Lord Tyrie Portrait

Lord Tyrie

Non-affiliated - Life peer

Became Member: 12th June 2018


1 APPG membership (as of 30 May 2024)
Extraordinary Rendition
3 Former APPG memberships
Classical Music, Financial Markets and Services, Music
Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards (Joint Committee)
16th Jul 2012 - 30th May 2024
Finance Bill Sub-Committee
21st Jan 2020 - 8th Sep 2020
Public Accounts Commission
4th Nov 2015 - 3rd May 2017
Liaison Committee (Commons)
14th Oct 2015 - 3rd May 2017
Liaison Committee (Commons)
10th Sep 2015 - 3rd May 2017
Treasury Committee
18th Jun 2015 - 3rd May 2017
Public Accounts Commission
6th Jun 1997 - 31st Mar 2015
Treasury Committee
9th Jun 2010 - 30th Mar 2015
Liaison Committee (Commons)
19th Jul 2010 - 30th Mar 2015
Treasury Committee
9th Feb 2009 - 30th Mar 2015
Justice Committee
6th Nov 2007 - 6th May 2010
Tax Law Rewrite Bills (Joint Committee)
11th Jan 2010 - 6th May 2010
Tax Law Rewrite Bills (Joint Committee)
7th Dec 2009 - 6th May 2010
Committee on Reform of the House of Commons
20th Jul 2009 - 6th May 2010
Draft Constitutional Renewal Bill (Joint Committee)
1st May 2008 - 22nd Jul 2008
Conventions (Joint Committee)
17th May 2006 - 31st Oct 2006
Shadow Paymaster General
1st Jun 2004 - 1st Jun 2005
Shadow Financial Secretary
1st Jun 2003 - 1st Jun 2004
Treasury Committee
16th Jul 2001 - 8th Dec 2003
Consolidation etc. Bills (Joint Committee)
28th Jul 1997 - 11th May 2001
Public Administration Committee
16th Jul 1997 - 11th May 2001


Division Voting information

During the current Parliament, Lord Tyrie has voted in 212 divisions, and 12 times against the majority of their Party.

18 Oct 2023 - Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill - View Vote Context
Lord Tyrie voted No - against a party majority and against the House
One of 5 Non-affiliated No votes vs 9 Non-affiliated Aye votes
Tally: Ayes - 245 Noes - 204
18 Oct 2023 - Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill - View Vote Context
Lord Tyrie voted No - against a party majority and against the House
One of 5 Non-affiliated No votes vs 10 Non-affiliated Aye votes
Tally: Ayes - 245 Noes - 209
23 Oct 2023 - Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill - View Vote Context
Lord Tyrie voted No - against a party majority and in line with the House
One of 4 Non-affiliated No votes vs 7 Non-affiliated Aye votes
Tally: Ayes - 185 Noes - 218
23 Oct 2023 - Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill - View Vote Context
Lord Tyrie voted No - against a party majority and against the House
One of 4 Non-affiliated No votes vs 6 Non-affiliated Aye votes
Tally: Ayes - 208 Noes - 199
4 Mar 2024 - Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill - View Vote Context
Lord Tyrie voted No - against a party majority and against the House
One of 5 Non-affiliated No votes vs 6 Non-affiliated Aye votes
Tally: Ayes - 258 Noes - 171
4 Mar 2024 - Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill - View Vote Context
Lord Tyrie voted No - against a party majority and against the House
One of 5 Non-affiliated No votes vs 6 Non-affiliated Aye votes
Tally: Ayes - 260 Noes - 169
11 Mar 2024 - Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill - View Vote Context
Lord Tyrie voted No - against a party majority and against the House
One of 3 Non-affiliated No votes vs 4 Non-affiliated Aye votes
Tally: Ayes - 204 Noes - 192
11 Mar 2024 - Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill - View Vote Context
Lord Tyrie voted No - against a party majority and against the House
One of 4 Non-affiliated No votes vs 5 Non-affiliated Aye votes
Tally: Ayes - 217 Noes - 192
11 Mar 2024 - Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill - View Vote Context
Lord Tyrie voted No - against a party majority and against the House
One of 3 Non-affiliated No votes vs 4 Non-affiliated Aye votes
Tally: Ayes - 202 Noes - 187
20 Mar 2024 - Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill - View Vote Context
Lord Tyrie voted No - against a party majority and against the House
One of 4 Non-affiliated No votes vs 8 Non-affiliated Aye votes
Tally: Ayes - 271 Noes - 228
30 Apr 2024 - Victims and Prisoners Bill - View Vote Context
Lord Tyrie voted No - against a party majority and against the House
One of 2 Non-affiliated No votes vs 5 Non-affiliated Aye votes
Tally: Ayes - 214 Noes - 208
14 May 2024 - Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill - View Vote Context
Lord Tyrie voted No - against a party majority and against the House
One of 5 Non-affiliated No votes vs 7 Non-affiliated Aye votes
Tally: Ayes - 228 Noes - 213
View All Lord Tyrie Division Votes

Debates during the 2019 Parliament

Speeches made during Parliamentary debates are recorded in Hansard. For ease of browsing we have grouped debates into individual, departmental and legislative categories.

