Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Butler-Sloss Excerpts

Wednesday 11th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 391 stands in my name and those of my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel and the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe. In Committee, speaking to the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, I raised the case of the police officer, Martyn Blake, whose case served as the perfect example of the difficulties of serving as a police firearms officer.

The Independent Office for Police Conduct, as is the norm, investigated Martyn Blake following a police firearms operation in London that resulted in the fatal shooting of Chris Kaba, and he was subsequently charged with murder. The case proceeded through the full criminal justice process and the evidence was examined in open court before jury under the rigorous standards of criminal law. After hearing the evidence, the jury acquitted him.

For most people, an acquittal, after an initial investigation and then a full criminal trial, would represent the end of the matter, but in this case, despite the acquittal, the IOPC indicated that the circumstances of the case would still be examined further in the context of police misconduct proceedings. The IOPC then reopened those proceedings, constituting its second investigation and the third investigation overall.

Whatever one’s view of the original incident, the situation raises the question of how many times an officer should be required to defend themselves for the same conduct. We have had restrictions and double jeopardy since the 12th century, but this appears to be triple jeopardy. Police officers can be investigated by the IOPC, referred to the CPS, dragged through the courts, acquitted and then reinvestigated. My amendment would amend the Police Reform Act 2002 to ensure that where a police officer has been investigated for a complaint or a conduct or DSI matter, prosecuted in a criminal court and acquitted, the same conduct cannot simply be reinvestigated by the Independent Office for Police Conduct unless there is substantial new evidence. That last point is important.

The Criminal Justice Act 2003 reformed the law of double jeopardy by permitting retrial where there was new and compelling evidence. I completely understand that if new evidence comes to light, the IOPC may need to reopen an investigation. There is a safeguard in the amendment to ensure the fairness of the police complaints system. I do not dispute the importance of police accountability; public confidence in policing depends on robust oversight, and the Independent Office for Police Conduct plays a vital role in that framework, but accountability must also be balanced with basic principles of justice. When the criminal courts have examined a case and reached a verdict, there must be a strong presumption that the matter is settled.

I know only too well that police officers make difficult and sometimes life and death decisions in circumstances that are fast-moving, dangerous and highly uncertain. They do so in order to protect the public. When something goes wrong, it is entirely right that their actions are scrutinised carefully and independently, but it is equally important that the process is fair, proportionate and finite.

I hope that the Minister will realise the harrowing mental burdens placed on the police and accept the amendment. All I am asking is for him to meet me half way and bring something at Third Reading or perhaps commit to bringing forward a proposal along these lines in the upcoming Bill on police reform. If he does not accept my amendment today and cannot give me an assurance about police reform, I will seek to divide the House.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

In family cases of sexual or physical abuse, someone can be tried and acquitted but then dealt with in the family court on very much the same evidence. That is partly because there is a difference in the standard of proof, which, in a criminal case, is much greater than in civil and family proceedings. Having said that, I am entirely sympathetic to this amendment.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I cannot support this amendment, for two reasons. First, it imposes a regime which is wholly different from the regulatory practices in every other regulatory authority. For the last 15 years, I have practised exclusively as a legal adviser to regulatory panels, including for doctors, nurses, midwives, healthcare practitioners and social workers. In each and every case, a practitioner, a registrant, who has been acquitted by a criminal court can be brought before the regulatory panel to face misconduct proceedings. That is because the standard of proof is different: the criminal acquittal means that they failed to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the regulatory panel is entitled to find, on the balance of probabilities, that misconduct has been made out.

That takes me to the second point. Not only is it contrary to all the practices that we as a Parliament have imposed on other regulatory authorities, which I have identified, it is contrary to the merits. It may very well be that an officer who has properly been acquitted is none the less, on the balance of probabilities—the test within the regulatory authority—guilty of misconduct. I believe that that option should remain. I am very close to the position of the noble and learned Baroness, who draws from her experiences in the family courts. My experience is in regulatory proceedings, and what is proposed in this amendment is profoundly different from what we have imposed on the regulatory authorities.