Asked by: Angus Robertson (Scottish National Party - Moray)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what deviations or exemptions from the Military Air Systems Certifications Process were made for the Airseeker aircraft; when those deviations or exemptions were made; and who authorised each such deviation or exemption.
Answered by Philip Dunne
I refer the hon. Member to the answer I gave on 16 June 2014 (Official Report, column 364W) to the hon. Member for Plymouth, Moor View (Alison Seabeck).
Asked by: Angus Robertson (Scottish National Party - Moray)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, when it is planned that the Capability Decision Point will be reached for the Type 26 Frigate programme.
Answered by Philip Dunne
The Capability Decision Point defined the key user requirements to be delivered by the Type 26 Global Combat Ships (GCS), and the milestone was achieved during the programme's Assessment Phase (AP) in November 2011. This allowed the Ministry of Defence to plan for a class of thirteen ships, approve the ships' baseline design and to focus on more detailed costing and design work during the remaining period of the AP.
On 20 February 2015, the Government announced that this work was sufficiently mature to conclude the AP and the programme will move forward into its Demonstration Phase (DP) with effect from 1 April 2015.
Under the DP contract, worth £859 million, we will continue detailed design work, invest in shore-based testing facilities and purchase key initial equipment for three Type 26 GCS vessels. In parallel, we will continue to work to understand better the programme schedule, cost and risk.
On current planning, and subject to a main investment decision, this will allow the Manufacture Phase to commence in 2016.
Asked by: Angus Robertson (Scottish National Party - Moray)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what estimate he has made of the total cost to his Department of operations in Iraq since 30 September 2014.
Answered by Mark Francois
Her Majesty's Treasury have agreed that the net additional costs of the military air operation, including the Tornado GR4s, Reaper and Voyager Air-to-Air Refuelling aircraft, can be met from the HM Treasury Special Reserve. A limit of liability of £41 million in Financial Year 2014-15 for this activity was agreed at the Supplementary Estimates in February 2015.
The net additional costs of training and equipping the Iraqi and Kurdish Security Forces as well as providing UK enablers is currently being met from the £50 million Deployed Military Activity Pool (DMAP). The net additional costs of the military support to the humanitarian mission in Iraq in August and September were £3.5 million; the Ministry of Defence has recovered the majority of these costs from the Department for International Development.
Asked by: Angus Robertson (Scottish National Party - Moray)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, if he will place in the Library the letter with reference DG/03/01/MOD STRAT dated 8th February 2011 between the Director General of the Military Aviation Authority and the Second Permanent Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Defence.
Answered by Mark Francois
A copy of the letter has been placed in the Library of the House.
Asked by: Angus Robertson (Scottish National Party - Moray)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to the Answer of 2 February 2015 to Question 222053, by what date the documents will be placed in the Library.
Answered by Mark Francois
A copy of the Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA): Fast-Jet Mid Air Collision Risk (Typhoon) has been placed in the Library of the House.
Asked by: Angus Robertson (Scottish National Party - Moray)
Question to the Home Office:
To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, pursuant to the Answer of 29 January 2015 to Question 222334, by what date the documents will be placed in the Library.
Answered by Mike Penning
The IPCC will write to the Hon. Member within the next two weeks to explain that the Ministry of Defence Police (MDP) is investigating this matter locally and it would not be appropriate for the IPCC to provide information about the local investigation, hence he will need to write to the MPD to obtain more information. I will place a copy of the letter in the Library of the House.
Asked by: Angus Robertson (Scottish National Party - Moray)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, how many nuclear safety events there were at HMNB Clyde and RNAD Coulport, by category, in each of the last six years.
Answered by Philip Dunne
The information requested, accompanied by the category definitions, is provided below.
Events are categorised in accordance with Her Majesty's Naval Base Clyde's internal criteria, which record all events, however seemingly minor. This comprehensive, independent recording process allows Clyde to maintain a robust reporting culture, undertake learning from experience and to take early corrective action. This reporting process has been agreed by, and is subject to routine inspections by, the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator.
None of the events in the reports caused any harm to the health of any member of staff on the Naval Base, or to any member of the public, and the severity of the reported events has remained at a very low level. For example, incorrect labelling of an empty pallet and not filling out the correct form before painting inside a submarine are two of the recorded events. Investigations into all such events are carried out and, where necessary, measures are, put in place to prevent a recurrence.
