Schools: Cadet Expansion Programme
Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts(4 years, 11 months ago)
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Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Lingfield, for obtaining this debate. I particularly commend his praise of Ofsted and its renewed interest in and emphasis on the whole child. This wider emphasis on the whole child, in which the cadets can play such an important part, is really good for our society in the broader educational sense and in this sense.
The Cadet Expansion Programme was launched in June 2012 and aims to open 500 cadet units in state schools across the country. Labour strongly supports this work, as it continues to offer new horizons for young people. Children and teenagers often learn important skills such as teamwork, resilience, confidence and self-esteem which can prepare them for the future, whether or not they end up having careers in the forces.
According to the 2018 Ecorys report into the cadet experience, kids in cadet forces better engaged with peers, got stuck in to their school work and liked being at school. For example, 59% of cadets learnt new skills, and 69% of RAF cadets achieved high GCSE results when compared to other pupils.
The Cadet Expansion Programme allows schools to build better links with the local community. The same report found that the presence of cadets at community events such as Remembrance Day often provided a tangible way to raise the profile of the school within the surrounding area. One respondent added that the link with the local community was,
“much stronger, and mutually beneficial”.
We on this side of the House rightly recognise those benefits.
The report concluded with various recommendations, including increasing publicity about cadets, enabling schools to develop longer-term strategies for their units, and further research into the programme’s outcomes. Can the Minister update the House on any progress on these recommendations, as well as confirm that the Government are on course to meet the target of 500 units by March 2020? Will the Minister also consider introducing a review of awards for cadets and adult volunteers to make them equivalent to recognised skills and educational standards such as the Duke of Edinburgh awards?
According to government figures published in April, there were 14,540 Sea Cadets, 37,670 Army Cadets and 32,850 Air Cadets—over 85,000 in total. However, these figures sadly revealed an almost 2% decrease, as well as a decrease in the number of adult volunteers for the Combined Cadet Force of almost 7.5%. While we wish to express our enormous gratitude to adult volunteers who give up their precious time to take part, the fall in their overall number is concerning. Can the Minister explain why there has been such a large fall in the number of adult volunteers? We should ensure that these people are recognised in the honours system, as they believe they are often overlooked.
The figures also showed that female representation in the Community Cadet Forces has increased slightly from 30.8% in 2015 to 33.4% in 2019. However, the Government stated that,
“the rise in the proportion of female cadets can be partly attributed to the decrease in the number of male cadets.”
Can the Minister explain how the MoD is to encourage girls, as well as those from BAME backgrounds, to take part in cadets? Funding too remains a key constraint for many. While the MoD covers some costs, schools have to meet others costs of employing a co-ordinator for the cadet unit and providing cover for teachers who are acting as adult volunteers. Can the Minister confirm how much funding has been awarded to schools through the Cadet Bursary Fund?
To close, I reiterate Labour’s support for the cadet programme and the benefits young people can gain when they take part. I hope the Minister is able to answer my questions, and that the Government will take positive steps to encourage the growth of cadet units across the services and across the country.
Afghan Interpreters: Security Clearance
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Earl Howe
My Lords, the Cabinet Office policy contains guidelines for appropriate nationality and UK residency periods for prospective applicants, but they are not absolute requirements and should be considered on a case-by-case basis for each individual. It is important to understand that the process of security clearance is a matter of assessing not simply an individual’s trustworthiness but the degree of risk to that individual in the circumstances of the employment that they seek, and the security measures that would be needed to protect that individual and potentially their family as well.
Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)
My Lords, the way in which the Government have treated Afghani interpreters is an absolute travesty. During the UK’s 13-year mission, they risked their lives in support of our Armed Forces, but have since been forced to work in low-paid jobs as well as struggling to secure security clearance and family visas. It has been reported that vacancies remain for interpreters with NATO forces in Afghanistan, so does the Minister accept that the Government’s decision not to speed up the security clearance process has hampered NATO’s continuing mission in that country?
Earl Howe
My Lords, I hardly accept anything that the noble Lord has just said. I do not believe that the Government’s scheme for previously employed interpreters is a travesty. I was glad to hear the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, endorse the quality of the scheme because uniquely in the world it is there to provide for our former staff and their families, who have played such a generous role in supporting UK and NATO staff in Afghanistan. In total, through our ex gratia redundancy scheme, around 500 former staff and their families have relocated to the UK, which represents around 1,295 individuals in total. In June last year the then Defence Secretary announced that the criteria had been even more generously expanded. We are the only nation with a dedicated investigation unit in-country to investigate and provide solutions to intimidation.
Defence: Expenditure
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Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)
My Lords, I wonder whether we could build on that point, as I am a little confused. In the good old days, when a Secretary of State made a speech, one had reasonable assurance that he was speaking the policy of the Government. That is not so clear at the moment. Have the various statements by the Foreign Secretary been more in his role as a candidate for Prime Minister than as a representative of the Government?
Earl Howe
As I said earlier, my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary was suggesting that it is right for the Government to ask themselves the question of how much they should be spending on defence. That is the question we are asking ourselves, or will shortly be doing, in the spending review that faces us this year.
D-day: 75th Anniversary
Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts(4 years, 11 months ago)
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Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Earl, Lord Howe, for introducing this debate, and congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Reay, on his maiden speech.
I was going to read the excellent speech that my adviser prepared for me, but I realise that it is not valid. I have no relations who were involved in the Second World War; my father was a hospital worker throughout that period. Little bits of the story have been so well told this afternoon that I will limit myself to commenting on what came out of the quite extensive reading I did in preparation for this debate. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, for reminding me how useless it is preparing speeches.
