Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Thornton Excerpts

Monday 2nd February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Monckton of Dallington Forest (Con)]

My Lords, I oppose Clause 191 standing part of the Bill.

Our role as parliamentarians, especially in this House, is to ensure that laws that make it on to the statute book are safe. Good laws require careful thought and prior consideration regarding any unintended consequences. Clause 191 fails to meet these criteria and should not become law. It was hastily added to an unrelated Bill and concerns a proposal that was neither a government manifesto commitment, nor called for by the public, nor subject to even rudimentary scrutiny.

Let me be clear: the law change proposed by Clause 191 does not relate primarily to one’s views on abortion, on which there will be a range of perspectives in this House. The abortion debate is often presented as pitting the rights of a woman against the rights of an unborn child at varying stages of development. It is not accidental that the legal limit for abortion is 24 weeks. That marks roughly the stage at which the baby is fully viable when born. This clause not only fails even to consider that person but would endanger the mother.

Laws exist for a variety of reasons. Sometimes, they exist to deter us from doing things that would cause significant harm to ourselves or others, out of motives that may be devious or simply desperate. The current law prohibiting women from performing their own abortions after 24 weeks is one such law. The existing legal deterrent protects women. For example, if a partner seeks to pressure a woman into an abortion beyond the 24-week limit, a limit which I note is already double that common in most European countries, a woman can currently point to the criminal law as a reason for not doing so. Removing this would make it much harder for vulnerable women to resist such pressure and would be particularly troubling given the dangers of unsupervised self-induced abortions later in pregnancy.

There is a supreme irony that those who claim to support legal abortion on the basis that the alternative would be unsafe—illegal abortions—are now proposing that women can perform such illegal abortions, outside the terms of the Abortion Act, in an unsafe environment. This law change would, in effect, reintroduce back-street abortion, as women would not be able to have terminations in a clinic beyond the 24-week limit but could do so at home, on their own, without the prospect of any subsequent investigation, using pills not designed for use outside of a clinical context beyond 10 weeks. The potential consequences are terrifying.

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

Does the noble Baroness accept that none of these things has happened in Northern Ireland? We changed the law and decriminalised abortion in Northern Ireland several years ago and literally none of the things that she is mentioning has happened there—nor in any of the other 50 countries where abortion is being decriminalised.

[Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)]

My Lords—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, my Amendment 456 has the support of the noble Baronesses, Lady Wolf and Lady Falkner, and the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. I am especially grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Wolf, who unfortunately cannot be here due to a prior commitment overseas.

This is a simple amendment: it would reinstate the offences that Clause 191 would otherwise decriminalise for women acting in relation to their pregnancies. The amendment also provides that criminal proceedings against any woman acting in relation to her pregnancy could not be instituted without the consent of the Attorney-General. Under the current law, a woman may avoid criminal liability if defences such as duress apply. The effect of Clause 191 would be that, regardless of circumstances, it would never be a criminal offence for a pregnant woman to do any act with the intention of procuring her own miscarriage at any stage of the pregnancy. It would, however, remain an offence for any other person to administer drugs or use instruments to cause an abortion. If Clause 191 is adopted, we would end up with a law that simultaneously denies criminal responsibility to the principal—again, regardless of individual intent or circumstances—while maintaining it for others.

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, for the very useful meeting that she arranged before Christmas for some of us and the proponents of Clause 191, in particular Ms Antoniazzi MP. As the proponents explained to us, what has prompted Clause 191 is a rise in completely unmeritorious investigations against women. Some of these cases are genuinely appalling. For example, we know of the case of a woman who went into spontaneous premature labour, called for help and instead of being met by medical support was met by the police. While she was still trying to resuscitate her prematurely born baby, even before the paramedics arrived, the police were in the house searching the bins. She was separated from her critically ill baby and investigated for a year for abortion offences, despite medical tests confirming she had not taken any medication.

