Parliamentary Buildings (Restoration and Renewal) Bill

Lord Stunell Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 8th July 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stunell (LD)]

My Lords, I speak as a member of the Joint Committee that looked at the draft Bill and produced the report which is in front of your Lordships as background to this debate. The report had a number of practical recommendations for implementation, and I was very pleased indeed to hear from the Minister in her introduction the way in which many of those recommendations were adopted in the House of Commons, or will be subject to further refinement and, we hope, adoption in the House of Lords at a later stage.

We have had an excellent debate with many fine contributions. I hope the Minister will find the opportunity to respond to many of the points made, if not in this debate, at least subsequently, because many drew out the tensions between different, quite legitimate objectives in delivering restoration and renewal. One thing that will happen when we decant is that the decanted accommodation will be better than the accommodation we are in now, and it is completely unrealistic to expect us, in eight, 10 or 15 years’ time, to move back into a building with lower standards than the temporary accommodation. I mention that particularly in relation to deafness. I am sure we will be able to hear in every room in the temporary accommodation, which is certainly not true here—I speak as someone who is a serial complainer about that.

What is really important and valuable from this debate is that there is universal acceptance that doing nothing, or business as usual, is not possible. There is an unacceptably high risk and urgent action is essential. The disastrous Notre Dame fire has certainly spurred everybody into action. It may be that the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, disagrees, but a 24-hour fire safety team is neither normal nor cheap—nor is it guaranteed to produce 100% success.

The Bill is very welcome: indeed, it is overdue. In fact, the timeline so far has already been dangerously extended, as a number of speakers in this debate have pointed out. It has been characterised by short outbreaks of action and then prolonged periods of frustrating delay. The cause of those delays has not been explained or explored, particularly in this debate, but, bearing in mind that each delay came at a time when the ball was in the Government’s court, one might surmise that it was something to do with reluctance at the highest level to commit to a project which, however essential and urgent, has very few friends outside this building and none at all in the print media.

It might be thought that a year’s delay at this stage is neither here nor there. It is going to take another 16 years anyway, so what is another few months at the beginning? Actually, it has not been without cost—the cost of carrying the risks of catastrophic failure forward for another 12 months while construction costs have also risen by 1% more than either RPI or CPI, depending on which of those indices the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, would like us to use.

Simply having that delay and looking at enhanced construction costs compared to rising tax revenue and so on has added £40 million to the cost of the £4 billion project. That is not even factoring in extending 24-hour fire cover costs for a further year. That is bad enough, but suppose that government uncertainty and reluctance had come during the actual construction period. For the purposes of illustration, a £4 billion project lasting eight years would need spending at £500 million a year. A year’s delay in decision-making would then cost the thick end of £300 million, arising from people standing around waiting for decisions and from paying overtime to catch up, not to mention extra plant hire, cranes and warehouse space.

We should certainly learn from Crossrail. Originally, we all said that this was going to be like the Olympics and Crossrail; we have stopped saying that and now only say it will be like the Olympics. Crossrail, once seen as a glowing example of success, is now an awful warning of costs and delay.

That brings me to one key area where the Joint Committee came to a different view from the Government about how this unique, massive and difficult project should be managed. The Bill is all about governance: not what should be done, how much should be done or even when it should be done, but by whom it should be commissioned and signed off. The Joint Committee considered the draft Bill very carefully in that respect. Our recommendations were framed to build a decision-making structure that would minimise delays and wasted effort. That is why we recommended that the new structure recognise reality and make transparent who exactly will decide if, when and how this project goes ahead.

That brings me to recommendation 11 in our report, which I think nobody else in the debate so far has mentioned:

“Parliament has determined that the Treasury should be subordinate to Parliament … in accepting or rejecting the costs of the project … However, we do not consider that this on its own will provide sufficient political buy-in from the Treasury over the course of this long project”.


That seems pretty clear, and it is sad that the Government feel that they do not want to accept that recommendation. Whatever the value of all the different governance procedures—no doubt there will be much discussion of them in Parliament, as well as rows and inquiries—that rather misses the point that, before that can happen and any estimate can be laid by the estimates commission, it must,

“have regard to any advice given by the Treasury”.

