Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Lord Vaux of Harrowden Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 21st October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, these amendments are tabled in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Younger of Leckie. I am also grateful for the support of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden. The amendments concern the crucial questions of ministerial and parliamentary oversight of the extensive investigatory and enforcement powers granted under the Bill. The Bill sets out to create a powerful investigatory body with wide authority, but the lines of accountability are unclear.

The first of my amendments roots the exercise of the powers provided for in this part of the Bill firmly within the framework of the Act itself. It makes it clear that investigatory and enforcement powers under Clauses 3, 7, 17 and 38—covering information notices, entry and seizure powers, direct deduction orders and deduction from earnings orders—may not be exercised except as expressly provided for in this clause. This is a vital safeguard. It ensures that these powers cannot be used arbitrarily or for purposes beyond those envisaged by Parliament. In essence, it ties the use of such powers to the functions and objectives clearly defined elsewhere in the Bill, preventing mission creep, ensuring accountability and anchoring their use in clear statutory purpose.

The second amendment, which is closely related, builds on that principle of restraint by setting out a clear system of authorisation, accountability and record-keeping. It would require that the most serious powers—those involving access to personal financial information, entry and search of premises, or the recovery of large sums of money—can be exercised only with explicit ministerial approval. This is not just bureaucracy; it is responsibility. It makes Ministers answerable for the exercise of powers in their name.

Other powers of a lesser nature would require sign-off at senior Civil Service level or above, ensuring that every exercise of authority is subject to appropriate scrutiny and senior oversight. In addition, the PSFA would be required to maintain a register recording each use of these powers—the date and nature of the action, the official or Minister who authorised it, and the justification for doing so. That register would then be laid before Parliament annually.

If we are to give such considerable powers to civil servants acting on behalf of Ministers, we must be absolutely certain that there are clear lines of responsibility and clear records of decision-making. Without those, we risk creating a dangerous vacuum of accountability. Let us be clear: the significant new powers which the Bill grants to officials are not to be taken lightly. They go to the heart of personal privacy, financial autonomy and, potentially, due process.

Under this amendment, certain especially intrusive powers, such as requiring the disclosure of personal financial records, applying for search and seizure warrants or imposing deduction orders of over £10,000, would require explicit approval from a Minister of the Crown. This would ensure that decisions with the potential to impact individuals’ lives in a profound way are not taken in isolation by junior officials, because if something goes wrong or those powers are misused or abused, it will not be the officials who are hauled before Select Committees or public inquiries—it is the Minister for the Cabinet Office who will be called upon to account for actions taken in his or her name, of which they may have had absolutely no knowledge. It is therefore vital that the Minister is satisfied that the action is justified and is willing to stand behind that decision if challenged. This line of accountability is crucial for proper oversight; it also protects the Minister.

We have seen through painful and enduring examples such as the Horizon scandal what happens when the chain of accountability between operational decision-makers and Ministers is allowed to break down. Victims are left without recourse, officials retreat into anonymity and Ministers are left to apologise for decisions they did not make and could not have prevented. We should learn from that experience. We should ensure that the exercise of coercive state powers, particularly powers as sensitive as these, is traceable, reviewable and ultimately answerable to Parliament.

These amendments were well received and supported by noble Lords across the House in Committee. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, for adding his name, and other noble Lords who supported these proposals. These amendments protect the Minister, the department and individuals who may be subject to these powers. They ensure that no power is used without proper authorisation, that every use is recorded, and that Parliament can see each year how these powers have been exercised and by whom. We support the Government’s ambition to tackle fraud and error in the public sector, but we must always remember that power without responsibility breeds mistrust. This is not an abstract constitutional point. It is a matter of basic fairness, good governance and trust in public administration.

