Financial Services Bill (Second sitting)

Alison Thewliss Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 2nd sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 17th November 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Mr McFadden]

Q Thanks. Can I slightly switch subjects now, to ask you about packaged retail investment and insurance-based products? The Bill removes the requirement for performance scenarios on PRIIPs. Could you just set out for us, in as simple terms as possible, what is wrong with these performance scenarios, and why there is a desire to remove them? If they are removed, what kind of information should be provided to consumers to help them make as informed an investment choice as people can?

Chris Cummings: Thank you for the question. You have touched on such an important issue for our industry. Through the consultation on PRIIPs we highlighted to EU policy makers and regulators, to our own Financial Conduct Authority and others, the dangers that we saw in the PRIIPs key information document, the PRIIPs KID. Because of how the methodology for PRIIPs was created—taking a rather avant-garde view of the calculation basis—it meant that we could have negative transaction costs. Somebody could trade in the market and it would not only not cost them any money; they could actually lose money by making a trade. That led to some perverse outcomes that were pro-cyclical in the presentation of the information they gave.

Let me give you an example by reflecting back on a new fund that has had just two or three years’ experience. Imagine if, over the course of its life, that fund had had a very strong performance; it had done very well over a three or four year period. Because of the pro-cyclicality of how it had to report performance scenarios—looking to the future—it would have to present a potential investor with scenarios that were entirely positive and that generated levels of return that nobody in the industry would seriously put in front of a retail investor to suggest that this was what they could actually get. They were being forced to do it because of the methodology—the calculation basis—which reflected only that, if you had a few good years of performance, your fund would continue to have good years of performance. Similarly, if your fund had had a few bad years of performance, all you could project was that that bad performance would just continue and continue. That was because of the calculation basis and the way that the rules were written.

As an industry, we kept drawing this issue to the attention of the policy-making community in order to say that, if nothing else, when it comes to disclosure and investment, we have managed to convey the central message that past performance is no guarantee of future performance. Please let us keep on reminding people that past performance is no guarantee of future performance. Sadly, that requirement was taken away. The new calculation basis was introduced, which led to the industry ultimately being forced by its regulator to produce this pro-cyclical—and deeply misleading, in our view—information.

We continued to lobby against the wider introduction of the PRIIPs KID, arguing first that it should not be introduced. Secondly, having lost that argument and seen that that it was introduced only to closed-ended funds, we argued that it should be kept there until the wider implications were seen and not extended into the world of undertakings for the collective investment in transferable securities, because of the scale of UCITS and how many millions of people across the UK and Europe rely on them.

We were genuinely heartened when the Treasury announced that, post Brexit, it would be undertaking a review of the PRIIPs KID. What we hope to see, actually, is a wider-scale review of disclosure, whereby we can start from a different position. Given the technologically advanced world that we are living in today—the greater use of mobile phones, applications and computers, and just understanding that people engage with financial services in a very different way—could we have a rounder discussion about how we can do the thing that we want to do as an industry? We want to have a more engaged client base and to help them understand the different funds that are available and the different risk profiles of those funds, so that they can invest with more confidence, and certainly with more clarity about likely outcomes, rather than having to give false performance scenarios that simply nobody trusted in the industry.

[Alison Thewliss (Glasgow Central) (SNP)]

Q I have a couple of questions on equivalence. Equivalence is a bit of a point in time. How far do you feel that the limits of equivalence could go? How much change would happen before that was withdrawn?

Chris Cummings: I think this is a “two ends of the telescope” question, if you pardon the analogy. We tend to think a lot about the UK changing rules and changing approaches, and there are one or two examples of that in the Bill—we have just mentioned PRIIPs KID. There always seems to be a sense that it would be the UK moving away from the central European view of regulation. Of course, that need not be the case. There are a number of regulatory reviews that are timetabled to be considered by the European Commission. There is the alternative investment fund managers directive. There is the review of PRIIPs and so on. Looking two or three years out, there are quite a few opportunities where, actually, the UK may stay still because the rules work in practice and it could be the European Commission that is drifting away from the central scenario that we are in today. That is perhaps almost inevitable, looking 10 years out; there are bound to be changes to the regulatory architecture and the regulatory regime, because the UK will need to modernise its approach to regulation, and not only here and across Europe, but more globally, every economy is thinking about growth-oriented policies as a result of the covid crisis.

