Oral Answers to Questions

Lord Soames of Fletching Excerpts

Monday 14th November 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

The Loya Jirga will take place in Kabul, and of course ISAF has considerable resources deployed there in support of the Afghan security forces. Also, many ISAF contributing nations have special forces operating in Afghanistan, working in collaboration with the Afghan special forces and special police. All those arrangements will help to ensure the security of the Loya Jirga.

[Nicholas Soames (Mid Sussex) (Con)]

Will my right hon. Friend pay an especially warm tribute to the soldiers of the British Army, and those in other parts of the services, who are contributing so much to the training of Afghan forces? Has he decided in which particular areas we will specialise in training Afghans after 2015?

[Mr Hammond]

I am happy to join my right hon. Friend in paying tribute to British servicemen and women for their work in training and mentoring Afghan national security forces on the job. Looking forward, the Prime Minister has made a commitment that Britain will take the lead role in the Afghan national officer training academy, which will be established just outside Kabul and will train the bulk of officer recruits to the Afghan national security forces.

NATO Rapid Reaction Corps

Lord Soames of Fletching Excerpts

Friday 21st October 2011 Ministerial Corrections

[Nicholas Soames]

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the (a) number and (b) rank is of the UK personnel in HQ Allied Rapid Reaction Corps.

[Official Report, 18 July 2011, Vol. 531, c. 584W.]

Letter of correction from Nick Harvey:

An error has been identified in the written answer given to the right hon. Member for Mid Sussex (Nicholas Soames) on 18 July 2011. The civilian figures provided in the table were incorrect.

The full answer given was as follows:

[Nick Harvey]

The number and rank/grade of UK military and civilian personnel in the HQ Allied Rapid Reaction Corps is shown in the following table:

Defence Transformation

Lord Soames of Fletching Excerpts

Monday 18th July 2011 Commons Chamber

[Dr Fox]

That was one of the poorest attacks on a Government that I have ever heard. It is pretty rich for the Opposition, after calling for the statement for so long, to complain when we make it. They also seem to be utterly incapable of understanding, even now, the appalling financial state in which they left not only defence but the United Kingdom in general. Does the right hon. Gentleman really think that had we been given a choice—had we not faced a national economic emergency—we would be making spending reductions across the board? We are having to do that because of the mess that the Opposition left behind.

When it comes to numbers, yet again the Opposition seem not to have learned any lessons. They talk about total numbers all the time, but they do not talk about deployability. Yet again they have failed to learn the lessons of the mistakes that they made during their time in office. I want to see British forces that can be deployed better, and I want to see them better trained and properly equipped. When they talk about how much they value the TA, the Opposition would do well to remember that it was they who were cutting the reserves during their last months in office. It was they who were cutting reservists’ training and allowances to save small amounts of money. We do not need any lessons from them in that regard.

We are trying to augment the “one Army” concept by ensuring better interoperability between our reserves and our regular forces. We want our reserves, like those in other countries, to be properly used in a way that gives good value for the investment made in them, and gives them a greater say and more respect within the military family.

Investment had already been made in Leuchars, and I fully accept that some of that investment will be lost. However, we felt that—in the broader scheme of things, and if we were to achieve a better rationalisation of the estate—Lossiemouth was the better choice, given that we had an alternative for Leuchars in the form of investment in the Army in the south of Scotland.

The right hon. Gentleman asked about the footprint in Scotland. I should be happy to look at our footprint across the United Kingdom. What we have done is return to Scotland a footprint that is much more akin to what was there when we left office than to what was there when we returned to it.

[Nicholas Soames (Mid Sussex) (Con)]

I warmly congratulate my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State on his important and impressive announcement. Contrary to what the right hon. Member for East Renfrewshire (Mr Murphy) said, the Army will discover that the RAF bases into which it moves are very much better found than it is used to. Does the Secretary of State agree that the transformation and whole reform of the defence structure needs to proceed at a great pace, otherwise the rats at the Ministry of Defence will get at it?

[Dr Fox]

I would like to say that I am rat-proof, but that would probably be tempting fate. We have set out a path that we will clearly follow, from the defence reform set out by Lord Levene, through the basing review, which we have set out today, and through the reserves review and the extra investment that goes with that. It is correct that some of that will have to proceed quickly, but it is also correct that some of it can occur only if other steps are met. For example, the assumptions we make about Future Force 2020 and the size of the regular reserve ratio will depend on two things: that we ensure that the training and equipping of the reserves goes to the plan I have set out, and that we withdraw from Afghanistan in the time scale the Prime Minister has set out.

Oral Answers to Questions

Lord Soames of Fletching Excerpts

Monday 4th July 2011 Commons Chamber

[Dr Fox]

I fully understand all the hon. Gentleman’s arguments. As I have always said, we regard the military elements as having paramount importance, but we understand the other elements. Having taken a number of the key decisions over the weekend, I hope that we will make progress very shortly.

