Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill
Debate between Lord Tyrie and Andrew Love(10 years, 5 months ago)
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Mr Tyrie
Broadly, yes. Given that I am already stretching things a little in my opening remarks, I will try to deal with prop trading at the most appropriate parts of my speech—but the short answer is, as I say, broadly yes.
The commissioners met yesterday to discuss progress. We believe that the Government have converted the lion’s share of the Banking Commission’s recommendations into statutory action, where required. It is worth listing what has changed. The following amendments have been made to the Bill in order to implement our recommendations: electrification of the ring fence has been considerably improved since Commons Report stage; an independent review of the ring fence, which can consider the full separation of the banking industry, has been introduced; the Banking Commission’s recommendations on prop trading, which we just discussed, have, for the most part, been implemented; the proposals for the senior managers regime have been improved; a certification or licensing regime has been added to the Bill; a proper definition of a bank—the Bill’s definition was defective when it left this place, and it was a major lacuna—has been added to the Bill; the PRA has acquired a competition objective to complement that of the FCA; and audit requirements have been tightened for systemically important firms.
Furthermore, a good number of undertakings and assurances have been given in response to specific recommendations. Most importantly perhaps, the bank will almost certainly be given the Financial Policy Committee responsibility for the leverage ratio, and the Government have said that they will legislate to that effect after a review. We would otherwise have had to wait until 2017-18 to have that considered.
Mr Tyrie
I have pressed the Bank of England on that issue with my Treasury Select Committee hat on. A subsequent exchange of letters between the Governor and the Chancellor makes it pretty clear that by the end of next year the issue will be resolved and responsibility will lie with the Bank. Indeed, I think that for anything else to happen, given that exchange of letters, would be considered extraordinary, unless the review came up with some major obstacle that no one had previously spotted.
Another important assurance has been given in respect of so-called special measures. We proposed the establishment of an intermediate tool between enforcement at one end of the spectrum and day-to-day supervision at the other, which regulators could use to keep an eye on banks and help to improve standards. The Americans have something of the kind, which is known as a memorandum of understanding. The Government said that the statutory underpinning that we proposed would not be necessary, but the regulators have now announced that they will produce a full and detailed guidance note after consultation, which will set out how the new tool will be created and administered.
Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill
Debate between Lord Tyrie and Andrew Love(10 years, 10 months ago)
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Mr Andrew Tyrie (Chichester) (Con)
I shall say a little more than I usually say in the House because these arrangements are quite central to the work of the banking commission and give me an opportunity— my first—to explain some of the reasoning behind that work. The two key amendments that I have tabled would empower the regulator to split up a banking group if there were serious failures in the culture and standards of the ring-fenced body or another member of its group. In deciding whether these serious failures have occurred, the regulator would be required to take account of the recommendations contained in the reports of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, which I chaired.
We produced five reports about a vitally important industry, one that has become embroiled in very serious scandals that have cost the consumer, taxpayers and the whole country a fortune. The parliamentary commission was the first of its kind for a century. The last, exactly a hundred years ago, collapsed in a heap of partisan acrimony.
We have produced five reports in under a year, all of which were agreed unanimously. We also put in an unprecedented amount of detailed work, taking evidence for 171 hours in no fewer than 76 evidence sessions, in addition to deliberating in private for a further 74 hours. I would like to thank my colleagues on the commission in both Houses for their huge contributions, injections of energy and endurance. I would also like to express my thanks for the equally impressive commitment of the commission staff and specialist advisers, led by Colin Lee and his two deputies, Adam Mellows-Facer and Lydia Menzies. Only the very limited time available prevents me from listing many more of the staff who put in so much work. I would also particularly like to thank the Front Benchers of all parties, who have offered a great deal of support.
The task now is to get the report implemented, primarily by regulators and banks, and, where necessary, supported by statute. The Government have today responded to the commission’s most recent report—our fifth. I have had a chance to flip through the response, but there has been no time to digest it fully—it is about 80 pages—and, of course, no time for anyone to table amendments as a result. In view of the extent to which it looks as if the Bill has been changed, I would be grateful if the usual channels could consider recommitting this Bill to Committee. Failing that, at the very least—as the my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg) has said—an extra day should be provided for consideration of what will inevitably be a mass of Lords amendments. Bearing in mind the struggle that we had to get the half-day tomorrow, I hope that the Government will show more flexibility about this extra time.
