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Lord Timpson
“(4A) In section 244(1A) (duty to release prisoners not subject to special provision for release), for “and”, in the second place it occurs, substitute “to”.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the insertion by clause 29 of the new section 255BA of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (automatic release from recall) and ensures that section 244(1A) of that Act, which cross refers to the recall provisions, includes a reference to this new section.
The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Timpson) (Lab)
My Lords, Amendment 120 is in my name. I will also speak to Amendments 123 and 124 in my name. These three amendments are minor and technical, and we have tabled them as small but necessary changes to ensure that the Bill functions as intended. I begin by explaining the changes to Clause 29 through Amendment 120. This is a necessary technical amendment which ensures that the new automatic release from recall regime is integrated into the legislative framework and functions as needed. The changes to Clause 34, through Amendments 123 and 124, are also technical. They update cross-references so that existing powers which allow the Secretary of State to amend the number of hours specified in an unpaid work requirement continue to function correctly in light of the amendments made by Clause 34. I beg to move.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
I thank the Minister for his series of drafting amendments, which seek to tidy up the language and cross-references in the Bill. We on these Benches do not oppose the amendments, which will make things clearer for anyone reading the Bill in future.
Lord Timpson (Lab)
I thank the noble Lord for his view on these minor and consequential amendments.
“Powers of the probation service to impose and vary conditions of supervision(1) Where an offender is—(a) subject to a community order, a suspended sentence order, or a period of probation supervision, and(b) required to reside at a specified address as a condition of that order or supervision,the Probation Service may, in accordance with this section, direct that the offender reside at an alternative address.(2) A direction under subsection (1) may be given where—(a) it is necessary to protect another person (including a partner, former partner, or family member) from risk of harm, (b) it is necessary for the effective management or rehabilitation of the offender, or(c) it is otherwise in the interests of justice.(3) Where the probation service has made a direction under subsection (1), it may recommend or determine other terms of supervision, including—(a) restrictions on contact or association with specified individuals,(b) requirements relating to participation in programmes addressing offending behaviour, or(c) curfew or exclusion requirements, subject to approval by the sentencing court.(4) Where a direction or variation made under this section materially alters the conditions imposed by the sentencing court, the probation service must—(a) notify the court and the offender as soon as possible, and(b) seek approval by the sentencing court of the varied terms within 14 days, and in the absence of such approval the variation of the terms will not be effective.(5) Any direction or variation made under this section shall not have effect as if imposed by the sentencing court, until it has been approved by the court.(6) In this section, “the probation service” includes any person or body authorised to supervise offenders under the Offender Management Act 2007.”Member's explanatory statement
This new clause would give the probation service the power to change the residence requirement of an individual subject to supervision in certain circumstances, and to make other changes to the terms of supervision, subject to confirmation by the sentencing court.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, my Amendment 122, which is on page 25 of the Marshalled List, would give the Probation Service the power to change the required residence of an offender under supervision, and to make necessary consequential changes to the probation conditions and terms that apply to that offender’s probation. Any such change would, however, be subject to the approval of the sentencing court.
This amendment is about trusting probation officers to do their job by giving them the power to tailor probation terms to the needs of individuals under their supervision. It would have the incidental benefit of saving the court’s time. The safeguard is, however, the requirement for approval by the sentencing court, but it is to be imagined that in most cases that would be a formal procedure. It is right that the sentencing courts have ultimate control, but I would confidently expect the proposed changes sought by probation officers to be approved.
This amendment is all about trusting probation officers to tailor the probation over which they have supervision to the needs of individual offenders. I beg to move.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I will speak briefly to Amendment 122, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, which concerns the power of the Probation Service to vary residence requirements and associated conditions of supervision.
I begin by saying that we on these Benches appreciate the intention behind the amendment. The ability to move an offender from one address to another, particularly where there is a risk to a partner, former partner or family member, is plainly necessary in some circumstances. The Probation Service must have the tools to protect victims and to manage offenders effectively. This amendment seeks to provide a clearer statutory framework for doing so.
The amendment rightly provides that, where the Probation Service makes any such variation, it must return to the sentencing court for approval within 14 days of the confirmation. That is an important safeguard; the offender, the interested parties and the court must all be properly kept in the picture. However, we would welcome greater clarity from the Minister on how, in practice, the Probation Service would assess necessity, ensure proportionality and manage the additional administrative and supervisory burdens that such powers might create. Probation must also be properly resourced and supported.
We are also mindful that changing an offender’s residence could have profound consequences, not only for supervision and risk management but for the offender himself, in the form of employment, family ties and wider stability that underpins rehabilitation. The threshold for such a direction must therefore be robust, evidence-based and truly transparent.
In that spirit, I hope the Minister can reassure the Committee that the objectives behind this amendment—protecting victims and enabling better offender management—are achievable within existing powers, or, if not, that the Government will consider whether a more tightly defined mechanism might be appropriate. We are grateful to the noble Lord for raising these issues, and we look forward to hearing the Government’s response.
Lord Timpson (Lab)
My Lords, it is, and should remain, the role of the court in sentencing to determine the requirements that should apply to a particular community sentence and how they are varied. As the noble Lord, Lord Marks, set out, it is vital that risk is managed quickly and effectively. This is particularly important in cases where, for example, domestic abuse is of concern.
Where an individual has been sentenced to a community or suspended sentence, probation practitioners undertake comprehensive assessments to ensure that risk is identified throughout an order and managed early. This means that they can take appropriate action to respond to that risk, ensuring offenders are monitored effectively. This includes applying to the court, where appropriate, which has powers to vary the requirements of a sentence, including the powers to revoke a community order and to resentence, where it would be in the interests of justice.
We are creating a new domestic abuse flag at sentencing so that domestic abusers are more consistently identified. This helps prison and probation services manage offenders effectively and ensures that victims are better protected. Before making a relevant order containing a residency requirement, the court must consider the home surroundings of the offender.
The court can already give probation the power to approve a change of residence when requested by the offender—for example, where an offender would like to move closer to where they were undertaking a programme or to their place of employment. Offenders released on licence from a custodial sentence can already be required to comply with residence obligations. These can be varied as required, either by probation or the Parole Board, as appropriate, depending on the offender’s sentence.
To be clear, if an offender fails to comply with the terms and conditions of an order, they can be returned to court to face further penalties, including custody. I hope the noble Lord will agree that there are sufficient existing processes in place, and I urge him to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
I am not sure that I understand the rationale for saying that there are already existing powers in the Probation Service. That is something I wish to talk to the Minister about, and I am sure he will be happy to do that. We are very keen that the Probation Service be trusted to make such alterations on its own, subject to the approval of the sentencing court. We absolutely agree on that. However, currently I am not quite sure where the Government stand on this. It appears to me that they are too reliant on the sentencing court and too little reliant on the Probation Service, but I am sure that that is something we will discuss. While we discuss that, I beg leave to withdraw this amendment.
Lord Verdirame
“(1A) Subsection (1) of section 260 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 does not apply when a fixed-term prisoner is sentenced to a term of imprisonment of more than three years.(1B) A fixed-term prisoner is not to be removed under section 260 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 unless the Secretary of State has made arrangements for the prisoner to serve the remaining custodial period in the country to which the prisoner is to be removed.(1C) A fixed-term prisoner is not to be removed under section 260 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 unless the Secretary of State is satisfied that the interests of justice are not defeated by the removal (having regard to the gravity of the offence and the impact of the offender’s criminal conduct on those affected by it).(1D) Subsection (1) of section 260 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 does not apply in relation to a prisoner detained in accordance with subsection (4)(b) of that section after returning to the UK following a previous removal.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is intended to add certain limits to early removals to ensure that the interests of justice and those of victims are taken into account, and that early removals do not result in impunity.
Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I apologise for not speaking at Second Reading. If I had, I would have said that there are many positive things about the Bill. However, I have tabled this amendment, with the support of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, because I consider Clause 32 to be an unsatisfactory aspect of the Bill.
Clause 32 amends the Criminal Justice Act 2003 to enable the removal of an offender from prison for the purpose of immediate deportation from the United Kingdom, so that removal can happen at any time after sentence. Any foreign offender on a fixed-term sentence would be eligible for deportation without serving any part of their custodial sentence.
The Government have chosen to go beyond the recommendation of the Independent Sentencing Review, chaired by the former Lord Chancellor David Gauke. The review had proposed reducing the removal point from 50% to 30% of the custodial sentence, and that recommendation has already been implemented by statutory instrument. The review also recommended that foreign offenders sentenced to three years or less could be removed more swiftly—even before they had served any part of their sentence. However, Clause 32 does not include the three-year limit.
Some of the practical and principle problems with this change in the law were spelled out in an article in the Spectator last August by Professor Ekins from Policy Exchange’s judicial power project and the University of Oxford. He argued that this change in the law risks creating “perverse incentives” for foreign offenders, who would be able to commit serious crimes in the United Kingdom with relative impunity. Serious crimes would not be treated consistently or as their moral gravity warrants.