View all Lord Tyrie's debates

Lords initiatives

These initiatives were driven by Lord Tyrie, and are more likely to reflect personal policy preferences.


Lord Tyrie has not introduced any legislation before Parliament

Lord Tyrie has not co-sponsored any Bills in the current parliamentary sitting


Latest 50 Written Questions

(View all written questions)
Written Questions can be tabled by MPs and Lords to request specific information information on the work, policy and activities of a Government Department
1 Other Department Questions
16th Dec 2021
To ask the Leader of the House, further to the statistics in House of Lords Business on Thursday 16 December which show that the Department of Health and Social Care had 56 written parliamentary questions that had not been answered in 10 working days, more than any other department, what discussions she has had with the department about improving their responsiveness to parliamentary scrutiny through Questions for Written Answer.

As Leader of the House I take very seriously the responsibility incumbent on all Ministers and departments to provide full, timely and comprehensive answers to Questions for Written Answers. The Department for Health and Social Care received 1206 QWAs in 2021 compared to 599 in 2019, and have doubled the size of the relevant team to deal with the increased work and pressure.

My office approach departments who have not responded to questions after 10 working days, and remain in contact with them until the questions are answered. This process has been followed with the Department of Health and Social Care, and my office will continue to work with the department during this busy period to ensure prompt responses to all Questions for Written Answers.

18th Jan 2024
To ask His Majesty's Government what proportion of the (1) gross, and (2) net, migration figures for 2022 were foreign students.

The information requested falls under the remit of the UK Statistics Authority.

Please see the letter attached from the National Statistician and Chief Executive of the UK Statistics Authority.

The Rt Hon. the Lord Tyrie

House of Lords

London

SW1A 0PW

24 January 2024

Dear Lord Tyrie,

As National Statistician and Chief Executive of the UK Statistics Authority, I am responding to your Parliamentary Questions asking what proportion of the (1) gross, and (2) net, migration figures for 2022 were foreign students (HL1764); and what proportion of the (1) gross, and (2) net, migration figures for 2022 were dependents of foreign students (HL1765).

Your questions can be answered by using data published by the Office for National Statistics (ONS). These data can be found in our year ending June 2023 edition of our Long-term international immigration, emigration and net migration flows, provisional dataset [1]. This includes data up to June 2023. Specifically, for long term migration [2] by reason, including study visas, please see table 3 of the aforementioned dataset. Please note that the estimates within the dataset are still provisional.

For the year ending December 2022, estimates for both students and dependants are available for non-EU migrants. We do not currently have comparable figures for EU and British nationals.

For the year ending December 2022, total immigration was 1,234,000, of which 1,030,000 were non-EU migrants.

For the year ending December 2022, 315,000 students immigrated long-term, 31% of all non-EU migrants. In addition, 93,000 student dependants immigrated long-term, 9% of all non-EU migrants.

For the year ending December 2022, total emigration of all nationalities was 489,000 and emigration of non-EU migrants was 157,000.

72,000 were non-EU migrants who initially arrived on a study visa leaving (46% of all non-EU emigrants) and a further 12,000 were non-EU migrants who initially arrived on a study dependant visa leaving (8%).

To calculate net migration for students and their dependents, we take the number of individuals who emigrated – who initially arrived in the UK on a study visa (or study-dependant visa) – away from the number of individuals who immigrated on a study visa (or study-dependant visa).

This comes with some caveats. It compares immigration to emigration within the same period, so the migrants counted are a summary of both past and current behaviours at a fixed point in time. Individuals counted as an emigrant in this method could have transitioned to a different visa type during their time in the UK. This means that this measure could present a distorted view of the true causes for migration, for example where someone studies and then works.

For the year ending December 2022, net migration of non-EU migrants was 873,000. 243,000 was net migration for study visas, 28% of all non-EU net migration and 82,000 were study dependants, 9% of all non-EU net migration.

Figures used to answer your questions in this response have been included in Table 1.

Table 1: Immigration, Emigration and Net Migration for year ending December 2022

Year ending Dec 2022

All nationalities

All Non-EU migrants

Non-EU Students

Non-EU Student dependants

Immigration

1,234,000

1,030,000

315,000

93,000

Emigration

489,000

157,000

72,000

12,000

Net migration

745,000

873,000

243,000

82,000

The most up to date information is from year ending December 2023. This has been provided in Table 2 in case helpful.

Table 2: Immigration, Emigration and Net Migration for year ending June 2023

Year ending June 2023

All nationalities

All Non-EU migrants

Non-EU Students

Non-EU Student dependants

Immigration

1,180,000

968,000

282,000

96,000

Emigration

508,000

200,000

88,000

27,000

Net migration

672,000

768,000

194,000

69,000

Because of the increases seen in the immigration of students in the recent time periods, we would expect emigration to continue to rise as those students come to the end of their studies. However, research in our Reason for international migration, international students update: November 2023 article [3] suggests that more recent cohorts of students are staying in the UK for longer. We will continue to monitor this trend to see how it evolves over time.