For those reasons, this amendment is of vital importance. It provides the clear lines of authority and accountability that must underpin any responsible use of the significant powers in the Bill. The Government may say that safeguards already exist, but those safeguards are internal, opaque and unenforceable by Parliament. We are proposing a statutory framework for oversight that gives Ministers clarity, Parliament visibility and the public reassurance that power is being exercised carefully, lawfully and transparently. This amendment is not about obstructing the Government’s aims; it is about protecting them and protecting the integrity of the system we are building. I beg to move.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, the Bill creates a wide range of unprecedented and intrusive powers for both the Cabinet Office and the DWP. Throughout the course of the Bill—and in its previous incarnation under the last Government—my focus has been on trying to ensure that these powers are restricted to what is actually required for the purposes of dealing with fraud against the public sector and that there are appropriate and strong safeguards against overreach and overuse of these powers.

I recognise and acknowledge that the Government have introduced a lot of safeguards into the Bill compared to those we had when we were discussing similar measures under the aborted Data Protection and Digital Information Bill last year. This is a much better Bill, but it still introduces a wide range of new powers, and, while better, there are still areas where the safeguards should be improved. In particular, when creating powers of this nature, it is important that the safeguards should be in the Bill and not left to codes of practice or internal departmental rules, both of which can be changed without scrutiny. We will come back to that theme several times later today.

These two amendments cover the police powers that the Bill would give to the Cabinet Office and the Public Sector Fraud Authority. I have serious doubts as to whether it is genuinely necessary to give search, entry and seizure police powers to civil servants anyway, but if we are to do so, it is essential that there are very robust safeguards around their use.

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I look to the Minister to provide reassurance by committing to greater transparency over exactly what the eligibility indicators would require the banks to identify through the use of algorithms. These are modest proposals and, despite assurances, I do not think that I have as yet been reassured.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, as we have heard, this group relates to the measures in the Bill which would give the DWP the ability to require banks and other financial institutions to trawl all accounts that they hold to identify and provide information on accounts that have received certain benefits and which meet certain criteria as defined by DWP, all without any suspicion of wrongdoing. This is done by means of an eligibility verification notice, which can require periodic reporting—the noble Baroness did not mention this when she described it. For example, it could be daily, although there has been no clarity from the department or the Minister yet as to the periods that are intended. I should reiterate at this point: this is a much better Bill, and the safeguards are much greater than the last time we saw these clauses, but there is more to go.

I would like to make one other little correction to the noble Baroness on her example of universal credit. Her example was that the eligibility criterion that would be provided by DWP to the banks would be £16,000, because that is the limit. In fact, it could be a much lower number, because under the Bill:

“The eligibility indicators may be criteria to be met by a single account or by”


a number of “accounts combined”. For the universal credit example it might be £10,000 or £8,000, or something of that nature. In that situation, it is even more likely that eligibility indicators would be flagged for innocent people, but that is just a wrinkle within the Bill.

I think many of us are nervous about the introduction of what is effectively the suspicionless trawling of benefit recipients’ accounts, even with the safeguards that are there. However, I understand and have an awful lot of sympathy for the need to reduce fraud and error, and the need for the department to have the tools to do that. Amendment 45A, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and others, would—as I think we are about to hear—remove the provision altogether. My approach in this group and the next has been to seek to strengthen the safeguards that surround the use of the powers rather than to remove them altogether.

To that end, I have tabled one amendment in this group, Amendment 49, which the noble Baroness has already alluded to. I am grateful to both the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, for their support. It is very simple: it requires that the Secretary of State may issue an eligibility verification notice only if satisfied that it is necessary and proportionate to do so for the purposes set out in the Bill. It was quite surprising that this basic safeguard was not already in the Bill, because the same wording already appears in relation to all the other powers it creates. I had assumed that this was a drafting error or oversight, as I cannot imagine any reason why it should not be there in relation to these powers.

I am very pleased to say that, since I tabled Amendment 49, the Minister has tabled Amendment 48, which she has mentioned. That amendment does much the same thing, although it does not restrict the necessity and proportionality to the purposes of the Bill. That is regrettable, but I can live with the Minister’s version and I am grateful to her for doing this following the constructive discussions we have had on a range of issues throughout the process, for which we are very grateful.

