Use of Drones in Defence

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Wednesday 3rd September 2025 Westminster Hall

[Jamie Stone (Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross) (LD)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Lewell.

The potential of drones first struck me shortly after I was first elected to this place. In August 2017, the new aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth went on a tour of the north of Scotland and tied up at Invergordon. While she was there, an enterprising photographer flew a drone from the Black Isle across the Cromarty Firth with a view to taking pictures of the new aircraft carrier. The wind got up, and the drone automatically landed on the deck. That posed the question in all our minds: “How on earth did this happen? How did that drone get so close to an incredibly expensive warship—the pride of the Royal Navy?”

The photographer was quite open about what he had done, and he wittily quipped to the BBC that he could have put a couple of pounds of Semtex on the drone. Nothing was done about it, and the following week he did it again—he took photographs, but he did not land the drone that time. I made the point in the press that if that person had been of wicked intent, he could have flown the drone straight into the radar assembly and made a complete mess of our fine warship.

We have all seen the extraordinary effectiveness of drones, as has been referred to by the hon. Member for Bromley and Biggin Hill (Peter Fortune). I congratulate him on a thoughtful and timely speech—I will come to that in a second. We have seen what happens when a Ukrainian drone drops an explosive device through an open hatch on a Russian tank. Some military experts have argued that the massive explosion that happens is partly due to the way the munitions are stored in a circular fashion within the turret of the tank—it is called the “jack-in-the-box” effect. One thing is for sure: the crew have no chance of survival when that happens. The T-14 Armata tank was reckoned to be the last word in armoured vehicles, but Russia perhaps has not talked about it quite so much recently. We are pretty sure that drones may not get through its armour, but they have taken out the engine, and when a tank is immobilised it loses most of its effectiveness.

I suppose the point I want to make is an historic one. In 1906, Admiral Lord Fisher set about building HMS Dreadnought—it was very much his brainchild—and he completed it in nine months flat. Dreadnought completely transformed the way navies build their ships. It rendered every other warship in the entire world obsolete in one fell swoop, and all the other countries had no choice but to think that they had to build ships equivalent to Dreadnought—turbine powered, high speed, all big guns—and hundreds of battleships were just sent for scrap. The reason why I think this debate is historic is that it occurs to me that we may have such a moment on our hands right now.

I was my party’s defence spokesperson for a number of years. We all knew about Challenger 2 being upgraded to Challenger 3, but just how drone-proof will Challenger 3 be? We have all read about constructing cages over tanks, in the hope that drones will bounce off, but the fact is that all tanks have weak spots—we have heard about the engine of the T-14 Armata. Tanks are designed with their armour forward or to the sides to deflect at very high speed a missile or a shell; the rear of a tank is the most vulnerable bit.

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

My background is in armoured infantry and warfare, and I completely concur that the weak spots of a tank are probably underneath it or to the rear. As the hon. Gentleman pointed out with the Armata tank, we should consider the use of drones to immobilise, and not just the engine block. The weak spot of any tank is its tracks, which are very easily disabled—that is the point of an anti-tank mine. During the second world war the Russians trained dogs to find food under tanks, so that they could then strap explosives to them, send them under German tanks and detonate them. Should we be looking at the protection that we provide to the side of a tank, to further protect its tracked infrastructure and prevent it from being mobility-killed?

[Jamie Stone]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. He knows his subject—we can see that.

In conclusion, as we plough on from Challenger 2 to Challenger 3, and as we develop armoured personnel carriers and other armoured vehicles, have we in fact come to the Dreadnought moment, when we have to completely rethink how we design and indeed deploy armour? That could be the case, and if an APC is equally vulnerable to a drone, which it will be, we must think about how we move infantry around. I seek reassurance that the Government are taking a completely new look at that. As I say, I believe this is a Dreadnought moment, and we owe it to our armed services to have the courage to say, “Wait a minute, hang on. Do we need to start all over again with a blank sheet of paper?” Drones are here to stay, and the point made about us being at the forefront of constructing drones is true and I concur with it.

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Lewell.