[Nicholas Soames (Mid Sussex) (Con)]

I warmly commend my right hon. Friend for the determination he is bringing to bear to push through the Levene reforms. Does he agree that one of the most important issues affecting the three services is the need for “purple” command and control and for decisions to be taken on a tri-service basis, and that that should be pushed through?

[Dr Fox]

That is the natural way in which defence is developing in this country, as in others. We wanted to set up the joint force command to carry that process forward in a constructive and transparent way. It will also, as I said in my statement to the House, allow career progression right up to four-star level for those who might not get preferment through the traditional single-service structure. It is therefore not only good for defence but a thoroughly meritocratic reform.

Libya

Lord Soames of Fletching Excerpts

Tuesday 24th May 2011 Commons Chamber

[Nick Harvey]

The right hon. Gentleman quotes the French Minister, and my understanding is that the French have indeed taken a decision to deploy their attack helicopters in Libya. I state again for the avoidance of all doubt that no such decision has been taken by the United Kingdom. It is an option that we are considering, but no decision has been taken, and there is absolutely no sense in which it is true to say that we have kept Parliament in the dark about a decision that we have taken.

I do not accept that if we were to take the decision to use attack helicopters at some point in the future, that would be an “escalation” of what we are doing in Libya. The targets would remain the same; it would simply be a tactical shift in what assets we used to try to hit those targets. The right hon. Gentleman asks why we would consider doing this, and what would be the military logic of contemplating using attack helicopters. The principal advantage it would give us over the air assets we are currently deploying is the ability to strike moving targets with greater precision.

The right hon. Gentleman asked about the costs. I do not recognise the figure he gives. It is not possible to compute in real time a figure, but I say to him again that the Chancellor of the Exchequer has made it clear that the cost of this operation will be met by the reserve.

The right hon. Gentleman asked about maintaining the momentum. We keep our stocks under regular review, including specifically of Brimstone. We are content that we can keep going for the foreseeable future, but we will have to make adjustments as time goes on and calculate whether it will be necessary to increase our stocks.

On the operational allowance, the arrangements will remain as they are, but we are looking into the possibility of extending special consideration for those who would not meet the normal criteria.

The Government have been doing their utmost to ensure that the House is kept informed about what is going on. There have been debates and questions, and we have given several briefings, and if the right hon. Gentleman feels at any stage that he needs more information, he needs only to ask and we will do everything we can to afford him that information. We are involved in a military operation, however. We have to consider from time to time the tactics we are using, and you will understand, Mr Speaker, why we would not do so in advance on the Floor of the House. Apart from anything else, telling the enemy exactly what we are up to would be a very unusual strategy. As soon as decisions are taken, however, we will ensure that Parliament is informed.

[Nicholas Soames (Mid Sussex) (Con)]

I thank my hon. Friend for his statement. If the Apache helicopter were to be deployed, that would be entirely appropriate, particularly given the Gaddafi forces’ change in tactics, and the requirement to have a highly effective machine that can lurk and deal with the hard-to-find targets. What steps would need to be taken to marinise the Apache if it were to be operating off-carrier?

[Nick Harvey]

I agree with my hon. Friend that we are right to consider this in pursuance, as I said, of UNSCR 1973. Gaddafi and his regime remain a real threat to the civilian population in Libya and if we were to take a decision to use an attack helicopter, it would be in pursuit of that resolution. Such helicopters give us a greater ability to pinpoint targets, we are able to operate them from HMS Ocean or other maritime assets, and there is no need for any specific adaptation in order to do that.

Oral Answers to Questions

Lord Soames of Fletching Excerpts

Monday 16th May 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Howarth]

I think that the hon. Gentleman is being slightly churlish. I was extraordinarily impressed by the speed with which NATO responded. After all, there was a United Nations resolution and no mechanism by which it was going to be implemented. It is hugely to NATO’s credit, and particularly to the credit of its Secretary-General, that he and it made those structures available to enable support for the Libyan people to be provided not only by NATO but by many other countries. I am sure there will be a review about how successful everything has been in due course.

[Nicholas Soames (Mid Sussex) (Con)]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that despite the programme of modernisation, which is very welcome, and NATO’s extremely effective and speedy response over Libya, the question of NATO’s transformation is proceeding not nearly fast enough? Does he agree that it would be a pity if the Ministers’ meeting at NATO did not come up with a really substantial reform in that department?

[Mr Howarth]

As ever, my hon. Friend puts his finger on the point. He is absolutely right and we are absolutely determined. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State will be pressing ahead with transformation. We have led the way on this and we are determined not to let the issue lapse because if NATO is not efficient, lean and modern, it will not be able to deliver what we all seek.