The first thing that comes across to me is particularly relevant given the present visit of the President of the United States: the role of America in the 20th century, in particular its great President, Franklin D Roosevelt, and how he managed that presidency. The decision to enter the Second World War, in a country that had been isolationist for many years after its experience in the First World War, was enormously difficult for Roosevelt, who had seen that it was going to be necessary to gradually move to that decision. Fortunately for Europe, it was aided by first the Japanese at Pearl Harbor, and then by Hitler declaring war on America two or three days after that event—a tactical and strategic error of enormous proportion.
To me, there is no obvious reason why the Americans then committed themselves to a Europe-first strategy. They had an enormous threat in their own back yard—the Pacific—but they decided that the best way to face it was to commit to Europe. That commitment, not just in the Second World War but in the peace that followed and with the Marshall plan and the creation of NATO, has been the bedrock of the very privileged peace that we—particularly our generation—have enjoyed. When an unfortunate person, in my view, becomes President, we must not lose sight of just what western democracies owe to the commitment of Americans—both in blood and treasure—to that peace.
We also lose sight of the importance in this story of the Russians. Hitler once again helped there by not reading his history. Had he studied Bonaparte more carefully, he might have worked out that attacking Russia had never been a successful enterprise. But he did not do that, and he declared war on Russia. That drew the Russian people into the war, whether they liked it or not. One cannot do other than admire their enormous fighting retreat. The Germans got within artillery range of Moscow, but they fought back at enormous cost, in people and resources. By the time of D-day, they had stopped the advance at Stalingrad and effectively won that battle. The battle of Kursk, the biggest tank battle of all time, had taken place, and the Germans were effectively in retreat and devoting a substantial part of their military capability to the eastern front. D-day and the campaign that followed it would have been very different if the Germans had been able to focus their total military effort on the second front.
Today of course has to be a commemoration, but to a degree it also should be a celebration. D-day was one of the most brilliant pieces of logistics in all history. The bringing together of the resources—the men, the machinery, the supplies and the training, all working together to get the procedures right—was so successful; anyone who, like myself, was involved in bringing things together will know that. It was an exercise that was not, I am sure, on budget, but it was certainly on time. It is not an easy thing to assemble 2 million people, ready to attack. Things must have gone wrong, but the machine barely paused. The extremely clever, in-depth logistics had self-amending built in, so that when things went wrong they were corrected, and everything came together on time. It was also a magnificent example of co-operation, between nations and between senior people and those working at all levels of the machinery. There was interaction between the three Armed Forces—the Navy and the Air Force and the Army—and between those of different nations, coming together. It was a brilliant piece of logistics.
Sitting alongside it was an incredible deception. It started with the code breaking, but the security services were able to ensure that every spy that the Germans tried to infiltrate into this country was caught. As far as we know from the records, no German spy was successful in England. They were caught and executed or turned. The successful turning of those agents meant we were able to build this tremendous deception, which carried on many days after D-day—forces actually turned back to Calais again. The Royal Air Force made a brilliant contribution by dropping pieces of foil in its progress across to Calais which looked on the German radar as if there really was an invasion about to happen.
One of the few things that I know a bit about, having been an aviator, is the contribution of Group Captain Stagg. People do not notice how good modern weather forecasts are. If we think back, we would not believe it. We get a very good picture now of the weather about seven days ahead with only relatively minor variations. The world was nothing like that in 1944. There was not even an agreed allied way of doing forecasts. There was a very clear difference between the American view and the British view. Because of his eloquence and his ability to explain things, Stagg’s view prevailed. He and his team had one advantage. A book by John Ross states:
“The Allies had a much more robust network of weather stations in Canada, Greenland and Iceland; of weather ships and weather flights over the North Atlantic and observations by secret agreement from weather stations in the neutral Republic of Ireland … Those weather stations, in particular one at a post office at Blacksod Point in the far west of Ireland, proved crucial in detecting the arrival of a lull in the storms that Stagg and his colleagues believed would allow for an invasion on June 6”.
It had been a dreadful summer and the weather on 6 June was crucial. The invasion would have failed on 5 June or 7 June because of the weather. The next slot in terms of the moon, tide and those sorts of things was 14 June, when the worst summer storm for years destroyed one of the Mulberry harbours. The contribution of Stagg and his team would not have been easy. One has to admire Stagg, who would have had to stand up to considerable debate, and the bravery of Eisenhower backing him to go on 6 June that made it possible. I am just in awe that all these things worked. I wish things I have planned had gone so well and I bet that the Government do too—imagine if they could have done universal credit like D-day. But we put that to one side.
If I were of the age then I suppose I could have had a go at the logistics. If I had done the training I could have had a go at the meteorology. But I cannot understand the raw courage of those young men, many of them conscripts and most of whom had never been in combat before, who knew in the first wave that they may lose half of their people. I do not how they got into those boats or how they got out of the landing craft. I cannot look at myself and be sure that I could do it. There were very ordinary people who had the raw courage and selflessness to do it. It is impossible to express my awe and admiration for them and the leadership that made it a success.
We are commemorating and, as I said, in a sense celebrating D-day because it is crucial that we remember it. I am not a historian, but my vague feeling for the history of Europe is that, broadly speaking, over the last 1,000 years, Europe has either been at war, recovering from a war or preparing for a war. That may be a slight overgeneralisation, but the 70-plus years of peace that we have enjoyed since the Second World War is a very special period in European history. It is so dangerous to forget what it came from. We must remember how to avoid war. We must spend our time preaching that and of course deterring war. Commemoration is essential so I applaud the work of the Royal British Legion and of the Government in their co-operation in the commemorations. D-day and the subsequent campaign was a brilliant success. Things went wrong, but it was a brilliant success. It was born and persisted out of selflessness, courage, sacrifice and co-operation. If only we could show more of those qualities today, the world be a better place.