The nature of warfare has changed. During the last three years of conflict driven by the war in Ukraine and, perhaps controversially, two years of Israel Defence Forces operations in Gaza, we have seen a paradigm shift in the nature of warfare—a tangential move away from the manoeuvre warfare that has shaped military thinking since the blitzkrieg illustrated the potential of speed and firepower. The previous Conservative Government recognised the direction of travel and introduced the UK defence drone strategy prior to the election, in February last year. Backed by an investment of £4.5 billion, the intention was to enable the rapid experimentation, testing and evaluation of uncrewed platforms.

The past year has seen the publication of the strategic defence review, which reflects the continued change of focus. It makes much of the need to adopt a high-low mix, combining exquisite capability with attritable capability such as drones—for high-low, read “expensive-cheap”. At the recent Royal United Service Institute land warfare conference, the opening address of General Sir Roly Walker, Chief of the General Staff, directly referred to the change to a high-low mix in the British Army. He said:

“I want 20% of our lethality to come from the survivable layer, 40% from the attritable, and 40% from consumable. That does not mean I want 1/5th the number of crewed platforms in the Programme of Record, it’s that I want each one to be five times more lethal, survivable and sustainable…And I want to spend 50% of our money on the 20% of crewed and expensive, and 50% on the remaining 80% of attritable.”

We have all seen footage of first-person view drones and how they have been used in the Ukraine-Russia conflict. As a former infanteer, the sight of individual soldiers being stalked slowly by drones hovering just behind them, and menaced and killed at will, strikes fear into my heart for the future of being an infantryman. This is, hopefully, a temporary situation, and in much the same way that the improvised explosive device was in conflict with electronic countermeasures—ECMs—so too will drones find themselves, in time, at the mercy of counter-unmanned aircraft system solutions. Last week, there was an article in The Washington Post about the measures the Ukrainians are taking to combat Russian drone threats, which include going as far as using a biplane with a crew member firing them out of the air with a shotgun. That is the sort of inventive stuff that is currently going on in the east—we would not believe it if we saw it in a movie.

We have already seen the RAF and the Army begin to employ agile combat employment such as the penetrative threat of drones, as illustrated by the bold attack by Ukraine on airfields deep inside Russian territory mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Biggin Hill (Peter Fortune). There is, however, very little in place to prevent a copycat attack against our forces in the UK. If RAF Brize Norton can be breached by civilians on scooters, it can be easily breached by a swarm of drones. What price our air-to-air refuelling or heavy lift capability? That is not easily replaced and fairly easily defeated on the ground. What efforts are the Government making to ensure that we have permanent counter-unmanned aircraft systems capability at all operational flying bases? Agile combat employment will get us only so far and, as we have seen, it takes only a couple of litres of red paint to destroy a jet engine.

In Ukraine, we have seen that survivability is key: how we fight a vehicle is as important as how we physically protect it or conceal it. Before any talk about thermal camouflage or, increasingly, multispectral camouflage, we should consider how the age and capability of the kit we have makes it vulnerable to a drone threat it was never designed to encounter.

The strategic defence review outlines the British Army’s intention to move to a dynamic high-low capability mix, as I alluded to earlier, of 20-40-40: that is 20% crewed platforms to control 40% attritable—preferably survivable—platforms, and 40% consumables such as shells and missiles, also including attritable one-way effector drones. For such a fundamental doctrinal shift in manoeuvre warfare around which the entire Army would need to be restructured, a single sub-paragraph on page 110 of the SDR does not really cut it. I would be interested to hear the Minister’s view on how he plans to extrapolate such a paucity of strategic intent.

At the lowest consumable level, handheld off-the-shelf drones are a plentiful, cheap and effective tool. They are low cost and high volume. Our funding of capability in Ukraine should really be seen as an investment; it is not cynical to suggest that the current conflict is a helpful proving ground for our own future capability. First-person view drones have quickly become a stalwart of the modern battlefield and sit within what the Ministry of Defence considers to be tier 1 and tier 2—those that are consumable or attritable. It is those drones that will see the quickest development, the biggest leaps in capability, and the most effort going into combating them from an anti-personnel perspective. We have already seen the development of a counter-UAS ECM that has led to the impractical horizontal development of fibre-optic drones. The pace of development should force us to ask what the capability will be like by the time British troops are required to use them in anger.