There are other cases where women have been forced to take abortion pills by an abusive or violent partner, and they were put under criminal investigation while the partner was not. These investigations seldom result in prosecutions and the very few prosecutions hardly ever result in a conviction.

Under our amendment, the consent of the Attorney-General would be required to institute criminal proceedings, not to open an investigation, but there are reasons to believe that this procedural requirement would have a restraining impact on the investigation phase too. The Attorney-General cannot give consent retrospectively. The CPS’s guidance for offences that require AG consent makes it very clear that prosecutors should seek consent before charge.

The current policy for these offences also requires the involvement of senior officials. Before a case is submitted to the Attorney General’s Office for consent, a deputy chief crown prosecutor or deputy head of a central casework division must check that the case has been prepared to an appropriate standard. Following on from that, a lawyer at the Attorney General’s Office will review the application before placing it before the Attorney-General. That lawyer may seek further information or clarification from the relevant prosecutor and their line manager. It is also necessary to ensure that the Attorney-General is allowed sufficient time to consider the case, so that he can make his own assessment.

Finally, for all these offences, the role of the Attorney-General does not end with the consent to prosecution. The Attorney-General will have to maintain an interest in the progress of the case and be kept up to date.

The amendment cannot rule out the risk of an inappropriate or unmeritorious investigation. That risk cannot be ruled out for any offence on our statute book. The amendment seeks to balance competing legal and moral principles, while taking into account the reality of the situation.

The requirement for Attorney-General consent should discourage the police from investigating cases that will not pass muster not only with the CPS at a senior level but with the Attorney-General. The requirement would also offer an opportunity for a tightening of the policy in respect of these offences so that the risk of unmeritorious investigations and prosecutions is further reduced. The amendment does not specify a requirement for the Attorney-General to introduce guidance on the circumstances in which consent would be given, but it is to be expected that such guidance will be published and could make it clear that the bar is, indeed, high.

This is a probing amendment. There are other amendments in this group that I am interested in and inclined to support to mitigate what seems a rather radical approach in Clause 191. It would be of assistance in this debate if the Government could help us understand a bit more about what is really happening with these investigations.

To conclude, I have three brief questions for the Minister. First, what is the latest available data on these investigations, and do the data confirm an increase in criminal investigations against women since 2020? Secondly, how do the Government explain this rise in investigations? Finally, other than Clause 191—which, of course, was not part of the Bill originally—what policy steps have the Government been considering to remedy this problem?

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 461J. I thank my noble friend Lady Goudie, the noble Lord, Lord Patel, and the noble Baroness, Lady Miller of Chilthorne Domer, for supporting it.

The amendment seeks to add a new clause after Clause 191 that would pardon women who have had a conviction or caution for an offence abolished by Clause 191. Because of the existing 1861 legislation, abortion is classified as a violent crime. The record means that these women will permanently have to declare it as part of a DBS check, thus continuing the damage caused by this offence. It would ensure the removal of women’s details from police systems.

Like Amendment 459C, Amendment 461J seeks to right a wrong and an injustice. Of course, it is not the first time your Lordships have sought to do this, when something which has been unlawful and unjust is abolished. I am referring to the changes of the law on homosexuality and what followed.

The amendments in this very large group that seek to amend or get rid of this clause—passed as it was by a vote of 137 to 379 on a free vote in the Commons—will form the debate this afternoon. For example, Amendment 455, moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Meyer, seems to profoundly misunderstand what it means, because if abortion remains criminalised after 24 weeks of gestation then, under the current law, only women who have an abortion after 24 weeks of gestation are targeted by the police, even when, in most cases, they have had a spontaneous miscarriage or a stillbirth. That amendment would make no difference to the current cruel situation, but the noble Baroness actually says she wants to get rid of the whole clause anyway.