In Schedule 4 to the Bill, paragraphs 3(5)(a) and 3(5)(b) deal with phase one; paragraphs 6(5)(a) and 6(5)(b) deal with the transition year; paragraphs 8(5)(a) and 8(5)(b) deal with phase two. In a 15-clause Bill, three of the clauses are instructing everybody to have regard to any advice given by the Treasury.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

Why does the noble Lord think that the Treasury will agree to Parliament making this decision without its approval—I see the Leader of the House is not listening—given that I keep getting told that a much more modest proposal that I have been suggesting for a number of years is subject to approval by the Treasury and must be within a particular envelope? Either this Parliament makes decisions about expenditure or it does not. The noble Lord is saying that it will make decisions about billions of pounds, when it cannot make decisions about millions.

[Lord Stunell]

The noble Lord exactly anticipates the point I am coming to. If this goes ahead unamended, it is a recipe for the hidden hand to cause delay and wasted effort. Those were the points I was about to make.

The Joint Committee recommended that a Treasury Minister sit on the sponsor body, which will sign off the brief for the delivery authority. That is when the Treasury input is needed, not after a year’s work of design and procurement has been done, and perhaps wasted, when the estimates commission consults the Treasury, in accordance with paragraphs 3, 5 and 8, and is obliged to reject what comes to it. I say “obliged”, because if you must “have regard” to something, that leaves very little room to ignore the advice you receive.

There is a weakness in accountability here, but not a weakness of the designers, contractors, delivery authority or sponsor board. Those accountabilities are in the main clear and transparent, and very welcome for that. The weakness is in the accountability of the Government and the lack of any transparency in their input. I describe it as their “input” into the process but it is much more likely to be their extraction from it, because I do not believe that the Treasury would urge anyone to spend the money faster. However, their participation in the process is not transparent, and that weakness will lead to delay, waste and extra costs. How much better and simpler would it be to have the Treasury at the front end rather than the back end of the process?

It may be said that there is no problem because the Government will accept the point that the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, is so dubious about them accepting. However, we know that transparency influences the progress of the project, and that endless delays and costs involve money. When there was no transparency, we did not know, for instance, why it was taking so long for previous stages of this process to reach the House and for decisions to be taken. When those delays cannot be attributed and chased, they accumulate. I can well understand that the Government have no wish at all to be fingered by this problem; equally, we have to understand its cost. With costs running at over £500 million a year, I can well see that Ministers will be hesitant. That is five schools-worth a year, and the temptation will be to stop, pull back and slow down. That is bad and expensive news at any stage of a big project, but it is absolutely destructive when it is in full flow. Let us get that interference at the front level, and minimise the delay, the wasted design time, the costs and the aborted procurement. I hope we can come back to that key issue in Committee.

I concur with practically every speaker in this debate in saying that this is a good, sound Bill. It needs to go ahead, and quickly, and we need to make sure that any flaws regarding accountability that may be built into it are dealt with before it leaves your Lordships’ House.

Parliamentary Buildings (Restoration and Renewal) Bill

Lord Stunell Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 22nd July 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Scott of Needham Market]

My Lords, I want to make some brief comments. I start by reminding noble Lords that the shadow sponsor body sets six key strategic priorities in its publication about restoration and renewal produced in the spring—I know that everyone will have read it avidly and memorised it. The very first point in the very first block of priorities concerns fire—the risk of fire in the restored Palace and also during the restoration. Therefore, it is very much in the minds of the sponsor body, as your Lordships would expect.

The noble Lord’s point about evacuation was very interesting. My initial thought was that it really was not anything to do with the shadow sponsor body. It is an operational matter and something that we ought to do. Most of us, ever since being at school, have experienced fire drills. I thought I would be saying that this was a matter for the House, but the noble Lord made a more fundamental point about how much we do not know about how people use this place. One thing that the shadow sponsor body has found in its work is that people do not necessarily react as you would expect them to, so it is a very real point. However, I stand by my initial view that it is for the House authorities and not the shadow sponsor body to sort out the evacuation drill.

I hope that the noble Lord wants not to put on the face of the Bill a specific and technical response to fire but, rather, to probe whether we are taking it seriously. Having said that I am not speaking on behalf of the sponsor body, I know that we would be very keen to work with the noble Lord on this matter. Your Lordships will be aware that we have done a lot of work with Members on disability access issues, for example, and will be doing so on other matters, so I am very happy to talk to him about that.

