Chinese Embassy

Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent Excerpts

Monday 26th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, listening to the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, I was reminded that it was only in 2015 that the then Chancellor George Osborne declared the creation of a “golden decade”. I wonder how long it lasted.

At the very least, this decision will relocate China’s comprehensive security and surveillance efforts on to one huge 21st-century site. We believe it will amplify the threat and potentially endanger the security of vital financial data. It seems a clear indication of political weakness that the Government have taken this decision in the hope of furthering our relationship with China. This concession, along with issues such as the Government’s consistent failure to place China in the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme and their total failure to invoke sufficient legal protection against transnational repression of Hong Kongers, reinforced this message of weakness.

The Statement talks about the Government’s desire for a relationship with China and it says that the Government do not trade security for economic access. I agree, because given the scale of the trade deficit we have with China, we are actually increasing our security risks while continuing to give China virtually unfettered economic access. It is a win-win situation for China. There seems very little on the plus side of this relationship for us, except perhaps allowing Chinese Government-controlled firms to take large financial stakes in our critical national infrastructure.

Having made this announcement, what, if anything, does the Prime Minister hope to bring back from his visit? It is a transactional world. If the Prime Minister was to negotiate the freedom of Jimmy Lai, secure the removal of the bounties from the heads of Hong Kongers and close the university-based Chinese police operations then perhaps the extra risk that our security services describe flowing from this super-embassy might be worth taking. However, if all he gets is a handshake with President Xi, then he will have conceded—we will have conceded—a lot for absolutely nothing.

I will say a final word on the scale of this embassy. The plans for the super-embassy include the provision of 232 flats. I believe there are currently 146 embassy employees, which means that there will be accommodation for nearly 90 extra people—an expansion of at least 60% in the number of embassy staff. So what realistically does the Minister expect all those extra people to be doing?

[Baroness in Waiting/Government Whip (Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord and the noble Baroness for their points and questions on this matter, which rightly concerns us all.

To reiterate, this was a quasi-judicial decision taken independently by the Secretary of State for Housing. I also remind noble Lords of the premise of the Statement made by the Security Minister in the other place, which focused on the national security considerations of China’s proposal to build a new embassy at the Royal Mint Court. This concludes a process that began in 2018, when the then Foreign Secretary, Boris Johnson—who I believe may have been a Conservative—gave formal diplomatic consent for China to use the Royal Mint site for its new embassy, subject to planning permission, and welcomed it as China’s largest overseas investment. I think we have seen how much has changed in a few short years on the Opposition Benches. Nevertheless, I am aware of the significant interest that this issue has provoked in your Lordships’ House, and as such I am grateful for the opportunity to provide an assurance of the work that the Government have undertaken to ensure that UK national security is protected.

I am very fond of the noble Baroness, but her comments about the Government’s prioritisation of national security were outrageous. National security is our number one priority. The Home Office and the Foreign Office both provided views during the planning process on potential security issues around the build and confirmed in writing when these were resolved. We have engaged with key allies throughout, and our security and intelligence agencies have been integral to the process. As the director of GCHQ and the director-general of MI5 wrote in their letter,

“as with any foreign embassy on UK soil, it is not realistic to expect to be able wholly to eliminate each and every potential risk … However, the collective work across UK intelligence agencies and HMG departments to formulate a package of national security mitigations for the site has been, in our view, expert, professional and proportionate”.

They also judged that

“the package of mitigations deals acceptably with a wide range of sensitive national security issues, including cabling”.

Indeed, they noted that there were “clear security advantages” from consolidating China’s diplomatic estates in London.

I am also grateful for the close consideration and scrutiny that my noble friend Lord Beamish and the Intelligence and Security Committee have given this matter. His committee concluded:

“On the basis of the evidence we have received, and having carefully reviewed the nuanced national security considerations, the Committee has concluded that, taken as a whole, the national security concerns that arise can be satisfactorily mitigated”.


National security concerns that have been raised in media reports again in recent days are not new to the Government or the intelligence community, and an extensive range of measures has been developed to protect national security. We have acted to increase the resilience of cables in the area through an extensive series of measures to protect sensitive data. The Government have seen unredacted plans for the embassy and have agreed with China that the publicly accessible forecourt on the embassy grounds will not have diplomatic immunity, thereby managing the risk to the public. Based on all that and our extensive work on this matter, we are content that any risks are being appropriately managed.