Amendments 456 and 456A, introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, would, essentially, reverse the change agreed in the Commons and mean that abortion would remain criminalised. But I am aware that some noble Lords who are very concerned about this clause also support reproductive rights for women. We have already had many meetings about this, with the royal colleges and others. I ask that, between now and the next stage, those of us who take the view that reproductive rights are important but have concerns should continue those discussions.

Unlike what the noble Baroness, Lady Monckton, said in her speech on the clause standing part, this clause was not plucked out of thin air in the Commons. It is the product of years and years of trying to mitigate the criminalisation of women under cruel and awful circumstances. There have been entreaties to the DPP, discussions with the policing bodies and discussions with our legal systems, and every single one of them—I could bore the Committee by giving dates and facts—has taken the view that Parliament has to take a view on this matter. This is not something that can be mitigated by changing guidelines or rules. Indeed, Parliament took a view on this and decriminalised abortion in Northern Ireland a few years ago. As I said, this had no detrimental effect.

This clause seeks to ensure that women in England and Wales are no longer subject to year-long investigations and criminal charges—the kind of situation that the noble Lord just explained. Since 2020, around 100 women have faced police investigations. Six have gone to court; one has been sent to prison. The clause will not change the wider abortion law, or the existing time limits of the 1967 Act. It is supported by 50 organisations, including the medical royal colleges, violence against women and girls groups, every group that represents abortion providers in the UK and other women’s organisations. We should discuss our concerns about the clause and whether it does the job we want it to do, but there is support for it. Fifty countries in the world have not criminalised abortion. Why on earth should we in England and Wales?

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I speak to Amendment 456C, but I support Amendment 456, which was spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame. The purpose of tabling Amendment 456C is to see if a compromise can be achieved between those who favour Clause 191 in its present form and those who are strongly opposed to it.

Late-term abortions are, of course, already lawful if they fall within the permissive provisions of Section 1(1)(b) to (d) of the Abortion Act 1967. Those paragraphs, of course, permit late-term abortions if there is a serious risk to the health of the mother or a serious risk of abnormalities in the unborn child. But Clause 191 goes very much wider than that. It would permit a mother, without any restriction in law, to abort a child right up to the moment of birth. I find it very difficult to make an ethical or moral distinction between killing a child immediately after birth and killing a child immediately before birth. One has been born, the other has not, but I cannot discern any difference in principle.

--- Later in debate ---

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I agree that all investigations in this matter should be conducted with great sensitivity. I take the noble Lord’s points, but at the end of the day you have to establish a principle. May I complete my point before the noble Lord intervenes further? If there is powerful evidence that the mother has wilfully terminated the birth of a child immediately up to the moment of birth, it is right that Parliament should set out a process whereby she has to be investigated. If she falls within the defence, she will have a defence. I admit that that would not prevent an investigation, but at the end of the day you have to determine where you stand on whether or not this House is really going to guard human life.

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

How will we know? The noble Viscount needs to tell us how you would know that it was not the loss of a baby through natural circumstances? Who will decide?

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

It would be part of the process of investigation. In that context, I sympathise very much with the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, which would provide a further filter. There should be a prosecution only in cases where there has been a clear breach of the law. These are very sensitive matters and need to be conducted sensibly. But we have to stand on principle here.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

This is not about abortion up to birth, because the Abortion Act 1967 still stands. It is really important that noble Lords try to be accurate in how they describe this. I am not disputing anything the noble Lord says, except that it is not the case that this is about abortion up to birth. This is about the 1967 Act staying in place and about not criminalising women, is it not?

[Lord Carter of Haslemere (CB)]

That does not detract from the fact that Amendment 456 would create a robust filter, through which prosecutions would have to go before instituting criminal proceedings. That would need the consent of the Attorney-General and without that consent—

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

I have not quite finished.

I understand exactly what the noble Baroness is saying. I was not a criminal judge; I do not think I ever sent a woman to prison, so I am not qualified to speak on those issues. All I am really asking the Committee to reflect on is that we are principally being asked to change the law to support those who are not guilty of offences, and because the police are not behaving as they should.