Strategic Defence and Security Review

Lord Soames of Fletching Excerpts

Thursday 4th November 2010 Commons Chamber

[Dr Fox]

First, “cats and traps” are not yesterday’s technology. In fact, considerable expense is going into ensuring that there are more modern, more effective “cat and trap” systems. The United States is spending a great deal of research and development money on that at present. Secondly, if we are to have genuine interoperability, it makes sense to have carriers that the American navy or the French can land on and, in the case of the French, use when their carrier is in refit and they require ongoing training. It is perfectly rational to buy the plane with the longer range and bigger payload, which is in fact cheaper. In the past, it was decided, for whatever reasons, to build 65,000-tonne carriers without a “cat and trap” system, and that decision was augmented by the STOVL decision. That would have been the most expensive variant, with the shortest range and the smallest payload. We are bringing those greater capabilities into better alignment with the carrier itself.

The right hon. Member for Coventry North East mentioned the Harrier. We had to face up to the difficult choices that the previous Government put off. Regrettably, we have decided to retire HMS Ark Royal three years early and to retire the Harrier force—both in 2011. Of course, that is not unprecedented. The UK’s carrier strike capability was gapped during the late 1970s, as we transitioned from Buccaneer to Harrier itself. While Harrier was operating in Afghanistan between 2004 and 2009, our ability to generate carrier strike was at best severely curtailed.

Over the next five years, life-saving combat air support to operations in Afghanistan has to be the overriding priority. In Afghanistan, the Joint Force Harrier did wonderful work, and I pay tribute to the Harrier aircraft, the crews that have serviced them and the pilots who have flown them since they entered service. During its deployment to Afghanistan, the Joint Force Harrier flew in excess of 22,000 hours on more than 8,500 sorties, more than 2,000 of which were close air support missions. It is my understanding that every Harrier pilot from every Harrier squadron took part at some point during the Harrier’s deployment to Afghanistan.

Tough and unsentimental choices had to be made, however, and the military advice was that Tornado was the more capable aircraft to retain, due to its wider capabilities and force size, for not only Afghanistan but other significant contingent capabilities. Operations in Afghanistan between 2004 and 2009 took their toll on the Harrier force. By the time the aircraft was withdrawn from theatre, the force’s ability to recuperate and regenerate a fully operational carrier strike capability—notwithstanding the strenuous efforts to do so by Joint Force Harrier—had understandably been affected.

The decision taken by the previous Government in 2009 drastically to salami-slice the number of Harriers meant that, even if we had wanted to, we could not sustain our current fast-jet requirement in Afghanistan using Harriers alone. The decision in 2009 reduced the number of Harriers from 18 force elements at readiness to 10, but the military advice is that we require 40 force elements at readiness of Harriers to maintain our fast-jet contribution in Afghanistan on an enduring basis and without breaching harmony guidelines.

[Nicholas Soames (Mid Sussex) (Con)]

What steps does my right hon. Friend intend to take to retain the critical mass of flying skills of the absolutely admirable and remarkable Fleet Air Arm?

[Dr Fox]

The Fleet Air Arm will require something of a transitioning with the new joint strike fighter when we get towards the end of the decade. I have had discussions with my American counterparts, who have made it clear that, should we require help to maintain skills in any way in the run-up to that period, the United States will make the facilities available to us, and we fully understand that. Let me make it clear, as I did earlier, that the joint strike fighter will be flown from our carriers by both Royal Navy and Air Force pilots. We will maintain a joint force, which is an important message to both services at a time of uncertainty.

Some of the things we have read about Harrier have been hugely over-simplistic. As a result of decisions taken in recent years, I am afraid that the previous Government loaded the dice against Harrier a long time before the last election. I fully understand the consequences of retiring Harrier for livelihoods and basing, and the emotiveness of this beautiful and iconic aircraft, particularly in relation to the Falklands conflict of 1982, as everyone in the House will appreciate. However, I believe that we have made the right decision, based on unsentimental military logic.

The Falklands have been the subject of some comment in recent days. The Government are unequivocally committed to the defence of our overseas territories and dependencies, but the situation now is far removed from that of the early 1980s. First, we maintain a far more robust and capable force in the Falklands to act as a deterrent and to secure our interests there, and that force is able to be reinforced as the need arises. Secondly, and more importantly, Argentina is no longer ruled by a military junta that is repressive at home and aggressive abroad. Argentina is now a vibrant, multi-party democracy, constructive on the world stage and pledged to peaceful resolution of the issues that undoubtedly remain between us. Of course, we maintain robust contingency plans for times of crisis, and there is no questioning our resolve to defend the Falklands whenever required and from whatever quarter.

The decision to cancel the Nimrod MRA4 programme was extremely difficult due to the nature of the military tasks to which the aircraft was designed to contribute, the amount of public money that had been spent on it and the impact of such a decision on the people who have dedicated their careers to delivering this capability or who depend on it for their livelihoods. However, the severe financial pressures faced by the Government and the urgent need to bring the defence programme into balance meant that we could not retain all our existing programmes, as recognised by the previous Government in their Green Paper.