On our approach to China, I note that it is a fundamental and normal part of international relations that countries agree to establish embassies in each other’s capitals. The Government are engaging with China confidently and pragmatically, recognising the complexity of the world as it is and challenging China where we need to. Of course, we recognise that China poses a series of threats to UK national security, from cyber attacks, foreign interference and espionage targeting our diplomatic institutions, to transnational repression of Hong Kongers and China’s support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The Government have responded and will continue to respond to these challenges.

However, taking a robust approach to our national security also includes engaging with China. Indeed, it is only through engagement that we can directly challenge China on its malicious activity. By taking tough steps to keep us secure, we enable ourselves to co-operate in other areas, including in pursuit of safe economic opportunities that are in the UK’s national interest and in areas such as organised immigration crime, narcotics trafficking and serious organised crime. That is what allies do and what we are doing: delivering for the public, putting more money in their pockets and keeping them safe through hard-headed, risk-based engagement with the world’s most consequential power.

I would like to clarify some specific points raised by the noble Baroness and the noble Lord. The noble Baroness asked what this is for. She knows what this is for: as a result of a quasi-judicial process and a planning application, this is the consolidation of seven different sites into one. There are significant security benefits that come from that.

On the planning and building processes, I reiterate that this is a British planning application that has gone through a quasi-judicial process. The normal building inspections will apply as the building is developed.

As I said, national security is the first responsibility of any Government, and especially this Government. Any other suggestion is frankly appalling.

In response to the noble Lord, Lord Fox, I say that we will see the results of the PM’s visit when he returns and I look forward to discussing it in your Lordships’ House at that point.

On FIRS, we are looking carefully at whether other countries should be added to the enhanced tier. Any decision will be brought before Parliament in the usual way. Countries are considered separately for specification, and decisions are made on the evidence. The Government have a range of capabilities to manage and mitigate threats emanating from foreign states. FIRS is one of many tools that we use.

I will touch on the number of diplomats who will be present at the embassy. Under the Vienna convention, having an embassy is not a reward for like-minded partners but a necessity for any country with which we have diplomatic relations. On the issue of pragmatism, I say that we are talking about a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the second-largest economy in the world and our third-largest trading partner, so a level of diplomatic relations would be wise. It is also a fundamental and normal part of international relations that countries mutually consent to other nations having embassy premises. However, as the Vienna convention states, the UK has control over the number of diplomats in the UK on diplomatic relations. Any diplomatic position at the Chinese embassy must be approved on a case-by-case basis by the FCDO’s protocol department. The FCDO will work with allies on any additional extensions of that. As I have said, the Government have seen the unredacted plans. It is based on this and our extensive work on this topic that I am content that any risks are being appropriately managed.

The noble Lord raised a very important point about transnational repression. Noble Lords may be aware that I ran Index on Censorship until the general election and spent a great deal of time campaigning on these specific issues. The Government condemn the Hong Kong police’s efforts to coerce, intimidate, harass and harm those living in the UK and overseas; these acts of repression will never be tolerated in this country. We have raised these concerns directly with Chinese authorities, reaffirming that the extraterritorial application of Hong Kong’s national security law is unacceptable and will not be tolerated in the UK. The safety and security of Hong Kongers in the UK, including those on the British National Overseas visa, is of the utmost importance. The UK will always stand up for the rights of the people of Hong Kong. This is demonstrated through the bespoke immigration route for BNO status holders and their eligible family members.

The UK’s response to tackling state-directed threats is world leading. Appropriate tools and system-wide safeguards are in place to robustly counter transnational aggression. Following the Defending Democracy Taskforce’s TNR review, we have strengthened our response by implementing the National Security Act 2023, which provides a comprehensive suite of powers to counter the threat of TNR. We have rolled out training across 45 territorial police forces, including the upskilling of 999 call handlers to improve front-line identification of and responses to state-directed threats. We have published practical guidance on GOV.UK for individuals who believe they may be at risk, with advice to help them protect themselves physically and online. We have deployed tailored support and security assistance for individual victims, where we have become aware of them, that are proportionate to the threat and varied in scope and approach.