Brexit: Common Security and Defence Policy Missions and Operations (European Union Committee Report)
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Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)
My Lords, I welcome the useful report by the European Union Committee on the common security and defence policy. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Horam, for introducing the report and am grateful for the contributions of other noble Lords.
The CSDP dates back to 1948, when five countries, including the UK, signed the Brussels Treaty, which envisioned a collective defence effort to keep the continent safe after the Second World War. It is also seen as a proud achievement on this side of the House, because it was one of the steps pursued by Ernest Bevin to provide the security on which the reconstruction of Europe could be built. Since then, the Labour Party, along with EU partners, has played a defining role in establishing the framework for EU peacekeeping, crisis management and conflict-prevention missions.
When I read the committee’s report, I was reminded of how, during and after the EU referendum, the leave campaign often claimed that collective EU defence policy undermined the UK’s priorities. Defence was toxified during the debate, and fears of an EU army were enhanced to question whether the UK’s sovereignty would survive further co-operation. The EU was blamed for sapping our military might.
Helpfully, the committee’s conclusions, as well as to some extent the Government’s response, allow us to debunk such myths. The report found that CSDP missions and operations have made a significant contribution to a number of UK foreign policy priorities, including tackling piracy, promoting the rule of law, and peacekeeping in post-conflict situations. For example, the UK-led Operation Atalanta contributed to a dramatic fall in piracy in the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden, and was overseen here in Northwood.
The Government’s response to the report highlights Operation Althea in the western Balkans as supporting,
“the UK’s foreign policy priorities”,
by bringing security and stability to Bosnia and Herzegovina. It also states that, even after Brexit,
“UK priorities for European security are unlikely to change”.
This, of course, reveals the great Brexiteer myth of EU defence—that it has somehow been imposed upon Britain.
The report also shows how the UK was only a modest contributor to EU crisis management and missions overseas. It states that UK personnel contributions have been “very limited” and equal 2.3% of total member state contributions. Of the 35 past or current CSDP missions, the UK has provided 25, with an average of 16 personnel per mission—hardly a great drain on our resources. Britain’s main contribution was strategic guidance during the planning and review of missions and operations. Claims that the EU, rather than government cuts, was to blame for the UK’s diminishing Armed Forces are shown to be unfounded.
Since the report was published last May, we now have the withdrawal agreement, which has been defeated in Parliament three times, and the political declaration, which confirms how the UK faces a new future as a third country in terms of defence co-operation. It may participate in CSDP operations and missions, but without any leading capacity; the UK’s Defence Minister will no longer be able to take part in meetings; and the UK has the possibility of participating in the European Defence Agency, but without any decision-making role.
Perhaps one of the biggest failures of the Government’s botched negotiations is the fact that the UK will no longer have access to the Galileo satellite navigation system. The political declaration is incredibly vague on this point, stating:
“The Parties should consider appropriate arrangements for cooperation on space”.
It appears that the Government are lost in space. Why have they failed to secure continued participation in Galileo? Can the Minister confirm the Government’s plan for influencing the shape of EU defence and security policy after we leave the EU? This report also called for the UK to continue to sit on the Political and Security Committee, but this is not included in the political declaration. Does the Minister believe that observer status for the committee can be achieved?
As the Government continue to bring forward no-deal SIs, we can assume that they believe no deal remains a possibility, perhaps if the country is faced with a Boris Johnson Brexit. This would be disastrous for our collective security. We would have to withdraw from all common security and defence policy missions, we would be permanently shut out of the European Defence Agency, and our defence industry would be hit by crippling tariffs and delays at the border. When will the Government see that no deal is not an option?
Labour supports continued UK-EU co-operation on defence, and our priorities remain peacekeeping, crisis management and conflict-prevention missions. We will also continue to champion EU-NATO collaboration to promote and support European and global security effectively, especially on cyber warfare and artificial intelligence.
However, austerity has badly damaged our ability to co-operate internationally on defence. Budget cuts have led to sharp reductions in troops, equipment and investment. The Ministry of Defence faces an affordability gap of between £7 billion and £15 billion, and recruitment across the board is in free fall, with the Army standing at 75,880, well below the Government’s target of 82,000. Uncertainties over the UK defence budget could erode our standing, not only in Europe but with NATO and other key allies.
As the report shows, our modest contribution to the common security and defence policy acted as a significant force multiplier for the UK. Close defence co-operation between the EU and the UK makes us all safer, and I hope the UK will continue to participate in CSDP missions after we leave—whenever that may be. But the Government still have many questions to answer about post-Brexit defence co-operation with our closest partners.
NATO
Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts(5 years, 1 month ago)
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Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Earl, Lord Howe, for introducing this debate and the many noble Lords who have participated in it. It has been wide-ranging, and it is therefore inevitable I will repeat some points.
I am honoured to take part in today’s debate on the 70th anniversary of the founding of NATO. Over the past 500 years, the average lifespan of a collective defence alliance has been 15 years. That is why NATO’s anniversary is so impressive, and why it has been described as one of the most successful defence treaties in history. Against the backdrop of the ongoing Brexit chaos, the alliance remains the cornerstone of the UK’s defence policy and our collective security, and will become even more important as we leave the European Union and face new threats in the years to come.
For the Labour Party, NATO’s 70th anniversary is an extra special celebration. It was the leadership of Clement Attlee, and his Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, that was so instrumental in setting up the alliance in 1949. When Bevin moved the Motion in the other place to approve the North Atlantic Treaty which established NATO, he called it,
“one of the greatest steps for peace”.
He went on:
“In co-operation with like-minded peoples, we shall act as custodians of peace and as determined opponents of aggression, and shall combine our great resources and great scientific and organisational ability, and use them to raise the standard of life for the masses of the people all over the world”.—[Official Report, Commons, 12/5/1949; col. 2022.]
