Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Doocey Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 17th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, for raising a point that really had not occurred to me in years of gazing at Sections 4A and 5 of the Public Order Act. I also thank the noble Lord for his reference to the Handyside case, quite correctly observing that freedom of speech means nothing if it does not include the freedom to offend, shock and disturb. But, of course, Handyside was about ideas that offend, shock and disturb. Sections 4A and 5 are not talking about ideas; as the noble Lord said, they refer to threats, abuse and insult.

Outside the rarefied walls of academe, the cases in which Sections 4A and 5 are applied are to the objectionable drunk, on a train or in a doorway, who yells at somebody and can cause, in the words of the statute, distress or alarm. I agree with the noble Lord that they are not very different. In fact, he said it would be otiose to have both “distress” and “alarm” in the sections, but surely there is a shade of difference between the two. If there is some lasting upset, we could call that distress, but if it is a question of frightening or unsettling somebody by yelling an insult in their ear, that is probably closer to alarm. Although I agree with the noble Lord and the noble Baroness about the evils of overzealous prosecutors, I suggest that there is some purpose to these two very similar words both appearing in these two sections.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, I have listened to this rather short debate against the particular backdrop of the Government’s increasingly unsettling approach to public order—a direction of travel that raises real concerns on these Benches. The current stance seems to involve simply doubling down on the pattern set by the previous Administration, which, in our view, risks overpolicing protest, overburdening an already stretched justice system, diverting resources from serious crime and threatening legitimate speech.

In that context, we have sympathy with this proposal. However, I have some concerns about changing a standard legal formula in public order and anti-social behaviour law. It is widely embedded in guidance and operational policy; in removing it, there is a risk of creating uncertainty and confusion within the police, local authorities and the courts. At the same time, it is equally clear that the concepts of alarm and distress have, in practice, been stretched far beyond what Parliament ever intended. Some people are very easily alarmed or distressed by noisy but peaceful demonstrations, or simply by views with which they profoundly disagree. These cannot be a sound basis for criminal liability.

There is a real risk that an overbroad test inhibits free expression, penalises vulnerability and hands too much discretion to those who are most intolerant of difference. If the Government will not support this amendment, will the Minister explain how they intend to ensure that public order powers are not used to criminalise mere annoyance, eccentricity or disagreement, but are focused on genuinely threatening, abusive and harassing behaviour?

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

I thank my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough for tabling Amendment 352. It is welcome to see such a cross-party collection of noble Lords supporting it: the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, are not names always seen together on an amendment.

The amendment proposes to remove “alarm” from Sections 4A and 5 of the 1986 Act, as we have heard. As others have said, alarm is a word that denotes impression, mood and temperament. It is a word that allows the criminal law to stray beyond the prevention of genuine disorder and into the policing of irritation, discomfort or unease. Several legal cases have shown where this can lead. In a case called DPP v Orum in 1989, a conviction was upheld under Section 5 for shouting abuse at police officers. The court accepted that even trained officers, accustomed as they might be to a degree of verbal abuse, could none the less be persons likely to be caused “harassment, alarm or distress”. Although that may be understandable up to a point, it demonstrates how low the threshold has been set. If professionals whose job it is to face confrontation can be alarmed by rude language, one begins to wonder who cannot be.

Another case is called Norwood v DPP in 2003, in which a man was convicted for displaying a poster saying “Islam out of Britain” in his window. The reasoning again rested partly on the likelihood of causing alarm. Whatever one thinks of the views expressed—many of us would deplore them—the case illustrates how “alarm” can operate as a gateway through which deeply subjective reactions become the basis for criminal liability. It seems that these cases represent symptoms of a statutory provision that has no clear boundary. “Alarm” does not mean “fear of violence”—it does not require intimidation; it does not even require serious upset. It has been stretched to cover being offended, unsettled or merely uncomfortable. I suggest that is not a sound basis for criminal liability.

As others have said, the law retains and contains safeguards where genuine harm arises: “harassment” would remain in the wording of the statute, “distress” would remain in the wording of the provision, and Section 4 remains available for

“Fear or provocation of violence”.