His question about fire and heritage gives rise to a fundamental point, which is that noble Lords have many different priorities. Some say that heritage takes precedence and others say that accessibility does. I think that making something a number one priority above everything else on the face of the Bill would probably make life quite difficult later. There will be a point when the House has to make has to make these decisions. The shadow sponsor body, working with the designers, will put forward a whole range of propositions but it will be for the House to work through what it chooses to prioritise. Therefore, putting things on the face of the Bill that constrain that prioritisation could mean that Parliament has fewer choices when it comes to make a decision.

[Lord Stunell (LD)]

I do not want to comment on this from the point of view of a member of the sponsor body, because I certainly am not. I was a member of the Joint Committee that reviewed the legislation but I am not speaking from that point of view either. I am speaking as somebody who, in his professional life before entering the world of politics, supervised construction projects. Indeed, I was supervising a project when the people adapting the sprinkler system with welding equipment set fire to the roof and the building burned down. Therefore, I am very well apprised of the risks and I think that the noble Lord has done us all a favour by raising them in the way that he has.

I want to comment in particular on the specific technical solution that the noble Lord has put forward. I think he will recognise that this project’s construction phase will last for at least another 10 and probably 15 years. Mist sprinkling had not even been invented 10 or 15 years ago, so we need to be very well aware that what technology will deliver now might be completely different from what it is appropriate to deliver later. Therefore, I very much hope that he will make allowances for the specific point that my noble friend has raised and ensure that, whatever discussions take place, we do not lock ourselves into a technical solution that becomes outdated and irrelevant.

Parliamentary Buildings (Restoration and Renewal) Bill

Lord Stunell Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 22nd July 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Berkeley]

My Lords, I spoke about some of these issues in response to an earlier amendment. All I will say is that the amendment asks for a report for the building to be fully accessible, which I support, but to achieve that and the things that my noble friend and the noble Baroness, Lady Byford, have mentioned—including lifts, toilets and other areas that are currently inaccessible—will involve some massive works in this building and they will be very expensive. They will also reduce the amount of space available for other things, but I am sure that they have to happen.

My Amendment 17A proposes that the same criteria that my noble friend has put in Amendment 17 in respect of this building when we come back are also applied to the temporary accommodation that we might have in the QEII or wherever.

[Lord Stunell (LD)]

My Lords, to some extent my contribution has been prefigured, and I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Byford, for that. I strongly support everything that the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, has said. I particularly want to pick out his phrase about making this an exemplar project.

In the many discussions that I have had over the years about making this place accessible to people with physical deficiencies, if you want to put it that way, or disabilities—I speak as someone who is not profoundly deaf but is quite deaf and certainly needs his hearing aids—all too often the attitude and the response have been grudging, a sort of reluctant admission that under the Disability Discrimination Act they have a duty to do it, but it is certainly not one undertaken with great joy.

I would have thought that this building—as we are a national Parliament and representatives of a democracy that in other aspects is trying to promote civilised values around the world, and here I am thinking of the work of our international development department, our Foreign Office, God bless them, and others, where we are constantly saying that we set an example—should surely set an example when it comes to access for those of limited mobility or with some other disability.

I want to put a word in for my noble friends Lady Brinton and Lady Thomas of Winchester, who, as noble Lords will know, make their way around this building in electric wheelchairs. This brings into focus the fact that our different priorities are in conflict. A whole lot of additional fire doors have been put in, which make it virtually impossible for those two noble Members to proceed around the building other than with an assistant to open and close the doors. Various arrangements have been put in place for the doors to be left open during sitting hours and so on, but for all sorts of reasons—some might say bureaucratic reasons—those commitments do not always work.

Each of my noble friends has personal stories about the problems they have had of being trapped behind those doors waiting for somebody to come and open them. There are challenges, but there are solutions. One can imagine that in 10 or 15 years’ time, it will be entirely feasible for every door and every electric wheelchair in this building to be fitted with a transponder, and for the doors to open when a wheelchair approaches. However, the idea of anybody thinking of or implementing that seems a very long way away.