That is why, for us, we approach the discussion around equivalence very much from a point of view of saying, “Okay, even if the words on the page change, how can we make sure that the bandwidth is agreed by all sides, so that minor degrees of divergence from equivalence are not the straw that breaks the camel’s back?” That is why I come back to the point I was making just a moment ago about having a regulator to regulate a dialogue—a set, established forum where the FCA and the Prudential Regulation Authority can meet the European Securities and Markets Authority and the European Central Bank and so on, in order that information can be shared, regulatory approaches can be discussed and data can be shared as well, on a “no suprises” policy, so that we can make sure that in the UK and Europe there is a commonality of view, or a commonality of outcome certainly, that is being laboured towards.

I am confident that that would make sure that any discussions on equivalence are structurally much more sound and that we remove the political overlay. Across the industry, there is a concern that equivalence could be used as a political process rather than a regulatory one, which perhaps does not really lead to an outcome that is in the interests of savers and investors.

Every time a new rule is introduced that is different in the European Union from the UK, that adds costs to the industry, because we have to navigate our way through two sets of rules, which might not contradict, but simply do not join up. There are different reporting deadlines for data and so on. That is why we would really like to make sure we move to an outcome-based approach, rather than to a prescriptive, words on the page, exact phraseology, which will simply prove a headache for all.

[Alison Thewliss]

Q That is a good point about equivalence working on both sides; even though we have got off the bus, we might need to try to catch up with the bus to make sure we are still going in broadly the same direction. In your earlier answer, you mentioned other jurisdictions having more experience, having dealt with this for longer. Are there any particular examples that you feel would be useful, which the UK could learn lessons from?

Chris Cummings: Our friends in Switzerland have been navigating these waters for a period of time. The Investment Association continues to cultivate deeper relationships with our Swiss opposite number to see how it has mapped the terrain. We should make sure that we learn the lessons from how the US and the EU have negotiated when it has come to major directives. We have had a few instances where either the US was trying to apply its rules extraterritorially, into the EU, or where the EU sought to apply its standards and approaches outside the EU.

A really noticeable one was around costs of research. The EU, as part of the MiFID approach, suggested that all research had to be paid for. Investment managers had to pay for research produced by investment banks; in effect, we had to hand over cash. In the US, those payments were illegal. So the two regulatory regimes, both trying to protect consumer interests, found themselves at loggerheads.

Through industry intervention and working very closely with the regulatory authorities in the UK and in Europe and the SEC in the US, we were able to come up with a reasonably uncomfortable but workable compromise that has lasted over three years now, which gets reviewed on an ad hoc basis, but which allows both markets to function, even though the rules do not align. It is that kind of approach that makes you think, well, it works but it is sub-optimal. It feels ephemeral and, from an industry point of view, it is something else that is a distraction from the work of looking after our clients and investors. That is why we think that an openness and transparency around regulatory initiatives and regulatory thinking will help cement relationships into the future.

[Alison Thewliss]

Q Thank you. That is useful. Is there anything else that you expected to see in the Bill or that you would like to see in the Bill?

Chris Cummings: Actually, I think the Bill is a rather comprehensive document. I would defer to others who may have different opinions, but from the investment management industry, there is a good discussion about the overseas fund regime, which was essential for us; the future of passporting; a review of section 272, which we felt very strongly about; and of course equivalence. If anything, it goes towards what is most essential for our industry, which is protecting the delegation of portfolio management, because our industry in the UK is underpinned by an ability to manage the clients’ investments—yes, from the UK, but across Europe and much more internationally. Ensuring that ability to protect and preserve delegation is simply mission critical for the investment management industry, which is one of the few UK growth success stories that we have seen really expand over the past decade.