When accessing any of our files, you may find it helpful to read the 'notes, terms and conditions' contained within them.

Yours sincerely,

Professor Sir Ian Diamond

[1] https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/datasets/longterminternationalimmigrationemigrationandnetmigrationflowsprovisional

[2] We continue to use the UN definition of a long-term migrant: a person who moves to a country other than that of their usual residence for at least a year. https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/bulletins/longterminternationalmigrationprovisional/yearendingjune2022#glossary

[3] https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/articles/reasonforinternationalmigrationinternationalstudentsupdate/november2023

Baroness Neville-Rolfe
Minister of State (Cabinet Office)
18th Jan 2024
To ask His Majesty's Government what proportion of the (1) gross, and (2) net, migration figures for 2022 were dependents of foreign students.

The information requested falls under the remit of the UK Statistics Authority.

Please see the letter attached from the National Statistician and Chief Executive of the UK Statistics Authority.

The Rt Hon. the Lord Tyrie

House of Lords

London

SW1A 0PW

24 January 2024

Dear Lord Tyrie,

As National Statistician and Chief Executive of the UK Statistics Authority, I am responding to your Parliamentary Questions asking what proportion of the (1) gross, and (2) net, migration figures for 2022 were foreign students (HL1764); and what proportion of the (1) gross, and (2) net, migration figures for 2022 were dependents of foreign students (HL1765).

Your questions can be answered by using data published by the Office for National Statistics (ONS). These data can be found in our year ending June 2023 edition of our Long-term international immigration, emigration and net migration flows, provisional dataset [1]. This includes data up to June 2023. Specifically, for long term migration [2] by reason, including study visas, please see table 3 of the aforementioned dataset. Please note that the estimates within the dataset are still provisional.

For the year ending December 2022, estimates for both students and dependants are available for non-EU migrants. We do not currently have comparable figures for EU and British nationals.

For the year ending December 2022, total immigration was 1,234,000, of which 1,030,000 were non-EU migrants.

For the year ending December 2022, 315,000 students immigrated long-term, 31% of all non-EU migrants. In addition, 93,000 student dependants immigrated long-term, 9% of all non-EU migrants.

For the year ending December 2022, total emigration of all nationalities was 489,000 and emigration of non-EU migrants was 157,000.

72,000 were non-EU migrants who initially arrived on a study visa leaving (46% of all non-EU emigrants) and a further 12,000 were non-EU migrants who initially arrived on a study dependant visa leaving (8%).

To calculate net migration for students and their dependents, we take the number of individuals who emigrated – who initially arrived in the UK on a study visa (or study-dependant visa) – away from the number of individuals who immigrated on a study visa (or study-dependant visa).

This comes with some caveats. It compares immigration to emigration within the same period, so the migrants counted are a summary of both past and current behaviours at a fixed point in time. Individuals counted as an emigrant in this method could have transitioned to a different visa type during their time in the UK. This means that this measure could present a distorted view of the true causes for migration, for example where someone studies and then works.

For the year ending December 2022, net migration of non-EU migrants was 873,000. 243,000 was net migration for study visas, 28% of all non-EU net migration and 82,000 were study dependants, 9% of all non-EU net migration.

Figures used to answer your questions in this response have been included in Table 1.

Table 1: Immigration, Emigration and Net Migration for year ending December 2022

Year ending Dec 2022

All nationalities

All Non-EU migrants

Non-EU Students

Non-EU Student dependants

Immigration

1,234,000

1,030,000

315,000

93,000

Emigration

489,000

157,000

72,000

12,000

Net migration

745,000

873,000

243,000

82,000

The most up to date information is from year ending December 2023. This has been provided in Table 2 in case helpful.

Table 2: Immigration, Emigration and Net Migration for year ending June 2023

Year ending June 2023

All nationalities

All Non-EU migrants

Non-EU Students

Non-EU Student dependants

Immigration

1,180,000

968,000

282,000

96,000

Emigration

508,000

200,000

88,000

27,000

Net migration

672,000

768,000

194,000

69,000

Because of the increases seen in the immigration of students in the recent time periods, we would expect emigration to continue to rise as those students come to the end of their studies. However, research in our Reason for international migration, international students update: November 2023 article [3] suggests that more recent cohorts of students are staying in the UK for longer. We will continue to monitor this trend to see how it evolves over time.

When accessing any of our files, you may find it helpful to read the 'notes, terms and conditions' contained within them.

Yours sincerely,

Professor Sir Ian Diamond

[1] https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/datasets/longterminternationalimmigrationemigrationandnetmigrationflowsprovisional

[2] We continue to use the UN definition of a long-term migrant: a person who moves to a country other than that of their usual residence for at least a year. https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/bulletins/longterminternationalmigrationprovisional/yearendingjune2022#glossary

[3] https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/articles/reasonforinternationalmigrationinternationalstudentsupdate/november2023

Baroness Neville-Rolfe
Minister of State (Cabinet Office)
30th Jun 2023
To ask His Majesty's Government what protection is afforded by the relevant agencies to those disclosing information to the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament under whistleblowing arrangements as recommended by the Committee's Annual Report 2018–2019.