I recognise that this decision means taking some risks on the capability that Nimrod was to provide. Since the withdrawal of the Nimrod MR2 in March—a decision taken by the previous Government—the Ministry of Defence has sought to mitigate the gap in capability through the use, on a case-by-case basis, of other military assets, including Type 23 frigates, Merlin anti-submarine warfare helicopters and Hercules C-130 aircraft, and by relying on assistance from allies and partners. In view of the sensitive and classified nature of some of those military tasks and the implications for the protection of our armed forces, including the nuclear deterrent, it is not possible for me to comment on those measures in detail, but as the previous Government did, I am happy to make the Opposition spokesman fully aware, as far as the classification allows, of our decisions and the military advice upon which we take them.

As Defence Secretary, I have concentrated today on issues within my remit, but the guiding principle of the SDSR has been to join national security efforts across the Government, flowing from the direction that the new National Security Council now delivers. The SDSR covers far more ground—from conflict prevention to counter-terrorism, energy security, cyber-security and border security, and resilience at home and overseas—and I hope that hon. Members will take the opportunity to raise those wider issues today.

The Government had to take some difficult decisions, and the transformation will be painful, but we will emerge with a robust national security structure and a coherent set of capabilities that supports our foreign policy goals of rebuilding our prosperity and safeguarding our security both overseas and at home, but I should like to end by restating my commitment to sustaining operations in Afghanistan. We must succeed there—that must be our main effort. At the heart of those operations are the men and women of our armed forces, the civilians and families who support them, the intelligence and security agencies, and all those who stand between us and those who would do us harm. The whole House will agree that they are the best of the best and thank them for their dedication, professionalism and selfless commitment. All of us in this country owe them a very deep debt of gratitude.

--- Later in debate ---

[Nicholas Soames (Mid Sussex) (Con)]

In the week before Armistice day, I, along with every other Member of this House, salute the memory of the fallen and extend my thoughts and sympathies to their families, as well as to those who have been wounded, to wish them a speedy recovery. I further pay a heartfelt tribute to the men and women of the British armed forces, wherever they are serving—sea, land or air—and most especially to those in Afghanistan; to the service families, who just by keeping the home fires burning do invaluable work for the nation; and to the civilian staff in the Ministry of Defence and elsewhere, who support our armed forces extremely well.

I welcome the new shadow Secretary of State. I am delighted to tell him that I had the privilege of working on the Green Paper of his right hon. Friend the Member for Coventry North East (Mr Ainsworth), the former Secretary of State, which was valuable pre-thinking for some of the work that went into the SDSR. It was not the right hon. Gentleman’s fault, but looking back, perhaps the only mistake was that none of the aspirations that we discussed was in any way linked to financial considerations. They were really linked more to the question of capability. To that extent, the Green Paper did an important job, even though its conclusion at the end of the day was held to be rather unrealistic.

I declare an interest, as the honorary colonel of the Bristol university officer training corps. One of their distinguished former officers, the Minister of State, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, my hon. Friend the Member for Hertford and Stortford (Mr Prisk), now sits on the Front Bench, while the daughter of my right hon. Friend the Member for North East Hampshire (Mr Arbuthnot), the Chairman of the Defence Committee, is one of their most glittering alumnettes. I want the Secretary of State to be particularly aware of the exceptional work of the OTC this summer, when they deployed to Canada at full unit strength to take part in Exercise Prairie Thunder, an extremely important training operation that, as I am sure the House is aware, put formed battle groups through their paces before operational deployments, most particularly to Afghanistan. The cadets were attached to the opposition force, which is much the most interesting and fun thing to do, and they performed magnificently.

I raise that because I want the Secretary of State to congratulate the cadets on their efforts. They were extremely professional and did very well. I also want to thank the Ministry of Defence and all those responsible for helping, and to congratulate Lieutenant-Colonel Petersen and all those who arranged the exercise. I want the Secretary of State to understand that there is a wider utility to the university officer training corps, in supporting the regular Army. The exercise presented a tremendous opportunity for officer cadets to work with regular Army units, to everyone’s advantage. I hope very much that he will remember that point when important decisions are taken about the OTCs, who make an important contribution to the military life of this country and provide an invaluable footprint at universities.

When the Prime Minister announced the review, I welcomed especially the careful analysis done to support it, and I welcome most of the conclusions that have been reached. However, as the Prime Minister agreed on the day that the review was announced and as the Secretary of State said this afternoon, this is just the starting point for a much more fundamental transformation of defence in this country, so that in 10 years’ time we will have a defence posture and capability capable of securing our national interests at home and abroad. An enormous body of much more detailed work now needs to be done on strategy, capability and all the rest.