The new policy is said to have public support. It is true that the public, if asked, “Do you want foreign offenders to be deported?” will likely say yes by an overwhelming majority. But, if the questions are, “Do you want foreign offenders to go unpunished?” or, “Do you think British offenders should be punished more severely than foreign offenders for the same crime?”, I suspect the response would be rather different. To be clear, I am not opposed to the principle that a foreign offender should be removed after serving time in prison. The question is whether we as a country should give up on punishing and rehabilitating foreign offenders and instead deport them without any punishment.
The review recommended three years as the limit because it considered that foreign national offenders sentenced to three years or less would serve the equivalent of a short prison sentence and, in those circumstances, deportation could be viewed as punishment—although I must admit that, for my part, I have some difficulty with the notion that deportation itself is a form of punishment. Where the individual is already liable to deportation, it cannot be said to constitute a new punishment. But, more fundamentally, being deported is simply not the same as going to prison, and how punitive deportation is will depend on the circumstances, including the gravity of the crime. As Professor Ekins argues, it is very obviously not true that deportation is a punishment comparable with a lengthy term of imprisonment for offences such as rape, robbery or drug or people trafficking.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
I have Amendment 141A in this group, probing the position with regard to people who have been victims or survivors of modern slavery, human trafficking or domestic abuse.
The large majority of black and minoritised migrant women in contact with the criminal justice system are survivors of human trafficking and/or violence against women and girls. This often happens when a trafficker or abuser identifies their vulnerability, often resulting from unmet basic needs such as housing, income and healthcare. Their criminal convictions will have stemmed very often from the abuse they have suffered, and whether they were coerced into offending or acting under the influence of unaddressed trauma.
In the case of women, particularly, who have been trafficked, we know that the section—I forget the number—in the Modern Slavery Act that seeks to protect them is not working well. The very fact of deportation adds to the vulnerability to abuse; it often leaves the person subject to it without accommodation or income, and it removes community and support networks, in many cases leaving them in a place they are not familiar with. The risk of deportation has a similar effect. A person may be left without ways in which to meet their basic needs and in fear, and the fear itself adds to the vulnerability, which is capitalised on by abusers. This is particularly true for people who are already traumatised by previous abuse and exploitation.
We know that victims of human trafficking and modern slavery—and victims of domestic abuse—need specialist support and protection from re-exploitation and further abuse. I have used the term “she” because very often, mostly, it is a she. We know too that women have particular needs, largely stemming from their own backgrounds.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
My Lords, I will speak to the amendments in my name. I will also briefly comment on the excellent remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame. I too have great sympathy with his comments and have read the interesting article that Richard Ekins KC produced in the Spectator on 11 August. The noble Lord outlines the case very eloquently and I am minded to support his amendment because it is logical and sensible. It really goes to the heart of a philosophical debate about whether the Government’s proposals essentially forget the raison d’être of rehabilitation, re-education and punishment. If the system is predisposed just to deport someone then you are not really concentrating on some key aspects of the criminal justice system with regard to incarceration. The noble Lord’s comments and amendment are therefore logical.
I do not agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. I think that, as usual, her heart is in the right place but, in this case, her amendment would gum up the system and be misused by, in my opinion, activist judges to prevent the deportation of people who should be deported for the public good, safety and security. I therefore cannot support it.
I will not dwell too long on Amendment 142. It is pretty straightforward and the hour is late, but I do want to discuss at reasonable length my Amendment 146. We are now reaching the end of the Bill; we are on Part 4 and Clause 42, which is on the deportation of foreign national offenders. My amendment seeks to ensure that all British citizens, including those in Northern Ireland, can rely on their Government and their sovereign Parliament in Westminster to enact legislation on their behalf, including Clause 42, which was passed without vote, as I understand, in the other place.
However, due to the iniquitous and unfair Windsor Framework and the capitulation by the previous Government—of my party, sadly—in putting it into legislation, thereby making Northern Ireland an effective colony of the European Union, this legislation will not apply to Northern Ireland. Its people, who are British citizens, subjects of the Crown and taxpayers, will again be treated as second-class citizens as a result of this Bill, if my amendment is not accepted. Article 2(1) of the Windsor Framework effectively disregards the will of the sovereign Parliament of the United Kingdom, of this unitary state of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, in favour of a foreign legal entity and a foreign jurisdiction—laws over which residents of Northern Ireland have no say and whose fundamental rights are circumscribed; they do not have equal citizenship with UK citizens in England, Wales and Scotland.
These people are subject to the direct effect of Union law—European Union law, made in a foreign Parliament, designed by a faceless, unaccountable bureaucracy and unelected politicians who appoint each other—by virtue of Section 7A of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, which gives direct effect to such provisions automatically as part of UK domestic law, subject to those EU provisions. This, of course, trumps all UK domestic law, for the Supreme Court has opined:
“The answer to any conflict between the Protocol”—
that is, the Windsor Framework—
“and any other enactment whenever passed or made is that those other enactments are to be read and have effect subject to the rights and obligations which are to be recognised and available in domestic law by virtue of section 7A(2)”.
Yes, a Conservative Government legislated to make UK law permanently subservient to EU law in a significant part of the United Kingdom. In fact, this affects 300 areas of law across every aspect of life in Northern Ireland.
Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I apologise for my voice. I will try to keep going. It is not actually hurting the way it sounds, so noble Lords need not feel too much sympathy. I will follow on from the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, and support Amendment 146, which I have signed.
Most of the Bill, as noble Lords know, does not apply to Northern Ireland, but Part 4 does. These very important amendments deal with deporting foreign criminals. I very much support the Government’s move to do that, but I hope the Committee needs no reminding that this House passed three Bills recently that it said applied to the whole United Kingdom, but we then discovered the courts overruled that. We had the Rwanda Act, the Illegal Migration Act 2023 and the soon to be defunct legacy Act. We have had legal opinion from the former Attorney-General for Northern Ireland that the Tobacco and Vapes Bill will also not be able to apply. We were not able to bring in the export of live animals for slaughter Act to the whole United Kingdom as it does not apply in Northern Ireland.
The Minister is probably hearing this for the first time. Many Ministers have had to sit through statutory instruments in which those of us who wish to bring out the injustices of the Windsor Framework have been able to do so. However, Article 2 of the Windsor Framework overrules the sovereign Parliament; it very simply says that EU laws—laws that are not made in this House but by a foreign institution—overrule what our sovereign Parliament says. Whatever the history of this, and whatever party brought it in, we should all be beginning to realise that this is just not sustainable.
The three pieces of legislation to which I have referred have been overruled in respect of the people of Northern Ireland, due to parts of that legislation that offended EU rights and legislation. In the well-known Dillon case, the Court of Appeal decreed that it would disapply parts of the Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Act 2023 because it offended rights supposedly given to victims by EU law. The relevant parts of the Dillon judgment are now before the Supreme Court, and we hope to get a judgment on that soon, which will give us more context to see how we are being affected by the Windsor Framework.
This specific amendment deals with the deportation of foreign criminals. As the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, pointed out, if a foreign criminal is an EU citizen already living in Northern Ireland and this law comes in, they will have enhanced protection against deportation. If they are not an EU citizen but a foreign criminal from somewhere else in the world who is living in Northern Ireland, they are also likely to have enhanced protections that they would not have if they were living in Great Britain, because of the importation of the reliance upon the European Charter Of Fundamental Rights. I do not need to tell noble Lords that Article 19 of the charter affords particular protections against deportation. It states that each deportation must be specifically examined and that there cannot be a provision for automatic deportation. Part 4 of this Bill is going to do precisely that: for a foreign criminal convicted in our courts, the presumption will be towards deporting them.
Anyone with any common sense must think that it would be outrageous if we end up with a law that says that a foreign criminal living in Great Britain and found guilty can be deported but that a foreign criminal living in another part of our own country, the United Kingdom, cannot. That is something we need to address. The Minister never seems to want to tell us whether he has had legal advice from the Attorney-General, but if he has, he will probably say that this is okay. But they have said that on three Bills, and each time they have been proved wrong. Noble Lords will forgive me if there is a little scepticism about how the Bill will apply to Northern Ireland.
It is an important issue not only for Northern Ireland’s citizens but for citizens of the whole of the United Kingdom. At some stage, we have to look at the constitutional issue of whether we can, in our own country, make our own laws that apply to the whole country. That really does need addressing.
As the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, said, there is nothing about this in the Explanatory Notes—it has been completely ignored. The purpose of tonight’s amendment is to raise this issue and make it clear that many people believe that this will not be able to apply to Northern Ireland, and to ask the Minister to say very clearly that, if this Bill goes through, there will be an absolute determination—whatever it takes—to make sure that it applies in Northern Ireland.
Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)
My Lords, it is always a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey. It is good to see that even a hoarse and croaky voice cannot silence her.
I am broadly in favour of the amendments in this group. I particularly commend Amendment 146, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, which offers a common-sense solution to a very real problem. As has been indicated by the previous two speakers, this is yet another problem that has undoubtedly arisen because of the protocol and the Windsor Framework. It is clear that we need a much more fundamental solution that tackles and recasts that relationship.