The Minister’s other amendments also introduce small but useful tweaks to the safeguards, although I am not sure I would go as far as she does on their effect. With thanks to the Minister for her engagement, I will not move Amendment 49, but I should be clear that I do not believe that Amendment 48 and the others she has tabled remove the need for the changes we will discuss in the next group. We will have those discussions then, and I will obviously reflect on what she has said in the meantime.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I will be very brief. The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has amendments in this and other groups, several of which I have signed, to try to ameliorate or provide safeguards for some of the most intrusive elements of the current draft of the Bill. I also have great sympathy with the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, around the issue of transparency, which is very evidently absent from most of the Bill. I will support those individuals if they press their amendments.

My Amendments 45A, 65 and 74A, in contrast to those of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, are not nuanced. They would simply remove Clauses 75 and 76 and Schedule 3, in effect eliminating the requirement for banks to look into claimants’ bank accounts. They would destroy the principle that the Bill establishes: that a group of people, defined by the common characteristic that they are in receipt of benefits, should have a more limited right to privacy and data protection than the rest of the community.

I am also very concerned when banks become investigative agents of the state. I regard these as lines we simply should not cross. I know that the Minister does not share that view and is very content that those in receipt of benefits should be under a level of surveillance that is considered inappropriate for the rest of the community. To her credit, she has limited some of the most abusive features of the Bill that we received from the Commons, but she still asserts the underlying principle.

I also realise that this is very much a paving Bill for the intrusions that will follow the introduction of the digital ID. That scheme provides the tools that enable the state to carve out for surveillance any variety of groups of people whom it deems unworthy of sharing the general rights accorded under the law. I have tabled what are killer amendments, in effect, because the public need to know what exactly is at stake and what line has been crossed. I will not press my amendments, but I am also determined that the issues will not be quietly tidied away.

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Moved by

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden]

52: Schedule 3, page 80, line 26, at end insert—
“Reasonable suspicion and appropriate review of EVM information
5A (1) The existence of an eligibility indicator alone does not constitute reasonable grounds for suspicion for the purpose of section 109BZB (1)(a) of the Social Security Administration Act 1992.(2) Before taking any action to amend or suspend any benefit payments, or exercising the powers in Clause 109BZB of the Social Security Administration Act 1992, the EVM information must first have been reviewed by a person with appropriate seniority and experience authorised by the Secretary of State.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to clarify explicitly that the existence of an Eligibility Indicator alone does not constitute reasonable grounds for suspicion, and that before taking action to amend a benefit or undertake intrusive investigations, the information must have been reviewed by a suitable person.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, during the debate on the previous group, I mentioned that the two amendments in this group are designed to strengthen the safeguards around the use of the eligibility verification powers that are created by the Bill. I am once again grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, for their support.

Amendment 52 deals with how the bank account data that is provided by the banks may be used. The Bill requires banks to carry out a trawl of all accounts they hold to identify any that are in receipt of specified benefits and then to test those against criteria that will be provided by the DWP. If they meet those criteria, this raises a flag called an “eligibility indicator”, details of which must be provided to the DWP, along with certain other limited information, in a format to be decided by the DWP. The trawl can be required on a periodic basis. It could be, for example, daily—we do not yet know. No suspicion is required; this is simply a trawling operation of all bank accounts.

This raises two important issues. First, the existence of an eligibility indicator will presumably trigger action by the DWP. At the moment, there is nothing in the Bill that decides what that action could be. Clause 73 creates a range of very intrusive investigatory powers to investigate if an authorised officer of the DWP has reasonable grounds to suspect wrongdoing. Reasonable grounds for suspicion are not defined. Could the mere existence of an eligibility indicator constitute such grounds? There is nothing in the Bill to say that it cannot. I do not think that the amendments that were referred to in the last group by the Minister and which say the eligibility indicator can be used only to assist in identifying fraud or error solve this issue.

Secondly, and similarly, there is nothing in the Bill to prevent action being taken to suspend or alter a benefit payment in the event that an eligibility indicator is flagged. As we have heard, there are many innocent reasons why an eligibility indicator may exist. Indeed, as I have said, the eligibility indicator can be set at a level which would not indicate fraud at all—for example, £8,000 for a universal credit situation. The existence of an eligibility indicator does not indicate any guilt.

