Crime and Courts Bill [HL]

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Monday 25th June 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, the amendment would ensure that persons representing the views of police and crime commissioners are included in the definition of “strategic partners” set out in Part 1. The definition refers to,

“such persons as appear to the Secretary of State to represent the views of local policing bodies”.

Earlier in Part 1, a “policing body” is defined as including within its scope a police and crime commissioner. Perhaps the Minister will tell us whether the reference to “local policing bodies” in the definition of “strategic partners” also means local police and crime commissioners, or whether it means something different from the earlier definition of “policing body”—and if so, why.

It is important that police and crime commissioners are included as strategic partners. Under Clause 3, the Secretary of State is required in determining strategic priorities for the National Crime Agency to consult strategic partners. Bearing in mind that a police and crime commissioner will be responsible for issuing a police and crime plan and in so doing will have to have regard to the strategic policing requirement issued by the Secretary of State, it would seem odd if the Secretary of State were not required when determining his or her strategic priorities for the National Crime Agency to consult with persons representing the views of police and crime commissioners. Likewise, in preparing his or her annual plan, the director-general of the National Crime Agency must, under Clause 4 in Part 1, consult with the strategic partners. It would seem inappropriate if these partners did not include police and crime commissioners, bearing in mind that the annual plan sets out how the director-general intends that the National Crime Agency functions should be exercised. This could well have an impact on the functioning of local police forces, including whether that force is efficient and effective, which it is a statutory responsibility of a police and crime commissioner to secure.

We also learnt from the Minister last week in Committee that the unelected director-general of the National Crime Agency could direct a chief officer of an England and Wales police force to perform a task of unlimited magnitude, impact and scope specified in such a direction without having to obtain the consent of the Secretary of State or even having to consult the elected police and crime commissioner responsible for the force whose chief officer the director-general is ordering to take that particular course of action. That might be, for example, as the Minister told us,

“to take the lead to disrupt a human-trafficking gang that is predominantly based in that force area”.—[Official Report, 20/6/12; col. 1800.]

Potentially, that is hardly a minor task in terms of either time or resources.

On top of that, we were also told by the Minister that the unelected director-general of the National Crime Agency could direct a chief officer of an England and Wales police force to provide unlimited specified assistance to the National Crime Agency, also without having even to consult the elected police and crime commissioner responsible for that force—even though, as the Minister said, providing assistance involved transferring resources from the command of one force to another force or organisation.

To many people, that will seem an odd state of affairs, designed to marginalise the elected police and crime commissioner. If elected police and crime commissioners, now that we are going to have them, are not even one of the strategic partners to be consulted by the Secretary of State when determining strategic priorities for the National Crime Agency, or by the agency’s director-general when preparing the annual plan, then it would be further confirmation that police and crime commissioners are intended, in many ways, to be little more than figureheads—a situation and role that any self-respecting elected police and crime commissioner will, I am sure, be unwilling to accept. I move this amendment and await the Minister’s response.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I have Amendment 68 in this group, and it is another amendment to the definition of “strategic partners”. The relevance of strategic partners is their role as consultees of the Secretary of State when she determines the strategic priorities for the NCA. We are all familiar with the scope and importance of the NCA’s functions. My amendment would add to the list of strategic partners the Security Service, the Secret Intelligence Service and GCHQ. There was a time when a fiction was maintained about the existence or otherwise of at least one of these organisations but I think that we have moved beyond that. It seems to me unthinkable that the Secretary of State, given the subject matter of consultation on strategic priorities, would not consult those agencies.

Last week, on Second Reading of the Justice and Security Bill, I commented on how the priorities and concerns of the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism, which is embedded in the Home Office, seem to have affected—I am not making a judgment on this—all the Home Office’s thinking. As I say, I simply cannot believe that these services and agencies would be omitted in such a consultation. If it is not the case, then why not say so? If it is, then why is it?