Having said that, I warmly welcome the supportive tone of the pre-briefing given to the Financial Times about the publication that we have had today. Still, I would rather have heard about it here first. I am also very pleased that so many of the proposals and also the argumentation for them appear to have been accepted in full. But I am not fully reassured. The Government appeared to have accepted the commission’s proposal on a specific power to force the separation of an individual bank, but here we are, at the eleventh hour, trying to prevent the proposal from being severely weakened by the Government. In fact, as I will explain, the Government’s amendments would render the specific power of electrification virtually useless.
Some of the commission’s important proposals have not been accepted at all, for example on leverage, on which we support the recommendations of the Vickers commission, and on reform of the Bank of England’s antiquated governance structure, on which the commission supports the recommendations of the Treasury Committee.
Other ideas that the Government have rejected include the need to wind up United Kingdom Financial Investments Ltd and the regulatory reforms to provide statutory autonomy for the regulatory decisions committee. I find that especially regrettable. The Government have also rejected the proposal to remove the FCA’s strategic objective. No one can see much purpose to this except the Government. It can be used to trump the operational objectives of the FCA, including that of competition, and can thus serve only to weaken those operational objectives. On all those issues, I hope that their lordships will repair some of the damage that we have been left with no time to attend to here.
Mr Love
I agree with the hon. Gentleman that it is an offence to Parliament to read about the Government’s response first in the Financial Times. Give the mixed reception from the Government to our fifth report, we should have adequate time to discuss all the very important issues about which we deliberated for many days and which appeared in our recommendations.
Mr Tyrie
I strongly agree with the hon. Gentleman and I have already made both those points, which he just reinforced. All the amendments that I have tabled on behalf of the commission are about standards. Banking continues to suffer from the effects of poor standards. Even in the seven months that we took oral evidence, we had two more major LIBOR scandals, the interest rate swap scandal, a major bank found to be involved in money laundering in Latin America, and another fined $670 million for sanctions busting in Iran.
It is sometimes suggested that trying to do much about this will drive banks overseas. But all of the evidence we took pointed to exactly the opposite conclusion. Far from imperilling the UK’s global competitiveness, high standards will make the UK a more attractive place to locate. Many good things can flow from higher standards in banking, among them a restoration of trust. Trust is an essential buttress to the UK’s reputation as a global financial centre. It is also vital for the British economy. While banks are not trusted by their clients and particularly by SMEs, there will be less lending and less economic activity.
The crisis of standards and trust in banking—and it is a crisis—is multi-faceted, and so are the necessary remedies. None the less, the nub of the problem can be characterised as twofold. First, there has been a lack of individual responsibility at the top of banks. Collective decision making has diffused responsibility and a sense of duty to be vigilant. Secondly, there has been colossal failure of judgment by regulators, with an approach based on pointless data collection on a huge scale and needless box ticking.
In a nutshell, boards were negligent and the system of regulation was found seriously wanting the first time it was tested. Both boards and regulators were motivated by an understandable desire to cover their backs, but their lapses were inexcusable. The lack of personal responsibility in banks has been aggravated by misaligned incentives. By that I mean bonus and remuneration structures. They encouraged bankers to make short-term gains while the full risks and costs became evident only later. The taxpayer ended up picking up much of the tab.
Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill
Debate between Lord Tyrie and Andrew Love(11 years, 2 months ago)
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Mr Andrew Tyrie (Chichester) (Con)
Last July, immediately after its creation, the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards was asked by the House to undertake pre-legislative scrutiny of this Bill. In other words, in addition to fulfilling its terms of reference it was asked to examine the Government’s proposals for the implementation of large parts of the Vickers review. We have worked very hard to do what the House has asked of us, and I particularly wish to thank all my colleagues on the commission; all the commoners are in the Chamber today and although I cannot see any of the five peers up in the Gallery, their work has been not inconsiderable—as has been pointed out, they are a formidable bunch. I also wish to thank the Treasury Committee, which has continued to participate in aspects of this debate in our inquiries and the vast majority of whose members—nine, I believe—are also in the Chamber.