The Minister has told us the department will not treat an eligibility indicator as reasonable grounds for suspicion, but there is nothing in the Bill to define that. The draft code of practice that we have been provided with says that a benefit cannot be altered just because of the existence of an eligibility indicator, but that is only a code, which can be changed at will by this or any future Government without scrutiny. Furthermore, it is not known how much data will be sent to the DWP by the banks under the EVM process but, presumably, it is going to be substantial. It is clear that it will be processed electronically, and there is nothing in the Bill to prevent this process from becoming fully automated, including the decision-making. The DWP has made it publicly very clear that it is rolling out AI processes generally, which may be more efficient, but, in my view, any decisions need to be subject to human review.

In Committee, we heard about the Netherlands child benefits scandal, which was caused by automated decision-making—and interestingly, it eventually led to a Government falling. The Minister has been clear, and the draft code is also fairly clear, that the information will be reviewed by a person before any action, such as an amendment to or suspension of benefits, can be taken. But it is only in the code, and this could be changed without scrutiny.

I think that all of us in this Chamber trust the Minister completely, but she will not always be the Minister, however much we might wish that were the case. Indeed, it is even possible that this Government will not always be the Government. But this law will remain the law. A future Government may be less scrupulous about how benefit recipients are treated. The Bill, left unamended, would open the possibility that eligibility indicators, regardless of innocence, could lead to deeply intrusive actions or unfair financial impacts, potentially on a fully automated basis.

All Amendment 52 does is to make it clear that the existence of an eligibility indicator alone does not constitute reasonable grounds for suspicion, and it would make it a requirement that a suitably experienced person must have reviewed the information before any action to use intrusive powers against a benefit recipient or to amend or suspend payments is taken. I believe that is what the Government intend, so I really do not understand why there is a problem with accepting the amendment. It does not add any onerous obligations; it simply clarifies the situation that we are being told is the case.

Amendment 67 considers the impact and potential unintended consequences of these powers. The Government have included an independent review process in the use of the eligibility verification powers, which is a very welcome and important safeguard and a genuinely excellent addition since we last saw the Bill. But as it stands, the scope of that review is very limited. It covers only that the exercise of the powers has been in accordance with the Bill and the code of practice, that the persons who have been issued with eligibility notices have complied, and that it has been effective in identifying or assisting in identifying incorrect payments. The independent reviewer cannot look at any other impacts the policy might have.

In Committee, we spent a lot of time debating the costs that the Bill will impose on the banks, but no meaningful attempt has been made to quantify those yet. To quote from the impact assessment:

“At this stage we are unable to provide a robust assessment of business costs for validation because the operational solution for the measure is still being developed”.


We really need to make sure that the costs are proportional. All that Amendment 67 adds is a review of the costs of the policy to the scope of the independent review to ensure they are reasonable and proportional to the benefits.

We heard a lot about the fears of the impacts these new powers might have on disabled people and other vulnerable people, as well as the concern that imposing these onerous duties on the banks might reduce the willingness of the banks to provide banking services to those in receipt of benefits. As politically exposed persons, this is a subject that most of us here have personal experience of. We have seen how the banks behave when additional burdens are put on them in respect of a particular group of people. There is no reason to believe that that could not be the same in this situation. But the Bill includes nothing at all in relation to potential unintended consequences. Amendment 67 adds consideration of those potential unintended consequences to the scope of the independent review.

Finally, the amendment gives the independent reviewer the opportunity to confirm that they have received all the information that they require. This is now a bit of a formality, following the welcome government amendment that we debated last week, which changed “may provide information” to become “must”, but it was subject to a reasonably required caveat. There is still a possibility of disagreement between the reviewer and the department as to what information they might reasonably require. This just allows the reviewer to flag that they have not got what they think they need, which I think is a useful but not onerous safeguard.

These proposed eligibility verification powers are extremely intrusive, so they really must be subject to robust safeguards, which these two relatively simple amendments seek to strengthen. Unless I hear something unexpected from the Minister—and I shall listen to her very carefully—I am minded to seek the opinion of the House when the time comes. I beg to move.

[Lord Deben (Con)]

My Lords, there are moments when you hear a speech on a subject of which you are in general support that brings home very clearly the key issues; I think that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, produced that speech just now.

