Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Viscount Hailsham and Baroness Chakrabarti

Committee stage
Tuesday 27th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 449, I will speak briefly to Amendment 454. I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, for her support for Amendment 449. I have a nasty feeling that I may be uniting my noble friend Lord Cameron and the Minister in opposition to my amendments; I will forgive them on this occasion. I am also extremely grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for his support on the previous group—I rather hope I might get some support from him on this occasion.

The purpose of Amendment 449 is to ensure that Parliament has as much information as possible before a decision to proscribe is made. I accept, of course, that it is not possible for Ministers to disclose in general debate all the information which they may have received in private and which, in their opinion, justifies proscription. I worked in the Home Office and the Foreign Office for around seven years, so I am under no illusions. Of course, the Minister, who has a similar track record, will be under no illusions either.

Having regard to the serious consequences of proscription, we need to do all that we reasonably can to ensure that, when a proscription order is made, Parliament is as well informed as it can be and that the justification for the order is well based. Otherwise, we are wholly reliant on the judgment of officials and Ministers. Without being unduly personal, on matters of such importance, I do not wish to be exclusively reliant on the judgments of Boris Johnson, Suella Braverman or Liz Truss—however informed and considered some may suppose them to have been.

Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee could provide a way forward. Amendment 449 would create a precondition to the Secretary of State’s ability to make a proscription order. Proposed new subsection (3A) would require that, if circumstances allow, before the Secretary of State makes an order, the Secretary of State must place before the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament

“a statement of the reasons for making the order”

and, in such circumstances, a report of that committee must be published before the order is made. I accept that there may be circumstances in which the urgency of the matter demands more immediate action. Proposed new subsections (3B) and (3C) address that eventuality. In effect, the procedure would be the same as that provided for in proposed new subsection (3A), but it would be retrospective.

In either event, the Intelligence and Security Committee will be able to examine the stated reasons in much greater detail than the House could do in public session. A degree of scrutiny and interrogation should be possible. The report of the ISC could be very important, reassuring Parliament as to the propriety of the order if that is the opinion of the ISC, or alerting Parliament if the ISC is not supportive of the order. I do not pretend that this would be a complete safeguard. However, it would certainly be an improvement. On that basis, I commend Amendment 449 to the Committee.

On Amendment 454, I think I can anticipate the arguments that will be advanced by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. She and I agree on an awful lot, and I know I shall support her on this matter.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as a member of your Lordships’ Delegated Powers Committee. Of course, I speak for myself only but very much with those concerns in mind.

As noble Lords have heard from my friend who is also noble—but I cannot call him a noble friend—the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, I will speak to his Amendment 449, which I support, and my Amendment 454. I am grateful for his support and, on the latter amendment, for that of my noble friend Lord Hain, who is very sensibly not in his place at this hour. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame.

In contrast with the previous group—I am sad that there are not more participants from the previous group here—these are modest process amendments that are capable of uniting everyone who spoke for and against the various amendments in that group. Both these amendments are about increasing parliamentary involvement in and scrutiny of exceptional executive power—in particular, the power to proscribe an organisation as a terrorist organisation under Section 3 of the Terrorism Act.

To be clear—this may surprise some Members of the Committee—I believe that such powers are capable of being proportionate. In a democracy, no one should be allowed to organise a private army, in particular one that targets humans, and a democracy is proportionately able to respond by proscribing a terrorist organisation. It is none the less an awesome and exceptional power for the Executive to say that people will be prosecuted not just for their terrorist actions but for fairly broad and loose associations with people who may or may not be guilty of terrorist offences.

Sentencing Bill

Debate between Viscount Hailsham and Baroness Chakrabarti

Committee stage
Wednesday 26th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I agree with much of what the noble Lord, Lord Foster of Bath, said, save that I think that the Bill already deals with the problem identified by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan- Howe. It is important to look at the text of the Bill: this is a “presumption” against short sentences; it is not a bar to them. Of course, there is a philosophy behind the presumption: the authors of the Bill and the Government have taken the view, which is not a revolutionary view in relation to the evidence that has been collected over many years, that, generally, short sentences are not a great idea. They do not lead to rehabilitation; they do not help with reoffending.

If you disagree with that and think that a short, sharp shock is a jolly good thing, you are obviously going to disagree with the Bill and these provisions. Having lists of various offences is a good wheeze, but it is not consistent with the philosophy of the Bill, which is that, in general, short sentences do not work—they do not keep the public safe because they do not rehabilitate anyone and, in fact, some people go to the university of crime for a short course of less than 12 months and come out with drug problems, relationship breakdown and other issues that they did not have before. But this is only a presumption; it is not a bar. To respond to the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, with whom I so often agree, I do not think that anything else is required as an alternative to the list approach of exceptions, because there is the residual discretion provided in the Bill for exceptional circumstances.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

Is this not a case for the Sentencing Council to express some guidance on these matters rather than go down the route of the list system in a statutory form?

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I find myself back in the comfortable spot where I agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. Of course, that is something that we will come to later, no doubt, when we discuss the independence and the constitutional role of the Sentencing Council. If noble Lords are worried that I am being too glib, because “exceptional circumstances” seems too vague an alternative to a prescriptive list of offences which are exceptional, the answer is, on the one hand, to trust the judges—this is about their discretion, and they know jolly well about the awful case that the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, mentioned, and about situations where people are repeatedly not paying their fines or breaching community orders, which should be exceptions to the 12-month presumption.

The second part of the argument is that the judicial limb of our constitution has in the form of its Sentencing Council—and I use that language deliberately because I am for the independence of the Sentencing Council—a council to help guide judges so that there can be an element of consistency in courts around the country as to the approach on what is exceptional, and therefore what type of case justifies the exception to the presumption and the philosophy of this measure that short sentences are a bad idea.