The first report from the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, published in December, welcomed the Government’s decision to implement the Vickers ring fence, but we also argued that the ring fence had to be made much more robust if it was to have a good chance of enduring. We suggested that the level of innovation in financial services, the lobbying power of the banks, and the short memories of regulators and politicians all pointed to the need to reinforce the ring fence. That is why the commission recommended that the ring fence be supported by a reserve power, subject to final Treasury approval, to enable the regulator to impose full separation on a bank that attempted to game the ring fence. The Government have now accepted the merits of that recommendation and the Bill will be amended to provide for the reserve power, which is very welcome news.
In their response to our report, however, the Government did not accept a number of other proposals, so we produced a second report. It was published today and it seeks to do three simple things. First, for the convenience of the House, especially those Members who will serve on the Committee, it provides draft amendments to support all our proposals that might need statutory backing. As far as I know, that is an innovation for a Select Committee or Joint Committee and I hope that it will be of some use and perhaps set a precedent for how such Committees operate. The amendments have been prepared with the help of a former senior parliamentary counsel.
Secondly, an annex juxtaposes our recommendations against the Government’s response to enable the House to see clearly what has been accepted and what has been rejected.
Thirdly, the report examines the arguments made by the Government for rejecting a number of our recommendations. We were able do that on the basis of further evidence gathered from, among others, Sir John Vickers, the Governor of the Bank of England, the deputy governors and the chief executives and chairmen of most of the major banks. We have concluded that much more work is needed to improve the Bill and I shall linger briefly on only two areas. Much of what needs to be said is in the report and I hope that colleagues will find time to read it.
The first area is leverage. The parliamentary commission has not heard a convincing argument for blocking, as the Government seem determined to, the Financial Policy Committee of the Bank of England from setting the leverage ratio. We have concluded that the ratio is likely to be too low—that is, that banks are likely to remain overleveraged—but we also think that that judgment should rest with the financial stability regulator, the Financial Policy Committee, and not with the Chancellor. We argue that the regulator will want to consider long transitional arrangements, particularly for building societies—the Minister mentioned his concerns about this—as some problems particularly apply to those with large mortgage books. In our first report, paragraph 295 and the paragraphs preceding it go into the issue in some detail.
We also argue that the Bank of England should provide an annual assessment to Parliament on risk-weighting. It is clear to anybody who has considered the composition of risk-weightings and how they are derived, including the fact that they are based on modelling by the banks themselves, that to rely on risk-weighting alone would be a perilous task. It is vital that that should be supported by a robust leverage ratio, as risk-weightings are not a good measure, on their own, of overall balance sheet risk.
The Government have rejected all those suggestions and, frankly, I find it surprising that they cling to the line, which we heard again today, that we should wait for Basel—that is, that we should wait for other countries to decide. As many witnesses have said, it is for us to sort out what is best for Britain. We need to work out what is right for our industry, rather than waiting for a lowest common denominator decision from the Basel group. I was a little disappointed to hear more in that tone from the Government today.
From time to time, the Government even remind us, as they did today, that the transfer of the power to the Financial Policy Committee, if and when it happens in 2018, should occur only after it has been reviewed. In other words, it is possible that the Government might conclude that it should not be transferred at all. I think that would be a grave mistake. Getting leverage right is crucial to the future of the banking industry. With twin peaks in place and the financial policy up and running, it must be right to give that power to the FPC.
A second major outstanding area of disagreement is the Government’s rejection of a second reserve power for industry-wide separation. Our first report made it clear that this should be exercisable only after a fully independent review, after a recommendation from the regulator, and with Treasury approval. Not only did the Government reject the second reserve power, but in their first published response they even rejected the case for an independent review after a few years to assess the effectiveness of the ring fence.
On that last point—the need for a review—when the Chancellor came before the Committee about a fortnight ago, he appeared to be a little more flexible and he said he would consider it, and I noted the more emollient tone that we heard from the Minister today. I very much hope this presages some action on that point. I hope the Chancellor will give very careful consideration to the two points that I have raised here and that we raised in the report, both on leverage and on general separation.