Nuclear safety events involving Nuclear Propulsion:
FY 2008-09 | FY 200910 | FY 2010-11 | FY 2011-12 | FY 2012-13 | FY 2013-14 | TOTAL | |
Category A | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Category B | 9 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 12 |
Category C | 32 | 31 | 21 | 26 | 31 | 45 | 186 |
Category D | 32 | 27 | 35 | 27 | 25 | 54 | 200 |
TOTAL | 73 | 58 | 58 | 53 | 57 | 99 | 398 |
Nuclear safety events involving Nuclear Weapons:
FY 2008-09 | FY 2009-10 | FY 2010-11 | FY 2011-12 | FY 2012-13 | FY 2013-14 | TOTAL | |
Category A | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Category B | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Category C | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 3 |
Category D | 1 | 12 | 14 | 7 | 10 | 6 | 50 |
TOTAL | 2 | 13 | 14 | 7 | 11 | 6 | 53 |
There were no Category A or Category B events involving Nuclear Weapons, nor any Category A events involving Nuclear Propulsion. The details of the twelve Category B incidents involving Nuclear Propulsion are as follows:
Date | Description |
11 May 2008 | Low level contamination detected on the discharge pipework within the Radioactive Effluent Disposal Facility.
|
9 June 2008 | Temporary shielding to a valve in the Reactor Compartment had been removed without correct authorisation.
|
27 June 2008 | Inadvertent draining of onboard chemically treated water tanks into the contained submarine bilge, with no loss of water into the environment.
|
9 July 2008 | A crane at the berth was operated in a non-standard configuration without an approved concession.
|
2 October 2008 | Radiography Testing using a Faulty Source Mechanism.
|
27 October 2008 | A diving operation was undertaken while the reactor was operational.
|
8 December 2008 | Inadvertent shutting of steam valves out-with normal operating procedures.
|
11 February 2009 | Explosives Handling Jetty (EHJ) 125 tonne crane - lifts total breached. While within the capacity of the crane, the number of lifts exceeded the agreed annual total.
|
20 March 2009 | EHJ 125 tonne crane - lifts total breached. Following the previous incident, a concession was granted, however, this was subsequently exceeded for operational support purposes.
|
12 June 2010 | Loss of a freeze seal during routine valve maintenance leading to a contained submarine compartment water spill, with no loss of water into the environment.
|
14 June 2010 | Used protective suits in a double-layered plastic bag were accidentally dropped into the waters in the Base and recovered immediately. A member of staff became wet when recovering them: as a precaution, he was monitored to ensure no contamination, and was given the all clear.
|
17 August 2012 | Inadvertent radiation dose received by contractors while conducting submarine tank defect rectification work.
|
HM NAVAL BASE CLYDE - NUCLEAR SAFETY EVENT REPORTING
CATEGORY DEFINITIONS
Cat |
Nuclear Event Consequence |
Description
|
A | Actual or high potential for radioactive release to the environment or over exposure to radiation. | · Major failure of Site or Nuclear Propulsion/Nuclear Weapon (NP/NW) services.
· Major reduction of defence in depth.
· Major failure in administrative controls or regulatory compliance. |
B | Actual or high potential for a contained release within building or submarine or unplanned exposure to radiation.
| |
C | Moderate potential for future release or exposure, or localised release within a designated radiological controlled area. | · Minor failure of Site or NP/NW services (eg with protection via defence in depth).
· Minor regulatory or procedural compliance breach.
|
D | Low potential for release – but may contribute towards an adverse trend producing latent conditions. | · Poor safety culture, eg:
- Failure to report shortfalls. - Communication failures. - Leadership issues.
|
Asked by: Angus Robertson (Scottish National Party - Moray)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, how many nuclear safety events there were at HMNB Clyde and RNAD Coulport involving (a) Class A and (b) Class B incidents involving (i) nuclear propulsion and (ii) nuclear weapons; and what the details were of each such incident.
Answered by Philip Dunne
The information requested, accompanied by the category definitions, is provided below.
Events are categorised in accordance with Her Majesty's Naval Base Clyde's internal criteria, which record all events, however seemingly minor. This comprehensive, independent recording process allows Clyde to maintain a robust reporting culture, undertake learning from experience and to take early corrective action. This reporting process has been agreed by, and is subject to routine inspections by, the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator.
None of the events in the reports caused any harm to the health of any member of staff on the Naval Base, or to any member of the public, and the severity of the reported events has remained at a very low level. For example, incorrect labelling of an empty pallet and not filling out the correct form before painting inside a submarine are two of the recorded events. Investigations into all such events are carried out and, where necessary, measures are, put in place to prevent a recurrence.