Let me take this opportunity also to congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin) on the excellent report that the Select Committee on Public Administration has produced on strategy. He has made an invaluable contribution, and the Government need to pay careful attention to the points that he has made.

The purpose of the 2010 strategy review—and presumably that of all other reviews—is to achieve a strategy that matches ends, ways and means. The most immediate signal to come out of the SDSR is that the financial realities confronting the coalition Government—and the country—have forced them to make cuts that they would clearly much rather not have had to make. It is important to recognise that the SDSR has inevitably resulted in a real reduction in Britain’s ability to undertake strategic power projection. The jarring gong of reality has sounded, and the truly dismal lessons of the past 13 years have had to be learned in a very brief period.

As for the individual services, I would say this. First, I am afraid that I simply do not understand the stance of the Royal Navy, which would leave it unable to have anything but an absolutely minimal presence across the globe. That seems to be an appalling decision by the naval planners, and they will—mark my words—come always to regret it. Secondly, I simply believe that the Royal Air Force has got it wrong, while the Army has come up with a sensible, pragmatic and workable solution. However, will the Secretary of State tell me how he sees the development of the use of drone aircraft and who will be responsible for using them? What will be the configuration of the armoured regiments after the loss of the Challenger tanks? He is absolutely right to take those steps to retire—or, at least, to mothball—some of the Challenger tanks. What will the armoured regiments look like and what will their task be?

I warmly welcome the treaty signed between the French and British Governments. In truth, this has been 40 or 50 years in the making, and only now have the Prime Minister and the President of the French Republic managed to bring to harbour a very difficult and extremely important step for this country and for France. I am quite clear that it was the right thing to do. The most important step and the real game changer is with regard to the nuclear issues. I strongly and warmly welcome the treaty—although I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex has some reservations—and I think it will be but a precursor to further and greater co-operation.

I have three big points to make: first, on the reserves; secondly, on the need to maintain momentum around transformation; thirdly, on the Ministry of Defence headquarters.

I ask the Secretary of State to continue to examine how better to use our reserves. We in the UK are out of kilter with all our major allies. About 40% of US combat capability is generated by reserves. For example, the US deploys the National Guard brigades to Afghanistan where, after training, they perform on par with regular forces. The National Guard flies fast jets, including the 5th generation F-22 Raptor. The UK has demolished the capability of reserves to deploy as combat units. They are now used as trickle reinforcements to regulars. This may work well in Afghanistan—part of our main effort, as the Secretary of State said—and may help to allay regular overstretch. It is, however, a completely unimaginative approach to defence as a whole and a gross waste of a magnificent potential asset.

Much of our war-fighting capability is required at low readiness. As the House knows, this country faces no major external existential threat, and the opportunity to man much of it with expanded reservist capability and capacity clearly exists. Do we really need 300-plus fast jets at high readiness? No, we do not. Huge savings could be made, perhaps by placing two thirds of the force in reserve and building over the next 10 years the reserve capability to operate them. The Royal Air Force has a large alumni of brilliant fast-jet pilots, who would love to be better used. RAF regular pilots are reportedly restricted to 10 flying hours a month—fewer than US National Guard pilots.

Do we really need to man the tanks and artillery required for general war fighting with expensive regulars who are needed for operations on other equipment in Afghanistan? No, we do not. It is a gross waste of money, and they should have got on and done that a long time ago. Again, those could be stored with small quantities of equipment used for training competent reserve brigades to be held at low readiness. The same could go for much of our amphibious shipping.

The leadership of the UK armed forces, as I know the Secretary of State understands, has always shown a disappointing disregard for the real potential of a transformed Territorial Army, Royal Naval Reserve and Royal Air Force voluntary reserve. They need to be ordered to go away and undertake a root-and-branch review to re-balance armed forces to take proper benefit from this cost-effective and potentially powerful asset. I warmly welcome the steps taken for a review of our reserve forces, headed by General Houghton, and I pay particular tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury (Mr Brazier), who has down the years championed the TA in this House with great vigour, power and energy.

My second theme is the need to continue to build momentum for transformation. As many have said, the strategic defence and security review is a beginning, not an end, but how can defence build momentum around the need to transform our armed forces without the catalyst of the SDSR? I was truly disappointed to hear the new permanent secretary in her first pronouncement on Monday say that the SDSR would be taken forward through the defence planning process. I have to tell the House that this is the same broken defence planning process that got the Ministry of Defence into the appalling mess that it is in now. This is about horse-trading, delaying, single-service rowing and general fudging of issues. What we need is real transformation. That game has definitely been started by the Secretary of State and it is clear that he has the will to see it through. I very much hope that he will do so, and get his way.