[Alison Thewliss]

Q Thank you. Lastly, are you clear enough on what happens for existing investors if equivalence is withdrawn?

Chris Cummings: This is a matter that we have been working on very closely with our regulator, the FCA, and talking to Treasury about. It is part of the reason why, in firms’ preparations for—forgive the terminology—a no-deal or a hard-deal Brexit, the industry had to do the thing that we exist to do, which is look after our clients. So that has led to more substance, regulatorily speaking, being established in other jurisdictions, particularly in Luxembourg and Ireland, which have traditionally been the places where most investment management back-office work has been done, with the UK, of course, being the centre for fund management and the actual investment aspect of the industry.

[Alison Thewliss]

Thank you.

[The Chair]

I have second the shadow Minister, Abena Oppong-Asare.

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[The Chair]

For the Scottish National party, first of all, their spokesperson, Alison Thewliss.

[Alison Thewliss]

Q Just to pick up where Pat left off on the idea of scrutiny, Catherine, I think you mentioned that the City of London has a joint committee on that. Could you tell me a bit more about how that operates and whether there is something Parliament can learn from that?

Catherine McGuinness: Actually, what I was mentioning was the International Regulatory Strategy Group, which is a cross-sectoral group of practitioners, who come together to look at a number of issues and make recommendations. We can provide the Committee with their recommendations in this space. As I said, they are suggesting that we look at a joint Select Committee on financial regulation in Parliament. I am happy to share with the Committee more details about the International Regulatory Strategy Group and its current programme of work, if that would be useful, and to provide copies of the paper in this space.

[Alison Thewliss]

Q That is really helpful, thank you. I think I share some of the nervousness that people have about all of these regulations being introduced and not having that level of scrutiny. Are there any particular areas where you feel that more scrutiny is necessary?

Catherine McGuinness: Regulation is a complicated issue. I think that if we are handing powers to the regulators to make regulation, when over the past few years we have made regulation through the EU, where there is level after level of consultation and development, we need to look at how we replicate that and put in the appropriate level of scrutiny as we take things forward ourselves.

I have to say that we very much welcome this Bill as a step in the right direction in getting the framework in place but, as people have said, it is a first step. We think it is then important to move on and look at the next round in the Treasury’s consultation on the regulatory framework, as well as how to implement—to stray a little from your question—the Chancellor’s statements in his announcement last week.

[Alison Thewliss]

Q Thank you. Emma, are there any particular aspects that you feel require additional scrutiny and transparency over decision making within the regulator’s new powers?

Emma Reynolds: I would agree with Catherine and echo what she has said. Obviously, there are significant transfers of powers to the regulators, given that we are onshoring this regulation. In an EU context, we had the European Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, which is a sizeable Committee with huge resources and an enormous amount of time to write and draft amendments in this area.

It is not in the tradition of our Parliament to have such Committees. In a way it would mean this Bill Committee sitting permanently. In Parliament, working with industry and Government, we need to work out exactly how we will do it, bearing our traditions in mind. That is why the IRSG, which is a point of contact between us and the City of London Corporation, came up with some of the ideas in the paper, which Catherine mentioned. We are very willing to share that with the Committee.

[Alison Thewliss]

Q Thank you very much. One of the recommendations within TheCityUK briefing that was sent round was around working towards implementing EU capital regulation requirements and requiring further guidance on that. Do you feel that you have clarity since the briefing was sent, or do you still require more clarity?

Emma Reynolds: Yes, we sent that briefing out. Thank you for referring to it. Yes, we would like to see more guidance and clarity from the Government as to whether the UK’s version of the so-called CRR II—Capital Requirements Regulation II—is going to differ in any substantial way from the EU’s CRR II. Some of our members have put resources and time into planning for that. It is just a question of ensuring that we have the most efficient planning for what comes next.

[Alison Thewliss]

That is useful. I will hand back to my colleagues.

[The Chair]

I saw Angela Eagle indicate she wanted to speak.

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[The Chair]

We will now move on to the SNP spokesperson, Alison Thewliss.