It is extremely dangerous for us to put ourselves in the hands of AI. It is particularly dangerous to put those who are vulnerable into the hands of AI. Indeed, I find it offensive when people who are able to appreciate things particularly well think it all right for others to be subject to automatic operations. The point made by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux—the Government recognise this matter, which is why it is in the advice, though why is it not in the Bill?—is a very important issue for this House.

I do not think it acceptable to have circumstances increased where vulnerable people are subject to “the system”, which is why I want to say just a word about it. It seems to me that one reason why democracy is so much under threat is because so many people feel themselves to be under threat by the system. The system is an alien thing. Well, if you do not want it to be alien, you have to make sure that it is at least human and not merely a machine.

There is another reason; it is one that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, gave delicately and politely but effectively. There are some pretty nasty people in this country who are, at the moment, blaming most things on groups of people whom they dislike, whether it is because of their race, because of their position or, in a sense, because they think that they just do not matter. It is always possible that such people get into power. I do not want those people to have a chance to use legislation that we—we are decent people, I hope—have passed. That is why I have come to speak on this particular amendment: in these months and years, we have to stand up on every occasion and recognise the damage that is done in a system where people like that get power. You have only to look across the Atlantic to see what happens when those who build up antagonism against groups get power and use legislation that was meant to be different in order to ensure the ends that they have in mind.

I beg the Minister to recognise that all we want is the guidance in the law. If we have that, she need not worry. I say that as somebody who has a history, as a Minister of some 16 years, of always being very tough on fraud and always believing that people should not get what they do not deserve, do not need and should not have, because that is very damaging to those who do need it. That is why I do not like it: it puts them in so difficult a position. I beg her simply to make sure that, when we do not have Ministers of the standing and quality that she has shown, they cannot use the law for improper purposes.

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[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, it is in the Bill. The requirement for reasonable suspicion for exercising powers under Clause 109BZB is set out in that clause. The fact that an account meets an eligibility indicator does not necessarily mean that there are any grounds for suspicion of fraud or other offences. It does not even necessarily mean that a benefit has been overpaid. Paragraph 3(1) of Schedule 3B on eligibility verification makes clear that eligibility indicators only indicate that a benefit

“may have been, or may be, incorrectly paid”.

The eligibility indicators in an eligibility verification notice must be criteria which indicate that the specified relevant benefit may have been or may be incorrectly paid.

The legislation therefore clearly reflects that EVM information will have to be considered alongside all other relevant information before further steps are taken. As I have said, DWP is required to consider all relevant information to determine whether there are reasonable grounds to suspect an offence. This is about not just this but about existing legislation and powers. I hope that my position on that is clear and that the government amendments in the previous group have helped to make it clearer.

Amendment 52 also requires that the information be reviewed by an appropriately senior person. We do not know exactly what the definition is of a senior person. However, it is an established legal principle that the Secretary of State must be satisfied that officials are suitably trained and experienced to take decisions on their behalf. The amendment is therefore unnecessary. I hope that the noble Lord will not feel the need to press it.

Amendment 67 would add three additional requirements to the role that the EVM independent reviewer will be required to undertake. Government Amendments 68 and 69, spoken to in an early group by my noble friend Lady Anderson, addressed paragraph (f) of that requirement by requiring the Secretary of State to provide information to the independent reviewer where it is “reasonably required”. In case there are any concerns about that, we foresee a close working relationship between DWP and the independent EVM reviewer, where DWP gives the reviewer the information that it needs.

However, the government amendment makes it even clearer that we are committed to providing necessary information. If necessary, DWP could ask the reviewer to demonstrate why a certain piece of information is necessary for the purposes of their review, by reference to the scope of the review and the matter that it has to cover, as set out in legislation. If the independent reviewer then demonstrates that the information is necessary for them to carry out their review, the legislation is clear that DWP must provide it.

On paragraph (d) of this amendment regarding costs incurred by business, this is a matter the Government take seriously. We are committed to keeping costs associated with this measure proportionate and to a minimum. As the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, is well aware, over the passage of the Bill we have worked very closely with UK Finance to improve the Bill and our draft codes of practice. At a recent meeting with Ministers, UK Finance welcomed this extensive engagement, which it feels has significantly strengthened the Bill. It indicated that it was not calling for further legislative change.