That leads me to my third point about the MOD. The best four years of my life were spent as Minister of State for the Armed Forces. I loved every single minute of it; I worked with the most wonderful people. They are marvellous people, but the MOD has become a vast and cumbersome beast. It centralises all power and freezes all decision making. Absolutely no one is accountable and no one is ever held to account. Difficult decisions are nearly always avoided, and vested interests always prevail. For a start, the single services plans organisation needs to be turned upside down and a far more purple approach is required. There are more three-star officers and officials in the headquarters now than there were 20 years ago when our armed forces were two thirds larger.

I would like to remind the House of what I said on 15 October 2009 in a debate on defence policy:

“How can anyone seriously justify the creation last year of the post of director general of strategy to serve in addition to the director general of policy, who did the job perfectly well when I was a Minister? How can anyone justify creating a commercial director general, a chief of defence materiel, a deputy chief of defence staff personnel and a director general of human resources? It is a crazy, absurd, overblown bureaucracy.”—[Official Report, 15 October 2009; Vol. 713, c. 503.]

That must be dealt with. The Secretary of State will have to move very quickly on this if he is to get his way on other matters.

[Mr Jenkin]

My hon. Friend is making some extremely powerful points. Does he agree that the emphasis now seems to have become a competition not between the three services, but between military personnel and civilian personnel? The fact that civilian personnel have given themselves equivalent ranks to military personnel has put them more in direct competition, so that they double up the functions of the armed forces.

[Nicholas Soames]

My hon. Friend is right. The problem is that there are overlaps at every level of decision taking in the Ministry of Defence. Two separate audiences are competing with each other. It is extraordinary that an institution that understands the ethos of command is so bad at doing it itself. Some of the most dreadful things were brought to me when I was a Minister. There might have been a terrible military cock-up and it would be taken away to be examined. The issue would come back six months later, but everyone would have had their fingers over it and Ministers would end up being told that it had been a great military triumph. It is true that no one is ever held accountable. The decision making is very lame and very long-winded.

[Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)]

May I give a practical example to illustrate my hon. Friend’s point? I learned to my horror that the vice-chief of the defence staff had recruited a civilian medical adviser, to parallel the function of the three-star surgeon-general who is doing a very good job—and, of course, at great expense. Perhaps that provides an example of a post the could be cut.

[Nicholas Soames]

My hon. Friend makes an extremely vivid and important point. We can bet our bottom dollar that there would have been a frightfully good reason for doing it—it should have been blown out of the water on day one.

All this has created the mess we are in, with a £38 billion overspend. One of the most important jobs of the Secretary of State and the Administration is to build an agile strategic military headquarters and Department of State which are able to respond effectively to the rapidly changing environment of the 21st century. That does not exist in the Ministry of Defence at present, and it must be created, which will mean considerable decentralisation. The front-line commanders-in-chief need to be given the tools and the space that they need to do the job. As has been said, they need to be allowed to get on with it, and to stop being micro-managed by civil servants in Whitehall.

I am very pleased that the Secretary of State has engaged Lord Levene and a team of admirable and extremely experienced experts from the private sector to assist in this task, but if they are to drive the huge changes that are needed, senior officers and officials must recognise that what they have built has failed catastrophically, and must change. They must understand the need to transform. The senior military and officials need to own the change themselves, and they need to drive it forward. It will be a complete and fundamental change of culture, but it must be achieved.

Let me end by reading out a quotation that I have read out during almost every speech on defence that I have made in the House for years and years. It is a remarkable speech made by Lord Wavell, which the House should bear in mind as all these changes are being made, and as they think about the men and women at the sharp end—the people who end up having to deal with decisions, sometimes very bad decisions, made in the Ministry of Defence.

Lord Wavell said:

“in the last resort, the end of all military training, the settling of all policy, the ordering of all weaponry and all that goes into the makings of the armed forces is that the deciding factor in battle will always be this. That sooner or later, Private so-and-so will, of his own free will and in the face of great danger, uncertainty and chaos, have to advance to his front in the face of the enemy. If all that goes wrong, after all the training, the intensive preparation and the provision of equipment and expenditure, the system has failed.”

Despite everything, the system has not failed.

The House needs to remember, in the midst of the sometimes idiotic and petty political arguments that separate us in all parts of this House of Commons, that these young men and women are doing something really extraordinary, and doing it at great personal danger and risk to themselves. Ministers must never forget, in this great talk of strategy, this plethora of change and all that will go on at the top, with headquarters being got rid of and people being shuffled around, that they must be able to continue to deliver the really remarkable people who are able to do the job for which all this money is spent. That must be kept at all times in the forefront of the minds of the Secretary of State and the shadow Secretary of State.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr James Arbuthnot (North East Hampshire) (Con)]

So far, this has been the best informed and best defence debate I have attended in this House. As the right hon. Member for Coventry North East (Mr Ainsworth) knows, I had a very high opinion of his tenure of office as Secretary of State for Defence, and it is a pleasure to follow him. He spoke with his habitual integrity and persuasiveness. I also wish to welcome the shadow Secretary of State for Defence to his position. As he knows, I also have a very high opinion of him, to the extent that I was a bit surprised that he did not stand for the leadership of his party. [Interruption.] I have ruined his chances now. I hope that, contrary to his own wishes, he will be in that position for rather longer than his predecessor was, because we should not have too many changes of position in these very important places.