As for deafness, I am inclined to say: do not get me started. Can we at least make sure that the new provision complies with existing law? This building does not comply with existing law and although people have wriggled and squiggled when they have talked to me about how they believe they have put in place various so-called first aid measures to make it okay, it all comes down to the person with the disability fitting into a system which, frankly, does not work or deliver. We certainly need to make sure we have standards that comply with existing legislation.

We need to consider what standards we as a legislature will impose upon employers and other public buildings when we get to 2035. Will our standards for them have risen? If so, can we make sure that we design our standards to do that as well? In fact, I would go further than that and say we ought to set outstanding standards and aim to be best in class for a public building in the United Kingdom—and why not best in class throughout the world? We need to see what that would mean and how we would make it work, rather than reluctantly dragging this along behind us and seeing what we can get away with.

This debate fits somewhere in between the debate we have already had on public engagement and the one we are going to have on future-proofing. I will just make the point that if you exclude or do not engage with people with disabilities, you are not doing the job that we set out to achieve in the first set of debates. I will not use all my ammunition on future-proofing at this point, but when we get to those amendments, it is worth remembering that not just the standards but the expectations of people in 20 years’ time will not be lower than they are now. If we are not achieving current standards now, simply doing things the same way in the revised, upgraded building will not do it.

I strongly support what the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, said. He has much more experience than I do of both being a guerrilla and sitting at the big desk taking the decisions. In so far as I can give him any support from either of those dimensions, I shall certainly do so.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

My Lords, I very much support these amendments. My noble friend Lady Byford and the noble Lord, Lord Stunell, have picked up on the importance of catering for not just those with physical disabilities but those with non-physical disabilities, which are not always visible and which we are therefore not aware of.

I want to make one point, because if I do not, I suspect nobody else will. At the moment, there are parts of the Palace which are difficult, indeed inaccessible, for anybody who suffers from acrophobia—a severe fear of heights. There are real difficulties. I am conscious that architects do not take that into account when designing new buildings. Some buildings are extremely problematic. I want to put that on record because I suspect otherwise nobody else will, but it needs to be taken into account.

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[Lord Stunell]

My Lords, I support the amendments moved by the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett. Future proofing is the end of some of our previous discussions, so a great deal of the ground has been covered in one way or another. We need to future proof against possible constitutional developments, developments in public expectation and changes in technology. These two amendments cover that very well.

I draw the Committee’s attention to the fact that whenever we talk about constitutional change, a whole lot of people freeze and say, “We don’t want to build in constitutional changes with this; that would be pre-empting another process”. I point out that over the timescale of this project, a lot of constitutional change will take place, independent of repair, restoration and renewal, and we need to ensure that, at the end of it, we do not have a building that does not accommodate the changes that will have been made.

If we wind the clock back 20 years, there was no Westminster Hall debating chamber in the other place. It is now a very important part of the other place, and I would not mind guessing that in 20 years’ time it will be seen as even more important. In this debate we have talked already about a more profitable use for the Royal Gallery—not necessarily financially profitable but how we might use it.

If we spend five or, perhaps, 10 years in the QEII, I have little doubt that our procedures will adapt to that building in ways which people will be reluctant to give up when they come back to this building—whether it is a simple thing, such as somewhere to plug in your iPad when you are sitting on the Benches, or something else that we have not even imagined. All these things need to be clearly in the minds of the sponsor body and the delivery authority.

It might be said that we should not be offloading this responsibility on to the sponsor body. I agree with that, but the alternative is that this House and the other place confront the questions of constitutional reform themselves. My imaginative capacity is insufficient to see how that would happen. I think that the reality will be that the sponsor body will come back to this House and the other place and will say, “We can do this, or we can do that”. Then we might find that we are at last engaged in the kind of thinking that, at the moment, everyone shies away from.

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Moved by

[Lord Stunell]

23: Schedule 1, page 11, line 25, leave out paragraph (b)

[Lord Stunell]

My Lords, debates today have probably added £1 billion to the total cost of R&R. When we look at we have said about disability, constitutional changes, public engagement and future-proofing, I think that we can forget £4 billion and start to look at £5 billion. All that is in square brackets anyway.