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

I have two questions for the noble and learned Baroness. Why does the noble and learned Baroness think 50 countries have found this not to be a problem? Abortion is decriminalised in virtually every country that has had abortion legislation since the 1967 Act. So, I am wondering why the noble and learned Baroness thinks that is a problem. My second question is: why does the noble and learned Baroness think that adding further complications, which the amendment of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, would, would make this any better?

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords—

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)]

My Lords, we are coming back to the terminally ill debate that we had on Friday. Women may well be—although not in this particular case—coerced by partners to take pills when they would not otherwise have wished to do so. Perhaps noble Lords who have tabled amendments to do with face-to-face consultations have that in their minds, as a face-to-face consultation would require deeper insights on the part of medical professionals—pills by post do not.

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

My Lords—

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)]

I would like to proceed a little further and then I will give way to the noble Baroness.

If we wish to change abortion law, we are perfectly entitled to do so as a society, but this clause raises significant questions that I hope the Minister will be able to answer, even though—I accept this—the Government said on Second Reading that they remain neutral on the clause and that they anticipated a free vote. As the clause seeks to repeal Sections 58 and 59 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 and the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929, can the Minister explain how charges could be brought in a case such as Mr Worby’s and others? This was a poisoning and an attempt to procure a miscarriage without the woman’s consent—and it happened without repealing those offences.

As the Government have not carried out a consultation on this proposed change, how will providers of pills by post be regulated further to ensure that late-term pregnancies still carry protections under the Abortion Act and other criminal law? Will the Government commit to carrying out an overall review of the extent of the problem with police investigations of these women and to opening discussions with the relevant authorities to ascertain how better to focus police interventions? That is the objective of our Amendment 456.

On all sides of the Committee, we recognise the distress caused to women by unfounded police intrusiveness. There must be other measures that could address how that can be done with care. Upholding the rights of women in terms of their bodily autonomy, as well as society’s obligations to provide the appropriate medical care for them at this vulnerable point of pregnancy, exists on the one hand. On the other, we have obligations to the rights of the unborn child.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)]

I will say one more sentence before I sit down, and I will be happy for both noble Baronesses to intervene then.

We have obligations to the rights of the unborn child, as that is what very late-term abortions are about in terms of viability. These things engage our ethics and responsibilities in law. I suggest that the Minister seeks to engage with those of us tabling amendments to guide us on how we in this Committee can do both responsibly.

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

If you are being coerced into ending a pregnancy outside the law, and if you report that to the police, you yourself will be investigated for a criminal offence. That would be the case even though it is clear—as we know from that court case—that the man is the person who has coerced you into doing that. Can the noble Baroness say how this can be right? If a woman goes to the police in those circumstances—why would she?—she would be investigated for a criminal offence. That is what the law says now.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)]

In the Worby case, the woman discovered what had happened to her, went to the police and was not investigated.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

I have never committed murder or been a hangman, but I can take a view on capital punishment from a moral view. To disaggregate people and their right or obligation to comment on the debate is not helpful. I caveat that by saying I have an awful lot of respect for how eloquently the noble Baroness put her case.

As I said at Second Reading, this will harm women, increase the number of late-term abortions and dehumanise children in the womb in a way I find chilling. But that has not been reflected on in the way that this has come to form part of the Bill.

During the debate on Report in the other place, which lasted a little over two hours in total, three new clauses were debated: proposed new Clause 1, which is now Clause 191; proposed new Clause 20, which proposed an even more extreme form of decriminalisation than that which we are considering today; and proposed new Clause 106, which I am delighted to see tabled again as Amendment 460 in the name of my noble friend Lady Stroud, which, needless to say, I strongly support.

In fact, saying that there were two hours of debate on such a significant proposal is perhaps overly generous. Sandwiched between the remarks of the three Members moving the proposed new clauses and the responses of the Front Benches, just 46 minutes were given over to speeches from Back-Bench MPs. The point is that there has been a scandalous lack of consideration of this change in our law and its impact.