The first and most important thing that the Ministry of Defence did was to start a strategic defence and security review, so the first and most important thing that the Select Committee on Defence did was to begin an interim report on that review. After we have done more work on our current inquiry into Afghanistan, we will be resuming our inquiry into that review. We have not yet done that, so what follows are my own views, rather than those of the Committee.

The 1997-98 review took place in a benign economic climate, whereas this year’s review happened against bank meltdown and the simply dreadful economic consequences. That is why the Government decided that the defence and security review had to coincide with the comprehensive spending review. As a result, it became primarily a spending review and, secondly, a defence and security review. Is that a bad thing? It is absolutely essential to get the country’s economy right. What won the second world war was the United States’ economy, and the same applies to the cold war. The greatest weapon that a country can have for its defence is a strong economy, and any business man knows that the key to having a sound business is keeping one’s costs under control. If the Government had done nothing, instead of paying £43 billion a year in debt interest alone, by the end of the Parliament we would have been paying nearer £50 billion a year. As the former Chief Secretary, the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill (Mr Byrne), said, there is no money left.

The Defence Committee recognised all that, but we also wanted to look at the process of the review and we concluded that it was, pretty much, rubbish. This review took five months, whereas the highly regarded 1997-98 review took 13 months. The haste of this review meant that an opportunity to consult the wider public, defence academics, the defence industry and Parliament was missed.

[Nicholas Soames]

I know my right hon. Friend’s views on this matter, but does he accept that the review was the first stage of a process that will require a great deal more work? Both the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Defence have made that point. It is merely the architecture behind the transformation of defence that will take place, so an ongoing defence review will be needed all the time; indeed, there is to be one every five years.

[Mr Arbuthnot]

I accept what my hon. Friend says and I listened with great admiration to his earlier comments. There is a lot of work to be done, as the Secretary of State has made plain, and I hope that my hon. Friend will play as valuable a part in it as he played before the election.

My greatest concern about defence is that the British, and perhaps the European, public believe that defence is a job done and that the end of the cold war meant the end of the need to spend serious amounts of money on defending our interests. They think we can rely on the Americans to protect us, but they are wrong: the Americans will protect us only for as long as it is in their interests to do so. Until our constituents demand that we spend more on defence, no Chancellor of the Exchequer will wish to do so, but that will not happen until the public are properly engaged in talking about defence or until they understand its importance and purpose. If one conducts a defence review behind closed doors, while everyone is away on holiday and at a pace that would startle Michael Schumacher, no such understanding will arise. Let us hope that the next one comes across better.

Given all my criticisms of the process, the result was far better than I expected. First, the Secretary of State for Defence did an absolutely valiant job of fighting his corner and I doubt that he alienated the Prime Minister or the Chancellor in the process—he was doing his job. Secondly, given that the Secretary of State started with a defence posture and budget that were both utterly incoherent and unsustainable there was a surprisingly strategic feel to the outcome, the thrust of which seems to be that we shall be gambling our security in the short term in exchange for its enhancement in the longer term. That is preferable to the reverse, provided that we always have at the front of our minds the need not to fail in Afghanistan.

Thirdly, despite the tightness of the settlement, there was a recognition of the changing and unpredictable nature of the threats we face. There was extra money for cyber-security and a recognition by the Secretary of State personally regarding the threat from electromagnetic pulses. I expect also that there will be extra money for space security. Those are some of the new threats.

Defence Treaties (France)

Lord Soames of Fletching Excerpts

Tuesday 2nd November 2010 Commons Chamber

[Dr Fox]

For a long time there has been a French-American bilateral relationship and an Anglo-American bilateral relationship on the nuclear deterrent. As the former Defence Secretary, the right hon. Member for Coventry North East (Mr Ainsworth), will know, there has been discussion for some time about whether the relationship should be trilateral, given the cost of the programmes, but the decision has been taken that for the moment the double bilateral relationship will continue. We are strengthening the third, Anglo-French, part of that, because we believe it is in our interests to do so for reasons of both cost-effectiveness and our obligations under the non-proliferation treaty.

[Nicholas Soames (Mid Sussex) (Con)]

I warmly congratulate the Secretary of State and the Prime Minister on bringing to birth this long-overdue arrangement. Can the Secretary of State confirm that co-operation on the ground between the British and French armed forces has been very long standing, and will he say something about the number of formations across the armed forces that will co-operate with their French counterparts?