Bevin stressed that the purpose of this pact was to act as a deterrent. It sent a message to potential adversaries that NATO’s members were not,
“a number of weak, divided nations”,—[Official Report, Commons, 12/5/1949; col. 2017.]
but a united front, bound together in the common cause of collective self-defence. To this day, this common cause is sought through peaceful settlement and collective responsibility for action. Article 1 strongly articulates the need for peaceful resolution to disputes, while Article 5 underlines how an armed attack against one,
“shall be considered an attack against them all”.
Today, the original 12 NATO members have grown to 29. Along with its central role of ensuring the security of the North Atlantic area, NATO also supports global security by working with partners across the world. In non-combat missions in Afghanistan it provides advice and training to security forces, while Operation Active Endeavour seeks to deter terrorist activity in the Mediterranean. More than 800 members of the UK Armed Forces are also stationed in the Baltic states as part of a NATO mission to reassure allies and deter aggressors.
NATO allies are committed to spending a minimum of 2% of their GDP on defence, and it is right that we encourage all allies to meet the NATO guidelines, as the 2014 Wales summit communiqué made clear. However, the UK is barely scraping over the line when it comes to its own level of defence spending. In recent years, the UK’s defence expenditure to NATO has included several items that had not been included previously, such as the addition of pensions to the 2% target; Labour did not include them when we were in government.
We must recognise that years of government cuts have severely affected the UK’s military capability. Recruitment across the board is in free fall, with some front-line British Army battalions down by one-third. The 1st Battalion Scots Guards is 34% below its workforce requirement, while the 2nd Battalion The Princess of Wales’s Royal Regiment is 31% below its target strength. This is unsurprising since the National Audit Office found in December that Capita, which has managed recruitment for the Armed Forces since 2012, has consistently missed Army targets, with a shortfall ranging from 21% to 45% each year. The Government’s decision to outsource recruitment to the company has been a total failure. Morale across the Armed Forces has also declined during the past decade, dropping from 66% to 51% for Royal Marines officers, and the Ministry of Defence has said that its equipment plan faces an affordability gap of between £7 billion and £15 billion.
It is impossible to suggest that this lack of investment and care for our forces, as well as uncertainty about spending commitments, does not undermine the UK’s role in NATO. How can the UK be a key player in the alliance if questions about the long-term commitment to defence spending remain? If recruitment and morale are failing, and if the Ministry of Defence simply cannot afford the equipment it needs, I urge the Government to address these issues immediately.
As we look forward to the next 70 years for NATO, it is clear that it will need to adapt to new resurgent threats. Despite, at times, the isolationist and unpredictable actions of the US, the relationship between America and Europe remains incredibly important. It constitutes £3 billion a day in trade, and our countries share deep interests and values—especially a fundamental belief in democracy. This relationship provided vital protection for citizens in the face of the actions of the Soviet Union. It will continue to be important in the face of resurgent threats from Russia. In the last few years, Russia’s aggressive stance has repeatedly attacked our rule-based international system with abhorrent disregard and self-interest. This was shown through its disgraceful and illegal annexation of Crimea and Donbass in 2014, and in the reckless poisonings in Salisbury last year. These actions have led to a renewed focus on the immediate security of the alliance and the need to secure NATO’s eastern border.
In government, Labour would engage with NATO to see how it could maximise security and dialogue inside and outside the alliance area, as well as using membership to promote democracy and human rights. We would also want to examine how NATO and the UN could interact and operate together more effectively on conflict prevention and peace operations.
Technology is also opening up whole new dimensions for warfare. Cyber remains a huge task for the alliance, but it has taken some welcome steps. At the Brussels summit in 2018 the allies agreed to set up a new cyberspace operations centre, and cyberattack can now trigger an Article 5 response. As NATO also strengthens its co-operation with the EU on cyberdefence, it represents a key area where the UK must continue to co-ordinate action with our European partners after Brexit. We must not allow the UK leaving the EU to limit our security and defence co-operation with important allies, especially when it is in our interest.
AI will also be at the heart of most future cutting-edge technologies, in both the military and civilian worlds. Machine learning will enable new modes of warfare, including various forms of autonomous and semi-autonomous weaponry. The country that invests earliest and most aggressively may end up in a position of military supremacy. Camille Grand, NATO’s assistant secretary-general for defence investment, said that he viewed artificial intelligence in the broad context of new and disruptive technologies, adding:
“Nobody has fully assessed how much it’s going to change the way we do military operations. Is AI going to be a tool to assist in decisions, or is AI going to allow for more autonomous systems to operate?”
To answer these questions we must explore how NATO and the UN can work together to develop an international governance framework to provide oversight of the use of AI by the military, especially the ethical and moral implications of autonomous weapons. The stronger the position we take now, the more likely that AI will be used as a global public good.
On its 70th anniversary, NATO’s success is undisputed. Having seen it secure seven decades of peace and stability, Labour will ensure that it remains the cornerstone of the UK’s defence policy in the years to come, as it adapts to maximise security, pursue dialogue and promote human rights as warfare changes far beyond Attlee and Bevin’s comprehension.
Royal Navy: Type 31e Frigates
Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts(5 years, 2 months ago)
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Earl Howe
The noble Baroness is quite right: in April, the forecast cost of the equipment plan exceeded the allocated budget of £7 billion over 10 years, which is the central estimate. Indeed, if we took no action, the plan would not be affordable. However, based on past experience as well as what we are doing, we are confident that we will successfully deliver the plan within budget, both this year and next year, through effective management, by monitoring and controlling costs as we go, and with the benefit of the additional money secured in the Budget.
Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)
My Lords, on 20 July 2016, the then chief executive of Defence Equipment and Support, said to the Defence Committee that,
“the eight Type 26 frigates are approximately £8 billion-worth of planning going forward”.
I interpret that as meaning that a Type 26 frigate will cost £1 billion. The Government have consistently said that the Type 31e frigates will cost a quarter of £1 billion each. Just how incapable will these frigates be, or does the Secretary of State have a magic wand?
Earl Howe
My Lords, the Type 26 is a high-end specification, anti-submarine warfare frigate; not unnaturally, that specification makes it expensive. The Type 31e is an adaptable, general purpose frigate, subject to completely different procurement processes. However, it should not be inferred from that comparison that the Type 31e will be in any sense a low-grade warship. Of its kind, we intend it to be a world-beater, which other Governments will wish to buy.
Armed Forces Act (Continuation) Order 2019
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Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD)
My Lords, unlike my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford, I have not been involved in any of the Armed Forces Bills going back to 2006 or before, nor indeed to the equivalent statutory instrument last year. However, last year the equivalent debate was in Grand Committee in the Moses Room, where I listened to my noble friend Lord Campbell speaking on behalf of the Liberal Democrats.
When I went yesterday to get the draft statutory instrument, the Printed Paper Office was a little overtasked. In the end, I was given six copies of a draft that said “2018”. I thought that did not seem quite right, but I read the draft. I went in this morning to see whether that was really what I was meant to be reading, and got the draft defence statutory instrument for 2019. The phrasing of the two statutory instruments is almost equivalent, but two paragraphs have been added to the Explanatory Memorandum. There is paragraph 8, to which the noble Lord, Foulkes, has already referred, and paragraph 9, which says, under the heading “Consolidation”:
“This instrument does not amend any other legislation so no consolidation is needed”.
However, paragraph 8 on the EU, headed “(Withdrawal) Act/Withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union”, says that it does not relate to this—and the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, said “Hallelujah”. If one looks very closely at the Explanatory Memorandum, the footer indicates that it is from DExEU. I assume that this is simply because the Civil Service is so overwhelmed by statutory instruments at the moment that the assumption is that nothing can come as a statutory instrument that does not relate to Brexit. It says “DExEU/EM/8-2018.2”. I assume that DExEU is not really involved with this statutory instrument, and that it is the normal MoD statutory instrument and Explanatory Memorandum.
We have already heard that whether the Armed Forces, starting with the Army, can go forward requires the consent of Parliament. This year, of all years, it is essential that Parliament gives its consent to ensuring that the Armed Forces can move forward. If we are to believe some of the preparations for Brexit and a no-deal Brexit, we are led to understand that Her Majesty’s Armed Forces might be brought into some sort of action to ensure stability, not just of the realm externally, but within the United Kingdom.
Since this order appears to be being used a bit like a Christmas tree Bill, to enable noble Lords to talk about various defence issues, clearly it is important to stress, alongside the noble Lord, Lord Judd, our support for and gratitude to the Armed Forces for everything they do in the service of our country. On this occasion, however, I should also like to ask the Minister whether the Armed Forces are being prepared for action in the event of a no-deal Brexit, and what work Her Majesty’s Government are doing to ensure that the Armed Forces have the resources that they require.
The Minister has told us that the statutory instrument and these rules allow for command, disciple and justice, all of which are important, but it is also important to think about the well-being of our Armed Forces, and ensure that they are able to do their job as effectively and efficiently as possible. If we are thinking ahead to the need in due course for another Armed Forces Bill in 2021, what work is the MoD doing to think about the future, and is there some way in which your Lordships’ House can assist the Minister and the MoD to ensure that the Armed Forces have all the resources they require?
Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing this instrument. The Labour Party supports Her Majesty’s Armed Forces, and I am sure that support goes across the whole House. My boss in the other place, Nia Griffith, used this order to comprehensively review the present position of the Armed Forces. I will restrict myself to quoting two paragraphs of her speech, the first on,
“forces numbers and the alarming downward trend across each of the services. When Labour left office in 2010, we had an Army of 102,000 … an RAF of 40,000 and a Royal Navy of 35,000. Now they are all substantially smaller. The Army and RAF have been cut by 25% each and the Navy is down by nearly 20%”.
The second paragraph states:
“The steady decline in service morale is a significant worry. The proportion of Army personnel reporting high morale in 2010 was 58% for both officers and … other ranks, but that fell to 46% for officers and … 36% for other ranks in 2018”.—[Official Report, Commons, 18/2/19; cols. 1229-30.]
I have never had the privilege to serve full-time in Her Majesty’s Armed Forces, but I have been involved with them over the years. I was taught that effective armed forces come from good equipment, good training and good morale, and the drop in morale since 2010 is sapping away the capability of our Armed Forces. I hope the Minister will agree and give some indication of how this will be addressed in the future.
I have just two specific questions about the law.
Lord Tunnicliffe
My Lords, that is not a question for me but for the Minister. What it brings out, given some of the contradictory statements by Her Majesty’s Government, is the need for a proper Armed Forces debate in the not too distant future—I think that is the view across the House.
I move on to my narrower questions. First, what happens if we do not pass this instrument? The Minister has anticipated that question substantially in his opening speech, but the one area he did not cover is what would happen to military personnel if it is not approved. What happens on simple issues such as whether they are paid and whether their accommodation is still available? The information he gave us earlier was all about the maintenance of discipline, which we can all understand. But we also have to recognise that we may be unabling the continued proper employment of personnel by passing this order.
The order and the Act that we are keeping alive are about the law. The one area that I have never really managed to understand is this: by what authority does a member of the Armed Forces use lethal force? To put it more directly, when that person kills someone, why is that not murder? Is the explanation different when war has been or has not been declared? In particular, what is the legal position if they kill someone supporting the civil authority in the United Kingdom?