Crucially, I do not regard this amendment as necessary because the independent reviewer must already assess the measure’s effectiveness. Financial institutions receiving an EVN have the right to appeal a notice that is unduly onerous. We have committed to provide a further impact assessment 12 months after Royal Assent.

Paragraph (e) of the amendment would require the independent reviewer to include within their annual report any adverse effect that the EVN may have on vulnerable persons’ or benefit claimants’ access to banking services. I assure the noble Lord and the House that protecting DWP customers, especially those who are vulnerable, is very much a priority for this Government. However, we do not believe that this amendment is necessary.

First, there is no reason for individuals to lose access to banking services solely because of information shared under EVM. We have been clear that information does not imply any wrongdoing. The Bill makes provision to exempt financial institutions from returning suspicious activity reports in certain circumstances if the information that they have is only the result of an EVM match. We are working with the FCA to prevent any unintended consequences. Secondly, as I have indicated, this measure simply provides a source of data that feeds into the long-standing processes in DWP, where layers of support and specialist staff already exist to ensure that those who are vulnerable or have complex needs get the right support. Thirdly, this measure will help our customers, including those who are vulnerable. It will help us to spot genuine errors in claims early, help us to take steps to correct these and prevent large overpayments and debts building up that are recoverable.

I hope that the arguments which I have put out there have been enough to persuade the House on why we should move ahead. I beg the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I thank every noble Lord who has taken part in this debate. I particularly thank the noble Lord, Lord Deben, for his generous words, and the Minister for her fulsome response. On the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, about allowing people to get away with fraud, I want to make it really clear that I do not want people to get away with fraud. I am as keen as anyone to make sure that fraud and error are reduced. Please do not take away from this that I am soft on fraud. I hope my track record on fraud is well known within this House.

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Moved by

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden]

67: Clause 76, page 44, line 32, at end insert—
“(d) the costs incurred by the Secretary of State and by those who have received eligibility verification notices have been reasonable and proportionate,(e) the exercise of the Secretary of State’s powers under Schedule 3B has had any adverse affect on vulnerable people or on the ability of benefit claimants to access banking services, and(f) the independent person has been provided such information as they consider necessary to carry out the review.” Member's explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to expand the scope of the independent review of the use of the eligibility verification powers to ensure that the costs are proportionate and any unintended adverse consequences are identified.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I listened carefully to what the noble Baroness had to say on Amendment 67. All it would do is add scope to the independent reviewer to cover the costs of this policy, to make sure that they are reasonable and proportionate and that any unintended consequences are identified.

I will make just a couple of points. The noble Baroness mentioned UK Finance. I acknowledge that she and the department have had a lot of constructive discussions with UK Finance during this process, and that it is broadly happy with the Bill. However, it is not at all sure what the costs are, because we still do not know exactly what it is being asked to do. So UK Finance supports including a review of the costs in the Bill.

The debanking point is not to do with an eligibility indicator causing someone to be debanked; it is because the Bill creates onerous obligations that relate to benefit providers. As I have said before, as we know as PEPs ourselves, where banks have to follow onerous rules or suffer onerous provisions, there is a risk that they decide not to provide services to people related to those onerous activities. We have seen that with the PEP situation; I know myself that it has been very difficult. This point is slightly different from the one the noble Baroness described, but it is important that the costs be reviewed to make sure they are proportionate and reasonable and that any unintended consequences are identified by the independent reviewer. So I wish to test the opinion of the House.

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Moved by

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden]

75: Clause 77, page 46, leave out line 6
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would remove the ability for DWP authorised investigators in England and Wales to use reasonable force when exercising their powers of entry, search or seizure under PACE 1984. If reasonable force is needed, it remains a matter for the police.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I apologise: noble Lords are going to get fed up with hearing me, but this is the last of it. Amendments 75 to 77 relate to the new police powers that the Bill confers on DWP staff. Once again, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, for their support on this. I am also very grateful to the organisation Justice for its help and briefings on this matter.

