Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill

Debate between Lord Young of Norwood Green and Lord Wills

Monday 10th December 2012 Grand Committee

[Lord Wills]

My Lords, I, too, have added my name to the amendment and would like to say just a few words in support of it.

As we have heard, the new test proposed in Clause 15 attempts to remedy a loophole created by the case of Parkins v Sodhexo Ltd. Most people agree that that loophole should be closed but, in doing so, the Government risk creating a new barrier to whistleblowers, adding new complexity to a legal framework which can already be daunting enough for those wishing to expose wrongdoing. The amendment proposed by my noble friend Lord Touhig is an attempt to remedy that by removing the “good faith” test and, as he explained, to rebalance the legislation back towards protection of the whistleblower.

In doing that, as we have just heard from the noble Lord, Lord Low, my noble friend is following the recommendations of Dame Janet Smith in the Shipman inquiry, who said that in her view the words “in good faith” could be omitted from the Public Interest Disclosure Act. She argued:

“The three tiered regime of the PIDA, with its incrementally exacting requirements, should afford sufficient discouragement to those minded maliciously to raise baseless concerns”.

She continued:

“If the words ‘in good faith’ were removed from the PIDA, the test under the PIDA would be brought more closely into line with the test for ‘malice’ in defamation proceedings. It would seem to me to be desirable that the tests should be as close as possible so that a person thinking of making a report can be safely advised about his/her position in respect of both types of proceedings”.

I know that the Government share the view of everyone on the Committee that everything possible should be done to encourage the exposure of wrongdoing, and I hope that even at this relatively late stage, they will feel able to accept what is a modest and sensible proposal to that end. If, for whatever reason, they do not, I would be grateful if the Minister could explain why the Government reject the arguments of Dame Janet Smith. Why do they not accept that the three-tiered regime, with its incrementally exacting requirements, affords sufficient discouragement to those minded maliciously to raise baseless concerns—especially as they are remedying the loophole created by the case of Parkins v Sodhexo Ltd? Secondly, can the Government explain why they think that it is not desirable for the tests in the Act to be brought more closely in line with the test for malice in defamation proceedings?

Having said all that, I understand that the Government are engaged constructively in discussion with Public Concern at Work. I hope that they may feel able to accept the compromise amendment which I have tabled as Amendment 23F. That recognises that, for whatever reason, the Government are not keen to accept Amendment 23 but might be prepared to accept an amendment which removes good faith as an issue in assessing liability but retains it as a consideration in assessing remedies.

As I am sure the Minister will be aware, precedent has been established with the Polkey reductions, which are used in allowing for unfair dismissal damages to be reduced where there has been contributory negligence. Amendment 23F is a compromise which will at least mitigate the problems with the status quo by ensuring that motive will not play a central role in securing protection for whistleblowers. Although the Minister may not be able to give a definite statement on this now, I hope that he can reassure us that he expects that he will be able to reach a form of wording which will be satisfactory to all sides in a compromise amendment.

[Lord Young of Norwood Green]

My Lords, I shall speak briefly to Amendments 23 and 23F, because people who are far more expert in these areas have already forensically examined them. My noble friends Lord Touhig and Lord Wills, have already explained the reasoning behind them. They raise the important issue of how a broad public interest test would interact with the existing good faith test.

When Parliament passed the Public Interest Disclosure Act, it did not place a public interest test in the legislation, choosing instead to define the categories of wrongdoing under which disclosures in the public interest disclosure action fit. Good faith was seen as the appropriate safeguard.

If the public interest test is to be considered at all, it is crucial that it is considered in conjunction with the test of good faith. With the Government’s new test proposed in Clause 15, whistleblowers would need to show that they had reasonable belief that their disclosure was made in the public interest. Later there is the good faith test that their predominant motive for making a disclosure was in the public interest, creating, in effect, a double whammy of double public interest. Amendment 23F, proposed by my noble friend Lord Wills, would that good faith would become a consideration only at remedy stage. There is already a precedent for this, similar to the Polkey reductions used in allowing for unfair dismissal damages to be reduced where there has been contributory negligence.