Earl Howe
My Lords, I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate. I will of course do my best to answer all the questions that have been raised. I start with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, who gave us a most interesting exposition of his long experience, not only in relation to the Armed Forces but also as a law officer. Not unnaturally he homed in on the service justice review, which is being undertaken by His Honour Shaun Lyons, who, I am sure noble Lords will agree, has an excellent knowledge of criminal law and procedures, as well as having served in the Royal Navy as Chief Naval Judge Advocate. The review is covering all aspects of the service justice system, including court martial and the types of cases that it deals with, the summary hearing process, the service police and the Service Prosecuting Authority.
The policing aspects of the review are being led by Sir Jon Murphy, a former chief constable of Merseyside Police. The noble and learned Lord asked whether it was possible to see the conclusions of the report. The answer is, “Not yet”. The review is due to report in the spring. That will give us time to consider it and, if necessary, make plans for any legislative changes before the next Armed Forces Bill in 2020. As for consultation, there is no public consultation on the process, but Judge Lyons is consulting a wide range of stakeholders with an interest in the service justice system. Of course, he can be contacted by interested parties through the head of the review secretariat.
The noble and learned Lord asked in particular about the ability of the service justice system to deal with serious offences. As he will be aware, the service justice system is capable of dealing with the most serious offences, and has done so over the course of history. It has been held to be compliant with the European Convention on Human Rights, both for investigations and prosecutions within the UK and abroad, where the civilian police do not have jurisdiction. We are, however, keen for the review to take a strategic look at all key aspects of the service justice system, and this is one of the issues being explored.
The noble and learned Lord referred to the use of majority verdicts under the current system. The Government, as he will be aware, have been successful in establishing, both in the European Court of Human Rights and in the civilian courts, that the court martial system is in principle safe, independent and impartial. The current system has been considered twice by the Court Martial Appeal Court in the last five years and was on both occasions held to be fair and safe. Noble Lords, and noble and learned Lords, will know that the Court Martial Appeal Court is made up of the same judges as sit in the civilian Court of Appeal. That Appeal Court has held that there is no ground for deciding that a verdict by simple majority is inherently unfair or unsafe. I am advised by my noble and learned friend Lord Keen that in Scotland a majority verdict of eight to seven in a murder case, for example, would be sufficient to convict an accused person. However, the Government recognise that there are differing views about the system of majority verdicts, and this is another issue that will be covered by the review.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, for the compliments he paid me over the recent Written Answers that I was able to give him. I am glad that he found them helpful. He referred to the dreadful accident that I am sure we all remember involving the deaths of two RAF pilots in Scotland. I will take away the suggestion he made about the possibility of encouraging the process to move forward in Scotland. I would not wish to give a firm undertaking to that effect, because I do not want to do anything improper as regards undue influence on the Scottish Executive, but I undertake to take the point away.
The noble Lord asked me about Gibraltar and the jurisdiction over Gibraltar in relation to this order. The Armed Forces (Gibraltar) Act was passed by the Gibraltar Parliament on 8 November 2018—very recently. It came into law on 10 December 2018. The Act gives effect in Gibraltar law to certain provisions of the Armed Forces Act 2006, and Gibraltar wishes to make its own provisions in relation to that Act. Of course, we continue to work with Her Majesty’s Government of Gibraltar on the inclusion of the Royal Gibraltar Regiment within the Armed Forces Act 2006 service discipline regime to ensure that a discipline system is put in place that meets the needs of the regiment. The noble Lord also asked whether there had been any consultation on the order. There has been no public consultation but, as a matter of routine, the Armed Forces are consulted in relation to legislation that affects the service.
The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, asked what point we had reached in relation to an issue that he has very effectively championed in this House on more than one occasion: the vexed issue of the challenge in recent years to the principle of combat immunity. This has created considerable legal uncertainty about liability in combat situations and the risk that we may be moving towards the judicialisation of war, if I can put it that way. We want to introduce better combat compensation for those injured in combat operations and for the families of those killed. The public consultation closed on 23 February 2017. Therefore, we have consulted and are still carefully considering the views expressed during the consultation and will be publishing a response.
The proposal that we are advancing is that compensation would be paid at the same level as court damages, which can often be substantially greater than awards under the Armed Forces compensation scheme. Our aim is to ensure that those who have risked their lives in the most challenging of circumstances should be put in the best possible financial position quickly. That last word is one of the operative words, because some of these cases have a tendency to drag on and it is immensely upsetting to the individual or their family—and many times to both. The vast majority of compensation paid in these circumstances currently is not as a result of MoD negligence. These proposals are aimed at providing combat compensation to those who have suffered in the most extreme circumstances. We will announce further proposals in due course and I hope to have further news before too long on that front for the noble and gallant Lord.
The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, asked what arrangements involving the Armed Forces are being considered for the case of a no-deal Brexit. She will remember, I am sure, that on 18 December last year my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Defence announced that approximately 3,500 service personnel would be held on standby to ensure that defence resources were available to support the wider Government to implement their no-deal Brexit contingency plans, if required. In headline terms, the prudent standby package will comprise approximately 3,500 personnel at varying levels of readiness, including niche capabilities such as military working dogs. No defence estate is ring-fenced at this time as it is anticipated that there will be spare capacity available during spring 2019 to provide a warehousing/storage function, if that is required. Similarly, it is judged that in extremis a request for defence strategic transport capability could be accommodated by existing capacity.
In addition to the prudent standby package, defence has also been making available military planning expertise to support other departments with their Brexit contingency plans. To date, we have provided 28 military planners to a number of departments across Whitehall. I hope that that outline is helpful to the noble Baroness.