Other statutes address stalking, threats and coercive conduct. My noble friend’s amendment would remove nothing that is truly necessary to protect the public. It would restore a measure of seriousness to public order law. Criminal offences should address conduct that is objectively wrongful, not speech or behaviour that happens to alarm someone whose threshold for alarm may be very low. This amendment has our wholehearted support, and I hope that it has the support of the Minister too.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Sugg (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to the amendments in my name in this group. Amendments 353 and 355, co-signed by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester and the noble Baronesses, Lady Doocey and Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, relate to a statutory definition of honour-based abuse and a duty to issue multi-agency statutory guidance.

Honour-based abuse is a form of domestic abuse motivated by an abuser’s perception that a person has brought, or may bring, dishonour or shame to themselves, their family or their community. It can take many forms and is often complex to identify, but it centres on controlling individuals to compel them to behave in certain ways or subscribe to certain beliefs. For some, the concept of honour is prized above the safety and well-being of individuals, and to compromise a family’s honour is to bring dishonour and shame. In extreme cases, this is used to justify abuse, disownment or physical harm. Honour-based abuse is not a cultural tradition or religious practice. It is a form of abuse that can occur within any community, regardless of faith or background.

Despite increased reporting to the national honour-based abuse helpline, commissioned by the Home Office, it remains the least prosecuted form of violence against women and girls. Across agencies, it is inconsistently recognised, poorly understood and inadequately responded to. Without clarity, front-line professionals are unsure how to spot the signs, and victims can slip through the cracks.

The need for change is starkly illustrated by the story of Fawziyah Javed. Fawziyah was a lawyer; she understood the importance of evidence and tried to protect herself and her unborn child. She repeatedly sought help, reporting to health professionals, contacting the police and gathering evidence against her abusers, but her situation was not taken seriously. Her case exposes a persistent and systemic failure to recognise honour-based abuse within statutory systems. Multiple perpetrators were involved, but they were overlooked because investigations often focused on a single individual, reflecting approaches designed for intimate-partner domestic abuse rather than the extended, collective and coercive nature of honour-based abuse.

In late August 2021, when Fawziyah made a second report to the police, the risks she faced had still not been recognised. On 2 September 2021, Fawziyah, aged 31, and 17 weeks pregnant with a baby boy, was tragically murdered when her husband pushed her from Arthur’s Seat in Edinburgh. Immediately after this, as was shown in the Channel 4 documentary “The Push: Murder on the Cliff”, he did not call 999; the first call he made was to his own father. This illustrates the family-involved dynamics of honour-based abuse, which are too often overlooked by statutory systems.

Fawziyah’s mother, Yasmin Javed, has led the campaign to ensure that her daughter’s legacy drives meaningful change, and has permitted me to share Fawziyah’s story. Yasmin’s courage and advocacy ensures that survivors’ voices are heard and their experiences are recognised. She believes strongly that the lack of understanding of honour-based abuse and the absence of a universal statutory definition meant that Fawziyah’s experience and the perpetrators were missed.

Fawziyah’s story demonstrates why we urgently need a statutory definition and accompanying guidance, not just for the police and prosecutors but for teachers, social workers, healthcare professionals and everyone who has an opportunity to identify abuse early before it escalates. It will help professionals understand its complex dynamics and act decisively to protect victims.

In August, the Government announced six new measures to tackle honour-based abuse, including legislating, at the earliest opportunity, to introduce a statutory definition and multi-agency guidance. I am very pleased that we are on the same page on that.

Turning to the definition itself, Amendment 353 puts forward a suggested definition that has been developed over a number of years. It is not my definition but the product of sustained work by the sector, legal experts and, most importantly, survivors with lived experience. From 2022, survivors worked with the University of Nottingham to develop a survivor-informed definition. This work identified serious limitations in existing non-statutory definitions and provided a framework that captures the collective and coercive nature of this abuse. Building on this survivor-informed foundation, barrister Naomi Wiseman, drawing on extensive experience in this field, led further work with violence against women and girls sector partners to draft a statutory definition. Through multiple iterations, consensus was reached upon a definition that reflects the complexity of honour-based abuse.

To date, this work has engaged survivors, over 60 organisations and specialist legal expertise. It combines lived experience with professional knowledge to bring clarity, consistency and stronger protections. This process has been truly sector-wide and survivor-led. Survivors’ voices have shaped every iteration, ensuring that the definition reflects the realities of honour-based abuse. I wish to put on the record my sincere thanks to all those involved, particularly the survivors. Their dedication and insight, born from personal experience and gaps in professional responses, has ensured that future victims can be recognised, protected and believed in the ways that they were not.

This survivor-led process has required significant time, expertise and emotional labour, often carried out amid ongoing abuse, ostracism and bereavement. Every consultation involves survivors and bereaved families retelling painful and traumatic experiences. They do this out of a sense of duty, so that their survival can mean something for the many who are not able to speak out. Dame Nicole Jacobs, the Domestic Abuse Commissioner, has welcomed this work. She said: “I recognise the significant progress that has been made to date and emphasise the importance of grounding any definition in survivor experience. I support the ongoing work led by survivors, the specialist sector and Karma Nirvana to ensure the definition is effective”.

Of course, we all want a definition that works, and I therefore welcome the debate to come, so we can agree a definition that is fit for purpose—one that respects survivors’ lived experience and treats their contribution with the seriousness that it deserves. I am grateful to the noble Baroness the Minister and Home Office officials for their engagement to date. I know that work is ongoing on a revised definition, and I hope that we can work together, with survivors, experts and the sector, to return on Report with a workable, legally sound definition that reflects survivors’ experiences, strengthens protection and supports effective multi-agency working.

Timing matters here. For years, survivors, the sector and front-line professionals have called for a statutory definition, and this Bill is the vehicle through which change must be delivered—it really cannot wait any longer. The CPS and police are revising their guidance, which is due mid-next year, and they need a statutory definition in place to do so effectively. The success of this reform will also depend on the rollout of clear, comprehensive communication and training, a commitment that I am pleased to say that the Government have already made for next year. We need the definition to make that effective. For too long, perpetrators have escaped accountability, while victims have been failed. The time to act is now.

I turn to Amendment 354 in my name, co-signed by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester and the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws; the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, has tabled a similar amendment in this group. Amendment 354 would recognise honour as an aggravating factor in sentencing. It would ensure earlier identification of honour-based abuse in investigations and prosecutions, and that sentences properly reflect the gravity of the offending. Safeguarding would be strengthened for victims facing risk from multiple perpetrators, and it would also act as a stronger deterrent.

The murder of Somaiya Begum, a 20-year-old biomedical student, exposed a critical gap in the criminal justice system. Despite an active forced marriage protection order, Somaiya was murdered by a family member. Evidence at trial demonstrated the role of family pressures and honour dynamics, yet the court concluded:

“It is not possible to identify a motive for this dreadful attack”.


In his defence statement, the defendant explicitly relied on notions of honour to shift blame on to other family members. Despite this, the judge did not recognise honour in sentencing. This demonstrates how the absence of formal recognition allows key motivations to be overlooked, weakening justice and accountability.

Somaiya’s case and other cases such as the terrible murder of Banaz Mahmod, to which I know the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, will refer, illustrate several wider systemic failures. Yesterday would have been Banaz’s 40th birthday—and I pay tribute to Banaz’s sister, Payzee Mahmod, who has been a tireless advocate for changes to the law in Banaz’s memory, and whom I have worked closely with on this campaign. I also want to acknowledge Banaz’s sister Bekhal, who is calling for change in this area too.

When we do not recognise the aggravation of honour in the perpetration of these crimes, there are multiple consequences. First, there is the erasure of victims; when honour motivations are not named, survivors and families feel unseen and invalidated, deepening mistrust in the justice system and perpetuating silence. Secondly, there is unreliable data: judgments rarely reference honour, creating the false impression that such cases are infrequent or absent, despite evidence to the contrary. Thirdly, there are low prosecution rates: between April 2024 and March 2025, only 95 honour-based prosecutions were brought, with fewer than half resulting in conviction. Supporting this amendment would address these failures, improve data, strengthen accountability and ensure that courts formally acknowledge honour-based motivations, giving survivors and families the recognition and justice that they deserve.

Given that we are a little later than planned, many noble Lords who were going to speak in favour of these amendments are sadly no longer in their place. That includes the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, who, given her long experience, fully supports these amendments, in particular making honour-based abuse an aggravating feature, to send a clear message to communities and sentencing judges.

I pass on my sincere thanks to the Minister for the meeting to discuss this issue with not just her but three Ministers and officials across both departments. I am also very grateful for her own suggestion that she speak to the sector and survivor representatives ahead of this debate to hear from them directly. I listened with interest to the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, earlier in response to the Urgent Question on the VAWG strategy, and I look forward to reading that strategy tomorrow, given his reference a number of times to honour-based abuse.

I appreciate that the Government are clearly working to make progress on this, and I have two questions for the Minister. Will she commit to continuing to work with the sector to bring forward amendments on an agreed definition and guidance for Report? Secondly, while I heard the Minister’s explanation on Monday on existing aggravating factors and sentencing practice, we know from reviewing sentencing remarks in cases of clear honour-based abuse that, in practice, these factors are inconsistently applied and often fail to capture the collective, coercive and family or community-driven nature of the abuse. In that context, could the Minister set out the Government’s position on formally recognising honour-based abuse as an aggravating factor in sentencing?

In conclusion, I pay tribute again to the tireless work and bravery of survivors. Without them the progress on this work to date would not be possible. I would also like to thank Karma Nirvana, whose incredible work supports victims and survivors, brings the sector together collaboratively and campaigns for these life-saving changes alongside over 60 leading organisations. I am deeply grateful to the survivors and sector representatives who attended a briefing for noble Lords here last month. They reminded us plainly that honour-based abuse remains an invisible crime, with invisible perpetrators and, tragically, invisible victims. They told us that making progress on these amendments will save lives, prevent immeasurable harm and deliver recognition and justice for those who deserve it. Fawziyah, Somaiya, Banaz and so many others cannot speak for themselves, but through the courage of their families and advocates, we have the opportunity to act. In their names, I beg to move.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, for moving her amendment. This group also includes Amendment 356 in my name and in the name of the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb and Lady Blower, whose support I greatly appreciate. I also thank Southall Black Sisters for their tireless campaigning in this vital area.

I echo the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, in paying tribute to Banaz Mahmod and to the extraordinary courage of her sisters, Bekhal and Payzee, whose tireless campaigning has kept the spotlight on honour-based abuse in the hope that Banaz’s legacy will drive real and lasting change. Banaz was just 20 when she was murdered by her father, uncle and five male cousins. Her crime? Leaving her abusive husband and having a boyfriend she wished to marry. Her family convened a council of war to plan her killing, claiming that her wish for divorce and choice of partner brought shame on the family and the wider community. She did everything that we tell victims to do. On five separate occasions, she reported rape, violence and threats to kill—even an attempt on her life by her own father. She named those who would later murder her, yet she was not believed or protected. Her murder is not an isolated tragedy but emblematic of wider patterns of institutional failure to identify and respond to honour-based abuse.

That is why I have I have also added my name to Amendments 353 and 355, calling for a statutory definition to be brought forward as quickly as possible, alongside guidance, so that the thousands of incidents of such abuse reported in the UK each year are treated with the gravity they deserve. I too urge the Government not to miss the opportunity presented by the Bill, and I hope that the Minister will provide that reassurance.

Amendment 356 would make honour a statutory aggravating factor in sentencing. A similar amendment in the other place limited this to murder, but here it is deliberately broader. This would ensure that any offence committed in the name of honour is explicitly treated as aggravated in sentencing. It shares the aim of Amendment 354 but, in the absence of an existing statutory definition, it defines the aggravating factor independently, focusing instead on the perpetrator’s conduct and mirroring existing language from racial and religious aggravation laws. This approach would allow the aggravating factor to take effect immediately, while consultations on the definition take place between the Government and the sector.

Critically, Amendment 356 also recognises the frequent involvement of multiple perpetrators and colluders. In Banaz’s case, police estimated that around 50 men were involved, either in the killing or in shielding those responsible. This recognition is vital for improving how agencies identify and respond to such abuse.

I have reflected on the comments made during Monday’s Committee about the concept of honour already being adequately covered in legislation. I do not want to anticipate the Minister’s response, but I imagine she will say that judges are already familiar with the concept of honour and that evidence of its presence will already result in a stiffer sentence.