[Edward Morello]

The hon. Member is right to point out the rapid change in drone technology in the field in Ukraine. We have also seen the deployment of artificial intelligence such that where drones are being jammed, the AI can take over and continue to lock on and have something in the region of a 70% success rate even after jamming. Obviously, there is an understandable shift in UK military thinking towards drones, but that needs to be supported by UK innovation in the AI space. We need to get greater ownership of that, especially in our technology sector and our universities, to support development. Does the hon. Member have any views on that?

[Ben Obese-Jecty]

I think AI will increasingly become a mainstay of the battlefield, and how we employ it will become incredibly important. My concern is about the control of AI and knowing that the target we are trying to prosecute is indeed still viable right up to the last safe moment. Once we lose control of a drone and it becomes AI-capable, in theory it could switch to a more preferential target, which may be a good opportunity, or it may be a catastrophe that ends up as front-page news. We need to think carefully about how we employ drones.

On the overall development of drones, another important factor to consider is how we employ the warhead. It is only a matter of time before we look at options such as the replacement of Javelin—I was a Javelin platoon commander when I was in the Army—which has a two-stage warhead, with the first stage penetrating the armour and the second stage going inside the vehicle, exploding and detonating to kill the crew. The application of something like a two-stage warhead to an FPV drone is going to become an increasingly potent threat. It will be interesting to see at what point that emerges on the battlefield.

At tier 3—a level up—we have those platforms that are firmly considered to be survivable. The entry into service of Protector RG mark 1, replacing Reaper, illustrates how the Royal Air Force is moving further into the world of uncrewed air systems. With a ceiling of 40,000 feet and a mission endurance in excess of 30 hours, it marks the next evolution in our drone capability. With an ongoing project to enable it with the low-collateral Brimstone 3, it will be a potent weapons delivery platform, although that project is currently rated at amber.

Indeed, the introduction of remotely piloted aircraft systems—RPAS—as its own stream within RAF pilot training illustrates the complexity of how drones will be used going forwards. We have already seen the SDR outline the desire to introduce a hybrid carrier air wing, with crewed and uncrewed platforms operating alongside one another from our carrier strike group.

That leads us into the category of exquisite capability. The elephant in the room is GCAP—the global combat air programme—a trilateral endeavour with Italy and Japan that aims to deliver a sixth-generation fighter by 2035. I do not wish to derail the debate by talking about the merits and pitfalls of sixth-generation fighters, and whether by the time they arrive we will still need or want an exquisite capability, given how precious we are already about our fifth-generation F-35s, but there is a key issue with the platform as an exquisite capability.

The intention of GCAP is not to have massed squadrons of fighters flying into dogfights over Russia. Those days are long gone; in future, we should expect most, if not all, engagements to take place beyond visual range. Any near-peer conflict will involve formidable air defence that will render the low-level bombing runs of yesteryear the stuff of Hollywood. No, the intention is to operate GCAP as a system of systems: a crewed platform where the pilot is less of a pilot and more an integrated part of the system—effectively, a weapons platform operator co-ordinating the battle space—and where the uncrewed autonomous collaborative platforms, or loyal wingmen, operate as a squadron and conduct the task as an attritable but very expensive asset that can complete the mission without risk to aircrew, impervious to being disabled by ECM, and operating networked to GCAP itself.

The RAF’s autonomous collaborative platform strategy aims to have ACP as an integral part of the RAF force structure by 2030, and we have started to see that being rolled out in recent weeks. This is a concept that I do not believe we can fully afford. The National Infrastructure and Service Transformation Authority already has the future combat air system rated at red—that is not just GCAP but the ACP strategy that accompanies it. It would be one thing to achieve an ACP capability, and another to develop and deliver a sixth-generation fighter, whether on time or decades late, but to deliver both seems fanciful based on the Ministry of Defence’s procurement track record.

In a world where the infantry are still using armoured vehicles that came into service the same year the Beatles released their debut single—closer to the end of the first world war than to today—with no current plans to replace them, I cannot envisage a situation where we have a sovereign fighter jet that ranks as the best in the world and a squadron of drone fighters operating alongside it. We urgently need to start managing our expectation.