Earl Howe
I assure the noble Lord that we are only too aware of the point he has raised. I think there is common to us all an antipathy to seeing large numbers of Armed Forces personnel on our streets, so to the extent that that can be avoided, it will be. However, it is prudent nevertheless to have the kinds of contingency plans that I have outlined.
The noble Lord, Lord Judd, asked me, very properly, about the training that Armed Forces personnel receive before they are deployed to a combat zone. I can tell him that such training as he asked me about does take place; that is, training in international law, international humanitarian law and the law of armed combat, which of course governs all that we do, and indeed those key provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights. We are as mindful as he would wish us to be of the need to maintain the kinds of standards that set an example to other nations in how our Armed Forces personnel should behave in such circumstances.
The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, referred to the fall in Armed Forces morale, as evidenced in recent surveys. It will not surprise him to hear that we take this extremely seriously. There is no single reason for that fall in morale, but we are aware that a number of factors play into it. That is why the chief of defence personnel is leading an important work strand in the Ministry of Defence known as the people programme, which involves looking at the terms and conditions of service—that is, pay and pensions—and accommodation arrangements for personnel; flexible service is another strand. A proposal is also being explored to use the early departure payment resource more effectively and efficiently, which, it is hoped, will address part of the issue we face over the retention of trained people. Therefore, we are not sitting back and doing nothing. However, it is true to say that at a time when the Army in particular is not deployed on an overseas operation in large numbers—although we are overseas in modest numbers—morale tends to suffer. Young men like an exciting challenge, and if they are sitting in barracks and simply training, there is a tendency for morale to dip. That is not to sound complacent, but I am advised that we have seen that in the past.
The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, asked me by virtue of what law a soldier or serviceperson is empowered to kill. Of course, UK military personnel are always subject to UK law, even on overseas deployments, under the Armed Forces Act. As such, they have the right to use force in self-defence in accordance with UK domestic law. In the context of overseas armed conflicts, personnel may also use offensive force in accordance with their rules of engagement, which reflect the position under both domestic and international law, including the law of armed conflict. I hope that those answers will have been helpful to noble Lords. To the extent that I have not covered everything, I will of course write.
Lord Tunnicliffe
I wonder whether the noble Earl could be a bit more specific in the answer to the last question—not now, obviously, but I really would value a letter, because this is a key question. As we know, when it goes wrong, the alternative is that the person involved is indicted on a murder charge. When we give people the responsibility to use lethal force, it would not be unreasonable for them to know that there is a very solid background for them to do as they are ordered.
Defence and Security Public Contracts (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019
Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts(5 years, 3 months ago)
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Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for introducing this statutory instrument. On the other hand, that is not really true: the facts of life are that I would rather not spend my weekend studying SIs for a scenario that is deeply absurd and the Government should have ruled out many months ago. It is, however, forced upon us.
Initially, I tried to read the Explanatory Memorandum while applying the test that I have been using so far—that there is no new policy except what is necessary to smooth the transition. That is essentially the test of the withdrawal Act. He has already said, however, that this SI goes beyond what is allowed in the withdrawal Act. I noticed that the SI also prays in aid the infamous—as I would call it—European Communities Act 1972, which must have the grandest powers of any piece of primary legislation. Since, therefore, this is quite important—that the Government are seeking to mix the two—I would be grateful if he could give a little more detail on where the 1972 Act has been used and where he is praying in aid the 2018 withdrawal Act.
I found the Explanatory Memorandum difficult to understand because it requires considerable previous knowledge. I can find only one area of concern. In general, the references to the requirement for a new organisation—for new parts of government to take over what is happening in the EU—all seem to make sense.
Essentially, I think the Minister has said that this SI leaves the situation unchanged. Does that mean that the requirement to put defence procurement up for both domestic and international tender is unchanged, except where derogated under provisions similar to Article 346, which I assume is written into the regulations? Does the derogation for national security reasons remain unchanged? Has it been decided that it should not be enhanced, as many of us would argue it should, to include wider, more long-term considerations, such as the preservation of UK sovereign capability by favouring UK firms in some circumstances? This measure seems to create a situation where the rest of the world can bid for UK contracts except where derogated. Does that mean that UK firms will be able to bid for foreign contracts, particularly opportunities in the EEA?
Finally, can the Minister indicate what will happen to these regulations in the event of a deal? Do they die in total or in parts? How will the deaths be managed?
Earl Howe
My Lords, once again I thank the noble Lords who have contributed to this debate for their questions, which I will do my best to answer. The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, and the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, both asked a similar question about the coming into force of these regulations and the circumstances in which they might not come into force. These amending regulations apply only in a no-deal scenario, other than the changes being made under Section 2(2) of the European Communities Act.
The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, was slightly unclear as to how we could avail ourselves of powers under that Act if we are not a member of the community. The answer is that we are still a member of the European Union and we can avail ourselves of the powers under the 1972 Act until such time as we cease to be members. The very minor adjustments we are making will come into force regardless of whether there is a deal or no deal. If the withdrawal agreement enters into force, the UK, with certain specific caveats, will be treated as an EU member state for the duration of the implementation period. Therefore, the current DSPCRs will continue to apply for that period, albeit with the updates and corrections made in Regulation 2.
The noble Baroness and the noble Lord asked about those changes. They are very minor. They are, in the main, changes required to resolve outdated references and to correct an omission arising from an amendment to the European Economic Area agreement. There is an amendment to the definition of “member state” to add Norway and Iceland, ensuring that economic operators from those two EEA states are covered. Again, that amendment is required regardless of whether the exit-related changes come into force. There are various other minor changes that I can read out, but I think it would be tedious if I were to do so.