I accept that some aspects of abortion law are an issue of conscience, but that is not a “get out of jail free” card for failure to undertake any form of due diligence, particularly on proposals that many of us regard as potentially dangerous. There is no impact assessment, there has been no pre-legislative scrutiny and there has been no consultation of any kind. I hope that the Minister, in responding to this group, addresses those issues.

I strongly support the noble Baroness, Lady Monckton, in her proposal to remove Clause 191 from the Bill and will do so again on Report. However, the danger of Clause 191 is compounded by the continuation of the pandemic hangover policy of pills by post, which provides for easy access to abortion pills without sufficient checks. I am afraid I simply cannot understand the view that holds that Clause 191 is pro-women. In combination with the ongoing availability of pills by post, it instead seems to me to offer the worst of both worlds. It opens the gates for overly expeditious access to less-than-safe care.

As the Member for Reigate in the other place has said:

“Being pro-choice should not mean supporting fewer checks and worse care for women seeking an abortion. Indeed, this is an issue where both sides of the abortion debate ought to eschew tribalism and unite in support of common-sense measures that safeguard women”.


I hope that we can rise above tribalism on this issue and find some common ground.

There are amendments in this group which I strongly support, including Amendments 455 and 459, but I will move on to my own Amendment 461F. While I would pick out other excellent amendments from this group, in the interests of time I will speak to my amendment particularly. My amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish guidance on the investigation of offences relating to abortion and infanticide within 12 months of the commencement of Clause 191. The amendment is concerned with providing clarity and clear protocols to distinguish between what would be a decriminalised self-induced abortion and a criminal act of infanticide or child destruction.

My amendment is also designed to reassure proponents of Clause 191, including some who advise concern about possible intimidation or distress caused to a woman who may have experienced a miscarriage or stillbirth. I recognise those concerns. Women facing miscarriage, stillbirth or medical crisis deserve care, dignity and compassion and nothing in my amendment would change that. However, I point to the other way around and suggest that the absence of clear guidance is what can produce overreach and inconsistency. When professionals are left uncertain about the law and about thresholds, practice understandably becomes variable. Some cases may be mishandled—

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

I am puzzled by something that the noble Lord has said and perhaps he would like to clarify. I am not quite sure how jailing women is pro-women.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

If the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, will forgive me, I did not quite hear the last part of her question.

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

The noble Lord has talked about being pro-women and I would like him to explain to the Committee why jailing women is pro-women.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

The simple point is that if Clause 191 is incorporated into the Bill, we will have a situation where many more women are under threat of coercion and many more women will face complications. Even the incomplete and substandard figures produced by the Department of Health on abortion in 2023 show that, at over 20 weeks’ gestation, 60.3% of women per 100,000 experienced complications arising from abortion in all clinical settings. That phenomenon will continue and will get worse. I hope that that is sufficient for the noble Baroness.

My amendment is directed towards striking an appropriate balance by providing legal certainty that would prevent overzealous investigation, weighed against the need to protect children. By defining clear thresholds for investigation, we protect vulnerable women while maintaining a shield for infants born alive. Clause 191 fundamentally changes our legal landscape and it is appropriate and reasonable to require updated public consultative guidance so that police and prosecutors understand what remains investigable, what standards apply and how to act lawfully and consistently.

In conclusion, if Parliament insists on decriminalising the woman’s role in procuring her own abortion, it has a profound moral duty to ensure that the law can still protect the infant the moment it leaves the womb. Amendment 461F is a measured attempt to ensure this and arguably the bare minimum in terms of responsible lawmaking. I urge noble Lords to support my amendment and others in this group, which seek to protect women and the most vulnerable lives among us. I urge Ministers to consider my Amendment 461F carefully as the Bill moves to Report.