The Government talk a good game on RPAS but, for all the talk of increasing the defence budget, our drone strategy looks an incoherent mess. I am sure the Minister will set me straight on whether that is accurate. We are pouring money into exquisite capability while watching the war in Ukraine spiral-develop capability that we have no idea how to use in the last 100 yards. The pace of technological change that is driving the evolution of the threat environment is such that unless we leverage the spiral development capability that already exists here, coupled with the expertise that now exists in Ukraine, British forces will be left behind.

--- Later in debate ---

[Al Carns]

I completely agree. I can see a future—we will talk about this later—involving a high-low mix, in which we have very sophisticated fifth generation capability matched by relatively low-end hardware with very sophisticated software. When we combine the two, we can increase our mass, our lethality and our overwatch of large swathes of land, sea and air. It is also worth noting—I will cover this later—that there are false lessons from Ukraine. The Black sea is not the Pacific or the north Atlantic. However, the technology, when designed with the right hull form, can absolutely survive in those environments.

Moving on to air, we see co-ordinated waves of drones penetrate the most sophisticated air defence systems in the world and strike far beyond the frontline. I mentioned yesterday, in relation to the remembrance of the battle of Britain, that we are hearing air sirens every day in Ukraine. We are not talking hundreds of drones; we now talking, in some cases, of thousands of drones attacking major cities and critical national infrastructure throughout Ukraine.

These capabilities are being enhanced, made increasingly sophisticated—with the capability to map and target-identify—and combined with the use of data and artificial intelligence to train training models, with profound implications for the way we fight warfare. Our adversaries understand that. Russia, other countries such as China, and large states are developing at a different scale. They are already producing drones on an industrial scale, and investing in innovation to make them more capable and deadly, and to remove the human even further from the battlefield. War is driving an innovation cycle that cannot be replicated in peacetime.

The hon. Member for South Suffolk (James Cartlidge) talked earlier about the innovation cycle here with SMEs. SMEs that often have joint ventures or relationships with companies at the front in Ukraine are innovating faster than anyone else. We are talking 20 or 30 to 100 innovations in a year, in comparison with some of our contracts in the past, which have had one, two, three or four innovations linked into the contractual management.

I would argue that we need to do more. Ukraine reminds us daily that to safeguard the nation we have an obligation to lead in the development of uncrewed systems. We may not have the opportunity to fight differently. Historically, almost every major conflict has been characterised by short periods of manoeuvre, and long periods of attrition to build up capability and capacity and to innovate, which are then broken by periods of manoeuvre, with a focus on supporting the warfighter with the best technology. I would posit that, if it came to it, our adversaries would seek to draw us into an attritional conflict, which puts the burden on the defence industry, our economy and our society’s ability to sustain the fight. At a tactical level, there is an argument that this will no longer be about supporting the warfighter, but about supporting the technology in the fight. That is a fundamental shift and change in opinion, and a critical and fundamental distinction in the way that future wars may be fought.

This Government have taken decisive action, as laid out in our strategic defence review, first to integrate uncrewed systems across the British Army, Royal Navy and Royal Air Force, and to adapt our military culture to recognise that uncrewed systems are a core capability.

Several hon. Members mentioned the innovation cycle. In Ukraine early on in the war, a stalemate took place across the frontline, broken by periods of manoeuvre and usually initiated by dominance in GPS-guided munitions. The Russians quickly learned to counter a proportion of that, and as such the innovation of drones and uncrewed systems came into place on land, at sea and in the air. We have now accelerated along that line. We have gone from hundreds of different Ukrainian companies with different intellectual property swamping the battlefield with small start-ups, to the Ukrainians synthesising that capability procurement down to a set number of drones, and mass producing. They are using the innovation cycle on the frontline, with companies embedded in combat companies to drive that innovation cycle faster than ever before. They went broad to start with, and they have now gone narrow and are scaling. It is starting to work.

We must learn some of those lessons as automated platforms are bought by the Army, Navy and Air Force. Do they all talk to each other? Do they have the same software, or different hardware? Can they work together? Can they work on an integrated kill net? If they do not, we may repeat some of the same mistakes as Ukraine. A great quote is, “Slow is smooth, smooth is fast.” There is a bit that we must watch, and we must ensure that we get this right, because if we get it wrong, it may be difficult to unravel.