Mr Tyrie
I do not think it is particularly democratic to give the authority directly to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, but I understand what he means if he thinks that Parliament should be given some opportunity to debate the issue. It is possible that some scope for flexibility could be built in to reconcile the point that he is making and the point that the commission is making. What would be unacceptable would be for the legislation to reach the statute book without a power of general separation and without there having been a thoroughgoing independent review. If those are in place, the extent to which Parliament can be involved a second time, and the extent to which the Chancellor himself should trigger that involvement, is something on which we could show flexibility.
I said that I hoped the Chancellor would think carefully about leverage and general separation, but there are a good number of other issues to which I hope he will give some thought, most of which have, at least briefly, been mentioned so I will not linger on them. I know that other Members want to speak, so I shall cite just three or four.
On derivatives, the Government appear completely at odds with the Vickers review and somewhat at odds with a slightly modified version of the same point that has been put forward by the commission which I chair. I will not delay the House now by going into the detail.
I hope the Chancellor will also consider a point that has scarcely been raised so far today—the need for the imposition of the so-called sibling relationship between the two parts of the ring-fenced bank under a single holding company, rather than the parent-child relationship, which was originally proposed in the Vickers report and which the Government still support. There are good corporate governance grounds and other grounds for supporting that proposal, which won widespread support in evidence that we took on it.
I hope the Chancellor will also think carefully about the way in which individual banks demonstrate whether they should benefit from a PLAC exemption—an exemption from the requirements of primary loss-absorbing capacity. This is a complex area which mainly affects banks headquartered in the UK with large overseas subsidiaries and branches. It is an issue that needs to be approached with considerable care. We thought very carefully about it and came forward with a balanced recommendation. On that, too, so far I have not seen enough flexibility from the Government.
The issues in the Bill are crucial for Britain. The industry is a great one, but it has serious problems. The Bill will address only some of the sector’s structural problems, and there is a lot more to be done. The parliamentary commission expects to produce its final report in May and that will seek to address some of the wider issues, the problems of standards and the culture in banking. We have just had a shocking LIBOR scandal and the wholesale rigging of crucial wholesale markets, and we have seen the equally shocking rip-off of consumers in the payment protection insurance scandal and of small businesses in the interest rate swap scandal. Those and other revelations, which have included sanctions busting and money laundering, reflect deep-seated problems of standards in banking.
Neither the Bill nor our proposals in May, nor for that matter any global initiatives under way, will solve all those problems. In fact, many of them will perhaps take many years—decades—to address. But something can and should be done, and that is why the Government are right to have made a start with this Bill. I very much hope that they listen to what the commission has said about it, because if they improve it further, along the lines that we have proposed, it can make a substantial contribution to a much stronger banking industry in Britain.
Amendment of the Law
Debate between Lord Tyrie and Andrew Love(13 years, 1 month ago)
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Mr Tyrie
What I am trying to do is not answer the questions, but pose them for Select Committees and others to try to answer. I am trying to point out that in order to generate a coherent growth strategy, a large number of policies need to be looked at in the round to ensure that we are not wasting public resources.
Mr Love
Does it not concern the hon. Gentleman that nothing has been said in today’s Budget about the centrepiece of the Government’s growth strategy—the national insurance holiday for small companies outside London and the south-east? Should we not know more about how that is going and whether it is, in any way, a success?
Mr Tyrie
That is an interesting point. As the hon. Gentleman knows, the Committee will be holding hearings next week and we will have an opportunity to take evidence on exactly that point.
I wish to draw my remarks to a close by observing that growth and the deficit reduction strategy—the two issues I have been discussing—will be one and the same thing if a reduction in the size of government allows room for the private sector to grow. I know that this is not something on which agreement will be reached across the House and that it is the very stuff of party politics, but I hope that Members sitting on the other side of the House will permit me to end with a personal view. Even if there were no deficit, we should still reduce public spending because at close to 50% of gross domestic product it is too high. It reduces choice and freedom for millions of individuals, and it burdens enterprises with unacceptable levels of taxation. During the 13 years of the previous Government, public spending averaged about 40% of GDP. I support this Government’s plans to reduce it to that level again.