It is vital for trust and integrity within the security and intelligence services that all employees are able to report wrongdoing and to do so in confidence.

There are appropriate policies in place should members of staff in the relevant services wish to report their concerns and a number of internal and external routes available for whistle-blowing, one of which is through the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, but all of which the Government considers to be safe and effective.

Baroness Neville-Rolfe
Minister of State (Cabinet Office)
15th Dec 2022
To ask His Majesty's Government whether they have any plans to place the Fulford Principles relating to the detention and interviewing of detainees overseas on a statutory basis.

The Government has no plans to place The Principles on a statutory basis.

Baroness Neville-Rolfe
Minister of State (Cabinet Office)
8th Dec 2022
To ask His Majesty's Government what plans they have to refer the case of Jagtar Singh Johal to the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, under the provisions of the Justice and Security Act 2013.

His Majesty’s Government has no plans to refer the case of Jagtar Singh Johal to the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament.

Under section 2(3)(b) of the Justice and Security Act 2013, the Prime Minister may ask the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament to consider a matter outside of the Committee’s self-determined work plan, provided that the consideration of the matter is consistent with any principles set out in, or with any other provision made by, the agreed Memorandum of Understanding, as per section 2(4) of the Act. One such principle in the MoU is that careful consideration must be given to whether it is appropriate to investigate a matter which relates to criminal or civil legal proceedings, inquiries, or inquest proceedings.

As the subject of ongoing legal proceedings, it would not be appropriate to comment on the allegations brought against His Majesty's Government by Mr Johal. However, His Majesty's Government has consistently raised concerns about Mr Johal’s case in India with all levels of the Indian Government. Ministers and officials have together raised Mr Johal’s detention on over 100 occasions since 2017, and they will continue to do so.

Baroness Neville-Rolfe
Minister of State (Cabinet Office)
21st Nov 2022
To ask His Majesty's Government what formal discussions they have had with (1) the Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, and (2) the Committee as a whole, since June 2016.

His Majesty's Government regularly engages with the Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, and with the Committee as a whole. Details of formal interactions with the Government are published in the Committee's Annual Reports, which are publicly available on the Committee's website.

The Government values the work of the Committee, and understands the importance of regular engagement as part of an effective oversight relationship.

Baroness Neville-Rolfe
Minister of State (Cabinet Office)
23rd Nov 2021
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether, prior to the triggering of Article 16 of the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland, they would provide an opportunity for that action to be debated in Parliament; and whether any such debate would be on a divisible motion.

The UK Government has always been clear that we would prefer to settle these issues consensually and reach a positive outcome with the EU through negotiations.

However, if a negotiated outcome cannot be found, Article 16 remains a legitimate provision within the Protocol to safeguard peace and prosperity in Northern Ireland and to support the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement.

In such circumstances, we will, of course, set out our justification for using Article 16 and its legal basis at an appropriate time. The Government remains committed to keeping Parliament updated on the UK-EU relationship and to providing legal certainty and clarity for Northern Ireland.

6th Jul 2021
To ask Her Majesty's Government what consideration they have given to requiring all political parties represented in the House of Commons to publish party membership numbers.

This is a matter for individual political parties.

Lord True
Shadow Leader of the House of Lords
2nd May 2024
To ask His Majesty's Government in each of the past three years how many times (1) OFCOM, (2) OFGEM, (3) the Competition and Markets Authority, and (4) the Financial Reporting Council, have exercised the power to disclose the identity of persons under investigation.

The subject of OFCOM’s investigations are services rather than individual persons. The details of these investigations are published on OFCOM’s website.

OFGEM also publishes details of its investigations on its website.

The Competition and Markets Authority exercised the power to identify persons under investigation in seven cases in 2021; ten cases in 2022; and in five cases in 2023. In some of these cases multiple parties have been identified.

The Financial Reporting Council has not exercised the power in any of the past three years.

2nd May 2024
To ask His Majesty's Government what evidence they have of the power to disclose the identity of persons under investigation being exercised by UK regulators where the disclosure has not been in the public interest.

The Department for Business and Trade does not hold centrally evidence on whether regulators have disclosed identities of a person under investigation when it has not been in the public interest.

28th Feb 2024
To ask His Majesty's Government, since its creation, how many whistleblowers the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has compensated; how much in aggregate has been paid in compensation; and what reimbursement has the CMA received from the Treasury for compensation payments made.

The CMA’s informant reward programme is an important tool in uncovering cartel activity. Payments have been made under the informant rewards programme.

The CMA does not provide figures about the levels or numbers of such payments. Given the number of CMA cases, divulging even aggregated payment figures could over time risk allowing the identification of cases having a whistleblower. This could put whistleblowers at risk and undermine the programme as a whole.

Informant reward payments are directly covered by the CMA’s budget.

19th May 2023
To ask His Majesty's Government how many transatlantic submarine or pipeline telecommunications cables are in ownership or control, largely or wholly, by members of NATO.

There are no transatlantic submarine or pipeline telecommunications cables under direct UK public ownership or control. We anticipate this to be the same for other NATO member states, but it would be a matter for NATO member states to confirm.