The noble Baroness and the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, asked about the effect of the coming into force of these regulations on UK companies and what the benefits to UK industry are likely to be. The main benefit for both UK and Gibraltarian suppliers will be stability and continuity of working regulations, which are well established, understood and practiced. Importantly, UK and Gibraltarian suppliers will continue to enjoy legal rights to participate in UK defence and security procurements. Other non-UK economic operators, save for those in Gibraltar, will not have these rights under the amending regulations. I make it clear that that is not to say that only UK or Gibraltarian suppliers can bid for defence and security procurements. As noble Lords will know, the UK has a long-standing practice of allowing overseas suppliers to participate in defence and security procurements where there is no need for restrictions on who can bid in some way—for example, on national security grounds.
The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, asked whether UK companies would be disadvantaged regarding their access to the EU market. As a matter of EU law, EU member states will no longer be legally obliged to open their defence and security procurements to UK suppliers, as the EU defence and security directive will no longer apply to the UK after exit day. However, it has to be said that our UK suppliers are recognised as world class. They offer extraordinary experience and expertise in defence. Individual EU member states therefore may choose to give UK suppliers access to their competitions to maximise the effectiveness of their procurements in the same way as the UK does. There is a strong case in terms not only of value for money but of other considerations, such as interoperability and cutting-edge capability.
Lord Tunnicliffe
I feel that I have lost my place. Is the Minister saying that non-derogated invitations to tender will be restricted to the UK suppliers and Gibraltar, or will they be available to worldwide competition, with certain exceptions?
Earl Howe
It will depend on the procurement. If it is determined that the procurement rate relates to an issue necessitating the protection of UK sovereign capability, as in the case of the construction of warships, we would restrict the tendering process to UK-based suppliers. However, the generality of defence procurement is opened up to the widest market possible, although, as was pointed out, we make clear in certain procurements that we will not entertain bids from certain countries. Each procurement has its operational basis made clear at the outset.
The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, asked whether we will give state aid to suppliers. We have no intention of providing state aid to UK suppliers, which is incompatible with our state aid regime. I am sure she will not be surprised to hear that. Having said that, it is important to understand that there are ways we can alert our home-based industry to forthcoming procurements to enable them to prepare their bids in good time and understand our needs. That process is already under way; we are clear that the entire procurement process needs to be smoother than it perhaps has been. That is not the same as state aid, however.
The noble Baroness also asked whether the Government have modelled the impact of the change on UK defence exports. As I said, defence suppliers will lose their legal rights to participate in procurement in the EU 27, but the quality of our companies should ensure that many EU member states will still wish to entertain bids from our defence industry. As the noble Baroness knows, the UK defence industry participates in co-operative defence projects, such as Eurofighter; that will not change either.
Lord Tunnicliffe
I am sorry to ask the same question over and again, but it is important: putting the derogated areas covered presently by Article 346 to one side, do the regulations—noble Lords must realise that I cannot read them; it took all my time to read the Explanatory Memorandum and try to understand it—require the UK to put non-derogated opportunities to international tender, or is that a matter for the United Kingdom Government’s discretion on a project-by-project basis?
Earl Howe
It is important to understand that competition remains at the heart of our approach to defence procurement. Currently, we routinely allow bids from suppliers outside the EU, although the current legislation provides a legal right of access only for suppliers based in EU member states. Where we restrict who can bid in some way—for example, on national security grounds, as I have mentioned—we would make that clear at the outset in the advert or in any pre-procurement documentation.
That position will not change after exit day. Suppliers in the EU and elsewhere will still be free to bid for procurements where no limitations are specified. What is changing is that bidders from the remaining EU member states will not have a legal right to bid for defence contracts; this is the same position as for suppliers currently based outside the EU. I hope that answers the noble Lord’s question.
Earl Howe
For UK Government defence procurements, the process from the point of view of an EU supplier will be no different. What it will experience is the need to bear in mind two separate portals or bidding channels; one is the UK e-notification system, which I mentioned earlier, and the other is OJEU. It will need to keep an eye on both if it wishes to participate in the Europe-wide market; in using that phrase, I include the UK as still being a European country, even if not a member of the EU.
Lord Tunnicliffe
The noble Earl says there will be no changes. I understand that at the moment, in non-derogated areas, EU suppliers have a right to bid and we have an obligation to take their bids seriously. I think that under the new situation they do not have this right and that whether they are allowed to bid will be a matter of policy. That policy could change year by year or Government by Government.
Earl Howe
That is technically right. It is our policy to maintain access for EU member states—and indeed, non-EU states—in many, if not most, instances of procurement. A good example might be the fleet solid support ships. We invited tenders from all over the world to build those ships and that should provide the best value for money. We all hope that UK suppliers will feel confident in bidding for that contract, but we wish to benefit the taxpayer as well as the Royal Navy and the process will be an open one.
To answer one point which the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, alluded to, there will of course be opportunities to reform the defence procurement rules after we leave the EU. The current rules are generally seen as out of date, compared to the PCR 2015. We have the opportunity to take a fresh look at what is needed for defence procurement—
RAF: Operational Conversion Unit
Lord Tunnicliffe Excerpts(5 years, 4 months ago)
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Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)
While we recognise that we have had to live without aircraft carriers, and then with aircraft carriers but without aircraft, when will the carriers be optimally equipped? The Minister seemed to imply in an earlier answer that that would be when 24 aircraft could be embarked and fully crewed. When will that be, how does that compare with the original plan, and what is the critical path: fully trained pilots or aircraft deliveries?
Earl Howe
With regard to whether the critical path is aircraft or indeed pilots, we clearly need both, and we are on track and within budget to deliver both in accordance with the planned rollout. For example, this will see initial operating capability for carrier strike—one squadron consisting of 12 frontline F35s and 18 pilots—in December 2020. Full operating capability, consisting of two squadrons, will be achieved in December 2023.