I mentioned adapting our military culture, and the hon. Member for South Suffolk mentioned commander training within our organisations, whether that be Dartmouth, Cranwell or Sandhurst. I have been on that, as an individual responsible for people, to ensure that these things are inculcated at the earliest stage of training, whether that be defence from drones or the adoption of drones as a critical component, much the same as a machine gun is for a rifle section. We are moving forward in that space.

Secondly, as hon. Members have said, there is a requirement to work seamlessly with industry, transforming our procurement and industrial base to meet the demands of modern warfare and drive growth for the nation. To do that, we must encourage the best of Ukrainian industry to share its expertise with us. We must continue to foster a truly innovative and adaptive defence industry that draws on the best of Britain. What I am leading to here is that British start-ups and British companies, both primes and SMEs, must engage with Ukrainian companies on joint ventures and cross-IP sharing to enhance the best of both. If they do that, I genuinely think they will be world beating, above and beyond what British industry already is.

The Government’s vision is to become a defence industrial superpower by 2035, and we are making that a reality. As a frontier industry, drone development is key to that economic transformation, which will attract major investment and create high-quality jobs. It is also vital to put the best systems into the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. Drone systems now will be out of date within six weeks on the frontline, but the training and the integration of the culture and the software may not be, so we must think carefully as we bring systems into the military and avoid 10-year contracts that buy the wrong drone in six years’ time that is way out of date in six weeks.

The Government are doing everything possible to capitalise on this opportunity. We have committed to more than doubling our spend on autonomous systems over this Parliament. I pushed really hard to get £4 billion of investment in mass-produced both unsophisticated and sophisticated weapons. The hon. Member for Huntingdon mentioned GCAP and loyal wingman; I would see loyal wingman as a sophisticated, high-end, fourth, fifth or sixth-generation capability. I see mass uncrewed systems for the Army—and in some cases the Navy—slightly differently.

[Ben Obese-Jecty]

If we are talking about those low-end, attritable systems being introduced at Army or Marine level as section-level capability, like a light machine gun, at what point will we look at redesigning our entire military capability in terms of logistical supply of batteries and parts for those? We all know that soldiers already carry too much kit, and carrying more batteries for drones will be key in that. How can we effectively redesign the section attack to incorporate drones? As I said in my speech, this is a fundamental shift in how the Army fights battles. I appreciate that the Minister is doing everything he can to introduce drones into the ecosystem, but it seems to me that we are making huge changes here. This is almost the same as introducing the machine gun and then wondering why we do not know how to fight it properly when we get to the battlefield. I would be interested to hear what we are doing to further that.

[Al Carns]

It is a combination of the two. Yes, it is a machine gun moment for the Army, but it is also an Air Force moment for the whole military, so we need careful consideration of how we will integrate this. The Ukrainians, for example, have combat companies who will fly 150 FPV drone strikes a day. They will do that with separate teams flying in support of infantry, much as we would have had close air support in the past. A drone team may fly 50 drone missions a day with 80% lethality and accuracy.

I will leave it to the generals, the admirals and the air vice-marshals to work out how they integrate the system. However, it must be integrated at the section and infantry level all the way to the division level in the Army; from the single ship all the way to the fleet level in the Navy; and from the single aircraft, if not major drone, all the way to fighting formations in the Air Force. That is the level of integration that will be required—it is pretty seismic.

We talked earlier about the high-low end mix. We will help to deliver Europe’s first hybrid carrier air wing. The hon. Member for Huntingdon mentioned, and I agree, that GCAP and the loyal wingman programme are sophisticated capabilities, but there is nothing to say that it is not—no pun intended—a Russian doll method where something releases something smaller that becomes more attritable and more mass-produced. That is probably where we are going with many of these systems.

We are also enhancing our uncrewed naval platforms. The patrol of the north Atlantic, protecting our continuous at-sea deterrent can adopt some of that technology. We will also, as the hon. Member mentioned, move towards a 20:40:40 capability mix for the British Army, which I think is essential, as is being proven in Ukraine at the moment. As he mentioned, that is 20% crewed, 40% reusable and 40% disposable uncrewed systems. I would like to see a lot of those drones used as ammunition so that, much as we would have down the range with a magazine and 30 rounds of ammunition, we should be able to go down the range with 10 drones, fly them down, use them, get proficient in that and ensure that we are as accurate and lethal with a drone as we are with a rifle, if not more so.