Chapter 2 of Part 2 creates powers of search, entry and seizure by authorised DWP staff, effectively giving civil servants the same powers as police officers. This is similar to the powers conferred on the Cabinet Office and the Public Sector Fraud Authority that we have debated previously, but with one very important difference: unlike the PSFA powers, these DWP powers would allow DWP-authorised officers to use reasonable force against benefit claimants when exercising their new entry, search and seizure powers. This would make it lawful for a DWP officer—not a police officer, but a civil servant—to enter your home, seize your belongings and forcibly hold you down while doing so. Let us be clear: this power of force is being sought to be used against benefit recipients, a section of the population, as we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, that is recognised to be more vulnerable and to live with disabilities at a higher rate than the population at large.

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[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for his help but I will try to manage for now. To open a filing cabinet or to open a device without the consent of the owner requires using reasonable force. I fully accept that he does not think that the DWP should have any of those powers. I hope he will bear with me and allow me to move through the arguments to make a case as to why I think it is necessary. If I cannot persuade him then I accept that, and he will go into the other Division Lobby, but I hope he will allow me to explain why I think this is necessary and proportionate.

One of the risks of the approach that has been taken to try to limit the use of reasonable force as set out by PACE is that it could have the unintended consequence of removing an authorised investigator’s common-law right to self-defence—for example, if they were physically threatened during a search and seizure activity. Clearly, the safety of our authorised investigators is paramount and they, like anyone else, must have the right to defend themselves if threatened. We will of course take a number of steps to ensure staff members’ safety. That includes conducting risk assessments on application for the warrant and during the search and seizure activity itself, and equipping staff with critical safety equipment and protective clothing.

The noble Lord, Lord Harper, asked about training. All DWP-authorised investigators will be required to complete training to the equivalent standard of the police before they can use these PACE powers. I assure the noble Lord, Lord Deben, that money will be made available to pay for that. We will not expect people to use these powers if they have not had appropriate training. That was a good question and I am pleased to answer it. In addition, DWP criminal investigators undertake investigative training as part of the Government Counter Fraud Profession. All staff must have training to industry standards before they can be considered even for authorised investigator status. That will ensure that staff are benchmarked to the same standard.

The DWP will not have the power of arrest. I remind the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, that the previous Government’s fraud plan, including the version put out in 2024, when he was standing where I am, proposed not only the powers we have here but that DWP staff should have the powers of arrest. We decided that was not appropriate but, as I have said, we do think that the power to have reasonable force against property is reasonable. We have taken what I think is a proportionate view. In the situation described, where the DWP arrives at premises but the police are not there and its staff find their entry is obstructed, the policy will be that they should remove themselves from any potential danger and request police presence.

The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, also mentioned oversight. We will be commissioning His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services to inspect the use and effectiveness of these powers in England and Wales and His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary in Scotland to do so there. These inspections can focus on any part of the end-to-end criminal investigation and their reports will be published by the Secretary of State. In addition, the Independent Office for Police Conduct will be responsible for reviewing any serious incidents or complaints in relation to these powers in England and Wales, with the Police Investigations & Review Commissioner responsible in Scotland.

While I am here, two other questions were asked on the IOPC. In one, I think the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, said that the IOPC regs were a Henry VIII power. I am advised that they are not, because they do not seek to amend or repeal primary legislation. The proposed amendments to Part 2 of the Police Reform Act are contained in the Bill itself. On the question of funding, the DWP has secured the necessary agreements with the IOPC and will continue to work closely and in partnership with it to ensure that its needs are considered, including financial arrangements. The regulations will make provision as to payment for this service and permit the lawful disclosure of sensitive files and information relating to the exercise of the functions and powers. I hope that reassures the noble Lord on that point.

On the other questions that have been mentioned, just to be clear, the drafting in Schedule 4 for Scotland is intended to clarify that force cannot be used to compel individuals to provide information when required to do so by a court protection order. This mirrors PACE as it applies in England and Wales. On the exercise of reasonable force when executing search warrants, the provisions in the Bill both in Scotland and in England and Wales are comparable. I hope that reassures noble Lords who think that we think that people in Scotland are less dangerous than people in England and Wales. I can assure them that is not the case.