Subsea cables are privately owned and operated, although governments work with the operators, regulators, international partners and others to assess the overall resilience of subsea infrastructure and respond to high-impact events.

19th May 2023
To ask His Majesty's Government how many transatlantic submarine or pipeline telecommunications cables are in UK public ownership or control.

There are no transatlantic submarine or pipeline telecommunications cables under direct UK public ownership or control. We anticipate this to be the same for other NATO member states, but it would be a matter for NATO member states to confirm.

Subsea cables are privately owned and operated, although governments work with the operators, regulators, international partners and others to assess the overall resilience of subsea infrastructure and respond to high-impact events.

22nd Mar 2022
To ask Her Majesty's Government what estimate they have made of the increase in cost to the buyers of Russian (1) oil, and (2) gas, in the UK of a ban on the import of these products.

The UK is in not dependent on Russian gas. In 2021 it made up less than 4% of UK supply. The integrated nature of the European gas market, and the fact that gas is an international traded commodity, means that factors that influence European or internationally prices are likely to be reflected in UK prices. The Government remains confident in the UK’s energy security and the UK’s highly diverse sources of gas supply.

Crude oil operates in an international market and influenced by a range of supply and demand factors. The phasing out of Russian imports will not be immediate, but allows the UK time to adjust its supply chains.

3rd Feb 2020
To ask Her Majesty's Government what steps they intend to take to ensure that the interests of (1) consumers, and (2) competition, inform the Brexit red tape challenge.

The Conservative Manifesto stated that “Through our Red Tape Challenge, we will ensure that regulation is sensible and proportionate, and that we always consider the needs of small businesses when devising new rules, using our new freedom after Brexit to ensure that British rules work for British companies.” We shall announce further details of the Challenge in due course.

23rd Jan 2024
To ask His Majesty's Government what estimate they have made of the total undergraduate fees paid by foreign students coming to the UK in (1) 2018, (2) 2019, (3) 2020, (4) 2021, and (5) 2022.

The Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA), now part of JISC, is responsible for collecting and publishing data about UK higher education (HE)

Table six of HESA’s ‘HE finance data’ reports on the income from tuition fees and education contracts at UK HE providers between the 2017/18 and 2021/22 academic years. This data is available by level of study and students’ domicile (UK, EU, non-EU) and is accessible at: https://www.hesa.ac.uk/data-and-analysis/finances/table-6.

Complete data for 2022/23 will be published in Spring 2024.

22nd Jan 2024
To ask His Majesty's Government what estimate they have made of the number of undergraduate foreign students who graduated in (1) 2018, (2) 2019, (3) 2020, (4) 2021, and (5) 2022; and what estimate they have made of the number of graduate foreign students who completed their courses in each of these years.

The Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA, now part of JISC), is responsible for collecting and publishing data about UK higher education. The latest statistics refer to the 2021/22 academic year.

Figure 15 of HESA’s 'Higher Education Student Statistics: UK, 2021/22’ reports the number of qualifications obtained at undergraduate and postgraduate level at UK Higher Education Providers between the 2017/18 and 2021/22 academic years, and is available by students’ domicile (UK, EU, non-EU) prior to study. See figure 15 attached.

Updates on the timing of HESA Student Statistics for the 2022/23 academic year are available via the following link: https://www.hesa.ac.uk/data-and-analysis/upcoming.

30th Jan 2020
To ask Her Majesty's Government what plans they have, if any, to make pension dashboards interoperable with Open Banking, including the processes for customer authentication.

The Government recognises the achievements made by Open Banking and the potential for the Industry Delivery Group, as a part of the Money and Pensions Service to learn from their experience to inform the development of pensions dashboards. At the same time, we recognise that Open Banking aims to improve consumer outcomes in an environment where consumers already know what they have and who they bank with, which enables consumers to authenticate themselves directly with their bank provider.

The Department for Work and Pensions response to its consultation on pensions dashboards highlighted where there were potential opportunities to align with Open Banking for example, on some aspects of the data standards and the governance register. The Department for Work and Pensions is working with the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, which is currently leading a smart data review that is looking at ways to promote interoperability across financial services and other sectors. The Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy’s proposals, following on from its consultation paper from June 2019, will be published in due course.

16th Jun 2022
To ask Her Majesty's Government what assessment they have made of the use of Evusheld by other countries; and what data they have received on that drug’s efficiency at combatting the effects of COVID-19.

The Antivirals and Therapeutics Taskforce engages with other nations on the use, deployment and evaluation of therapeutics and antivirals. We understand that more than 20 countries have procured Evusheld and a proportion have begun to deploy the treatment.

AstraZeneca announced positive trial data from the PROVENT trial, which showed Evusheld’s efficacy against developing symptomatic COVID-19. However, this trial took place prior to the emergence of the Omicron variant. The TACKLE study will provide additional efficacy data on Evusheld for the treatment of COVID-19. AstraZeneca commissioned the UK Health Security Agency to undertake testing into the effectiveness of Evusheld against the Omicron variants. Initial data against BA.1 and BA.2 has been shared with AstraZeneca. The Department is currently reviewing the efficacy of Evusheld for prophylaxis.