[Alison Thewliss]

Q Thank you very much, Chair. I was having a look at the policy recommendations of the Association for Financial Markets in Europe for the EU-UK relationship. To what extent do you feel the Bill achieves those recommendations?

Adam Farkas: The Bill provides the possibility to achieve those recommendations. It provides the framework for future UK financial regulation. It provides the possibility, delegated to the respective regulatory authorities, to shape the UK’s financial regulation. However, if it is going to be a transparent process, as it is expected to be under the Bill, that opens up the possibility of retaining co-ordination with the EU in a new setting. The Bill sets the foundation to meet the policy recommendations that we put forward, but it does not guarantee it.

[Alison Thewliss]

Q So we are still some way from finding out what the building looks like.

Adam Farkas: Yes.

[Alison Thewliss]

Q With regard to the point that you made about legacy contracts and LIBOR, to follow up on the questions I put to Chris Cummings of the Investment Association earlier, do you think that there is merit in having something in the Bill, rather than having FCA rules on this matter?

Adam Farkas: I am probably not qualified to answer that. I am allowed, but I am probably not qualified. I think the FCA, as an authority, has been playing a leading role globally in the whole transition process and the whole global co-ordination process. The Bill’s intention to give a strong role for the FCA in defining the last steps of what happens with the legacy contracts and with LIBOR as a benchmark is pointing in the right direction, but I will not go further than that.

[Alison Thewliss]

Q That is fair enough. I was trying to get at whether there is stronger ground if it is in legislation, rather than dependent on rules, for any disputes that might arise.

Adam Farkas: That is probably a legal question.

[Alison Thewliss]

Q Constance, if I am right, you have been responsible for working on some green finance work. Do you think that there should have been more in the Bill to look at those things, rather than waiting for a later stage? Is this a good opportunity to perhaps look at some of the green finance issues, rather than waiting until later?

Constance Usherwood: The Basel 3.1 aspect, in particular, is about ensuring that banks hold capital commensurate with the risks that they take. As such, the Basel framework that it seeks to emulate in UK law does not consider climate risk as a risk. That is not to say that that work is not under way in international forums. The Network for Greening the Financial System is certainly looking at how to incorporate climate risk—or whether it can be incorporated—into prudential regulation. It is at a very nascent stage. I think the work that the PRA is doing in that forum is very positive, as well as such things as climate risk stress testing.

That is something that the PRA might want to open the door to later, once it is more considered and technically advanced. Certainly, the sustainable lending aspect is an important mandate that it has to look at. We remain interested in how it develops that mandate in its consideration of the rules.

[Alison Thewliss]

Thank you very much.

[Angela Richardson (Guildford) (Con)]

Q Adam, in your earlier comments you said that London is the financial services hub of the EU and that it has been a strong voice in shaping the EU’s regulatory framework. First, do you believe that we will continue to be a strong voice in global regulator-to-regulator discussions? Secondly, do you agree that the Financial Services Bill will increase the UK’s resilience to economic shocks, while meeting our international commitments on protecting the global financial system?

Adam Farkas: Answering the first question involves a bit of speculation into the future. Given the importance of the City of London as a global financial centre, and given the weight and experience of UK authorities in global standard-setting bodies, I would be inclined to confirm that yes, the United Kingdom is expected to remain a strong voice in multilateral standard-setting bodies and in multilateral discussions on financial stability, as well as in micro-financial regulation, markets, insurance and prudential banking regulation.

There is probably no conclusive answer to your second question, but the Bill certainly opens up the possibility of creating a framework within the United Kingdom that will delegate a lot of rule-making powers to the respective authorities—the PRA and the FCA. It will provide a well-defined, clear and transparent framework, and it will also define an accountability regime with that framework. In my view, that will establish the possibility—subject to the detailed rules that will then be adopted—that financial regulation as a whole will continue to ensure financial stability in a global financial centre.

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[Mr McFadden]

Thank you.

[Alison Thewliss]

Q You have talked about the importance of having clear and effective regulation, which all of us around the table can probably agree with. Have you any concerns about the transparency issues around the regulations, with the regulator taking on so much more of the responsibility?