This Government will always welcome the knowledge and experience of noble Lords and Baronesses in your Lordships’ House, particularly when they pertain to matters of national security. So let me again reassure your Lordships that upholding national security is the first duty of government and we will continue to take all measures necessary to disrupt these threats. Based on the extensive work on this topic, the Government are content that any risks to the UK’s national security are being appropriately managed.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for repeating the Statement. She made a great deal in her remarks of the quasi-judicial process that has been used. No reference, though, has been made to the Royal Mint Court Residents Association’s decision to open a judicial case challenging the mega-embassy on the Royal Mint site. Has the Minister considered imposing a moratorium while that legal process continues?

She also made a great deal about transnational repression, and I salute the work that she has done in a previous incarnation on that important issue. I thank the Government for providing time on 26 February for a full-scale debate in your Lordships’ House on the report from the Joint Committee on Human Rights on transnational repression. May I appeal to the noble Baroness to make available a copy of that report and a copy of the committee’s report on the use of slave labour in our supply chains, which touches on a point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, and the noble Lord, Lord Fox, about how we cannot compete with a country that uses slave labour? Will she ensure that those two reports are in the hands of the Prime Minister before he travels to Beijing?

I have two questions for the noble Baroness. It has been claimed publicly by Richard Holmes of the i paper and Caroline Wheeler of the Sunday Times that, during 2025, while both journalists were working to uncover the risks associated with the sensitive cabling below the mega-CCP embassy, government media officials sought to discredit both journalists and denied that there were any such cables. Is it true that government officials denied the presence of sensitive cables? Is it true that these two good journalists were smeared by officials, who well knew that they were working on a true story, which the Government have themselves now admitted? If the noble Baroness does not have the answers to those questions immediately, I would be grateful if she would agree to write to me.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

I think I am agreeing to write to him. I genuinely do not recognise, nor have I been aware of, that report regarding the journalists. I cannot comment on specific mitigations or on some of the issues. The noble Lord will have heard, both during my comments and those of the Security Minister, that we have discussed the cables. So I would find that concerning, but I will write to the noble Lord.

With regard to getting things into the hands of the Prime Minister, I will give it a go, but I assure the noble Lord that I will get the reports into the hands of someone in No. 10, in the hope that they will get to him before he leaves.

On the potential judicial review, the noble Lord will be aware that the Government are completely adamant that our actions are lawful and, on that basis, we will continue to proceed with the appropriate processes.

[Lord Beamish (Lab)]

My Lords, my noble friend, in her answer, referred to the ISC. The ISC has looked at this very closely. We were given access to all the confidential and sensitive documentation, and we took evidence from our security services and Ministers; I thank them for that. We came to the conclusion that Ministers, in making their security assessment, had been given all the information available, and also that the mitigations that could have been put in place on some of the issues that did concern the embassy were satisfactory and could be put in place.

In saying that, in 2023, we published our China report, in which we were very clear about the threat that China poses to the UK in terms of security. It also, as was referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, laid out the golden era that opened up many aspects of our society, business and academia to the Chinese state under the leadership of the noble Lord, Lord Cameron. Does my noble friend agree that this Government will take a very strong and robust approach to our national security when it comes to China, while recognising, as she said, that China is one of our main economic trading partners, but what they will not do is put that in the place of our security, which the last Government did?

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

I thank my noble friend for the work that he and his committee have done, both in terms of ensuring appropriate scrutiny of the Government and more broadly. He raises a really important point, which I should have done earlier on. As ever, we need to thank the intelligence services, which work every day to keep us safe. One of the things that is so important in this space is that MI5 has 100 years of experience in keeping us safe and managing risk. It is at the forefront of our national security, especially in this space, and we are grateful for it.

My noble friend is absolutely right that there is a clear threat posed by China. We fully recognise that China poses a series of threats to UK national security, from cyber security attacks and foreign interference and espionage targeting our democratic institutions to transnational repression of dissidents in the UK. That is why, since we came into government, we have done the following: we have launched the new cross-government state threats unit; we have done the training models, as I spoke about earlier; we have invested £600 million in our intelligence services; we have strengthened support for political parties in the Elections Bill; we have provided £170 million for a new sovereign encrypted technology and £130 million for integrated security funds, and we have removed surveillance equipment that would be subject to the National Security Law companies. We are acting because there is nothing more important than national security. That is the first responsibility of this Government and that is what we are acting upon.

[Baroness Foster of Oxton (Con)]

My Lords, in 2015, if I recall, we were in coalition with the Liberal Democrats and I think that Nick Clegg clearly agreed with George Osborne’s position on China. But I did agree with the noble Lord, Lord Fox, when he highlighted the numbers of staff who will be allocated to this embassy. I wonder whether there is ever a limit on the number of people who can come here when an embassy is either created or expanded.