15th Jun 2022
To ask Her Majesty's Government what advice they have given to immunocompromised individuals who are still shielding from COVID-19.

The shielding programme ended on 15 September 2021. The COVID-19 vaccination programme has ensured that shielding is no longer necessary for immunosuppressed people. In addition, the Government has issued public health advice in an online only format for those whose immune system means they are at higher risk of serious outcomes from COVID-19. This advises eligible individuals to ensure they receive additional doses of the vaccines as appropriate.

Many people in this cohort are also eligible for new monoclonal antibody and antiviral treatments to prevent the risk of serious illness and hospitalisation. The advice also suggests that those who are immunosuppressed should seek advice from their National Health Service clinician where appropriate and consider additional steps to prevent the risk of infection. This may include avoiding those who have tested positive for COVID-19 and their household contacts until 10 days after a positive test and ensuring their home is well ventilated when receiving visitors.

14th Jun 2022
To ask Her Majesty's Government what assessment they have made of the efficacy of Evusheld on the protection of patients with metastatic cancer from COVID-19.

The Department is currently assessing Evusheld, which includes requesting clinicians to advise on the most appropriate option for the National Health Service with the available data, the public health situation and other treatments available. We expect to receive clinical advice shortly.

The Therapeutics Clinical Review Panel provides advice on the most appropriate patient cohorts for new COVID-19 therapies, including preventative treatments. However, we are currently unable to confirm the efficacy of Evusheld for specific patient groups. Final clinical policies and eligibility would be proposed by the NHS and agreed by the United Kingdom Chief Medical Officers.

13th Jun 2022
To ask Her Majesty's Government what estimate they have made of the number of immunocompromised individuals who would benefit from access to Evusheld if it became available.

Urgent work is underway with clinical experts to estimate the size of the cohort. The Therapeutics Clinical Review Panel provides advice on the most appropriate patient cohorts for new COVID-19 therapies, including preventative treatments. Final clinical policies and eligibility would be proposed by the National Health Service and agreed by the United Kingdom Chief Medical Officers.

9th Jun 2022
To ask Her Majesty's Government, further to the Written Answer by the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for the Department of Health and Social Care on 7 June (1507), when they expect the UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA) testing review of Evusheld to be completed.

AstraZeneca commissioned the UK Health Strategic Authority (UKHSA) to complete testing into the effectiveness of Evusheld against the Omicron variants. The initial testing is now complete and data has been shared with AstraZeneca. After reviewing the data, it is a matter for AstraZeneca to determine whether to commission further testing, therefore we are unable to confirm when testing will be completed.

16th Dec 2021
To ask Her Majesty's Government what estimate they made of the number of PCR tests for travel that would be required between the date of the announcement of their reintroduction of the requirement on 7 December and (1) 5 January 2022, or (2) a date for which an estimate may have been made covering the Christmas and New Year period.

The maximum number of travellers per week forecast for the period of 7 December 2021 to 5 January 2022 was 1 to 1.5 million. Providers indicated capacity of approximately 4.4 million polymerase chain reaction tests per week, sufficient for the number required for travel.

15th Dec 2021
To ask Her Majesty's Government, further to the Written Answer by Lord Kamall on 12 October (HL2767), why the direct costs of an at-home PCR test are commercially sensitive.

The direct cost of an NHS Test and Trace polymerase chain reaction (PCR) test is commercially sensitive as the release of this information would be detrimental in future negotiations with individual suppliers of PCR tests.

13th Dec 2021
To ask Her Majesty's Government, further to the Written Answer by Lord Kamall on 12 October (HL2767), in which format the data relating to the number of COVID-19 PCR tests for travel is held; and what plans they have, if any, to publish this data.

Data on the number of COVID-19 polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for travel was previously held for arrivals from ‘red’ and ‘amber’ list countries.

Data on testing for international arrivals from red list and non-red list countries, including confirmatory PCR tests, from 30 September 2021 is published weekly in an online only format at GOV.UK.

9th Dec 2021
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they require suppliers of COVID-19 PCR tests for travel advertised on GOV.UK to record the complaints they receive; whether these suppliers are required to submit this data to the Government; and if so, whether they will publish this data.

We do not require such providers to record the complaints they receive.

7th Dec 2021
To ask Her Majesty's Government, further to the Written Answer by Lord Kamall on 2 November (HL3083), what changes have been made to the information required from approved suppliers of COVID-19 PCR tests since 2 November.

From 12 November, all private providers are required to maintain the Government’s minimum standards for the international arrivals services they offer. The changes ensure that the standards of service of private providers are consistent with the quality expected, from initial application to throughout the lifetime of the service, to support public health. Any organisation involved in carrying out the end-to-end testing service cannot sell tests until the UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA) has written to the appropriate organisation to confirm that the testing service meets the standard. Additionally, there have been amendments to the daily sales reporting, which as a mandatory legal requirement for all providers of international arrivals testing, must now include details in relation to tests that were cancelled that day.