While we await that solution from government, and a recognition of the need to embrace that, we cannot simply sit on our hands and hope that everything will be alright until then, because this represents a real undermining of the Bill itself. Even the strongest supporter of the Windsor Framework or the protocol would have to admit that their application in these circumstances represents a high level of overreach. If the rationale behind our current arrangements with the EU as regards Northern Ireland is to regulate trade and try to protect the EU single market then the issues of the deportation of foreign criminals and immigration stand a mile away. They serve no purpose in the supposed objectives of that relationship.
There is a very good reason why issues around deportation are handled on a national basis, in whichever nation it happens to be. If there are regional variations within a country on issues such as deportation, that is, frankly, a road down which lies madness. That is what is being threatened by the current position we are left in. The Government in recent weeks have laid out a range of measures to try to help tackle and be serious about dealing with illegal immigration and foreign criminals, some of which are contained within this legislation. However, if the Government are to be successful in this objective, but do not tackle the issue relating to Northern Ireland, they leave their position fatally undermined.
This is not simply a constitutional affront and an outrage; it is a very real practical difficulty. If we are left with a situation in which this cannot be applied in Northern Ireland, or if a defence is offered by foreign national criminals to avoid deportation, this not only creates a situation in which Northern Ireland is treated as a second-class citizen but it leaves the whole of the UK vulnerable on this issue. Northern Ireland then becomes simply a back door to those criminals—a safe haven to either come in from or return to, with a perceived greater level of protection for those criminals than would be the case elsewhere. Wherever we set the boundaries on the issue of deportation, we need something that applies across the whole of the United Kingdom.
As outlined by the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, in particular, this is a real and practical issue. We have seen on a number of occasions, in particular in the three court rulings that the noble Baroness outlined, that this is not simply a theoretical debating issue but a practical issue in which rulings have been made. For instance, there are many in this House who would see deep flaws with the Rwanda Act, but the important thing about the ruling on that was that the courts said that EU law was supreme on this issue and therefore overruled the position in Northern Ireland, which meant that it could not be applied there. That renders the entire legislative process a nonsense. If we do not fix this, we will be left in exactly the same position.
So there is a challenge for the Government: they need to embrace what I think is a common-sense solution, to make their own legislation work better. I look forward to the response from the Minister. I hope that he will not simply say that this is not necessary and that they have given an assurance, because we have been down this road time and time again. With previous legislation, we have had reassurances, in this House and the other place, that the Government were completely confident that it would all be watertight and there would be no problem. However, on each occasion, the courts overruled the Government’s position, which was found to be wrong. I look forward to the Government responding and—I hope—adopting this amendment, because something of this nature is clearly needed if we are to solve that practical problem.
Baroness Lawlor (Con)
My Lords, I will speak briefly to support my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough’s Amendment 146, which was supported so ably by the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey.
One measure of a Government’s sovereignty is that they make the law for their citizens—the whole country and their whole territory—and they uphold that law. However, as we have heard this evening, Northern Ireland will not necessarily be included in proposals to deport foreign criminals, as Northern Ireland will be subject to the Windsor Framework arrangements.
We may hold different views about the Windsor Framework. I feel that it was a bad mistake by the Conservative Administration to move from the temporary arrangements of the withdrawal agreement to the permanent acceptance of arrangements that were regarded by both sides—the EU and the UK Government—as transient, pending the best endeavours of both parties to get it right. I am sorry that that did not happen and that we are left with the Windsor Framework, but that is no reason for the arrangements to promote economic EU law in Northern Ireland to apply now to criminal law.
It is a mark of the UK’s sovereignty that it upholds the law for the whole country, and I hope that the Minister will accept this amendment, so that the citizens of Northern Ireland can rest assured that foreign criminals will be deported, no matter from where they come. The amendment would also ensure—as the noble Lord, Lord Weir, mentioned—that Northern Ireland will not become a haven for a disproportionate number of foreign criminals fleeing there because they know they will not be deported. For all these reasons, I heartily support the amendment.
Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)
I will very briefly go back to a point about Amendment 122A that I raised at Second Reading. The Minister was kind enough to write to me to explain the pressure on prisons and the need for places, but I have already suggested earlier today a far better solution to that.
I will make two points. First, if someone comes here to commit a crime—for example, a drug dealer or a contract criminal—it is no punishment to be sent back. In fact, it is a bonus for them, because they do not have to pay for the return trip. I hope that the Minister can reassure us that the most rigorous examination will take place before people are deported.
Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)
I think that a very valid point has been made. I immediately think of the situation—
Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)
It is Committee, so I am entitled to speak in relation to that point.
The case that comes to my mind would highlight the absurdity of the position of simply having an immediate deportation: namely, the Russian agents involved in the Salisbury attempted murder. Had they been captured and convicted, they could have been immediately sent back to Russia on that basis, possibly to a hero’s welcome, rather than any level of punishment. It shows the absurdity, and I agree entirely with the remarks made by the noble and learned Lord.
Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)
Perhaps I could just finish my second point very quickly. It is simply that, even if the public do not think there is any harm in just deporting someone who has committed a crime, I would caution Government not to rely on public opinion. It does not always stay constant, but I can be sure that, if a serious crime is committed and someone is deported without being punished, this provision will come back to haunt the Government, and I do not want that to happen.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, the principle of deportation of foreign national offenders attracts almost universal support. I say “almost” because the cohort of foreign national offenders may not entirely embrace the idea. However, if we introduce a system whereby they are deported without custody or punishment, I suspect that they will come on board with the idea as well.
It occurs to me that the Government are going to approach this with considerable and conspicuous care and take on board the very considered amendment advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, and Amendment 142 from the noble Lord, Lord Jackson. It will, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, said, come back to bite us if it is discovered by very professional criminals that you can come here, execute your robbery, contract killing or whatever else and then, when you are caught, we pay your air fare home. It does not make an awful lot of sense.
With regard to Northern Ireland, I would take Amendment 146 as a probing amendment inviting the Minister to explore the impact of the Windsor Framework on this proposal.
I note that, if a foreign national offender in Northern Ireland is offered the option of deportation or lengthy custody in Northern Ireland, he might well be inclined to the former, but that is just a practical proposal. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.
Lord Timpson (Lab)
I start by thanking noble Lords and the noble and learned Lord for tabling their amendments, their interest in this topic and their considered words. I reassure the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, that prisoner transfer agreements are very important. A few weeks ago, I went to Albania and met the Justice Minister and consulate colleagues to reiterate how important it is and to see what more we can do.
Our priority is to protect victims in the UK and ensure that these offenders can never again offend here. Once deported, offenders will be barred from ever returning to the UK, protecting victims and the wider public.
I will address the amendments in turn. Amendment 122A, limiting the early removal scheme to those in receipt of a sentence of less than three years, would mean a more restrictive early removal scheme than we currently operate. On the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, on foreign national offenders, there are more than 3,200 FNOs who would not be eligible for removal under Section 260 because they are serving a fixed-term sentence greater than three years. The impact on our ability to manage prison capacity would be substantial. We already transfer prisoners to serve the remainder of their sentence in their home country under prisoner transfer agreements, where they are in place.
However, these are not suitable in all cases, and it is important that we retain multiple paths for removal to reduce prison capacity and speed up removals, especially when you consider that it costs an average of £54,000 a year to house these offenders. Once removed, FNOs are barred from ever returning to the UK, keeping victims and the wider British public safe.
The early removal scheme remains a discretionary scheme that will not be suitable for all foreign national offenders, and we are reviewing the existing guidance that includes a range of reasons it can be refused.
The “stop the clock” provision means that those who re-enter the UK in breach of their deportation order, following an ERS removal, are liable to serve the remainder of their sentence here.
I reassure the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, that we are working with the Home Office to revise the policy framework that underpins the scheme and ensure that clear operational guidance is in place before the measure is commenced. I am happy to write to the noble Lord on his detailed questions. The eligibility of those who have returned after a previous removal is one consideration, as is the commitment made in the other place to consider those convicted of stalking offences.
Amendment 142, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, seeks to introduce immediate deportation for foreign nationals given sentences of at least six months. This would require the Government to make an immediate deportation order in respect of persons who have committed less serious offences. In the Bill, we are extending automatic deportation to persons given a suspended sentence of 12 months or more.
We will also increase the deportation consideration threshold to include anyone given a suspended sentence of any length. In this, the Government are going further than any previous Government in tackling foreign criminality. We have ramped up the removals of foreign criminals, with almost 5,200 deported since July 2024—an increase of 14% compared with the same 12 months previous.
However, just as we no longer transport convicts to the other side of the world for stealing a loaf of bread, we do not think it appropriate to have immediate deportation for less serious crimes in the way proposed by the noble Lord. Lowering the threshold in the way that his amendment does would result in a disproportionate duty to deport for low-level offending. It would lead to significantly more appeals being made against such decisions, arguing exceptionality. It would increase the operational burden to pursue deportation in cases where it was unlikely to be successful because the offending was relatively minor.
On Amendment 146, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, for their understanding of my lack of knowledge on the intricate details of the Windsor Framework. In fact, I think that when the Windsor Framework was going through Parliament, I was very happily running a shoe repair business.