It is a move to help deliver our goal of increasing the Army’s lethality tenfold. I argue that we need to move on that as fast as is feasible. The critical component is our partnership with industry, and not just the big primes but SMEs are key to delivering those ambitions. That is why we have established UK Defence Innovation to connect with investors and get those SMEs, innovators and start-ups able to break into the defence market, which we know has been a problem in the past. That will ensure that we can rapidly identify and back innovative products that will give us a military, and indeed an economic, edge.

To integrate these new technologies across three military services—I think this is the critical component—we are creating an uncrewed centre of excellence, alongside a range and testing facility. It will be surrounded by SMEs and industry, with the people who know what they are talking about, because there is a lot of snake oil out there. We must put them in one place and then, as I mentioned, slow is smooth, smooth is fast. We must allow them to help the Army, Navy and Air Force to contract different hardware that has simultaneous and integrated software. That is how we will create capabilities that will be able to talk to each other in the future.

[Al Carns]

In the SDR, there was a £1 billion investment in an integrated targeting web, and that is what ties all these systems together. The only way it will tie together is if the software is interchangeable. Indeed, if we were then to lay on AI in quantum, we would be taking it to the next step of starting to remove people further back down the chain. I believe we will always have to be in the chain, but we will move back. Our adversaries may not. That will be a pivotal change in the way of warfare again.

The uncrewed centre of excellence is one to watch within the SDR. It will be in place by February. It will provide centralised expertise, funding and standards. The Military Aviation Authority and the Civilian Aviation Authority were mentioned. The centre will help them to develop and get through some of the bureaucracies while remaining in line with the rules and regulations. It will help to develop skills across defence. For example, drone qualifications across the Navy, Army and Air Force at the moment are all starting to move in different directions. We have to synthesise them, and make sure that they are correct and that everyone is doing the same, so that we can swap and interchange people. That will help to deliver a regulatory framework in which our companies can succeed.

In June, we announced a landmark partnership with Ukraine to share technology, harness the innovation expertise from the frontline and increase our industrial co-operation, which is critical because innovation is moving at such a pace on the frontline. Our plans are a shot in the arm. We need to continue to push as hard as is feasible for what is already one of the leading uncrewed systems sectors in the world.

[Ben Obese-Jecty]

Recently, we saw the ACUA Ocean Pioneer granted a licence by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency. Do we think that by pushing out more civilian licences to enable more companies to develop those autonomous platforms, including for things that have maritime applications, drones will be enhanced more quickly? I appreciate that a drone can be set up and flown relatively easily, but getting something that floats in the water, particularly something sizeable that has a civilian application, is quite difficult. Do we think that advancing the number of licences given to companies working on autonomous maritime capability would be an advantage?

[Al Carns]

The reality is that the governance and compliance of some of these systems has not kept pace with the innovation in the technological-industrial world. The drone centre of excellence will cut through that. Some countries are using dual-use technology, from drone delivery of shopping through to resupplying in disaster zones, and mapping and tracking forestry for carbon capture. We are on the very cusp of a change. It is interesting to look at the key capabilities of what each drone requires to sustain itself to innovate, and where those capabilities come from. That may give us a lead on where we should be focusing from an economic perspective as well.

The hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) made a really interesting point. He mentioned “Star Wars”. It feels a bit like that. When I watched the first destruction and sinking of a Russian frigate, I said it was a cross between “Star Wars” and “The Dam Busters”, because that is the leap it was making in war. Three ships were sunk in three weeks by relatively simple uncrewed systems, taking out the most significant naval platforms in the world. A lot of people would say that, as these ships get removed off the line of march, one of the biggest mistakes would be to replace them with the same capability.

Drone warfare is today’s reality. Capabilities are evolving faster than any of us can possibly imagine in Ukraine. That is why the Government’s response has been both immediate and decisive, but we have to go faster, and we have to go harder. Through clear leadership, unprecedented investment, closer work with industry and, importantly, our Ukrainian partners who are at the cutting edge, we will ensure that Britain remains at the forefront of this revolution. I genuinely believe that we will get there, and that it will make us stronger abroad and secure at home.