Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Baroness Lister of Burtersett Excerpts

Wednesday 28th January 2015 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

104: Clause 21, page 14, line 7, at end insert—
“(f) an academic function of a university or other further and higher education institution”

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[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, in moving this amendment I will speak also to Amendments 105, 107, 109 and 115 on behalf of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, of which I am a member. The amendments give effect to the recommendations made in our pre-legislative scrutiny report. Amendments 107 and 109 would exclude higher education institutions from the new statutory duty to,

“have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism”,

although I suspect that the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, would do so rather better. Amendment 104 excludes,

“an academic function of a university or other further and higher education institution”,

from that duty. Amendment 105 makes it clear that the Prevent duty is subject to the duty contained in the Education (No. 2) Act 1986 to uphold freedom of speech, covering staff, students and visiting speakers. Amendment 115 requires that when issuing guidance and giving directions, the Secretary of State should have regard to the principle of academic freedom as contained in the Education Reform Act 1988, which includes a duty,

“to ensure that academic staff have freedom within the law to question and test received wisdom, and to put forward new ideas and controversial or unpopular opinions”.

These amendments may be technically deficient, but as they are for now probing amendments, I trust that the Minister will bear with me.

Recommendations stem from the JCHR’s conclusion that,

“because of the importance of freedom of speech and academic freedom in the context of university education, the entire legal framework which rests on the new ‘prevent’ duty is not appropriate for application to universities”,

and from our observation that its relationship to universities’ existing duties with regard to freedom of speech is not clear. I have some sympathy with concerns about other parts of the educational sector, but following the JCHR report I will confine my remarks to HE institutions and will focus in particular on the question of academic freedom, therefore inevitably touching on some of the points already made. In doing so I declare my interest as an emeritus professor at Loughborough University.

Ministers have emphasised their commitment to academic freedom of freedom of speech, which I welcome. In a letter of 20 January to the JCHR, the Minister, James Brokenshire, pointed out that this freedom comes with a duty to ensure that it is within the law. Exactly. Given that, it is not clear why the Prevent duty has to be put on a statutory footing—moving from co-operation to co-option, as the noble Baroness, Lady Sharp, so pithily put it. Universities are already required to operate within any law that circumscribes freedom of speech. At last week’s packed meeting, addressed by the Minister and Mr Brokenshire—I thank the Minister for arranging that—we did not receive a convincing explanation. I suspect that the purpose of the meeting was to reassure noble Lords; my impression was that it had the opposite effect.

Since then, the JCHR has received the Minister’s letter, in which he set out why the Government believe that the application of the duty to universities is a matter of enormous importance. He cited the proportion of people convicted of al-Qaeda-associated terrorist offences who had attended an HE institution—the implication, presumably, being that their HE experience helped to lead them there. He acknowledged that some students arrived already radicalised or are radicalised by external influences, while suggesting that others can become influenced by non-violent extremism at university but later move on to violence. That seems to reflect the kind of linear, conveyor-belt theory of the journey to terrorism, which is challenged by many experts in the area and which was questioned earlier by the noble Baroness, Lady Warsi.

There are two main areas of concern, which have sometimes been conflated: visiting speakers policies, and the free exchange of ideas that lies at the heart of the relationship between lecturers and students. With regard to visiting speakers, it is unclear how the new duties sit alongside the duty in the 1986 Act not to use beliefs or views as grounds to refuse access to premises. We shall look later at the draft guidance, so I will not go into that now, apart from coming back, in a moment, to the question of definitions.

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[Lord Bates]

Normally I go beyond what I am instructed to say by my patient Bill team who work behind me, but on this occasion, I think that I am probably behind them in that the letter says in terms that we have heard enough already to reach a judgment on the practicalities of the provision in paragraph 66 and that we will rework that, notwithstanding the answer which I accept that I gave to the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, earlier, that we would reflect on the issue and did not want to prejudge the consultation. I suppose that we have prejudged the consultation in that particular regard because we do not want what we consider is the important issue of keeping the universities within the broader statutory provision to be, as it were, misunderstood or challenged on relatively small procedural matters which could cause alarm and are many miles away from where the principal focus of our efforts should be.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his characteristically good-natured and considered response, which I shall discuss in a moment. I thank all noble Lords who put their names to my amendments and the many noble Lords from across the House who supported them. I cannot remember many debates in your Lordships’ House where not one noble Lord has spoken in support of the Minister, although many have rightly emphasised how much they support what the Government are trying to achieve in terms of preventing terrorism. We have had perspectives from Northern Ireland, Wales and Scotland. I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, for pointing out the deficiencies of Amendment 105 and how we can put that right. We have heard important arguments of principle that go to the heart of what a university is about and have pointed out how we could undermine the very values that we are trying to protect. As I said at Second Reading, I call these values of democratic citizenship. There is nothing uniquely British about them, but they are values that we probably share. We have also heard important arguments regarding practice, where noble Lords have pointed out that there seems to be a lack of understanding of how universities work, and that the practical implementation of the measure would be counterproductive, not least in pushing underground some of the debates with which we need to engage.

Before I discuss the Minister’s very helpful finale, so to speak, I wish to make a couple of points. He pointed out that Universities UK had itself issued guidance which is rather similar to the guidance that everybody has decried as being much too prescriptive. However, the fact that no one, not even Universities UK, seemed to know that it had included the relevant measure suggests that probably most universities simply ignore that bit of it because it is so obviously fatuous. However, the big difference is that if a university fails to comply with that guidance, the Home Secretary will not issue a directive against it and it will not find itself in court. There is a huge difference between the advisory guidance that Universities UK issues and statutory guidance related to the Bill.