This amendment seeks to disapply parts of the withdrawal agreement and Article 2 of the Windsor Framework in relation to the automatic deportation provisions in the UK Borders Act 2007. I think that the intention behind the amendment is to ensure that deportation decisions in Northern Ireland can be taken on the same basis as deportation decisions in the rest of the UK.
It is the Government’s view that Clause 42 is compatible with Article 2 of the Northern Ireland protocol and the Windsor Framework. Therefore, we do not agree that there is a need for this amendment. To reiterate, it is the Government’s view that the deportation of foreign national offenders is not prohibited by these provisions. It is our view that immigration is a reserved matter, and we apply the same immigration laws across the whole of the UK.
I want to reassure the noble Baronesses, Lady Hoey and Lady Lawlor, and the noble Lord, Lord Weir, that foreign national offenders, regardless of where they are in the UK, should be in no doubt that we will do everything to make sure they are not free on Britain’s streets, including removal from the UK at the earliest possible opportunity.
I note that the stated purpose of Amendment 141A as tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, is to probe the effect of Clause 42 on survivors of modern slavery, human trafficking or domestic abuse. I reassure the noble Baroness that the Government take their responsibilities towards vulnerable people very seriously. The Home Office has published guidance on how to identify and support victims of modern slavery and human trafficking. Where removal of a person would breach the UK’s obligations under the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, deportation must not proceed. Victims of domestic abuse whose relationship has broken down can apply for permission to settle in the UK permanently. Victims of domestic abuse who meet the threshold for deportation will be considered for deportation in the same way as other persons.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness for the opportunity to set out the Government’s position regarding the impact of Clause 42 on people who have a reasonable claim to be a victim and survivor of modern slavery, human trafficking or domestic violence. Such a claim does not amount to immunity from deportation for people convicted of an offence, although in some circumstances temporary permission to stay may be granted to victims of human trafficking or slavery. The changes brought about by Clause 42 will not alter this.
I thank noble Lords and Baronesses for this debate and ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
Just briefly, on the point of my amendment, one problem is that people simply do not know what their rights are and find it very hard to find out. However, I wanted to ask the Minister about prisoner transfer agreements—I was wondering whether to raise this earlier in the debate. Is he able to tell the Committee how many are in place, or could he perhaps write to us to give us information about that? I am slightly ashamed to ask this because I am sure that a quick search on the internet would tell me, but I think the noble Lord will be more authoritative.
Lord Timpson (Lab)
I will write to the noble Baroness with exact details. I have quite a few details in my head, but I want to get it right, so I will write.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
Very briefly, my Lords, I want to thank the Minister for his very helpful, illuminating and quite reassuring answer, which those of us who spoke to Amendment 146 are grateful for.
Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his answer. I too would like to hear more about prisoner transfer agreements. They are the best policy solution in this area, so I am glad to hear that the Government are still pursuing that route. On whether the three-year limit is more or less restrictive, it is true that it does not feature in the legislation currently, but the key element of the current regime is that foreign offenders have to serve 50% of the custodial part of their sentence. That 50% has been reduced to 30% following the statutory instrument a few weeks ago, but Clause 32 would reduce the 30% to zero. In that context, the three-year limit would not be more restrictive.
However, with that in mind, I very much look forward to the Minister’s letter dealing with the other questions that I raised. I hope that he will be able in due course to meet me and others who are interested in this amendment to discuss what to do on Report. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Timpson
“(d) in paragraph 13(1)(a) of Schedule 23 (power to amend maximum number of hours of unpaid work), for “paragraph 2(1)” substitute “paragraph 2(1A)”.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment updates a cross reference and is consequential on the amendment made by clause 34(2) (limits on the number of hours in an unpaid work requirement in a community order or suspended sentence order).
“(ba) in paragraph 6, for “paragraph 3(5)” substitute “paragraph 3(5A)”;”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment updates a cross reference and is consequential on the amendment made by clause 34(5)(b)(ii) (limits on the number of hours in an unpaid work requirement in a supervision default order).
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, and others in the name of Baroness Jones of Moulescoomb, seeks to remove the power of providers of probation services to publish photographs of the offender.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)
My Lords, in moving Amendment 124A tabled by my noble friend Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, I shall speak also to Amendments 124B to 124F. I note that there is also a Clause 35 stand part notice in this group in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, which has the same aims—we have just taken different routes to the same intended outcome.
These amendments are linked with one aim. If we are serious about reducing reoffending and rebuilding lives, we cannot allow public humiliation to be smuggled into the justice system through the back door—but that is exactly what Clause 35 does. It proposes giving Probation Service providers the power to publish the names and photographs of people carrying out unpaid work as part of their sentence. What could be the purpose of this measure? What problem is it solving? It does not support rehabilitation. It is not going to reduce reoffending. It appears to make humiliation part of the sentence given to the offender, and not just the offender but the people around them—their family and friends, potentially. This is a significant departure from evidence-based practice and threatens to undermine the goals that we claim to be pursuing.
I note that the Chief Inspector of Probation has warned that naming and shaming offenders is likely to act as a disincentive to rehabilitation and that, instead of encouraging compliance, it risks pushing people away from engagement entirely. If someone is planning to turn up, do the work and meet the terms of the order, why on earth would we introduce a measure that is likely to be an active discouragement for that? The evidence tells us that reintegration into their community, into employment, is what prevents reoffending. Public exposure will have the opposite effect. Probation officers, through their union, have raised alarm about the outcome for families, especially for children, who can bear the weight of a sentence for a crime that they did not commit. We know of cases where children have been bullied, harassed and even forced to change schools because a parent’s offending has been publicly exposed.
This is not just the view of a few organisations; 24 charities and experts, people who are working day in and day out with children and families affected by the justice system, have put out a joint letter opposing this clause. They warn about photographing people on unpaid work and publishing the images online, where they may remain indefinitely. We now have photo recognition software, so we can expect this only to get worse in future, and that will follow people for life. It risks making it harder to get a job or secure housing; it risks vigilantism and violence, and it risks damaging the children. We have international obligations to uphold the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. We should consider the best interests of a child in every policy decision, yet this clause very clearly does not.
I can see that some other noble Lords wish to speak, so I will stop now, but I think there are very strong and unanimous feelings on this clause and the wrong direction that it is heading in.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
My Lords, I support the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle. Parliamentary draftsmen have been appropriately euphemistic in the title of Clause 35, but they could have drafted it: “Naming and shaming of offenders in the community”. I oppose Clause 35, and therefore support the amendments in that vein, because it is contrary to the ambitions of the Bill as a whole, undermines rehabilitation and therefore the prevention of further crimes and is outwith the philosophy of the Bill. I hope and believe that the Government are better than Clause 35, and I know that my noble friend the Minister is better than this. With his characteristic humility, he described himself as a simple entrepreneur who ran a business to mend shoes, but he also ran a business to mend humans—in both cases attempting to save “soles”.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
I am sorry. It is nearly Christmas, and it is late.
There are policies that sit on shelves in Westminster and Whitehall for many years, and over the years and the decades people reach for the shelf and pull them off. It is very easy to blame civil servants, but the special adviser class—a cross-party class—have their files on the shelves too, and this naming and shaming thing has been doing the rounds for decades. Our lovely friends the special advisers are not here in the Chamber at this time; they are at the Spectator party or the New Statesman party or whatever it happens to be this evening, but naming and shaming of offenders is a really bad idea.
I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett. The one point of difference is that, if one were to be charitable, one would say it is really important that the public have faith and confidence in community orders. I agree with that, so I would support a slight alternative to this approach, so that we are not naming and shaming particular offenders but taking other steps to make very clear in the community that this was built, cleaned or done by offenders serving sentences in the community. That would achieve the best ambitions of this policy without the cruelty and humiliation that the noble Baroness rightly identifies. That is what I ask my noble friends the Ministers to take back to the department and reflect upon. I think that would be something the Government could think about before Report.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I oppose this clause standing part of the Bill. It seems to me that everything that has been said by the noble Baronesses, Lady Bennett and Lady Chakrabarti, is right. I also agree with the suggestion by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, that there is nothing at all wrong with saying that work of a particular kind was done by offenders as part of their community order. What I object to is, as she says, the naming and shaming.
But it goes further than that—it is, by definition, naming and shaming of offenders under supervision, because it is only offenders who are undertaking an unpaid work requirement who will be subject to this clause. I suggest that the compulsory photographing of such offenders—by probation officers, if you please—and the publication of those photographs and the offenders’ names, would be profoundly damaging. I, like the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, regard this clause as likely to damage relationships between probation officers and their clients, undermine offenders within their communities and make it more difficult for those offenders to integrate within those communities. The clause is overwhelmingly unlikely to do anything to rehabilitate offenders or reduce reoffending. It is, in short, largely vindictive only. Since one can expect the publication of names and photographs mostly to be by local media outlets, such publication is likely to fuel hostility to offenders whom we are trying to rehabilitate among their community and likely to encourage what the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester earlier today called “penal populism”, with what, I suggest, could be only damaging effects.
