Crime and Policing Bill

Viscount Hailsham Excerpts

Wednesday 11th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I have real reservations about Amendment 385, which I am afraid I cannot support. I am glad that my noble friend is not thinking of testing the opinion of the House.

I speak as a cyclist and I fear, for the reason touched on by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, that what is proposed in Amendment 385 is likely to damage relations between the police and innocent cyclists. The truth is that, when bicycling, we all wear a variety of things that are capable of disguising our identity. I did this morning. One always wears a helmet, very frequently one wears goggles or spectacles, either as sunglasses or to keep the rain out, and when it is cold one wears a ski mask or scarf around the bottom of one’s mouth. All these things are capable of concealing one’s identity. I saw several people doing this today when I was bicycling in from King’s Cross. This will damage relations between the police and innocent cyclists.

I ask, rhetorically, what kind of person is the police officer likely to stop? Most probably, I suspect, it will be a person from an ethnic minority, who may be young too. Anybody who has been in Parliament as long as I have knows the trouble that you have from stop and search. That is proportionate, because the carrying of weapons is a serious risk. I acknowledge that it is perfectly correct that cyclists on occasion conceal themselves in order to seize bags and mobiles—that is true—but the remedy is disproportionate.

Furthermore, the amendment gives rise to an interesting question of principle. If it is right to impose this restriction in respect of cyclists, what about motorcyclists? They come into exactly the same category and are perfectly capable of snatching a bag or mobile, and most of them now have visors over their helmets. So, what are you going to do about that?

My own view is that, yes, there is a problem, but this is a disproportionate remedy. It will impact on innocent cyclists, as I venture to describe myself, and it will damage relationships between the police and the cycling community. I was very glad to hear that my noble friend indicated he will not test the opinion of the House because, had he done so, I would have voted against him.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I hear the concerns of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, about Amendment 385. It would confer a power on a constable to stop a cyclist without any basis, reasonable or otherwise, to suspect that they are committing an offence or are about to commit an offence, when they may have, as the noble Viscount said, a perfectly good reason to be wearing a face mask. They may have influenza, which they do not wish to share with others, or they may be concerned to avoid diesel or petrol fumes on the road. Moreover, the amendment would confer an unrestricted power on the constable to require the person concerned to remove the face covering, with the sanction of a fine or imprisonment, without any requirement on the constable to consider whether that individual has a proper reason for wearing a face mask and without any defence of reasonable excuse. I too could not support such an amendment.

In Amendment 387A, the noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe, made a powerful case about the mischief which afflicts local communities. My only concern is whether her proposed new clause would do much, if anything, to address this real mischief. The remedy would still depend on enforcement action by local authorities or the police, and would still depend on evidence which is difficult to obtain. I appreciate that police forces are independent, but the Government need to do all they can to encourage them to take action to deal with these problems. If that requires further resources then they should have further resources, but it should be a priority for effective policing.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

In family cases of sexual or physical abuse, someone can be tried and acquitted but then dealt with in the family court on very much the same evidence. That is partly because there is a difference in the standard of proof, which, in a criminal case, is much greater than in civil and family proceedings. Having said that, I am entirely sympathetic to this amendment.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I cannot support this amendment, for two reasons. First, it imposes a regime which is wholly different from the regulatory practices in every other regulatory authority. For the last 15 years, I have practised exclusively as a legal adviser to regulatory panels, including for doctors, nurses, midwives, healthcare practitioners and social workers. In each and every case, a practitioner, a registrant, who has been acquitted by a criminal court can be brought before the regulatory panel to face misconduct proceedings. That is because the standard of proof is different: the criminal acquittal means that they failed to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the regulatory panel is entitled to find, on the balance of probabilities, that misconduct has been made out.

That takes me to the second point. Not only is it contrary to all the practices that we as a Parliament have imposed on other regulatory authorities, which I have identified, it is contrary to the merits. It may very well be that an officer who has properly been acquitted is none the less, on the balance of probabilities—the test within the regulatory authority—guilty of misconduct. I believe that that option should remain. I am very close to the position of the noble and learned Baroness, who draws from her experiences in the family courts. My experience is in regulatory proceedings, and what is proposed in this amendment is profoundly different from what we have imposed on the regulatory authorities.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I have added my name to this amendment, which the noble Lord, Lord Davies, set out the case for very well. It is linked particularly to the Chris Kaba case.

I will try to address the points made by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. He made a fair point. There are times when, even if someone has been acquitted of a criminal offence—in this case, a charge of murder—disciplinary issues might be discovered which are not directly related to the death but a professional body may want to address, such as ammunition not being signed out properly or something else that was important but not relevant to a criminal charge. The concern in this case, as the noble Lord, Lord Davies, explained, is that it appears from the press release, which is all we have to go on, that the IOPC basically laid its charge based on the criminal case—the charge of murder. That might seem very difficult to understand.

The amount of time this takes—I am sure that this can happen in medical cases—is substantial. In the Chris Kaba case, from event to criminal case took about three years. The officer will probably wait another two years. The noble Lord, Lord Davies, addressed the double jeopardy point—it is probably nearer to triple or more jeopardy. There are two or three bites of the cherry as far as the officer is concerned, although we must look at it beyond the officer’s understanding.

There is first an assessment of whether there is a criminal charge. Should that be negative, there is then a misconduct charge. Should both be negative, if there is a death involved, which we are particularly concerned about with respect to police firearms officers, a coroner’s court will be convened, after waiting for the two previous decisions. At the end there can be a verdict of unlawful killing, at which point the whole thing starts again. All this accounts for the very long processes. Why can these decisions not be considered in parallel rather than sequentially? I have still not really heard a proper explanation for that.

If the IOPC considered in the police case that there was gross misconduct or a conduct issue, why did it not lay a charge at the beginning? Why did it wait for the outcome of the criminal case, unless, as the noble Lord, Lord Davies, has suggested, more evidence had been discovered in the criminal case that might have made a difference? No one has said that.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

The noble Lord was suggesting, I think, that it is wrong to hold a subsequent disciplinary proceeding on precisely the same facts that gave rise to the acquittal. But in the regulatory proceedings of which I have been speaking, that is precisely the case. Very often a practitioner or registrant who has been acquitted before a criminal court then comes before a regulatory panel facing misconduct proceedings on precisely the same facts. My point is that the amendment is seeking to put in place a regime wholly different from that which operates in every other profession, and deprives people of the option of finding an officer guilty of misconduct when, on the balance of probabilities, the officer is guilty of misconduct.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

I am not going to try to argue the case; I am making my argument, and the noble Viscount is making his. The other regulatory bodies do not have something called the IOPC, a body that is charged with investigating this type of thing. That is fine, but it imposes a further burden and further process. Two groups are badly affected: the family of the person who has died and the officer in the case. Of course, I make the case for the officer, but both matter in that both are badly damaged. For me, this is a subset of the later discussion we will have about police firearms officers, but it is just one indication of some of the aggravation of their position, when, in every case, when charged, they have been found not guilty. In the Kaba case, following a three-year process, it took three hours for a criminal court to find that there was no case to answer and the officer was found not guilty.

It is very hard to understand why the IOPC, after all that time, having not charged in the first place at the time of the event, suddenly instigated the case at a later stage. For all those reasons that I have tried to identify, police firearms officers, who take incredible risks on our behalf, are an important group that we have to consider and, unless we find some comfort for them in law, the danger is they will turn around and stop doing it on our behalf. I think this is a help. I accept the fundamental point from the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, that it may be inconsistent, but I would argue that we are in a pretty inconsistent place now so far as the law and the process is set up.