Gurpreet Manku: I think that what will be important to see over the next year and in future is sufficient time for consultation, because that leads to further transparency. The documents that the FCA publishes are generally quite good and detailed, but I have seen some cases in recent years, and not just domestically, where there were very short windows to respond to quite technical consultations. Ensuring that there is sufficient time to review and digest any changes and to sit down and speak to the regulator about them will be helpful, and will also support the transparency objectives.

[Alison Thewliss]

Q What kind of time period would you be looking at? You mentioned that some of the firms that you represent are quite small, so obviously there might be capacity issues in making sure that they can turn responses round.

Gurpreet Manku: A typical consultation process is usually three months, which is usually enough time for us to gather the feedback from our members, whether they are large or small firms, and turn it into an industry-wide submission.

[Alison Thewliss]

Q That is useful. A lot has been reported about the impact on venture capital of the uncertainty around Brexit, with money going elsewhere and all the rest of it. Do you feel that the Bill gives enough confidence to the sector for people to continue to invest money in the UK?

Gurpreet Manku: Yes, I believe it does, because robust regulatory standards and a clear and stable legal and tax framework attract global investors. While I recognise that there are concerns about Brexit, over recent years we have seen the continued ability of our members here to raise international capital and invest it.

[Alison Thewliss]

Q Lastly, is there anything more that you can tell me about the impact of equivalence decisions within your sector?

Gurpreet Manku: Equivalence is important for us as well. I agree with all the feedback that has been provided to you throughout the day; I have been listening in on some of the sessions. Our members are prepared for all eventualities, which in practice means looking at setting up additional structures and obtaining additional licences in Europe to cover a period where equivalence decisions might not be available. Thinking about institutional fundraising more broadly, there are other ways to access EU investors, and some firms will have been looking at those routes in the absence of equivalence.

[Alison Thewliss]

That is useful. Thank you.

[The Chair]

If there are no further questions from Members, let me thank Gurpreet—who did a panel all on her own, remotely—for her evidence.

Examination of Witness

Peter Tutton gave evidence.

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[The Chair]

For the Scottish National party, Alison Thewliss.

[Alison Thewliss]

Q Can I ask about help to save accounts? I think there is somewhere in the region of 222,000 of those accounts, with about £85 million in them, and you are dealing with people who are very much on the brink of things. Can you tell me how you think it would be best for the Government to communicate with those people about what is likely to happen to their account and what they need to do?

Peter Tutton: That is a very good question, and I am not sure I have a complete answer for you off the top of my head. First, the Government have some communications routes: those eligible for help to save are effectively those people who are in receipt of universal credit and tax credits, so these are people whom Government can identify and should be communicating with anyway.

To a certain extent, the thing about the transition is that because it is automatic, it is about ensuring that people know where their money is. I do not have an answer straight away when it comes to the best way of doing that. We know that it can be difficult to communicate and get people to engage. It is one of these things where we need a trial wording approach, communicating, and making sure that that communication is very clear that this is something that is happening to your benefit: “Here it is, and here is how you can get at it.” At the same time, there need to be more comms, perhaps to recipients of universal credit—the numbers of whom have grown quite a lot recently, as you will know—about the fact that this scheme is available to help them, and that if they put some money into it now they will get a bonus, which they may be able to use quite soon to deal with their difficulties. Those are the two things that spring to mind immediately.

[Alison Thewliss]

Q Is there an argument for continuing the accounts and allowing them to keep earning some interest, rather than closing them after four years?

Peter Tutton: I think that is a good idea. There is a maximum amount of savings, so if you can afford to save the full £50 a month, you will get the full bonus. If you are only able to save £20 a month, you will not, but if you allow the £20 savers to save for longer, they would get more of a bonus. There is definitely an argument there to say, “If we want people to build up a precautionary savings pot, we should give those who have started saving the best opportunity to build that savings pot where possible, albeit by leaving the accounts open a bit longer within the scheme.” That sounds sensible.