We completely accept the position put by the noble Lord that community sentences are punishment and are intended to be punishment. They are punitive in the sense of restricting an offender’s liberty and imposing requirements that may be onerous on offenders, but they are also primarily directed at enabling rehabilitation and reducing reoffending. For such sentences to work, friendly and constructive relationships between probation officers and offenders, their clients, under their supervision and efforts to enable those offenders to be settled in their communities are vital. These proposals are, frankly, inimical to those ends. I have come across no evidence whatever that this kind of naming and shaming will do any good or reduce reoffending in any way. I believe it can only do harm. For that reason, I oppose this clause, and I invite the Government to abandon it.
Lord Bach (Lab)
My Lords, I am a great supporter of this Bill, and I also believe in tough community sentences. I think they are essential if we are to keep people out of prison. But I have to say that on this issue I do not see any positive point arising out of this clause. In my experience of working with probation officers—a long time ago, but I dare say they are not that different now than they were when I was in practice—I cannot see the likelihood of any probation officer wanting to do this and thinking that it was helpful in terms of making sure that his or her clients behave themselves in future. I think this is an excellent Bill, but I do not think this clause should be part of it.
Lord Foster of Bath (LD)
My Lords, I rise to support my noble friend and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle. The powers in this Bill currently propose that probation officers will have the power to publish offenders’ names and photographs alongside details of their unpaid work. The Government rightly argue that there is a need to increase the public visibility of sentences being carried out and allow people to see that justice is being done. I would go further and say that it is vital that those who are responsible for sentencing have greater confidence in community sentences.
I am currently chair of your Lordships’ Justice and Home Affairs Committee, but before I took over, my noble friend Lady Hamwee was the chair of that committee, and her committee produced an excellent report, Cutting Crime: Better Community Sentences. That made it very clear that over a long period of time community sentences had declined, not least during the upheaval, as we might call it, of the Probation Service; nevertheless, there was a continued decline. When it tried to analyse why that was, it found that it was in part because sentencers had lost confidence in community sentences. The mood was, “We simply don’t think that the orders we’re imposing will actually be enforced”.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, my noble friend said he thought I would agree. I agree.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, the Government have stated that the aim of this measure is to increase public confidence that justice is seen to be done as more individuals are diverted into the community. They claim that if individuals are seen to be giving back to their community then this will act as a deterrent against committing crime. I wonder whether there is an element of wishful thinking from the Government about this. The ability to take photos of offenders picking up litter is hardly a substitute for the prospect of time in custody.
If the Government intend to enact the substance of the Bill then perhaps any efforts to act as a deterrent are welcome, even a measure as small as this one. However, we would have to ensure that it is exercised properly and with a clear framework around it. Probation officers are already operating under extraordinary strain; they should not be required to improvise policy on a ground such as this, particularly when it has obvious implications for privacy, data protection and public confidence. There would have to be clear statutory guidance on when a photograph may be taken, the safeguards that exist against misuse and the redress that is available if things go wrong. As a number of noble Lords have mentioned, we must also guard against a drift towards humiliation or the selective publication of images in a way that would stigmatise individuals or particular communities.
If the purpose of Clause 35 is to demonstrate that unpaid work is both visible and constructive then the Government would have to ensure that the practice reflects those aims. Perhaps with proper regulation this might be possible, but without that it risks becoming another ill-defined power handed to an already overstretched Probation Service. We urge the Minister to commit to setting out clearly the safeguards and practical requirements that will clearly be required if a clause such as Clause 35 is ever implemented.
Lord Timpson (Lab)
I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones and Lady Bennett, and the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Beith, for tabling these amendments and raising their concerns about Clause 35. I also thank the noble Lords, Lord Foster and Lord Bach, for raising their concerns.
I am sure we can agree that people who commit crimes should show that they are giving back to society. This clause is about building public confidence in community sentences. Local communities should know that those who harm them are paying back and be able to see the positive work being done. As my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti pointed out, it is important that they can clearly see the benefits of community payback and have their say on the work undertaken by nominating projects in their area.
I understand there may be concerns about the potential impacts of this measure and I reassure noble Lords that careful consideration is being given to how it is implemented. I have listened to noble Lords’ comments and will take them away to thoroughly consider. I also reassure noble Lords that publication will not apply in all cases. Exemption criteria will be set out in secondary legislation. This will be used alongside clear operational guidance on the circumstances where publishing would not be appropriate. The criteria are to be determined but may include factors such as specific offence types or personal circumstances which present heightened risks to the offender, their families or others. Probation practitioners will use this guidance and their professional assessment to determine the right course of action. We should have confidence that they will use the power only where appropriate. I confirm to noble Lords that I have heard the points they have made and reiterate that we will reflect carefully before Report.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response and take encouragement from the phrase “thoroughly consider”. I hope, speaking as a former newspaper editor, that the noble Lord, Lord Foster, is right that yes, sometimes newspapers are right. We can live in hope.
I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. The hour is late, but we have had a very clear and engaged debate and a very clear direction of travel, even from the Conservative Front Bench. I think a fair characterisation would be that there is a great degree of scepticism about Clause 35.
I have just a couple of things to pick out. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, made a very important point about the relationship between probation officers and their clients. That really deserves extra consideration. I particularly thank the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble Lord, Lord Bach, for bringing their experience and knowledge and bravely delivering a clear message from the Government Benches.
Finally, I note that we have heard from both the current chair of the Justice and Home Affairs Committee and its former chair, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. The messages are coming to the Government from all angles. We reserve the right to bring this back on Report, but I very much hope that will not be necessary. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Morris of Bolton) (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 130 cannot be called as it is an amendment to Amendment 129.
Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd
“Management of offenders on probation: devolution to Wales(1) In paragraph 175 (prisons and offender management) of Schedule 7A of the Government of Wales Act 2006—(a) in sub-paragraph (3), omit “probation”;(b) under the “Exceptions” insert “Probation in relation to offender management”.(2) The Secretary of State must by regulations make further provision under this section to facilitate the transfer of the provision of the probation service in Wales from the Secretary of State to Senedd Cymru and Welsh Ministers.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause seeks to devolve probation services to Wales, by removing it from the list of reserved matters in the Government of Wales Act 2006.
Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)
My Lords, I beg to move an amendment that, at this hour of the night, might seem one that could have been moved on another occasion—but that is timing. This is a probing amendment to deal with a matter that is becoming important across many areas of justice, and Wales will return on a lot of Bills that are currently going through Parliament. I raised this issue at Second Reading and the Minister was kind enough to explain to me roughly where the problem is.
I think the problem can basically be described in this way: there are extremely good reasons, to which I shall come in a moment, for the devolution of probation to Wales. But the Government in Wales are anxious to have devolution to Wales, while the Government in London do not regard that as something they want to do—it is certainly not a priority—as they see their job as putting the Probation Service right first, whenever that may happen. What is very important is that what is happening is the subject of public debate, particularly because the elections are coming in Wales in May, and the various aspects of devolution are being highlighted by what one might call “friendly family discussions” between two different parts of the Labour Party: the Labour Party in Wales and the parliamentary party in London. It is so topical that, in fact, yesterday the research unit of the Senedd Cymru published a paper on this matter.
There are three options. The first is what I would call the Manchester model, which is a sort of dual commissioning for devolution to Wales. The second is passing executive responsibility to Welsh Ministers but maintaining control over policy in London; and the third is the devolution of both services and policy. There is a lot of information so, rather than trying to go through and explain it all, I will say that an extremely good paper by the Wales Centre for Public Policy and another paper by the Welsh Centre for Crime and Social Justice, through the Probation Development Group, set out many of the complex considerations.
The devolution of probation services was the solution when a commission that I chaired, which reported under the title Justice in Wales for the People of Wales, concluded in its chapter 4 that all penal services, including probation, should be devolved. This was an entirely non-political group. It included people well known in this area, such as Juliet Lyon, Sarah Payne and Peter Vaughan, the former chief constable of South Wales.
Why was it that we all came to the view that there should be devolution? First, and critically, justice in Wales is, for some reason, the one area of domestic policy that is not devolved. This is entirely irrational and is derived from the history of the way in which devolution emerged. In no other country in the world would you think that justice was so unimportant that you could leave it to one side and not devolve it with other services. In Wales, it is important that justice, and particular aspects of it, including the Probation Service, are devolved, so that they can work alongside the other parts of government.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, for bringing this issue to the Committee. Effective probation practice depends fundamentally on local knowledge, local accountability and integration with wider services, including housing, health, substance misuse, skills and so on. In Wales, these services, in contrast to probation, are largely devolved. It is therefore entirely reasonable to ask whether the current arrangement or settlement best serves the people of Wales and whether the structures we have today genuinely allow probation to work in partnership effectively with the devolved landscape.
The noble and learned Lord has raised an important point. We on these Benches do not commit ourselves today to the specific mechanism set out in the amendment. Devolution of an important plank of the criminal justice function requires proper consideration, planning and, above all, collaboration—I emphasise that word in the light of what the noble and learned Lord has said—between the United Kingdom Government and Welsh Ministers. We agree that that conversation cannot be avoided. It must be approached constructively with regard to the Welsh perspective.