Nuclear safety events involving Nuclear Propulsion:
FY 2008-09 | FY 200910 | FY 2010-11 | FY 2011-12 | FY 2012-13 | FY 2013-14 | TOTAL | |
Category A | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Category B | 9 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 12 |
Category C | 32 | 31 | 21 | 26 | 31 | 45 | 186 |
Category D | 32 | 27 | 35 | 27 | 25 | 54 | 200 |
TOTAL | 73 | 58 | 58 | 53 | 57 | 99 | 398 |
Nuclear safety events involving Nuclear Weapons:
FY 2008-09 | FY 2009-10 | FY 2010-11 | FY 2011-12 | FY 2012-13 | FY 2013-14 | TOTAL | |
Category A | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Category B | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Category C | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 3 |
Category D | 1 | 12 | 14 | 7 | 10 | 6 | 50 |
TOTAL | 2 | 13 | 14 | 7 | 11 | 6 | 53 |
There were no Category A or Category B events involving Nuclear Weapons, nor any Category A events involving Nuclear Propulsion. The details of the twelve Category B incidents involving Nuclear Propulsion are as follows:
Date | Description |
11 May 2008 | Low level contamination detected on the discharge pipework within the Radioactive Effluent Disposal Facility.
|
9 June 2008 | Temporary shielding to a valve in the Reactor Compartment had been removed without correct authorisation.
|
27 June 2008 | Inadvertent draining of onboard chemically treated water tanks into the contained submarine bilge, with no loss of water into the environment.
|
9 July 2008 | A crane at the berth was operated in a non-standard configuration without an approved concession.
|
2 October 2008 | Radiography Testing using a Faulty Source Mechanism.
|
27 October 2008 | A diving operation was undertaken while the reactor was operational.
|
8 December 2008 | Inadvertent shutting of steam valves out-with normal operating procedures.
|
11 February 2009 | Explosives Handling Jetty (EHJ) 125 tonne crane - lifts total breached. While within the capacity of the crane, the number of lifts exceeded the agreed annual total.
|
20 March 2009 | EHJ 125 tonne crane - lifts total breached. Following the previous incident, a concession was granted, however, this was subsequently exceeded for operational support purposes.
|
12 June 2010 | Loss of a freeze seal during routine valve maintenance leading to a contained submarine compartment water spill, with no loss of water into the environment.
|
14 June 2010 | Used protective suits in a double-layered plastic bag were accidentally dropped into the waters in the Base and recovered immediately. A member of staff became wet when recovering them: as a precaution, he was monitored to ensure no contamination, and was given the all clear.
|
17 August 2012 | Inadvertent radiation dose received by contractors while conducting submarine tank defect rectification work.
|
HM NAVAL BASE CLYDE - NUCLEAR SAFETY EVENT REPORTING
CATEGORY DEFINITIONS
Cat |
Nuclear Event Consequence |
Description
|
A | Actual or high potential for radioactive release to the environment or over exposure to radiation. | · Major failure of Site or Nuclear Propulsion/Nuclear Weapon (NP/NW) services.
· Major reduction of defence in depth.
· Major failure in administrative controls or regulatory compliance. |
B | Actual or high potential for a contained release within building or submarine or unplanned exposure to radiation.
| |
C | Moderate potential for future release or exposure, or localised release within a designated radiological controlled area. | · Minor failure of Site or NP/NW services (eg with protection via defence in depth).
· Minor regulatory or procedural compliance breach.
|
D | Low potential for release – but may contribute towards an adverse trend producing latent conditions. | · Poor safety culture, eg:
- Failure to report shortfalls. - Communication failures. - Leadership issues.
|
Asked by: Angus Robertson (Scottish National Party - Moray)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, if he will place in the Library a copy of the agreement in principle with BAE Systems for three offshore patrol vessels.
Answered by Philip Dunne
I refer the hon. Member to the answer I gave on 4 September 2014 (Official Report, column 297W).
Asked by: Angus Robertson (Scottish National Party - Moray)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, how many personnel are taking part in the Seedcorn initiative; what the location is of each such member of personnel; with what equipment those personnel are training; and what estimate he has made of the cost to the public purse of the Seedcorn initiative in each of the next two years.
Answered by Mark Francois
I refer the hon. Member to the answer I gave on 11 February 2015 to Question 223239, giving the number of personnel, their location, and type of equipment those personnel are training on, as part of the Seedcorn initiative.
The cost of the Seedcorn initiative in financial year 2015-16 is £2.5 million. Funding beyond that date is yet to be determined.