Following the recent changes to international travel, from 30 November 2021, it became a legal requirement to report S-gene target failure and particularly failure for the S-gene deletion 69-70 where the diagnostic laboratory is able to identify it. The minimum standards have been updated to reflect this.

7th Dec 2021
To ask Her Majesty's Government how many suppliers of COVID-19 PCR tests for travel are listed on gov.uk.

As of 9 December, there are 555 providers listed.

13th Oct 2021
To ask Her Majesty's Government, further to the Written Answer by Lord Kamall on 12 October (HL2766), how many suppliers they list as providing PCR tests for travel on the Gov.uk website; what information they require from suppliers who appear on that list; what checks they undertake of firms on that list; and what is the (1) lowest, (2) highest, (3) mean, and (4) median, cost of such tests advertised by suppliers on that list.

As of 15 October 2021, there are currently 555 providers of polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing for travel listed on GOV.UK.

Suppliers are required to complete a self-declaration against the Government’s minimum standards, which the United Kingdom Accreditation Service will review to met. Providers of COVID-19 testing services are required to apply for accreditation to provide sample collection and/or sample testing services The Health Protection (Coronavirus, Testing Requirements and Standards) (England) (Amendment) Regulations 2021 set out the deadlines for obtaining accreditation. Providers may not market these tests if these deadlines are not met.

The Department monitors issues raised by the public, data submitted by the provider and reports from regulatory and oversight bodies. Where the Department identifies that a supplier is not providing the high-quality service expected, we can ask for remedial action. Where minimum standards have not been met or public safety is at risk, we will ask for improvements to be made and the provider could be removed from the GOV.UK listing.

The lowest cost of such tests is £1.25 and the highest is £1080.00. While the median cost is not collected centrally, the mean cost is £45.00

15th Sep 2021
To ask Her Majesty's Government what is the direct cost of an at-home PCR test conducted by NHS Test and Trace.

We are unable to provide the direct cost of NHS Test and Trace polymerase chain reaction tests as this information is commercially sensitive.

15th Sep 2021
To ask Her Majesty's Government what is their estimate of the total number of PCR tests conducted for the purposes of facilitating international travel in each month of 2021; and of these, how many were conducted by NHS Test and Trace.

Data on the number of polymerase chain reaction tests for international travel is not held in the format requested.

23rd Mar 2022
To ask Her Majesty's Government what consideration they have given to passing emergency legislation to prevent the use of trusts as a means of evading sanctions imposed on oligarchs.

We have been moving at pace to sanction those propping up Putin's regime. Our sanctions since the invasion cover more than 1,200 Russian and Belarussian individuals, entities and subsidiaries at the heart of, or supporting, Putin's regime. This includes travel bans and asset freezes applied to Russia's leading oligarchs, with a combined worth in excess of £100 billion. Measures taken so far are historic and are having a real impact on Putin and his war machine. Nothing and no one is off the table.

18th Mar 2022
To ask Her Majesty's Government what assessment they have made of the (1) presence, and (2) active participation, of UK citizens in conflict zones in Ukraine; and what advice they provide to UK citizens regarding any potential legal consequences of such presence or participation.

The UK is not supporting British nationals going to Ukraine to fight in the conflict. We advise against travel to Ukraine and anyone who travels to conflict zones to engage in unlawful activity should expect to be investigated upon their return to the UK.

18th Mar 2022
To ask Her Majesty's Government what steps they have taken to ensure that the freeze on the Central Bank of Russia’s external assets is not circumvented by transactions through central banks of other countries.

The measures introduced on 1 March against the Central Bank of Russia, the Russian National Wealth Fund and the Russian Ministry of Finance prevent UK persons from providing financial services related to foreign exchange reserves or asset management to these persons or persons acting on their behalf or their direction. This action was taken in coordination with the EU and the US, who have introduced similar restrictions. This will prevent the Russian Central Bank from deploying its foreign reserves in ways that undermine the impact of sanctions imposed by us and our allies, and to undercut its ability to engage in foreign exchange transactions to support the Russian rouble.

18th Mar 2022
To ask Her Majesty's Government what consideration they have given to a no-fly zone in Ukrainian airspace, limited to humanitarian corridors.

Enforcing a no-fly zone would very likely lead to direct combat between NATO and Russian jets. The risks of escalation would be extremely high, and the potential consequences would be catastrophic for the entire world - including Ukraine. A no-fly zone would also apply to Ukrainian aircraft, preventing them from attacking from the air and allowing the vast Russian ground forces to move around freely.

17th Mar 2022
To ask Her Majesty's Government what information they have regarding the reported circumvention of sanctions on Russia by (1) India, and (2) Belarus.

In coordination with other countries, the UK is introducing the largest and most severe economic sanctions that Russia has ever faced. We remain focussed on building the broadest coalition possible, including with India, to continue the severe economic pressure on President Putin.

As part of our response to the Russian aggression in Ukraine, the Lukashenko regime is being made to feel the economic consequences for its support for Putin. The UK is working with our international partners to prevent those who fail to respect the rules-based international order from reaping its benefits.