Probation in Wales faces real pressures and deserves a stable and effective framework within which to operate. If the Minister believes that the current reserved model remains the right one, the Committee would expect him to set out clearly how it delivers coherence, integration and accountability, and how it is effective not in theory but in practice. We are grateful to the noble and learned Lord for initiating this debate, and we look forward to the Government’s response, probably not for just the one time.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Lemos) (Lab)
I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, for his amendment and his thoughtful engagement on this issue and others. I know he has met my noble friend the Minister outside the Chamber to discuss these things.
The Government committed to undertake a strategic review of probation in their manifesto, and it is still our plan to review the governance of the Probation Service, looking at partnerships across England and Wales. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, mentioned the Manchester model. I hesitate to agree with the suggestion that it is being imposed on Wales, but I have to say that I am rather a fan of the Manchester model. In fact, I regard myself as the progenitor of it—or one of them—when I was at HMPPS as its lead non-executive director. That is part of what is on offer, as it were.
It is important that the recommendations in this Bill are first implemented and that we bring stability to the Probation Service in England and Wales as it currently is before undertaking any structural review. The Government believe that this would not be the right time to consider factoring structural changes into the many changes to probation that will arise as a result of this legislation. I understand that the doctrine of unripe time is often a fairly feeble excuse for inaction, but I am sure that everyone in the Committee recognises that—if I can put it like this—the capacity for change in the Probation Service, with this Bill and the current situation, is pretty much maxed out.
The amendment proposes devolving the Probation Service, but not the equivalent in relation to sentencing or prisons. Devolving parts of the criminal justice system in this way would create a divergence between the management of offenders and the wider criminal justice, sentencing and prison framework across England and Wales. We know that poor handovers, weak communication or gaps in support during the transition from custody to the community are among the greatest barriers to successful resettlement, so we are concerned that some of the changes that might arise as a result of this would create friction in the way that I have suggested. Therefore, any framework in which prisons and probation are separately owned, funded or designed carries a real risk that the two halves of the process might fail to connect, particularly at a time of strain. When that happens, people leaving prison can all too easily fall through the gaps.
That is the heart of the Government’s view at the moment—that this is not a good time to impose structural change on the Probation Service. We want to be sure that we do not create the sort of risks and frictions that I discussed. We will continue to work closely with the Welsh Government to support the local delivery of services by devolved and reserved partners in Wales. I hope that I have given the noble and learned Lord some reassurance, at least sufficient for him to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)
My Lords, I completely agree with the noble Lord who has responded. It is obviously sensible to devolve prisons and probation together—that is what we recommended—but the political reality of the way in which the Governments in Cardiff and London relate, particularly when they are of the same party, made me think at this stage not to put down prisons and probation. I shall rethink that for the next time.
I wish that people here would realise that there will be no effective change to the Probation Service until we can take some of the money out of prisons and put it into probation. I am sure that most people who think about it realise that the Government do not have any money and realise it has got to come from somewhere, and that imprisoning people for sensible and shorter times is a much better policy. I would like to see that done in Wales, and I am convinced it could be done, so I will think about the suggestion from the Minister that we should put down both on the next occasion.
I said that the Manchester model was being imposed, but it is really a Hobson’s choice. That is what I mean about it being imposed—“You want something, so we will give you a little bit to keep you quiet”. But it is not the right model, because Manchester is not a country; it is a city in England where people here make decisions on policy. Wales is a different country, a proud and ancient nation. That is the difference, and that is why the Manchester model is good for Manchester but not good for Wales.
In the light of all that has been said, I hope that I may return to this issue, maybe in a slightly different and wider form of amendment, as suggested. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
“Review of sentence following a change in law(1) Where a person is serving or subject to a sentence imposed for an offence, and—(a) the offence has been abolished, or(b) there has been a change in the law which materially alters the sentence that would be imposed for the same offence following that change in the law,that person may apply to the sentencing court, or to such other court as may be prescribed, for a review of the sentence.(2) On such an application, the court may—(a) quash the sentence and resentence the person in accordance with the law as so changed, or(b) make such other order as necessary in the interests of justice. (3) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision for the procedure and eligibility criteria for applications under this section.”Member's explanatory statement
This new clause would allow a person still serving a sentence under a law that has changed to seek review or resentencing in line with the existing law.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, this group of two amendments in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee addresses the position of the effect of changes in the law.
Amendment 138 would give a right of review to an offender serving a sentence for an offence that has been abolished, or where the change in the law has altered the sentence that might be imposed. The offender in such a case would be entitled to apply to the court to give them the benefit of the change in the law and seek a decision that the sentence should be quashed, or a resentencing on the basis of the law as changed, or an alternative order that was in the interests of justice. It is a simple amendment that would entitle an offender serving a sentence to say that the law has changed and that if they were sentenced today or tomorrow, they would not be suffering the sentence that they are now serving, so please change it.
Amendment 139 addresses changes in the law more generally. It would require the Secretary of State to review and report every three years on changes in the law that would affect those already sentenced, where their sentences would be different as a result of changes in the law. So we move from the particular in Amendment 138 to the general in Amendment 139. The report would cover the adequacy of existing mechanisms for addressing perceived injustice arising from such changes in the law. The report would be bound to include recommendations for change to address such injustices and also data on the numbers of offenders involved and the numbers of those still in prison.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, these amendments may appear useful in a time where sentencing laws are revised with increasing frequency, as illustrated by this Bill. A call for transparency and data is also generally welcome. Both amendments reflect a desire to ensure that justice keeps pace with changes in law and society. I am sure that anyone can support that general intention. We would invite the Government to address constructively the concerns that lie behind these amendments.
However, it appears that there may be very real practical issues and difficulties about any such amendment to the Bill. To take one simple example, the Bill, when it becomes law in its present form, will determine that someone who is sentenced to 12 months or less should have a suspended sentence. At the point when the Bill becomes law, is everyone then serving a custodial sentence of 12 months or less going to seek review on the grounds that the sentence should now be suspended? It seems to me that there are an awful lot of practical difficulties around that possibility.
Then, of course, we are going to have people reviewing the Sentencing Council recommendations from time to time who will say, “Wait a minute: they used to recommend three years for what I did, but they are now recommending two. Could I please have a review?” While the amendments are well intentioned, it occurs that there could be an immense number of practical difficulties, putting aside even the imposition upon the courts to review sentences at regular levels.
Lord Lemos (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for these amendments, which I understand are seeking to ensure fairness in sentencing outcomes and are clearly rooted in the commitment, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, said, to ensure that justice keeps pace with society.
That said, it is important to recognise that mechanisms already exist to address perceived injustices, including criminal appeals and sentence reviews, and mandating a formal review every three years with accompanying data and recommendations therefore risks duplicating existing oversight functions and placing additional burdens on the justice system. As the noble Lord will appreciate, there are already pressures in our justice system and it is especially important that we ensure that any reforms that create additional burdens are proportionate, targeted and deliverable.
I note, however, that the recent Leveson review calls for a full review of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 to modernise how criminal records are disclosed. The Government are considering this recommendation and will update the House in due course. In addition to that, the Law Commission was invited by the Government to consider the law on criminal appeals. Its consultation closed earlier this year and the responses are currently being analysed. We can expect the Law Commission to report to the Government with recommendations next year. Given that those pieces of work are in train, I hope that gives the noble Lord some assurance that those recommendations will be carefully considered. While we are sympathetic to the principle that fairness underpins these amendments, for the reasons I set out, I ask him to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I will withdraw the amendment at this stage, but it is on the basis that I do not accept the criticisms of the detail of Amendment 138 made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen. The fact that a sentence has to be suspended under the requirements of the Bill does not mean that it is necessarily a lesser sentence that would not have been passed. In relation to other sentences that would not exist or offences that have been abolished, it seems to me that Amendment 138 ought to be accepted.
I accept that there are considerations of spent convictions that may have a bearing on this, but I am not sure that we are in the same ballpark when we are talking about spent convictions and either quashing a conviction or resentencing as a result of a change in the law. As for the review and report on recommendations and data, I understand that the Government’s position is that such review is carried out. It would be helpful to know what the publicity for that exercise is and how far the public and everyone else is going to be made aware of the reviews that are carried out, but that is something that we can discuss informally, I dare say. In the meantime, I will withdraw the amendment, if leave is given.
Baroness Chakrabarti
“Removal of power to remand in custody for a person’s own protection or welfare(1) Schedule 1 to the Bail Act 1976 (persons entitled to bail: supplementary provisions) is amended as follows.(2) In Part 1 of that Schedule omit paragraph 3.(3) In Part 1A of that Schedule omit paragraph 5.(4) In Part 2 of that Schedule omit paragraph 3.”Member’s explanatory statement
The amendment would repeal the power of the courts to remand a person in custody for their own protection or, if they are a child or young person, for their welfare.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
My Lords, I wish I could offer every Member of the Committee who is still here an espresso at this point. Instead, I will try to be short and lively.
This amendment is the only amendment that I have tabled to a Bill that I broadly support, for reasons that need little explanation at this point, but Amendment 140 in my name—by the way, I also support Amendment 147 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Foster of Bath and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames—has been on my conscience. I am particularly grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for signing it. Of course, she was the first and distinguished chair of your Lordships’ Justice and Home and Affairs Committee.