This legislation is not a money Bill; if it were, we would not be discussing it. It is a governance Bill, but how we arrange the governance affects how much money is spent. For example, the opaque governance of the process leading up to this Bill reaching your Lordships’ House has already cost us money, because it could perfectly well have come at least a year and probably 18 months sooner, which would have saved money. If it is hard to see how, perhaps I may say that the index of consumer price inflation in the last year was 1.9% and the index of construction price inflation was 2.8%—more or less 1% greater. That 1% leads to the whole project’s expenditure falling one year later than it would have done, which has cost us £40 million on a £4 billion project—probably £50 million—simply by starting a year later than we needed to. That is before we have a plan or a project on the table. My amendment is intended to enable us to avoid unnecessary delay and cost, and to learn from that story and the lessons of Crossrail.

Once upon a time when this project was first floated, the governance model in this Bill was advocated and supported because it was going to follow the magnificent models of UK construction projects where we had at last cracked the problem and, as seen with the Olympics and Crossrail, we could now deliver on time and on budget. We still say that, except we leave out the phrase “and Crossrail”; we only say, “the magnificent example of the Olympics”. What Crossrail illustrated is that once you have a delay you automatically and unavoidably have cost increases. That is not only because it costs money to take longer; it costs even more money to try to catch up.

My amendment is designed to save the large amounts of public money which come from delay in taking decisions about how the project should proceed. A project of £4 billion intended to take eight years is going to spend, on average, £500 million each year. That is not a trivial sum in anybody’s counting and certainly not in the Treasury’s counting. The year’s delay will not cost you all the £500 million but it will probably, à la Crossrail, cost you two-thirds—£300 million, say, will be the cost of holding things back for a year, for one reason or another. So the current way we are going to decide whether we can afford something goes something like this: the sponsor body develops a programme, signs it off and passes it to the delivery authority, which gets the design work and the tendering going and then reports back to the delivery authority, which reports back to the sponsor body, which sends it to the estimates commission, which at that point consults the Treasury. The Bill says it “must have regard to” the information or advice it gets from the Treasury. In fact, three of the Bill’s 15 clauses relate to having to have regard to the Treasury’s advice.

Whatever might be said in some idyllic constitutional theory about parliamentary supremacy, the actual tap is turned on and off by the Treasury. That is no surprise and certainly it is the reality of this piece of legislation. The point is that at least a year, and probably 18 months to two years, after the sponsor body has commissioned the work to be done, the Treasury will say, “Oh, no, sorry, that is not in scope, we cannot afford that. Spread it over 10 years, drop all the stuff about getting into the turrets, never mind Lord Stunell and hearing, let us just have it like it was in the old building and cut costs”. We will still have the delays. Incidentally, it will be very difficult to save as much by cutting things out of the design as it will cost to have the delays—which, of course, is another Crossrail story as well.

What we have is a system where we know it will be the Treasury taking the decision on whether the money is going to be spent, but instead of asking before we start, “Can we have the money to do this?”, we are going to wait until we have done everything and then the Treasury is going to say no. Amendment 23 simply short-circuits that in a very simple way. It says that it is permissible to have a Minister of the Crown on the sponsor body. It does not require that there shall be, and it is therefore still a matter of choice as to whether such a person is appointed or not. What that means is that, at the start of the process and not at the end, the Treasury would be saying what can and cannot be spent. In terms of parliamentary accountability and lots of other things, people will say, “That is completely wrong”, but the Government’s fingerprints are going to be on this and they are going to do their best to wipe their fingerprints off it, which they will be well able to do if they present it in anonymous advice to the estimates commission two years after the process began and the delays will be there.

My amendment allows the Government to find a way of being more transparent about taking the inevitable decisions that the Treasury will make and putting those in the public domain at the earliest moment. I know that I do not have too many friends on this, but I have given the House an option, which it does not need to exercise but which in five, 10 or 15 years’ time, a future Administration and the future House will be very grateful for, so that they can indeed save any more delays than those that will by then already have accumulated. I beg to move.

[Baroness Smith of Basildon]

My Lords, I listened carefully to the noble Lord, Lord Stunell. If I understand his argument correctly, he seems to be expressing a lack of confidence that Her Majesty’s Treasury will come up with the money and deliver on the funding at the end of the project, and to avoid that he is suggesting putting it on the committee that is deciding what the project should do and what money should be requested.