Noble Lords asked about the difference between the PSFA and the DWP. Primarily, this is a matter of scale. A tailored approach has been adopted by the DWP and the PSFA. The PSFA is likely to do a smaller number of investigations; the scale at which the DWP operates would be a very different use of police resource than it would be in the case of the PSFA. Therefore, we think it is appropriate.

Finally, I think somebody—I am sorry, I have forgotten which noble Lord this was—asked whether we would use this provision against vulnerable people, benefit claimants being vulnerable. Again, another form of reassurance is that the law requires any warrant application to include information about any vulnerable individuals who may be present on the premises. As a result, the DWP has to conduct risk assessments before even applying to the court.

I understand the comments that have been made. I hope that I have been able to reassure noble Lords that our proposals are proportionate. On that basis, I urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. In particular, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Harper, for giving us the benefit of his real-life experience on this and the very powerful example of how this can go wrong.

I confess that I am not persuaded of the need for DWP officers to have the ability to use reasonable force and I am tempted to go down the route the noble Lord, Lord Harper, suggests of removing it altogether. However, I want to be constructive. I do not want to ruin the Bill, so I think I can live with a situation where the Bill tries to mirror what the Minister has said the powers will be used for and limit it to that. If she thinks there are unintended consequences from that, those can be fixed at a later stage, at Third Reading. I make the point now that it is outrageous that Third Reading is in less than two days’ time from now, on Thursday. That is not the way we do things in this House. It does not give us time to sit down and try to work things out. I put it on record that it is just wrong.

I was slightly confused by one thing the Minister said. She described a situation where the police are there throughout as a waste of police time, when they could be off dealing with real crime, but just the sentence before she told us that this will be used only in cases of sophisticated high-value fraud. Is that not real crime? I confess that I am a bit confused by that.

Anyway, nothing I have heard has changed my view about the ability to use reasonable force against people being appropriate for DWP officials, particularly if the police are likely to be there all along anyway. I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 75, but I will, when the time comes, test the opinion of the House on Amendment 76.

Amendment 75 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden]

76: Schedule 4, page 94, line 11, at end insert—
“(4A) Section 117 (reasonable use of force) is to be read as if at the end there were inserted—“(2) Authorised investigators exercising powers under section 109D may only use reasonable force, if necessary, against items and property, not against persons.(3) Nothing in subsection (2) restricts the power of a police constable to use reasonable force, if necessary, when exercising powers under section 109D Social Security Administration Act 1992.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would prohibit DWP authorised officers from using force against people during the exercise of their entry, search and seizure powers, reflecting the policy intention in the Explanatory notes to the Bill. It preserves their power to use force against things – such as locked filing cabinets – and preserves police use of force, if necessary, under a DWP warrant.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

I beg to move.

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I turn to Amendment 88, which would require the independent reviewer not only to assess how the powers under this Bill are being exercised but to report explicitly on expenditure and recovery, and to provide Parliament with a cost-benefit assessment of the operation of the Act. These measures are not intended to frustrate the Government’s ambition to tackle fraud; we have reflected this in giving the Government five years to get set up and running before an initial report is required. Amendment 88 strengthens that ambition by ensuring that it can be demonstrated beyond doubt that the policies are working. This is paramount to any democracy, and I hope that the Minister recognises the importance of this in her response. I beg to move.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

I rise very briefly to support these three amendments, particularly Amendment 87, which relates to whether the independent reviewer “may” or “must” be given information. I thought we had that debate some time ago. The Minister tabled amendments for other parts of the Bill which reflected that, saying that they “must” be given information they reasonably require. I was not terribly happy with “reasonably require”; none the less, it seems very odd that this one is different and remains a “may”. My first reaction was that this must be an oversight, but apparently it may not be. I would love to understand why this is different for this clause, but not for the rest of it.

Amendment 86 is also important because, while the Bill creates the independent review process, it does not include when and over what period—that is to be added later, which somewhat undermines the independent review. It is rather unusual; I do not think I have ever seen a Bill which does not establish, on the face of it, when a review must be, or at least the latest time it can be issued. I really think it ought to. With that, I support these amendments.