[Alison Thewliss]

Q I have had it flagged via Macmillan that they think there is a bit of a weakness in the FCA’s reliance on guidance. They are arguing for a legal duty of care for all financial services providers. Do you think that would be helpful when it comes to getting ahead of people getting into trouble?

Peter Tutton: Yes, we are supporters of a duty of care as well: we have spoken with Macmillan about this, and we can see the point. It is an interesting one to attach to the Bill. The FCA said that it is due to reply to a consultation on a duty of care. That response probably will not come until Q1 next year, so it has been a bit delayed. That is a bit unfortunate, because if there is a need to legislate or it concludes that there is a need to legislate, the opportunity of doing so through this Bill will have passed.

We agree that there is a need for a duty of care. There has been a succession of problems over the years with financial services. The FCA does a good job: it does rules, and it is getting on top of some of the wide-ranging historical problems we have seen, from unauthorised overdraft charges to payday lending, other bits of high-cost credit, aggressive collections, and a whole range of things in my areas of interest. It is starting to get on top of these.

We think the measure could still be clearer. We think a duty of care, or at least being specifically required by a rule-making power to think about a duty of care and what that means, and empowering the FCA to make rules would be helpful. We have a particular take on duty of care. There are lots of definitions of it. One thing that we see is the idea of having regard to consumer protection. A duty of care could also help better define the consumer protection definition.

We still see too many cases where people who are vulnerable or face constraint choices because of lower incomes and are forced to use credit and things like that or because of behavioural biases built into products. People are in a situation where effectively there are firms exploiting those circumstances. This is the sort of thing that we think a duty of care could deal with. We need a more explicit statement in the legislation about the way firms need to understand the measure. In vulnerability guidance, we would make that more explicit and biting on the way firms have to think about their products and services, and making sure that they do not have the effect of exploiting vulnerable consumers.

We are not quite there yet with financial services, because these problems keep happening. It would sharpen that up and give a better line between what is regulatory policy and what is social policy. We would start to be able to have a better debate about when it is reasonable for someone on a low income to be on credit, the sorts of credit they may be offered that make their debt problems worse and why that is happening . That may help to stop that happening. For lots of reasons, we are supportive of the idea of a duty of care. It would sharpen the focus on vulnerability. It would sharpen the focus on the kind of detriment that people face when they are using financial circumstances as a sort of distressed purchase. For us, the measure is a good thing and something we would like the FCA to take forward.

[Alison Thewliss]

Thank you very much.

[Andrew Jones (Harrogate and Knaresborough) (Con)]

Q Peter, thank you for your evidence and written submission, which has been circulated to the Committee. One thing you say in that is that your evidence points to the importance of statutory protections as a key way to alleviate the harm of problem debt. Could you tell us a bit more about that evidence?

Peter Tutton: We spend quite a lot of time looking at the experience of our clients, and we survey our clients and poll them to see what has happened to them. When we were looking, back in the day, at breathing space we were trying to understand what brought our clients to advice and what helped them to recover. What we found was that our clients often had multiple creditors. On average, they would have about five or six. Typically, we find that some creditors, even most, will be very good, but it only takes one creditor to defect from good practice and to push for more money to destabilise people’s financial situation and restart the process of juggling bills and borrowing more to deal with a particularly aggressive, unaffordable payment demand.

There was a very strong message from clients that that impeded their ability to recover. At the same time, we spoke to our clients who were in the debt arrangement scheme in Scotland, and we got a very clear message from them that that kind of guarantee—the statutory framework that the debt arrangement scheme in Scotland gave them—reduced their anxiety and gave them a really good, strong and solid platform for recovery. They knew that if they paid what they could afford to pay and kept doing that, nothing else bad would happen to them in terms of unaffordable demands and escalating enforcement.

In that sense, we have known for a long time that people need protection from their creditors in certain circumstances. Both the experiences of clients who do not have that protection in England and Wales outside of insolvency and the experiences of clients who do have it in Scotland persuaded us that what has become breathing space in the statutory debt repayment plan was a necessary additional protection that we did not have at the time.