A number of noble Lords asked about the lack of evidence on how many universities are failing to comply in this regard. The Minister said that he accepted that the evidence has not been marshalled but that there are institutions that do not comply. Noble Lords who are academics would not accept that as evidence. Evidence has to be marshalled for it to constitute genuine evidence; otherwise, it is anecdote.

I very much appreciate the Minister saying that he will go away and reflect on the debate, but am slightly worried because he talked about the new Prevent duty sitting comfortably alongside existing statutory duties to uphold freedom of speech and academic freedom. The whole point is that it sits uncomfortably beside those duties. I am worried that we may be talking about some kind of parallel universe. I am not a lawyer so I may make a fool of myself when I say this, but the existing duties in the 1986 and 1988 education Acts are themselves subject to other laws which restrict freedom of speech, as I said, so I do not see why there is a problem in making the Prevent duty subject to those duties because they are circumscribed. Therefore, I do not understand the noble Lord’s argument on that. When he reflects on the debate, I hope he will think seriously about that, because if the new duty is not subject to those duties, it will not meet the concerns expressed so powerfully in your Lordships’ House—concerns which are based on noble Lords’ experience. I hope it will be possible to discuss this issue informally, although we clearly do not have an awful lot of time before Report, given the fast-track nature of this legislation. I welcome the fact that the Minister is prepared to think further about this and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 104 withdrawn.

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[Baroness Sharp of Guildford]

I have added my name to Amendments 112C and 112E. It is important that the fine print of the duty is spelt out in the guidance. It is extremely important that this should be put in the public domain and scrutinised by Parliament. I very much endorse the provisions of Amendment 112C. Similarly, in relation to the Secretary of State giving directions, it is important that this is transparent and in the public domain. Including such a report would actually be after the event. The scrutiny is not before the action but after it. Nevertheless, it brings the matter to public notice. It is vital that this is scrutinised by Parliament. I very much like the notion that a copy must be sent to the chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. That is appropriate given the interest that that committee has shown in these provisions.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

My Lords, the concerns that were expressed in earlier debates about the draft statutory guidance underline just how important it is that that guidance is the subject of proper parliamentary scrutiny. Indeed, the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which has just been referred to, has recommended that the Bill should be amended to require the guidance to be approved by affirmative resolution of each House. I want to ask one specific question about the guidance. I do not know whether this is my bid for a letter but it would be good to have the answer in Hansard. The guidance sets out what is expected from student unions and societies in relation to the Prevent strategy, including making clear the need,

“to challenge … extremist ideas which are used to legitimise terrorism and are shared by terrorist groups”.

Both Universities UK and the National Union of Students have questioned how this is compatible with student union status as independent legal entities. My noble friend Lady Kennedy of The Shaws made reference to this in passing but did not actually pose the question of how it is compatible. The NUS also points out that student unions are already regulated by the Charity Commission so it could be awkward if they had to be accountable to two different bodies. I would welcome an explanation of this either now or, if that is not possible, in a letter. How do student unions fit into this and how will it be possible for universities to apply the guidance to bodies which are independent of them?

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[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

My Lords, I have a few questions concerning the role of HEFCE as the appropriate monitoring body. I was slightly surprised when I heard that it would play that role. What expertise does it have as primarily a funding body—albeit, I accept, with some wider governance oversight? Is there not a danger that the chilling effect will be that much greater if compliance is policed by the funding body?

Will the Minister also explain how HEFCE will regulate those HE institutions with which it has no formal funding relationship? Finally, I understand that reference to “the Secretary of State” means the Home Secretary. However, Universities UK argues that it is inappropriate for HEFCE to be given directions by the Home Secretary; there is the whole question about the independence of universities anyway, but in so far as there is such a relationship, normally HEFCE has a relationship with BIS, not with the Home Office. I would therefore appreciate the noble Lord’s reflections on those questions, because I know that there are concerns in the HE sector about the role of HEFCE— I do not know what its own view is on that.

[Lord Bates]

My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords for their questions. I will first deal with the questions from the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, on HEFCE. As the noble Baroness will be aware, that is one of the questions we specifically ask on page 21 of the consultation:

“Do you agree that the Higher Education Funding Council for England is the appropriate body to monitor compliance with this duty? … Are there other higher education regulatory bodies that should be involved in monitoring compliance?”.

In many ways the short answer is that we are consulting on that. That was one of the reasons why when I introduced the government amendments I said that in certain cases we nominate the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills as the designated person for these purposes. I hope that addresses that point.

I turn to the point mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, on Scotland, which he raised in the previous context as well; as I have stated, it is our hope and intention to add Scottish bodies to Schedule 3 in due course. At such point we could look at making consequential amendments to this clause to make it applicable to Scotland. The other one relates to Northern Ireland. On the application of free speech in Scotland, which was referred to previously—I take the opportunity because the notes happened to arrive together—this part of the Bill applies to England, Wales and Scotland, but as yet no Scottish bodies are listed in Schedule 3; I made that same point earlier. However, we will look carefully at the wording used, to ensure that it applies equally across all territories, so the basic answer is what I already said in this regard.