Sentencing Bill

Debate between Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd and Lord Lemos

Committee stage
Wednesday 3rd December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Lemos) (Lab)]

I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, for his amendment and his thoughtful engagement on this issue and others. I know he has met my noble friend the Minister outside the Chamber to discuss these things.

The Government committed to undertake a strategic review of probation in their manifesto, and it is still our plan to review the governance of the Probation Service, looking at partnerships across England and Wales. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, mentioned the Manchester model. I hesitate to agree with the suggestion that it is being imposed on Wales, but I have to say that I am rather a fan of the Manchester model. In fact, I regard myself as the progenitor of it—or one of them—when I was at HMPPS as its lead non-executive director. That is part of what is on offer, as it were.

It is important that the recommendations in this Bill are first implemented and that we bring stability to the Probation Service in England and Wales as it currently is before undertaking any structural review. The Government believe that this would not be the right time to consider factoring structural changes into the many changes to probation that will arise as a result of this legislation. I understand that the doctrine of unripe time is often a fairly feeble excuse for inaction, but I am sure that everyone in the Committee recognises that—if I can put it like this—the capacity for change in the Probation Service, with this Bill and the current situation, is pretty much maxed out.

The amendment proposes devolving the Probation Service, but not the equivalent in relation to sentencing or prisons. Devolving parts of the criminal justice system in this way would create a divergence between the management of offenders and the wider criminal justice, sentencing and prison framework across England and Wales. We know that poor handovers, weak communication or gaps in support during the transition from custody to the community are among the greatest barriers to successful resettlement, so we are concerned that some of the changes that might arise as a result of this would create friction in the way that I have suggested. Therefore, any framework in which prisons and probation are separately owned, funded or designed carries a real risk that the two halves of the process might fail to connect, particularly at a time of strain. When that happens, people leaving prison can all too easily fall through the gaps.

That is the heart of the Government’s view at the moment—that this is not a good time to impose structural change on the Probation Service. We want to be sure that we do not create the sort of risks and frictions that I discussed. We will continue to work closely with the Welsh Government to support the local delivery of services by devolved and reserved partners in Wales. I hope that I have given the noble and learned Lord some reassurance, at least sufficient for him to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I completely agree with the noble Lord who has responded. It is obviously sensible to devolve prisons and probation together—that is what we recommended—but the political reality of the way in which the Governments in Cardiff and London relate, particularly when they are of the same party, made me think at this stage not to put down prisons and probation. I shall rethink that for the next time.

I wish that people here would realise that there will be no effective change to the Probation Service until we can take some of the money out of prisons and put it into probation. I am sure that most people who think about it realise that the Government do not have any money and realise it has got to come from somewhere, and that imprisoning people for sensible and shorter times is a much better policy. I would like to see that done in Wales, and I am convinced it could be done, so I will think about the suggestion from the Minister that we should put down both on the next occasion.

I said that the Manchester model was being imposed, but it is really a Hobson’s choice. That is what I mean about it being imposed—“You want something, so we will give you a little bit to keep you quiet”. But it is not the right model, because Manchester is not a country; it is a city in England where people here make decisions on policy. Wales is a different country, a proud and ancient nation. That is the difference, and that is why the Manchester model is good for Manchester but not good for Wales.

In the light of all that has been said, I hope that I may return to this issue, maybe in a slightly different and wider form of amendment, as suggested. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Sentencing Bill

Debate between Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd and Lord Lemos

Committee stage
Monday 1st December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lemos (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, and the noble and learned Lords, Lord Burnett of Maldon and Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, for tabling these amendments. I am very grateful for their continued and constructive engagement on the Bill.

Amendment 80, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, proposes to abolish the Sentencing Council for England and Wales. The noble Lord’s prediction is correct: I put on record that we strongly believe that it is right to retain the council, in view of the continued importance of its work in developing sentencing guidelines. He does not look completely surprised.