I turn to the point. The reality is that the regime in China is up to its neck in committing heinous crimes against its own citizens. It is up to its neck in supporting Russia and its invasion of Ukraine. It is up to its neck in the attacks that took place in Israel, and now in the Islamic Republic of Iran, where thousands of unarmed civilians are being slaughtered as we speak by the Ayatollah and the IRGC. Cyber attacks here in the UK are on the rise and are becoming much more frequent. So how can the Minister and this Government be so naive as to justify permitting the approval of this site?

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

I would like to clarify a couple of points. First, unless I missed something, the coalition ended in 2015. It was 2010 to 2015, so that was a matter for the noble Baroness’s party, not for the Liberal Democrats at that point. Secondly, on the number of diplomats, as I said earlier, that is subject to the Vienna convention. The Protocol Minister decides on a case-by-case basis on any additional applications for diplomats.

I have been very clear on the range of threats that China poses, but there are 370,000 British jobs that are dependent on our relationship with China. We need to have a level of pragmatism and a sensible relationship with the second-largest economy in the world and our third-largest trading partner. We just need to remember what we are doing and why we are doing it. The idea that this Government or any British Government are naive in their approach to foreign policy is frankly insulting.

On the specific matter that the noble Baroness raised about our relationship with China and where they have sat, the Prime Minister said, when he met President Xi at the G20 in 2024, that he also wanted to engage honestly and frankly in those areas where we have different perspectives, including on Hong Kong, human rights and Russia’s war in Ukraine.

We have genuine debate, we make our position clear, as we have on the national security law and on a range of issues, including Jimmy Lai’s status and the ongoing trials. You can have those conversations with allies only if you talk to them. While the world is as volatile as it is, I suggest that more words rather than fewer are important, which requires more people to have those conversations

[Baroness Alexander of Cleveden (Lab)]

My Lords, the events of last week and this week demonstrate to us the difficulties of managing superpowers and the challenges they present, as well as the opportunities. So, while the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, is right to suggest that China presents areas where we must oppose, there must also be areas where we seek to co-operate when we can. Does my noble friend the Minister recognise the need for expert advice to guide embassy location decisions, and is that the way to avoid the sort of ricocheting we have seen from the golden age that has already been referenced tonight to the ice age that we have also been presented with?

Can my noble friend the Minister also just confirm that the heads of MI5 and GCHQ stated that

“this consolidation should bring clear security advantages”?

Did she have the opportunity, exactly a week ago today, to hear this point reinforced by the director-general of MI5, speaking in this place, when he reiterated and dwelled on the fact that the greater threats surrounding espionage come not from within an embassy building but often from activities beyond an embassy that dominate much of the work of our security agencies? Finally, does my noble friend agree that, as we go forward on the question of embassy locations, we should be led by the UK’s most senior intelligence officers in our decision-making?

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

I thank my noble friend for her questions. One thing that is really clear, given that this Statement is about our national security, is about being led by our national security experts, who, as she rightly said, have been clear in their opinions about the mitigations that are required but also about the nature of this. With regard to the location of embassies, this is a piece of land that was bought in 2018 and was granted the diplomatic permission to move forward as an embassy, subject to planning permission, under the last Government—or, in fact, as I said, under Boris Johnson. But what is clear is that a quasi-judicial process has since followed. There is a 240-page document which outlines why that decision was made and how it was made, and it is all available to all Members of your Lordships’ House online. But she is absolutely right: my honourable friend the Security Minister in the other place and the directors-general of MI5 and GCHQ, have all made it clear that there are also clear security benefits to the amalgamation of seven sites into one.

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, the Minister acknowledged earlier the concern among Chinese dissidents in the UK about the embassy. She may have heard the comments from Chloe Cheung, a British resident and former Hong Konger—a young woman who has a bounty on her head from China. She has said she feels betrayed by the agreement to this embassy: it looks like a Chinese castle, and it sends a message about overweening Chinese power. Can the Minister sympathise with and understand the fear felt by those dissidents—and more widely than just those who are explicitly identified as dissidents?

I note that the Statement refers to a closed meeting with vice-chancellors that is going to be held next month. We of course have huge numbers of Hong Kong and Chinese students at British universities, and we have had experience of them being intimidated and subject to physical violence. What can the Government do to ensure that universities can protect those students? If we think about a Chinese student who has always followed the line and come here and just starts to ask some questions, what are we going to do to make sure that that student is safe here in the UK?

