Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Baroness Berridge Excerpts

Friday 27th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Berridge (Con)]

My Lords, I have added my name to Amendments 359, 660, 665 and 681, as I believe they would ensure the widest possible protection for those people who, due to issues of conscience, are not able to participate in assisted dying. I specifically use “not able”, which is a different concept from that of autonomy and choice that underlies the Bill. “Not able” in matters of conscience is something we have not really considered in our law for a long time, but, if one casts one’s mind to conscientious objection to being involved in war, it is an important part of people’s rights to be able to say, “I am not able to participate in that”. There was some comment about the role of the porter. Everyone has that right of conscience—not choice, but conscience. One only has to watch “24 Hours in A&E” to see that that brief encounter with the porter, as an example, is such an important part of healthcare. We need to remember that everyone has freedom of conscience, not choice.

Of course, if the Bill explicitly provided the opt-in system, as my noble friend Lady Fraser mentioned, then the protections in these amendments would not be needed. I am afraid that I address the noble and learned Lord again about pre-legislative scrutiny. I admire the confidence with which he assures us, Bill in hand, that this is all sorted out; but until I am satisfied that the royal colleges, representing the people who are going to deliver this, are satisfied that the Bill is that clear, I am afraid these amendments need to be considered.

There are other jurisdictions where there are tighter protections for practitioners. In Oregon, even, the medical practitioner does not have to participate, document requests or provide information, but the language in the Bill is just “unwilling or unable”, which is a wider definition.

The noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, has mentioned the case from Scotland, where they considered the conscientious objection clause in the abortion Bill, which was found to apply only to direct participation, not to the ancillary services these various amendments are trying to secure for individuals and organisations. I anticipate that there will be GP surgeries that will opt out because patients will want to know that whoever they get at the surgery does not support this.

The amendments would cover the situations I have been concerned about: the Secretary of State, the commissioners of services for assisted dying—if this is going to be an NHS service—and civil servants. I would be grateful if the Minister could confirm to us, either today or on our final day of Committee as currently scheduled, that the civil servants in all government departments who have had to work on the Bill have not been pressurised or required to work on it. The Bill may not yet be law, but it is good employment practice not to put any pressure on staff—noble Lords have given other examples—to make sure that they participate.

On the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, coroners still record verdicts of suicide. The Government still have a suicide prevention strategy. The Bill before us is amending the criminal law, called the Suicide Act 1961. I agree that we should act with compassion, but we have to be legally correct about what we are doing. There is potentially a wider issue there for the Government to take away if they want to change the name of legislation and the name of the strategy, but that is not for today.

[Lord Harries of Pentregarth (CB)]

My Lords, it has been a privilege to listen and learn and to try to clarify my mind regarding the various amendments. I wish that some of our critics in the press had been here this morning, because the amendments today go to the very heart of the Bill and we have had the opportunity of hearing from people on different sides of real expertise, including the noble Baronesses, Lady Gerada, Lady Hollins, Lady O’Loan and Lady Finlay. It has been a huge privilege for those of us who are not medical experts to be able to clarify our minds on this issue.

I hope the noble and learned Lord will be able to address the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Cass. She made points I had not heard before, and I do not know whether he had. She claimed that the Bill as drafted is not actually workable, and I very much hope he will be able to address that point.

I shall say three things. First, the noble Baroness, Lady Andrews, suggested that the things we are talking about today should be left to the medical professions to regulate. However, what we have been debating today—whether we should have a public register or whether we should simply have an opt-out clause, which everyone agrees with, of course—is not just simply a detailed regulation, with due respect; it goes to the heart of the Bill and Parliament has to make its mind up about it.

Secondly, towards the end of her speech, the noble Baroness, Lady Gerada, who we listened to with great respect, mentioned the well-known fact that a number of doctors, when patients come to the end of their life, give very large doses of painkiller, which has the effect of shortening the patient’s life. From an ethical point of view, there is a fundamental difference, depending on whether one is a utilitarian or a consequentialist on the one hand, or whether one believes that certain things are fundamentally wrong. This has been mentioned two or three times in the debates over recent years. For the ethical tradition that is this country’s base, particularly for the medical profession, there is a fundamental difference between administering a poison to kill someone and administering a large dose of painkilling drugs that has the foreseen effect of also shortening their lives, which from a moral point of view is entirely legitimate.

Lastly, on the question of language—this has been mentioned before—I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, that many of us do not like to confuse what we are debating with assisted dying. However, we also respect what the noble Baroness says—that the language of suicide is unpleasant and really not appropriate. Personally, I like to use language that is as neutral as possible and talk about people taking their own life, which seems to me as neutral a language as we can get on this.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I just want to respond to the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, on the importance of conscientious objection. The strength of Clause 31 and Schedule 3 is that they are not confined to those who can show that they have a conscientious objection to assisted suicide. Any doctor or any other person who does not wish to assist has a legal right not to do so, for any reason—indeed, they do not have to give a reason. That is the broadest possible protection. Let us not forget that it is broader than the protection which Parliament included in the Abortion Act 1967. Under Section 4 of that Act, the doctor or other person who does not wish to participate must not only have a “conscientious objection”; they must be able to prove that they have a conscientious objection if there is any issue about it. The Bill from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, includes the broadest possible protection.

My reaction to many of these amendments is the reaction I have had over 13 days to the amendments to this Bill which we have debated. Whatever their intention—I make no allegations about intention—their effect will inevitably be, unnecessarily, to impede the ability of persons who are dying to receive the assistance that they so desperately want.

[Baroness Berridge (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the clarity, but I draw attention to the fact that this is a position that could have been put, and still could be put, in a meeting with the various royal colleges to assure them that the Bill does what the noble and learned Lord and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, say it does. We are faced with a situation where the practitioners are not satisfied and do not have the confidence that the noble Lord alludes to: that the Bill will give them the protection that they want.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Of course, some practitioners do not have confidence. We are not going to get to any conclusion on the Bill that will enable Parliament to implement the view of the vast majority of people in this country.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I think we know the differences between us. I have set out what my position is. I am grateful to the noble Baroness for setting out hers again.

[Baroness Berridge (Con)]

In relation to what the noble and learned Lord said in response to the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, about not being rostered being a sensible solution, that is a different language from having a legally enforceable right to say to your employer, “I do not want to be rostered on that day”. Is that the correct position, as I understand it? Will the noble and learned Lord concede that these problems arise from the fundamental pillar of the Bill, which is that you can base this on the notion of autonomy, which is based on choice, but conscience is a different concept from that, and that is why we are in these difficulties?

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I honestly do not think that these are difficulties. There is absolute clarity in the Bill as to what the legal position is, and it is a very wide exception. It is more than sufficient to give protection to people who do not want to participate in the provision of assistance under the Bill. Pushing it wider and wider simply gives rise to uncertainty. The key thing is that there should be certainty and sufficient width, and I believe that is what Clause 31 has done.