This amendment concerns a provision in the Bail Act 1976 that, to my shame, I was unaware of until relatively few weeks ago, notwithstanding working in this area of law and policy for over 30 years. It really is on my conscience, and I think it should be on the conscience of the Government and the Committee. The provision states that vulnerable people may be remanded in custody for their own protection, even when they are charged with non-custodial offences. I would like to know from my noble friend the Minister’s reply, among other things, how this is conscionable and how it squares with the Government’s commitment to Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which sets very tight criteria for detaining people.
I was extremely grateful, as always, for a conversation about this with my noble friend the Minister and his officials two weeks ago. However, as a former government lawyer, I am always concerned about the danger of resistance to amendments because they “weren’t invented here”. I plead with my noble friend and other Members of the Committee to engage with a scandal. It is not a scandal on the scale of IPP. I did not speak in that debate to spare the Committee’s time, but I associate myself with all those who spoke on the IPP amendment. This is not indefinite detention, with all the lost hope, but it is about detaining vulnerable people who should not be detained for their own protection on remand in the criminal justice system.
I am advised by a coalition of NGOs—noble Lords in the Committee will have received their joint briefing—and Justice in particular. I am grateful to Emma Snell, a brilliant young lawyer at Justice, who has educated me about this provision. The coalition is broad; it includes Nacro, Inquest, the Centre for Women’s Justice, the Prison Reform Trust, the Howard League and so on.
Most of the people who appear to be detained for their own protection, including when charged with a non-custodial offence, are being detained because they have an acute mental health crisis, are suffering from addiction or are homeless. Some of them are at risk from others; that could be reprisals in the community or it could be from criminal gangs, and so on. However, none of that is justification for taking someone’s liberty, as opposed to keeping them safe and helping them. This is not something that we would do to witnesses. We would surely put a witness in a safe house rather than detain them for their own protection. I am incredibly concerned that we persist with this.
Furthermore, the Labour Party spoke against this in opposition only a couple of years ago, and it has been criticised by all the experts in the sector: the independent non-governmental bodies, the chief inspectors, et cetera. To my mind, it is unconscionable that we should detain somebody for their vulnerability and not for a danger that they pose to others. The classic and other grounds for remanding in custody, rather than on bail, are, “You will reoffend”, or, “You will interfere with witnesses”, and so on, but the idea that you should be detained for your own protection or, in the case of children, for your welfare is something that needs to be addressed.
To be fair to the Government, they are already proposing in the Mental Health Bill that this should not be on mental health grounds alone. That is progress, necessary and to be commended. But necessary is not sufficient, because there are other vulnerable people who will not be diagnosed as being vulnerable because of a mental health condition. That could include vulnerable women, homeless people and people who fear reprisals from criminal gangs. They should be made safe, and there are provisions to make them safe in other ways. I think the Committee would want to move away from the idea that we as a political community and a society can only care for and protect people through detention and coercion, and certainly the Bill, in its general thrust, is attempting to do that. I beg to move.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, I was very glad to sign this amendment, and I am very grateful to the noble Baroness both for having spotted it and for introducing it so clearly.
A few minutes ago, the noble Lord, Lord Lemos, used a phrase about justice not keeping pace with society. This is an example of that. It seems to me to be a hangover almost from the Victorian age. It is a cruelty to keep people in detention when they are actually vulnerable and need support. They are very often people among whose problems are mental ill-health; they just happen to have more vulnerabilities and problems than people who will fall within the Mental Health Bill.
“For their own protection” seems to me to be a misnomer. The reality is that this can make their condition worse. Some years ago, the Joint Committee on Human Rights conducted an inquiry on detention, which in part covered this issue. The stories we heard were frankly horrifying. This is not the time of night to go into them—but this is an area where we should really ensure that justice keeps up with and leads society.
Lord Foster of Bath (LD)
My Lords, I will speak briefly to Amendment 147. Noble Lords will be well aware that, in earlier debates, I have argued that what we do—whether it is for a custodial or non-custodial sentence—is of course about punishment but should also be about taking steps to reduce reoffending. I have therefore argued that either the police or the Probation Service must put in place measures to help with that, which would include things such as education, skills, and also measures to help people with drug, alcohol, and—as I have added—gambling disorders. We have had those debates already.
However, in today’s debate, I have mentioned the fact that something like 20% of people in prison are on remand, awaiting sentencing. As a result of the huge backlog in the Crown Courts, which I have also mentioned, it is a fact that many of those on remand will be in prison awaiting sentencing for quite a long time. So, it seemed to me perfectly reasonable that, while they are in prison, there should be opportunities that might help them in later life anyway, in terms of the same sorts of measures. This amendment very simply says that those who are in prison on remand should have made available to them the same level of provision that is provided for prisoners after sentencing. It is as simple as that, it seems to be common sense and I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, turning first to the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, I must say from the outset that we on these Benches cannot support it. The power to remand a person in custody for their own protection—or, in the case of a child or young person, for their own welfare—is not one that the courts use lightly. It is already tightly circumscribed and deployed only where the alternative would expose an extremely vulnerable individual to serious harm.
To remove that safeguard entirely would be a mistake. There are rare, but very real, occasions when a defendant’s personal circumstances, exploitation by criminal gangs or acute safeguarding concerns mean that the only safe option, in the immediate term, is to keep them in secure accommodation. That judgment, made by a court on evidence and subject to challenge, is not one that we believe Parliament should now deprive them of. Where children are concerned, the imperative is even stronger. The court’s paramount concern must be people’s welfare, and removing this power risks leaving young people unprotected in precisely those situations where intervention is most vital. For these reasons, we cannot support Amendment 140.
We strongly support the principle underlying Amendment 147 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Foster. Far too many people spend far too long in remand—months and, sometimes, well over a year—awaiting trial or sentence. For all practical purposes, they experience incarceration in the same way as sentenced prisoners. They are deprived of liberty, separated from their families and often held in conditions indistinguishable from the sentenced estate. Yet those in remand do not have the same access to rehabilitative programmes, education, therapy or other forms of support that are routinely offered post sentence.
That is increasingly difficult to justify, particularly given that time spent on remand is overwhelmingly treated as time served for the purposes of the ultimate custodial sentence. If we accept that remand can form a significant part of an individual’s total period in custody, it cannot be right that this is, in effect, dead time, in which they are able neither to progress their rehabilitation nor to address the issues that may have contributed to their offending behaviour.
Therefore, the amendment proposed by the noble Lord is a valuable contribution to a discussion that is long overdue. It does not prejudge the precise mechanisms or impose unworkable obligations on overstretched services, but it rightly challenges us to consider whether the current disparity is effective or conducive to reducing reoffending. The Government should engage seriously with the spirit of these proposals.
Taken together, the amendments highlight two themes that run throughout our debates on the Bill: the need to protect the vulnerable and the need to ensure that custody, whether pre or post sentence, serves a constructive purpose. I hope that the Minister will commit to further work in this area, and I look forward to his response.
Lord Lemos (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, for her amendment and for taking the time to discuss her related concerns with my noble friend Lord Timpson. I also thank her for her support for the Bill and its overall intentions—that is very much appreciated coming from someone with her track record.
Amendment 140 would remove an important safeguard which, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, said, is very rarely used but remains an option for the courts as a measure of last resort and out of concern for the defendant. Eliminating this provision could leave vulnerable individuals without any viable protection, particularly where alternative care arrangements were simply unavailable or could not be implemented swiftly enough. We fear that those may be the consequences. Examples where it may be used include where it is the only option available to the court to keep someone safe, such as in cases where the defendant is a member of a gang and could be subject to repercussions if they were not protected.
I hope it will also reassure your Lordships that the Mental Health Bill, which the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, referred to, is now in the other place. It includes a reform to end the use of remand for one’s own protection under the Bail Act where the court’s sole concern is the defendant’s mental health. This reform should ensure that remand for one’s own protection is, therefore, used only as a last resort in the circumstances I have outlined.
At this stage, repeal would leave a gap in the available provision. Courts must retain the flexibility to act decisively in safeguarding individuals when no other option exists. The amendment would risk unintended consequences for vulnerable defendants and undermine the protective function of the justice system.
Amendment 147, which I thank the noble Lord, Lord Foster, for tabling, seeks to allow prisoners held on remand to access rehabilitative programmes, education, therapy and other support before the start of their sentence. The Government’s view is that the amendment is not necessary, given that remand prisoners can already access those programmes where prisons run them.
There is also an important legal distinction here that I should highlight to your Lordships. Remand prisoners are held in custody pending trial or sentencing, and some have not yet been convicted. Of course, we recognise that people are spending more time on remand; therefore, as I have said, where these services are available and in the right circumstances, they should be able to access them. However, remand prisoners are legally distinct from sentenced prisoners, and we have to reflect that in the priorities for resources.