Since 1 March, the Foreign Secretary has launched a series of sanctions on Belarusian individuals and organisations who have aided and abetted Russia's reckless aggression towards Ukraine. The Foreign Secretary has committed to going further. Our intention is to extend recent Russia sanctions to Belarus in due course.

17th Mar 2022
To ask Her Majesty's Government what assessment they have made of any sanctions imposed on Belarus by other countries.

The UK continues to work in lockstep with international partners to coordinate sanctions as necessary, including on Belarus. As with all announcements on sanctions, the ultimate objective is to ensure that Putin fails in Ukraine. The whole of the UK Government, along with our international allies, is working to ensure that happens. The Lukashenko regime is being made to feel the economic consequences for its support for Putin.

17th Mar 2022
To ask Her Majesty's Government what consideration they have given to imposing sanctions on Belarus.

Under our Belarus sanctions regime, which was in place prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, we have imposed sanctions on President Lukashenko and 117 other individuals and entities as well as trade, financial and aviation sanctions. In addition, on 1 March, the UK announced a first tranche of sanctions against Belarusian individuals and organisations in response to the role the country is playing in Russia's invasion of Ukraine, including facilitating the invasion from within its borders. The Foreign Secretary has committed to going further and our intention is to extend recent Russia sanctions to Belarus in due course.

5th Jul 2021
To ask Her Majesty's Government how many staff working at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office at C5 level or above and working from the office on King Charles Street speak fluent Russian.

Language skills are critical to the FCDO's operation and Russian, as one of the FCDO's five top priority languages, is no exception to this. FCDO officers undertake full-time language training in preparation for roles overseas which require them to speak the local language (known as speaker slots). Although there are no formal 'speaker slot' roles based in King Charles Street, some roles in London (such as Research Analysts) will draw on language skills in their day to day work and officers returning from speaker slots are incentivised to maintain their language skills and 're-qualify' once their FCDO exam pass has expired (after 5 years).

18th Nov 2022
To ask His Majesty's Government, further to the Written Answer by Baroness Penn on 28 March (HL7077), whether they will describe the risks that they have assessed regarding their decision not to publish the Asset Purchase Facility deed indemnity; and which of these risks would “not advance the public’s understanding" of the arrangement by which HM Treasury indemnifies the Asset Purchase Facility.

The Asset Purchase Facility (APF) deed indemnity will not be published. The disclosure of the APF deed indemnity would be likely to expose sensitive information relating to the quantitative easing scheme and related processes.

HM Treasury indemnifies the APF which means that any losses or gains from the APF accrue to HM Treasury. This is public knowledge and the publication of the deed of indemnity will not advance the public’s understanding of that arrangement.

The Bank of England publishes quarterly reports for the APF, which explain to the public the implications of indemnity for the Treasury and the cash transfer arrangements between the Bank and Treasury.

22nd Mar 2022
To ask Her Majesty's Government what they consider would constitute the withdrawal of banking services from the Central Bank of Russia by the Bank of International Settlements; what discussions they have had with the Bank of England about the withdrawal; and what assessment they have made of the effectiveness of the measures to withdraw such banking services from Russia.

The government and Bank of England have cooperated closely in implementing sanctions on Russia and will continue to do so. Decisions over the nature of services provided by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) are a matter for that body and its members. The Bank of England, which is the United Kingdom’s member, has engaged with the BIS on this issue. The BIS has suspended access of the Central Bank of Russia to all BIS services, meetings and other BIS activities. The government is confident that the range of unprecedented measures announced by the international community are having a significant effect on the Russian economy undermining its ability to wage war in Ukraine.

22nd Mar 2022
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they have encouraged the Bank of England to make representations to the Bank of International Settlements in order to ensure that the Bank of International Settlements is not used to circumvent sanctions on Russia; if so, whether they are aware of any such representations; and if not, whether they will ask the Bank of England to make such representations.

The government and Bank of England have cooperated closely in implementing sanctions on Russia and will continue to do so. The Bank of England has engaged with the Bank of International Settlements (BIS). The BIS has suspended access of the Central Bank of Russia to all BIS services, meetings and other BIS activities.

18th Mar 2022
To ask Her Majesty's Government what representations they have made to the Bank of International Settlements to ensure that the suspension of international reserves prevents Russia from making international payments.

The government and Bank of England have cooperated closely in implementing sanctions on Russia and will continue to do so. The Bank of England has engaged with the Bank of International Settlements (BIS). The BIS has suspended access of the Central Bank of Russia to all BIS services, meetings and other BIS activities.

17th Mar 2022
To ask Her Majesty's Government, further to the Written Answer by Baroness Penn on 9 March (HL6405), whether they will publish the Asset Purchase Facility (APF) deed indemnity with the “operationally sensitive information” redacted.

The Asset Purchase Facility (APF) deed indemnity will not be published.

HM Treasury indemnifies the APF which means that any losses or gains from the APF accrue to HM Treasury. This is public knowledge and the publication of the deed of indemnity will not advance the public’s understanding of that arrangement.

This decision not to publish the information based on an assessment of risk that the Treasury has considered.