Over time, the council has developed offence-specific guidelines covering hundreds of offences, alongside a series of overarching guidelines. These guidelines have helped bring greater consistency, transparency and public understanding to the sentencing process. We welcome that.

The council also holds an important constitutional position, as mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, within the firmament of our justice system. It bridges the interests and responsibilities of Parliament, the Executive and the judiciary on sentencing policy and practice, while protecting the important responsibility of judges and magistrates to make individual sentencing decisions—I think I am reflecting what the noble and learned Lord said. For these reasons, I am afraid we do not support the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Jackson. I urge him to withdraw it.

I turn to the amendments tabled by the noble and learned Lords, Lord Burnett and Lord Thomas. They have indicated quite clearly their opposition to Clause 18 and propose an alternative approach to Clause 19. I am grateful for their careful consideration of this. Their concerns are shared by the noble Lord, Lord Marks. I know that they were experts in this field and their opinions therefore carry a great deal of weight with the Government. As the Minister made clear at Second Reading, in bringing forward these clauses we are aiming to maintain public confidence in the guidelines that the council produces, particularly in view of the sustained public scrutiny that the council has been under of late, which is partly reflected in these debates.

Events surrounding the imposition guideline, on which I do not propose to dwell but which obviously I need to reference, earlier this year highlighted an example of the issues that can arise where guidelines cover areas of policy that should properly be for Ministers and Parliament to determine. We are keen to avoid a similar scenario arising in future, and that is why Clauses 18 and 19 have been drafted to introduce approval measures that provide greater democratic and judicial oversight of the council’s work.

I recognise that noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Marks, are keen for more information about the intention of Clause 18. Put briefly, this clause will allow the Lord Chancellor to have a greater say over the guidelines that the council intends to develop across the year, ensuring that any plans are properly reflective of wider priorities across government and Parliament and with the wider public. As no noble Lord has so far mentioned this, I should stress that in preparing this clause we have had regard to similar provision that exists for comparable bodies across the justice system, such as the Law Commission.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

Will the Minister explain why the Law Commission, which is a body that looks at law reform for the Government, is to be equated with the independent Sentencing Council, which constitutionally balances the three interests? It would be very helpful to have that explanation. A second explanation it would be helpful to have is: is it intended that the business plan sets out in detail what is going to be in the guidelines so that the Lord Chancellor can look through it to see whether there is likely to be the kind of short sentence or two that occurred in this guideline that is unacceptable? It would be very interesting to know the Government’s thinking on both these points.

[Lord Lemos (Lab)]

I take the point that the noble and learned Lord makes that the Law Commission is different. That is why I said that we have had regard to that. On the second question that the noble and learned Lord raises, perhaps I can come to that in just a moment.

Clause 19 provides that the council can issue definitive guidelines only if the Lord Chancellor and the Lady Chief Justice each individually approve them. The amendments from the noble and learned Lords propose instead that the council should be free to issue definitive guidance unless both the Lord Chancellor and the Lady Chief Justice indicate that they do not consent. While I appreciate the sentiment and the spirit of compromise behind these amendments—which the noble and learned Lords, Lord Burnett and Lord Thomas, also referred to— I am afraid that we are not convinced that they would be the best way of securing the public confidence in sentencing guidelines that we seek. This is because they run the risk of definitive guidelines being published and implemented for use by the courts, even if the Lord Chancellor or, indeed, the Lady Chief Justice had indicated their discontent with them. We consider the current drafting of Clause 19 to be a practical and effective means of achieving our policy objective because it provides that the consent of the Lord Chancellor and the Lady Chief Justice must first be obtained before a definitive guideline can be published and implemented.

I emphasise that, in developing our current drafting, we have sought to reflect the distinct roles and responsibilities that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, referred to between Parliament, the Executive and the judiciary, as well as the careful balance that has been established for sentencing policy and practice. In particular, we are clear that these approval measures do not interfere—I hope that this is obvious, but I will emphasise it anyway—with the judiciary’s responsibility for setting sentences in individual cases.