There are already mechanisms in place to support remand prisoners, including access to healthcare. At the moment, the Government have no plans to expand all rehabilitative programmes, education, therapy and other support to remand prisoners. This would require substantial changes to prison operations and resourcing, and could divert resources from those already convicted and serving sentences. We recognise, however, some of the changes in the remand population. My noble friend the Minister and I would be very happy to continue to talk to the noble Lord, Lord Foster, about these matters but, given what I have set out, I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
My Lords, I am so grateful once more to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, but, I have to say, I am disappointed in the responses from both Front Benches on this occasion. They were uncharacteristic, knee-jerk responses that do not display a broader understanding of the other laws of England and Wales that deal—or should deal—with vulnerable people.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, mentioned children. There are ample measures for protecting children under the Children Act 1989 and looking after them in more appropriate circumstances than in criminal justice detention. I remind the Committee that we are talking about defendants who are being detained not for the classic justifications that they would commit further offences, interfere with witnesses and so on, but for their own protection. Of course, the criminal justice estate is not a place of safety or protection for anyone.
I did not hear a reply to my question about how this can be justified under Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights, but perhaps my noble friend the Minister could drop a note on that and offer it to other Members of the Committee. There will not be too many to send it to because there are not many Members here, but I would be hugely grateful for that.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, had it right when she talked about a Victorian hangover. There are too many Victorian hangovers in this area of law and policy, and I know that my noble friend Lord Timpson is well aware of that. The thrust of the Bill, in general, is about departing from such Victorian hangovers, such as social death and locking people up and throwing away the key. I urge further reflection.
If I am a member of a criminal gang who wants to turn King’s evidence but I am not charged with a minor offence, I will have to be put in a safe house, and there are schemes and measures to do that. But if I happen to be charged with a low-level offence that does not attract a custodial penalty, I am told that it is a last resort and that I am going to be locked up in a prison system where I will be more at danger from the criminal gang than I ever would be in a safe house. These are rather disappointing arguments from members of the Committee who, on reflection, may think again. I shall certainly return to this on Report, but I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
“Suspension of driving licences during bail for driving related offences(1) This section applies where an individual has been granted bail in respect of one of the following offences—(a) an offence under section 1, 1A, 2B, 2C, 3ZB, 3ZC, 3ZD or 3A of the Road Traffic Act 1988;(b) an offence under section 4, 5 or 5A of the Road Traffic 1998.(2) The court may, as a condition of bail, suspend the driving licence of the individual, pending the outcome of any criminal proceedings.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause would allow the court to suspend the driving licence of an individual charged for certain driving offences, pending the outcome of the trial.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, this amendment, in the final group of what has been a very long afternoon and evening, would give the power to a court when granting bail to a defendant charged with the most serious driving offences to suspend that defendant’s driving licence pending the outcome of criminal proceedings.
To recap fast, the offences covered by the amendment are: causing death or serious injury by dangerous, careless or inconsiderate driving; causing death by driving unlicensed or uninsured or when disqualified, or by careless driving when under the influence of drink or drugs; driving or being in charge of a vehicle while unfit through drink or drugs; and driving or being in charge of a vehicle while unfit through having alcohol over the limit or controlled drugs over the limit.
The reason for this amendment is obvious. When a court grants bail, it is carrying out an exercise of balancing the public interest in not prejudging the guilt of a defendant before that defendant is tried against the other public interest of keeping the public safe. I contend that the balance is clear when a power formally to suspend the driving licences of defendants charged with these offences is under consideration. These are life-threatening driving offences, and suspending a licence as a condition of bail for such a defendant is entirely appropriate. The suspension may not always be imposed but for the power to be there seems quite clearly desirable. I beg to move.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, for bringing forward this amendment. It proposes as a condition of bail to allow the courts to suspend the driving licence of individuals charged for certain driving offences. The offences in question include causing death or serious injury by dangerous driving or by careless or inconsiderate driving, or by unlicensed, uninsured or disqualified drivers. In addition, it includes those charges relating to driving when under the influence of drink or drugs or above the prescribed limits.
Safety on our roads is of prime importance, and the police have the ability to impose driving bans as a condition of bail under the Bail Act 1976 to ensure that further driving-related offences are not committed by those charged while criminal proceedings are ongoing. Indeed, driving offences committed while on bail are rightly treated as a serious matter. None the less, the potential benefits of public safety must, in a country where you are presumed innocent until proved guilty, be balanced with the rights of an as yet unconvicted defendant. Individuals who are granted bail may be on bail for extended periods of time, during which they may, assuming that other conditions on work have not been put in place, still have to drive to their place of work, for example.
So far, the powers to impose a driving ban as a condition of bail have been operational matters for the police. That said, allowing the court to suspend the driving licence of an individual as a condition of bail pending the outcome of any criminal proceedings would be a preventative step to reduce the risk of further driving-related offences being committed. We thank the noble Lord for initiating this debate and look forward to the Government’s response.
Lord Timpson (Lab)
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for this amendment, which seeks to give courts an express power to suspend the driving licence of individuals charged with specified driving offences as a condition of bail. We recognise that driving offences can have devastating consequences for victims and for their families and friends. Driving while under the influence of alcohol and drugs is a serious offence with potentially life-changing consequences.
There are already robust powers available to the police and the courts to impose bail conditions where there is a risk to public safety. This includes restrictions on driving where appropriate. In certain cases, courts may also impose an interim driving disqualification before sentencing. Road safety remains an absolute priority for this Government. The Department for Transport will shortly publish a new road safety strategy, and the Secretary of State for Transport has indicated that this will include a review of motoring offences. While I appreciate the importance of the issue raised by the noble Lord, given the forthcoming strategy and existing powers available I urge him to withdraw this amendment.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
I ask the Minister to consider this. The power to suspend that is sought by this amendment would be a power exercisable by the court and therefore reportable to the DVLA, as a result of which the driving licence would be formally withdrawn. I am not sure that is true of a ban on driving imposed by the police as a part of bail. That is the importance of the suspension that I suggest.
Lord Timpson (Lab)
I thank the noble Lord and will very happily meet with him next week to discuss that, as I suspect that there may be other matters that we wish to discuss on this Bill. I would be very appreciative of that.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
Pending those discussions, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
“Women’s Justice Board: annual reportThe Secretary of State must lay a report annually before Parliament reporting on the work of the Women’s Justice Board including in particular actions taken in response to its recommendations.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment requires the Secretary of State to lay an annual report before Parliament on the work of the Women’s Justice Board.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, this is the last amendment this evening. I am sorry to have to detain noble Lords, but I regard women’s justice as important. I know that the Minister does too, as he chairs the Women’s Justice Board, which is the subject of this amendment. It is quite new and is an important innovation with an impressive membership. I will not detain noble Lords by, as I had intended to do, reading through its purpose as set out in the terms of reference. However, its focus on early intervention and diversion, community solutions, issues specific to pregnant women and mothers with dependent children and reducing the number of young adult women entering the criminal justice system is not something that I have heard expressed before. These are all very important.
I am not suggesting that the board is not transparent. Its minutes are online, and the terms of reference include publication of an annual report as well as ad hoc reports. However, publication effectively by the Secretary of State would give its work the weight that it deserves. That is probably the best way of describing it. Even though this is the last amendment, it was one that I thought of early on. We cannot go through a Bill such as this without highlighting the needs of women offenders. We have referred to them, but it has felt a little as if they have been rather an add-on.
I will take the time to say that very often women who are offenders are victims before they are offenders: in particular victims of domestic abuse but also victims of circumstances. The MoJ data from 2023 estimated that 10% of cases that result in sentences of 12 months or less are related to domestic violence and, in a further 10% of cases, the offender is flagged by probation for domestic violence—so I am told by Refuge. I should declare an interest there, having a very long time ago chaired Refuge for a very long time.
The offences are often small, but they can be persistent. So we, the Liberal Democrats, were very pleased to see the creation of the Women’s Justice Board. It has for a long time been party policy. In fact, I discovered that my noble friend Lord Marks summed up the amendment that went to our party conference, including this. We would like to entrench its position as solidly as possible and give it the appropriate publicity. I beg to move.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, on the Conservative Benches, we are grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for tabling this amendment, which, although the last tonight, is certainly not the least important. It rightly draws our attention to the work of the Women’s Justice Board and the special needs of many women offenders. The case for transparency and for this report being published is well made. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.
Lord Timpson (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for her amendment and her continued interest in the Women’s Justice Board. I am very proud to chair it and drive its work forward. Noble Lords will be pleased to know that it is going well and I am very fortunate to be working alongside so many talented experts.
This amendment seeks to ensure parliamentary oversight of the board’s activities and outcomes, which would have the effect of subjecting the board to parliamentary scrutiny. As the noble Baroness knows, like her, I have a great interest in women’s justice and fully recognise the importance of transparency in this area. But Parliament already has well-established mechanisms to hold the Government to account, including through parliamentary Questions and Select Committee inquiries.
Reforming the way women are treated in the criminal justice system remains a keen ambition for this Government and for me personally. The expertise provided by the Women’s Justice Board is an important part of shaping our approach to the wider justice system. Although we cannot accept this amendment today, I assure the House that we are committed to keeping Parliament informed and will consider how best to provide periodic updates on the work of the board through appropriate channels. I suspect that one of the best ways we can update noble Lords is through the work we do and the results we get. I hope that this reassurance will enable the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, indeed, the results are what matters. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.