligible, so that would address the concern.

The final question relates to whether non-crime hate incidents will spring back into life, to use my noble friend’s expression. My response is, not so long as I am involved with this, and I am sure I could say the same for the chief executive of the college, Sir Andy Marsh. The serious point, however, is that there clearly has been a change of mood, partly because of the way in which social media has influenced this whole matter. But such action is always within the gift of any future Government, as my noble friend conceded: no Government can bind themselves to changing practice and policy. What matters now is that we put in place a robust regime that works and ensure that the police are focused on the right things.

Therefore, I am very pleased we have this broad agreement about the way forward. I do not think my noble friend’s amendment is necessary, but it is for the Government to respond to that. We must be wary of tying up the police more on this, when we are trying to release their time. We must also be aware of the injunction of the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence: that serious incidents must continue to be recorded. We must remember why this regime was set up in the first place. Not every recorded non-crime hate incident has been trivial; they can indicate a building pattern of behaviour and that is what we have to guard against. But the new system will put in place higher thresholds to ensure that the trivial are weeded out, and that, I think, is what we all want.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

My Lords, given the hour I do not want to detain the House for much longer. In fact, I have deleted the first page of my speech accordingly, and I will address the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence, in a moment.

First, this amendment insists that all future incident recording guidance must have due regard to freedom of expression—and that matters. In a liberal democracy, the test is not whether we protect only speech we agree with; it is whether we protect the space for robust, sometimes uncomfortable, debate on race, religion, sex, gender, politics and many other issues.

Police guidance should start from the principle that lawful speech is not a policing problem. Further, it deals with the past as well as the future. It should require that historic non-crime hate incident records which do not meet the proper recording threshold must not be disclosed on DBS checks and must be deleted when discovered. That is vital for natural justice. If we accept that this category has been misused and overused, we cannot leave people’s lives quietly marred by data that should never have been held in the first place. I particularly address these remarks to the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence.

This is not about turning a blind eye to genuine hate crime. On the contrary, by scrapping a vague, perception-based non-crime category, we free up police time and attention to focus on real offences: threats, harassment, violence and criminal damage. We will make the system clearer for victims and for officers. We will be sending a simple message that if you have been the victim of a crime, the law is there to protect you, and if you have merely heard something you strongly dislike, that is not in itself a matter for the police.

At the moment, too many people are unsure where that line lies. They fear that expressing a lawful view on a controversial subject might bring a knock at the door or a mark on their record. That chilling effect is corrosive. It drives honest disagreement underground and pushes some people out of the public square altogether. We should be defending the right to argue and criticise, and to challenge within the law, not encouraging people to outsource every disagreement to the police.

The amendment would preserve the ability of the police to record information where it is genuinely necessary for crime prevention and public safety. It would hardwire respect for freedom of expression into any future guidance. In doing so, it would strengthen civil liberties and good policing. It says that the police are there to deal with crime, not to catalogue lawful opinions. This is a distinction worth defending and I urge the House to support this amendment.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I have listened carefully to the contributions from the Minister and the noble Lord, Lord Young, on their amendments, and to other speakers around your Lordships’ House. I want to return to the difficult and sensitive issues, raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence, of where the boundaries are and protecting the vulnerable versus free speech. We have debated that in some detail, with examples in Committee, so I will not rehearse those. I have two questions for the Minister about the new arrangements.

We are losing from the guidance a useful paragraph that sets out exactly that the risk of significant harm may be greater if the individual who has experienced the incident is considered to be vulnerable, and then directs people to the College of Policing as to how the police do that. I mention this to the noble Lord, Lord Young, who said that everything under the regime that is about to disappear was entirely in the view of the individual who felt that that they were being done. That has not been the case. It has been assessed by the police, following the code of practice.

Can the Minister reassure your Lordships’ House that, in deleting Sections 60 and 61 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act, the police will not lose the balance that we have in the current code that sets out how to determine a vulnerable person from one of the categories covered in the Act, including race, religion, disability and LGBT, and the real risk that a crime may be committed in the future?

The noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence, spoke very eloquently. What she did not say, and everyone has assumed, is that it was absolutely obvious from the start, when the verbal attacks started on Stephen and other young people in his area, that it would not have looked like something that should have been recorded. But there is something called a course of conduct, which is very common in harassment and stalking and a number of anti-social behaviours that start to build up, and the police bring in psychologists to look at that behaviour. One of the problems is that we cannot lose that progression. If things stop being recorded, I do not understand how you can do it. There are certainly rules about not using it in DBS checks, but if you lose that information, I really fear that the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence, is right to have concerns. So, can I ask the Minister if the Government—