I understand why the noble Lord made his arguments, and, as I said, I listened carefully, but I am not persuaded by them. This is a parliamentary project, not a government project—that is an important distinction to make. There are times when I suspect that there may be battles between Parliament and government on this, although I hope not. I hope that in bringing forward the Bill, government is showing its intention to recognise that the work has to be done and paid for.

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[Baroness Barran]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Stunell, for tabling his amendment, which, as he explained, would allow a government Minister to become a member of the sponsor body. I also thank the noble Baroness the Leader of the Opposition for reinforcing the point that this is a parliamentary project and that we need to make that clear at all times.

I understand from the noble Lord’s speech at Second Reading that his key concern was about the potential lack of transparency around the Treasury’s advice on the estimates of expenditure, which in turn could lead to delays, waste and extra cost, as well as the need for Treasury buy-in to the project. The noble Lord has again articulated these points clearly tonight. He also stole the next part of my notes when he explained exactly how the process worked. However, I should add—I did not catch the noble Lord saying this, so I hope he will forgive me if I missed it—that the estimate is laid after it has been reviewed by the estimates commission and there has been consultation with the Treasury. The estimate is then laid before the other place for approval, including any comments made by the Treasury. I am advised that this is more transparent than the current estimates process for the funding of Parliament. To be clear to the House, this provides the opportunity for the Treasury to comment on the annual estimate, but it does not provide it with a veto. Furthermore, in terms of approval for the parliamentary building works, the Treasury is not given a role in respect of the outline business case. That is exclusively a matter for Parliament.

At Second Reading and again tonight, the noble Lord argued that a Treasury Minister could sit on the sponsor body, as recommended by the Joint Committee that examined the Bill. The role of the Treasury in this project is as an external party looking inwards, with the ability to review and advise upon the sponsor body’s annual estimates. The Treasury’s comments on the annual estimate will be laid before Parliament with the estimate. Therefore, the advice of the Treasury will be available when the House of Commons considers the estimate, and that provides for a clear role for the Treasury. The sponsor body and Parliament will therefore have transparent access to the Treasury’s views on the value for money and affordability of the project, which I hope addresses the noble Lord’s concerns around the transparency and the timeliness of that advice. Our view remains that, if a Treasury Minister was a member of the sponsor body, it would compromise that and could restrict the Treasury from being able objectively to assess the sponsor body’s annual estimates. In the light of these arguments, I hope that the noble Lord will consider withdrawing his amendment.

[Lord Stunell]

I thank the Minister very much for her reply and the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, for her words of comment on the amendment. She asked whether I trust the Treasury. If I replied yes to that, I would be the only person in this House who did. The Treasury rightly considers itself the guardian of the nation’s purse. In my experience, from both inside the system and looking at it from the outside, it is very rare for the Treasury to say, “Why don’t you take more money? Why don’t you speed up this project?”. I think we can all anticipate that the role of the Treasury in this is to be the gatekeeper of money. It sees that role as reducing the flow of money, particularly if Members of both Houses arguing the case for hospitals, schools, aircraft carriers and goodness knows what else, at the expense of this self-serving project for Members. You can see the national newspapers and media joining in that school.

The idea of someone turning the tap off is real. The only question is whether we have a system where we turn it off at the end of a long process, thus wasting a lot of money and time, or whether we turn it off at the beginning, so that we know we have to take 20 years, not 10 years, because we can spend only £300 million a year, not £500 million a year—as the case may be—in which case, we can design the project on a completely different timescale and get efficiencies that way.

The Minister said that the Treasury’s advice will be published. Yes, it certainly would be, but the question is whether the estimates would have been trimmed as a result of the advice given and the dialogue that goes on. The estimates commission “must have regard” to any advice that it receives from the Treasury. If the Treasury says, “You can spend only £400 million”, and the estimates commission is being invited by the sponsor body to spend £600 million, it is not statutorily in its power to put the £600 million figure on the table in front of Parliament, because it “must have regard” to any advice. The Minister may say that that is incorrect, in which case I should like to have that on record.

I will not pursue this tonight, not just because of the time but because I have no one here who agrees with me. I just say that I think that this is a problem that will come back to haunt us, and I may yet say something at the next stage of the Bill. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 23 withdrawn.