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, I have met many Chinese dissidents who live in the UK and did significant work with them in my former iteration. It is really important that we make sure that their voices are heard and that on British soil they have the protections afforded to everybody here.

On academic interference, any attempt by a foreign state to intimidate and coerce universities to limit free speech and academic freedoms in the UK will not be tolerated. The new Office for Students’ guidance makes it explicitly clear that universities should not tolerate attempts by foreign states to suppress academic freedom.

With regard to the closed meeting with the Security Minister, which will be held shortly, there is a reason why that meeting is closed: to make sure that the advice received by people is for them as regards how they manage and mitigate their risks. It would be inappropriate for me to go further on that.

[Lord Empey (UUP)]

My Lords, I would be grateful if the noble Baroness, if she does not have the figures available right now, could send me a letter and put it in the Library as to how many diplomats from the People’s Republic of China are accredited to the United Kingdom and how many United Kingdom diplomats are accredited to the People’s Republic of China. It would be very interesting to see what the figures are. She mentioned a quasi-judicial process. I suspect that the head of the planning department in Beijing would have very little say in whether we built a super-embassy there. It would be dealt with by other people. Only we could come up with that kind of process.

As regards Hong Kong, since the crackdown started, we have done virtually nothing and, in my opinion, we are going to do virtually nothing, because that is what we do well. I fear that the universities have laid themselves wide open to interference and pressure—money talks. The Minister has just pointed out that we have to be pragmatic because 370,000 jobs are at stake with regard to Chinese companies. But as long as we have a trade deficit of the scale that we have, and as long as we cannot invest in China under the same terms as the Chinese can invest here, that is the major letdown in the security of our country, because we are making ourselves, in effect, at their disposal. Will the Minister bear those points in mind and, if she will be kind enough, make the figures available to the House?

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

I find it very wise always to listen to the noble Lord and to bear his comments in mind. On the number of diplomats, I will have to write to the noble Lord as I do not have the figures to hand. As my noble friend who is the Minister for MHCLG in your Lordships’ House is here, I will leave her to ponder the noble Lord’s suggestions about revisions to the planning regime.

[Lord Bellingham (Con)]

My Lords, I certainly support the noble Baroness our Front-Bench spokesperson and the noble Lord the Lib Dem spokesman. This is a regrettable decision but we now have to move on. I am being pragmatic; I accept that it is going to happen, and we have to make the best of it. China wanted this embassy very badly, the Chinese will be delighted at this decision, and it will undoubtedly create a lot of good will. Just to build on what the Minister said about trade and investment, when the Prime Minister comes back from China, can we have a full audit of all the deals that have been agreed and the investment decisions that have been discussed, so that we can get a very clear picture of exactly how that bilateral trade relationship will move forward?

I will ask the Minister another question. I have visited getting on for 60 UK missions abroad, and one thing that has struck me is that we have always been very strong at employing locally engaged staff. Normally, it is a ratio of probably 2.5:1 or maybe even 3:1. My impression of China is that it employs very few locally engaged staff. We heard about the increase in accommodation that is going to be required in the new embassy. Can the Minister say something about the representations that she and the Government are going to make to the Chinese about employing more local British people in what is going to be a huge operation and a massive project?

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, there are several things to unpack there. First, I highlight the fact that while the Prime Minister is going tomorrow, the UK has been an outlier since 2018 in terms of our engagement with China. President Trump met President Xi in October and will visit China in the spring. Since 2018, President Macron has visited China three times, German leaders have visited four times, and Chancellor Merz is soon to travel to Beijing. Prime Minister Albanese went in July last year and Prime Minister Carney was there this month. There has not been a prime ministerial-level visit to China—the second-largest economy—since 2018, when the noble Baroness, Lady May, travelled when she was Prime Minister. There is a challenge here about how we chose going from one extreme to the other: a golden age to a golden ice age.

With regards to the trade agreements that will come out of the Prime Minister’s imminent visit to China, noble Lords will have the opportunity to discuss that in due course. What I would say is that this Prime Minister is going to China to deliver for the UK, and I look forward to discussing the details of what comes from that meeting in your Lordships’ House. With regards to the employment of local British people, I think that everyone should always want to employ local British people, but I will leave it for my colleagues in the relevant department to make that case.