[Dr Fox]

I am very grateful to my hon. Friend for his welcome. He is entirely correct that there has been long-standing co-operation. Some of the things that I have read and heard today have made it sound as though this was the first time there had been any military co-operation at all between the United Kingdom and France. Beginning with joint exercising next year, we will examine ways in which we can organically take forward co-operation such as we have outlined today. There is no big bang—this is about working out how we can best improve the relationship incrementally and build confidence over a long period, given the complexities of Afghanistan and so on.

Strategic Defence and Security Review

Lord Soames of Fletching Excerpts

Thursday 16th September 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Arbuthnot]

That, of course, is also what the Committee thinks.

One of the Committee’s principal objections is that the lack of general consultation may create a greater sense of disconnection between the Government’s decisions and the understanding of the people at large on defence issues. With regard to the public view of defence, there is a gap between what politicians say and what the public believe. In relation to Iraq, the British people became, towards the end of our engagement there, broadly opposed, mostly because of the very poor planning on what to do after we had won the war. There is a great degree of scepticism about the purpose of our deployment in Afghanistan. In my view, our people would support our deployment to Afghanistan if they thought we had a good strategy for winning, but at the moment they do not think that.

That gap between the public view and the country’s policy is both very important and deeply worrying. The SDSR was an opportunity to narrow the gap, but because of the speed with which it is being carried out, that opportunity has been missed. We in the defence community must therefore do all we can, not only in the UK but across Europe, to explain defence policy and our defence needs to the public. Without such communication, notwithstanding the country’s general support for the armed forces, defence will suffer.

That contrasts with the 1997-98 defence review, which was announced during the Queen’s Speech in May 1997 and reported, later than originally expected, just over 13 months later in July 1998. There was a good deal of consultation during the preparation of that review. The Defence Committee of the day played its part in that, holding 12 evidence sessions while the review was in preparation and eight more afterwards. It also produced a weighty three-volume report on the review—I do not know whether anybody read it, but at least somebody had the time to write it. It was a good review, but I would make two points about it. First, it ended up being underfunded, because it was overtaken by events. Secondly, I would caution the right hon. Member for Coventry North East (Mr Ainsworth), the shadow Defence Secretary, because it was held at a time when the British economy was strong, the Labour Government having received one of the best economic legacies in the history of this country. Before the shadow Secretary of State makes too much of his suggestion that this one is a cost-cutting farce—

[Nicholas Soames (Mid Sussex) (Con)]

Will my right hon. Friend give way?

[Mr Arbuthnot]

If my hon. Friend will allow me, I will just make this one comment, while I am in full flow, to the shadow Secretary of State. Before he makes too much of his suggestion that this review is a cost-cutting farce, he should reflect with an appropriate amount of humility on who got us into our current economic mess and on why the defence budget is such a shambles.

[Nicholas Soames]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that not only was that review not funded, but there was clearly a determination that it should not be funded, given that when these matters were discussed in the House, those on both sides agreed that the review would work only if it was properly funded and they signed up to it on that basis?

[Mr Arbuthnot]

My hon. Friend is entirely right; the problem was that the then Chancellor was not naturally enthusiastic about the issue of defence as a whole, and we saw the same thing when the defence industrial strategy was produced. Again, that was an extremely useful document, which was signed up to by the then Chief Secretary to the Treasury. He subsequently became the Secretary of State for Defence and discovered that he actually did not have the money to put that strategy into effect, any more than we had earlier had the money to put into proper effect an excellent 1998 defence review.

So now that I have antagonised absolutely everyone, I shall end by saying what I hope to see from the review. I hope and expect that its end result will be a changed Ministry of Defence, which is focused more on the threats of the present and the future than on the old cold war structures of the past. I hope to see an element of coherence, so that our future looks significantly better than our present. I hope and expect that the improvements that could be made to the way in which we buy our defence equipment will be far-reaching and helpful. I hope and believe that the result of the reductions in Government spending will be to strengthen the economy of the United Kingdom in such a way as to give us the chance to renew our defence industry. I hope, but fear I may not see it, that we can reverse, as we should, the reductions in our spending on research and technology. I also hope, although I am not at all confident, that enough of our defence structure will remain to take full advantage of the economic revival.

Military Bases

Lord Soames of Fletching Excerpts

Thursday 16th September 2010 Ministerial Corrections

[Nicholas Soames]

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many permanent UK military headquarters there are; where each is located; who has command at each such headquarters; and what the staff is of each.

[Official Report, 20 July 2010, Vol. 514, c. 182-84W.]

Letter of correction from Andrew Robathan:

Errors have been identified in the written answer given to the hon. Member for Mid Sussex (Nicholas Soames) on 20 July 2010.

The full answer given was as follows:

[Mr Robathan]

[holding answer 15 July 2010]: There are five permanent military headquarters (HQ) in the UK. Details of the location, who has command and staff employed at each are shown in the following table: