United Kingdom Internal Market Bill

Baroness Finlay of Llandaff Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 2nd November 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB) [V]]

My Lords, as other noble Lords have explained, the aim of these amendments is to ensure that not only is the office for the internal market appropriately constituted and organised so that it is accountable to all four democratically elected legislatures of the United Kingdom but also that the Competitions and Markets Authority—if this is to be the home of the new office—should be reconstituted to reflect the fact that its functions no longer relate exclusively to reserved matters.

I say “if” the office for the internal market is to sit within the Competitions and Markets Authority. Other noble Lords have already addressed that issue thoroughly and made clear that it is neither necessary nor desirable. The more radical attempts by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, to establish the office for the internal market as a truly independent and unattached new body are far more logical and would ensure the proper functioning of the office. The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, explained this very clearly. Their proposal has great merit. We will all be interested to hear the Minister’s arguments as to why a truly independent office is deemed undesirable.

Ministers keep claiming that passing the Bill is extremely urgent. If it is that urgent, perhaps he could explain why it would not be possible to initially brigade the office for the internal market under the CMA as an interim measure until it can be established by statute. After all, that is what seems to be happening with the Trade Remedies Authority. If I am correctly informed, the Government found it easy enough to establish a new body—the Trade and Agriculture Commission—as an independent statutory body.

If there are compelling arguments supporting the current proposal then it is imperative that the CMA can demonstrate that it really can command the trust of the devolved Governments and legislatures. If the Minister cannot give us those arguments during this debate, can he write to us specifying the justification? Nothing in these amendments suggests that it would be impossible for the CMA or for the OIM to function should a future devolved Government simply not want to engage.

The right of appointment of a board member to the Competitions and Markets Authority is important, but the board could function without one or more of these members. In the case of the OIM panel—where the devolved authorities would have to be fully engaged in appointments—if consent is not forthcoming within one month then the Secretary of State could proceed without their consent as long as he made a statement as to why proceeding without consent was desirable. That seems to strike an appropriate balance between ensuring the operability of the new arrangements and ensuring that the devolved institutions have confidence in a body that will have such significance for the future integrity of devolution.

[Lord Wigley (PC) [V]]

My Lords, I am delighted to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff. As she has made so many of the points that I intended to address, I shall not repeat them and I shall curtail my comments accordingly. I agree with the telling arguments made by the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd. I shall also limit my remarks because of the diabolical communications between Wales and Westminster this afternoon. Noble Lords may see this as an ironic reflection on the amendments that we have just been addressing.

I oppose Clause 30 standing part of the Bill and support Amendment 117, to which I have added my name and to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, has spoken. Like the noble and learned Lord, I shall desist from being drawn into the argument that Wales has so often been treated as part of England; that is for another day.

In the earlier debate on Amendment 110, the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, said that the CMA should be equally available to all four nations. During the debate on the last group of amendments, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, argued that the devolved Governments should have a voice. This is why I have added my name to Amendment 117.

The Bill is reinventing the CMA as a hybrid body with the OIM—very different from the widely respected body that has hitherto existed. The CMA has to be restructured accordingly.

The Bill is bringing the CMA into a highly controversial area, as it will be dragged into polarised arguments between the Governments of the four nations. Several noble Lords have already raised doubts about whether it is in any way appropriate that the CMA should be used in this way. If the CMA is going to act as an adviser to the Government, it has surely to be an adviser to all four national Governments within the UK. It has to be equally responsive to all four Governments and not beholden unto one Government more than the other three.

It is in that context that I support the amendment requiring there to be a nominee of each of the devolved Governments on the CMA board. Unless this is delivered, the CMA will be seen as the referee and as a body beholden unto one of the teams between which it potentially has to adjudicate. This will inevitably lead to conflict, and it is to give the devolved Governments greater confidence in the CMA that Amendment 117 proposes having a nominee of the devolved Governments within its structure. Having rejected earlier amendments to amend the statutory functions to avoid these dangers, the very least the Government can do is accept Amendment 117, or alternatively bring forward on Report an amendment to achieve a similar purpose. I urge the Minister for once to take a sympathetic approach to this constructive amendment.

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This Bill is not good for Scotland or the UK. These powers should be removed, and we should seek a partnership in which, where the UK Government wish to put resources into the devolved areas and territories, they do so with the support and consent of the devolved Governments, either by funding those programmes in addition to the Barnett formula or by agreeing to do it jointly, as happened with the city deals. These have been remarkably successful and are sowing the seeds for development in research, economic future planning and a lot of co-operation between the public and private sectors. It can be done well or it can be done badly but, in relation to these powers, it would be better if it was not done at all.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB) [V]]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Bennachie, and my noble and learned friend Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, who has explained, from a constitutional perspective, why Clause 48 has very little to commend it. I will illustrate why the powers that Ministers want to take for themselves might, in practical terms, be dangerous and damaging.

Under the last Labour Government, the Labour-led National Assembly chose to go in a different direction on education, which was one of the ways in which the late Rhodri Morgan put clear water between his Government, reflecting the unique circumstances of Wales, and the Government in London. The Welsh Government eschewed moves to establish foundation schools, academies and free schools. They have maintained the central role of local authorities in funding and supporting all schools, arguing, not least in rural areas, that an unplanned proliferation of schools would damage the viability of all educational establishments. They have vigorously championed comprehensive education. Whether or not you support this approach, the current Welsh Government have a mandate for it, supported by Plaid Cymru, meaning that more than two-thirds of Members of the Senedd back this policy.

Were the powers in Clause 48 to be granted, the UK Government could choose to fund free schools across Wales. This would positively undermine the policies backed by a majority of the Members of the Senedd and, more relevant still, a majority of the electorate. Even if the funding for such an initiative was genuinely additional to the block grant—I ask the Minister to give an unequivocal guarantee that that would be the case—such an intervention, even though it would give extra money, would undermine the Welsh Government’s education policy. A free school in an area such as Denbighshire could easily dramatically impact on the viability of local maintained schools. This does not seem right.

The cleanest way of dealing with and preventing this threat would be to remove the clause from the Bill. Nevertheless, for my part, I would be prepared to support alternative approaches. At the heart of this is the question of the so-called shared prosperity fund, which I am afraid some in the devolved nations suspect is a way of reallocating the funds that should come their way, especially to west Wales, to benefit the prosperity of England. The proposal of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, to establish a shared prosperity commission would dispel such suspicions by allocating replacement funds on the basis of need, not politics. However, as my noble and learned friend Lord Thomas explained, the onus really is on the Minister to give an explanation, which has been lacking to date, of why these powers are needed now when they have never been needed before.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I join the previous three speakers in giving notice of my intention to oppose the question that Clause 48 should stand part of the Bill. The grounds for my opposition to Clause 48 are based on paragraph 4(1) of Part 3 of Schedule 5 to the Scotland Act 1998. This is, after all, a devolution issue. That paragraph provides:

“This Schedule does not reserve giving financial assistance to commercial activities for the purpose of promoting or sustaining economic development or employment.”


In other words, it is within devolved competence for Scottish Ministers to provide financial assistance for these purposes. The same is true, I understand, of Welsh Ministers and in Northern Ireland.

The geographical reach of this provision is indicated by the fact that it applies to the whole of the UK. The power being sought would seem to cut across the powers of the devolved Administrations to provide this assistance in accordance with their own policies and order of preferences, although I appreciate that it extends over a wider field of activities. Providing assistance for reasons not at one with those policies and preferences would cut across the devolution settlements and for that reason be regrettable. I was very impressed by the example which the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, gave of how it could interfere with preferences felt in Wales, and no doubt examples could be found in the other devolved Administrations.

More importantly, I, like others, am looking for further information about how this clause is intended to operate. As the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, asked, what is the plan? Is it the intention that there should be consultation with the devolved Administrations before this power is exercised? If so, what weight will be given to any concerns that they may have? There is no attempt that I can see in the Bill to repeal the paragraph of Schedule 5 to the Scotland Act 1998 to which I referred, so presumably that power is to survive along with the power being given by this clause. To what extent, with regard to purpose and the amount of money involved, is this intended to reproduce within the UK what until now has been forthcoming from the EU? Can we expect the same amount of benefit to be spread among the nations as we have received hitherto? Will the ability of the devolved Administrations to use the powers reserved to them by the provision I quoted be limited in any way when this clause is brought into effect? If so, is that the intention? How are the funds which may be made available to be divided up between the nations? Can we be given any clarity on that point?

I hope that the Minister can shed more light on how this power is intended to operate, but at the moment, from what we have seen so far, it seems to cut across the devolution settlement and to be highly objectionable on that ground.

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[Baroness Randerson (LD) [V]]

My Lords, like the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, I will be very brief. I have added my name to his amendments, which simply reiterate the need for the CMA to consult the devolved Administrations, as well as the Secretary of State, and to obtain consent. They emphasise the importance of respecting devolution. I say to the Government that small things count. They guarantee good and fair government. It is important that the Government take note of the tone of the debates this evening and pay that respect to devolution in the terms in which the CMA operates in the future.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB) [V]]

My Lords, these amendments are part and parcel of the approach that my noble and learned friend Lord Thomas and I, and indeed the Welsh Government, have advocated. It seems essential to ensure that the office for the internal market is genuinely independent and accountable, on a basis of equality, to institutions in all four parts of the UK.

I want to take this opportunity to seek clarification on some of the powers that the Government propose to give the office. I understand that it would be able to compel persons to provide information and impose financial penalties on those who do not. I can see why these powers are necessary for the Competition and Markets Authority when it investigates matters of anti-competitive practices which possibly violate the criminal law. However, can the Minister please explain why the powers are necessary in the very different circumstances of providing independent advice on the potential internal market implications of measures proposed by a Government?

More specifically, one point in particular needs clarification. It is my understanding that devolved Ministers could not be compelled to provide such information, as, like UK Ministers, they are covered by Crown immunity. However, I am informed that such immunity does not extend to the devolved legislatures, meaning that the Senedd Commission could be compelled to provide information and fined if it did not. This seems wholly unacceptable, and I seek clarification.

[The Duke of Montrose (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I am pleased to be able to contribute to this stage of the debate, and to offer my support to my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering, and particularly to her Amendment 134. Just recently we have heard much discussion, even by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, about the suitability of the CMA for this role. But there is no doubt that we need a body, and what we are discussing are the functions it would need to perform. I have sight of the briefing provided by the Law Society of Scotland, which supported some of these amendments, and it has been pretty forensic in striving to ensure, in particular, that this Bill contains enough representation and consultation.

I also support Amendment 135; it seems to me very appropriate that the CMA should have powers to decide what is a matter of importance, because the general idea that anybody could ask it to produce a report is a recipe for overenthusiastic demand from all sorts of people.

Moving on to Amendment 146, Clause 35 deals with who gets to receive the reports that the CMA produces, before, during or after measures that are being introduced, and who will present that report. Subsection (4) excuses the Secretary of State from being the one who gives the report in person. Surely most of the reports will actually be initiated by the devolved Administrations, and reports on the initiative of Secretary of State will be far fewer, so why should the Secretary of State be excused from speaking to the report that he has asked for?

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Moved by

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff]

143: After Clause 31, insert the following new Clause—
“Advice on proposal to make regulations applying Part 1, 2 or 3
(1) Where the CMA is given notice of proposed regulations in accordance with section (Legislation to which market access principles apply)(5), (Services: application of sections 18 to 20)(9) or (Application of Part 3)(3), the CMA must give advice, or make a report, to the Secretary of State with respect to the proposed regulations.(2) The advice or report must (among other things) consider the potential effects on the matters specified in subsection (3)—(a) of any regulatory provision that any relevant national authority has proposed or might reasonably be expected to propose and that would be affected by the making of the proposed regulations, and(b) of the application of Part 1, 2 or 3 of this Act by virtue of the proposed regulations.(3) The matters mentioned in subsection (2) are—(a) the effective operation of the internal market in the United Kingdom, including—(i) indirect or cumulative effects,(ii) distortion of competition or trade, and(iii) impacts on prices, the quality of goods and services or choice for consumers,(b) the following in each part of the United Kingdom—(i) the health and safety of humans, animals and plants,(ii) standards of environmental protection, and(iii) any other aim that any regulatory provision mentioned in subsection (2)(a) would seek to promote. (4) Where the CMA gives advice, or makes a report, to the Secretary of State under this section—(a) it must at the same time send a copy of the advice or report to the Scottish Ministers, the Welsh Ministers and the Department for the Economy in Northern Ireland;(b) it must publish the advice or report in such manner as it considers appropriate.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires the CMA to provide advice or a report to the Secretary of State when notified of proposed regulations applying Part 1, 2 or 3 of the Bill and it specifies matters that the advice or report must consider.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB) [V]]

My Lords, Amendment 143 is to some extent a coda to our recent discussions on the role of the office for the internal market and to the amendments I moved last week, which were intended to underscore the primacy of the common frameworks process. They would ensure that the market access principles are triggered only when it proved impossible by consensus for the four Governments to agree a common framework. The triggering would be by bringing forward regulations using the affirmative procedure.

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[Lord Callanan (Con)]

I thank those hardy souls who have stayed for this brief debate. Amendment 143, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, is concerned with a proposed role for the CMA in the laying of regulations on the application of the market access principles. It builds on the earlier Amendments 6, 78 and 104, which concerned the scope within which the UK market access principles proposed in the Bill will apply. I understand that the noble Baroness has tabled this amendment on behalf of the Welsh Government, and I thank the Welsh Government for their positive engagement on the Bill so far. The UK Government look forward to continued and constructive future engagement with them on more aspects of these proposals.

Before I turn to the detail of this amendment, I note the previous discussion on similar amendments also tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, which would have narrowed the scope of the market access principles. As I set out then, those amendments would, in combination, prevent the market access principles from applying in time, at the end of the transition period. Earlier, I set out that the lengthy process the amendments put in place before the principles can apply, including the need to exhaust the framework discussions first, would mean a considerable delay in securing business certainty that trade can continue unhindered within the UK’s internal market. Amendment 143 would add an additional layer of bureaucracy to that process.

In our view, it would also problematically risk bringing the CMA into potentially contentious decision-making and mean its role was weighted towards supporting the Secretary of State over the devolved Administration counterparts. This contrasts sharply with our vision for this, which is to ensure that the OIM’s expert reporting is available to all four administrations equally. Above all, however, the advice provided by the OIM will be economic in nature. Its panel will have expertise across intra-UK trade, regulatory impacts on business and competition effects, which is one reason why the Government chose to establish it within the CMA. We had that debate earlier.

The office for the internal market will not be equipped, therefore, to opine on matters related to animal welfare or environmental protection. To lay this obligation on the OIM would bring a significant risk of duplication of the remit of other public bodies, which would cause considerable confusion for the many stakeholders in this field. For these reasons, and the uncertainty and confusion that this and other related amendments would generate for businesses and citizens, the Government regretfully cannot support them, and I hope the noble Baroness is able to withdraw.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for recognising the staying power of some noble Lords, because we have had three days of this debate. I am most grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for going through some of the aspects of this amendment in more detail and clearly pointing out that its aim is to establish a level playing field, at every level. There has to be a level playing field, because it is the only way in which the four nations will eventually be able to work together properly.

I echo the words of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, and I am grateful to him for stating that there is a need to have common frameworks at the centre of the Bill. This is something to which we will return on Report, because the Bill, as it is written, does not make this clear at all. In the way it is written at the moment, it looks as if the common frameworks are almost disposable. We need to come back to that.

I am glad that the Government recognise the involvement and commitment of the Welsh Government to have positive discussions, and I know that from the Wales end that that is true. They want to engage and come to a good solution. They want business certainty just as much as anyone else; they want less bureaucracy just as much as anybody else, but they need to know there will be a level playing field and fairness at the end of the day. That is why the common frameworks were so attractive, and why people have worked so hard towards them and are committed to carrying on working towards them.

Having said that and knowing that we need to have further discussions on this and that we will return to this on Report, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 143 withdrawn.