Typhoon Fighter Sovereign Capability

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Wednesday 12th November 2025 Westminster Hall

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Christopher. I welcome Turkey’s order for 20 Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft. I appreciate that it is good news for the UK, good news for the workers at Warton and Samlesbury and good news for BAE and the future production of GCAP. The Government have confirmed that the Turkish jets are tranche 4 aircraft, with the first of the order due to be delivered to the Turkish air force in 2030. The Government refuse to disclose the number of aircraft that will be delivered each year, but have confirmed that it will not impact our ability to conduct the RAF Typhoon phase 4 enhancement programme or, at the back end of that process, the manufacturing of GCAP.

I recently asked the Government what estimate the MOD has made of the contribution of Typhoon jets to GDP. The Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry told me:

“The biggest contribution of defence to GDP is peace and security.”

While in abstract I share that sentiment, it was not really the answer that I was looking for. Typhoon has been one of the UK’s most successful defence export programmes in recent years, with £1.4 billion in export contributions annually and over £30 billion of value to the UK economy, which is more than double the £12 billion initially invested. The programme contributes around £1.6 billion to the UK economy and helps to preserve our sovereign fighter jet manufacturing capability.

Under the NATO Eurofighter and Tornado Management Agency, the industrial subsystem production and workshare agreements across the partner nations arrangements dictate that the UK leads on manufacturing the front and rear fuselage, windscreen and canopy, fin and rudder, engine bay doors, foreplane and a range of major avionics systems, which make up 37% of each Typhoon aircraft. For both UK aircraft and UK-led export orders, final assembly takes place at Warton, where the major equipment components, which have been manufactured in Samlesbury by BAE Systems, are ultimately assembled. To that end, it would be good to know how much the order of 20 Turkish jets will create, given the satellite industries that orbit the final assembly and certification processes. Including the Turkish order, there are 154 Eurofighter Typhoons awaiting delivery across the partner nations of Germany, Italy, Spain and Kuwait. How many of those planes will receive final assembly at Warton?

What is the plan to ensure that there is no skill fade in the intervening years? While it would be nice to imagine a Kanban-style lean manufacturing process that sees Typhoons rolling off a production line every few days, these jets take several years to construct. What steps will the Minister take to ensure that those responsible for airworthiness testing and certification are kept current and competent between now and 2029, when the first Turkish jets will be approaching completion?

Beyond the order, it is worth addressing what assurances the Turkish have been given about the longevity of the jets. The Turkish air force will not receive the last of the jets until 2035, but the out-of-service date for the RAF is 2040. How will the jets be upgraded after we retire them? How will upgrades be delivered at the Warton and Samlesbury plants when they are focused solely on GCAP? The Typhoon is scheduled to remain in service with air forces across Europe and the middle east until the 2060s.

Our four remaining tranche 1 aircraft are based at the Mount Pleasant complex in the Falkland Islands, and I had the pleasure of visiting No. 1435 Flight earlier in the year to better understand their role in air defence and quick reaction alert for the south Atlantic islands. However, the handful of remaining tranche 1 Typhoons have an out-of-service date of 2027. Can the Minster confirm whether these will be replaced with tranche 2 or tranche 3 aircraft? If so, which other squadron will lose a flight?

As I mentioned, the current Typhoon fleet—our 67 tranche 2 and 40 tranche 3 planes—has an out-of-service date of 2040, but in a written answer to me on 24 September, the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry stated:

“Typhoon will continue to serve as the backbone of the UK’s Combat Air Force until at least the 2040s.”

Can the Minister confirm whether the out-of-service date of Typhoon is 2040 or well beyond that?

I recently asked the Government about the scope of the planned upgrades for Typhoon, specifically with regard to the mark 2 European common radar system, defensive aid suites, avionics and weapons. The Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry confirmed that those would be outlined in the forthcoming defence investment plan, which it is rumoured will not be published until December.

The upgrade programme is due to take place over the next 15 years—coincidentally, the same as the aircraft’s remaining lifespan. The Minister has previously informed me that the phase 4 enhancement—P4E—upgrade programme is in the system definition de-risking phase of activity, following the system definition contract last year. The full scope of the P4E capability package has not yet been agreed, and without that agreement the programme cannot progress on to the design, development and demonstration phase. With that in mind, it appears unlikely that the P4E programme can be accurately outlined in detail in the defence investment plan.

With the best will in the world, we know the Government are not about to pull the trigger on a domestic Typhoon order. We cannot afford them, and they clearly do not fit into the combat air succession plan. Having read the strategic defence review, it is clear to me that Typhoon is seen as an integral part—the backbone, in fact—of our combat air capability, but the MOD clearly wishes to pursue exquisite capability, irrespective of the opportunity cost.

The current plan sees a mixed fleet of Typhoon and F-35B. I stress the “B” because, frankly, the announcement on the F-35A is a red herring. We are yet to receive the remaining F-35Bs of the current tranche. The remainder are set to be delivered by March 2026, taking our total to 47, with one written off having fallen into the sea. The mooted 12 F-35As are a straight swap for 12 F-35Bs from the next tranche. Those F-35As were pitched as dual-capable aircraft, and would therefore form part of the NATO nuclear mission. If that is the case, why will the F-35As be assigned to 207 Squadron’s operational conversion unit? Using the planes as a training fleet workhorse does not scream nuclear readiness. How many of the jets will be held at readiness?

[Mr Calvin Bailey (Leyton and Wanstead) (Lab)]

Does the hon. Gentleman recognise that the highest echelon of pilots—those who are best trained—will be the operational conversion unit instructors? Therefore, the 12 aircraft allotted to the nuclear mission will be the leading edge of the force’s capability, so it makes eminent sense for that part of the force to deliver it.

[Ben Obese-Jecty]

I bow to the hon. Gentleman’s expertise in this field, being the decorated RAF pilot that he is. However, I also take that as Government confirmation that the OCU instructors will potentially form the backbone of our NATO dual-capable nuclear readiness force. Can the Minister confirm that when he sums up?

I know this is a trick question, as the Minister probably does not know what the nuclear readiness plan is, and I do not think the RAF knows either, given there is currently no timeline for gaining nuclear certification. At this point, it is worth noting that, in February, the US Marine Corps—by far the biggest user of the F-35B—changed its programme of record to more than double its order of the carrier variant, F-35C, while reducing its F-35B order by the same amount. Our carriers are not equipped with cats and traps, so the F-35C variant is a non-starter, but we should note the direction of travel of the US Marine Corps, given the combined arms nature of its brand of expeditionary warfare.

The Government have stated that the introduction of the F-35A variant will support the stand-up of a third frontline F-35B squadron, but the F-35A variants will not enter service until the 2030s—we have not even ordered them yet—and that is quite aside from the certification of nuclear capability. When will we achieve initial, and then full, operating capability for the F-35A with nuclear certification?

Crucially, our F-35s are not capable of conducting missions alone. It is not often discussed, although we have already mentioned it here, but the F-35 cannot yet carry the Meteor missile, MBDA’s beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile. The Government have previously confirmed to me that the current estimated timeline for the Meteor’s in-service capability is the early 2030s. Our top-of-the-range jet fighter currently has no stand-off air-to-air missile capability. It is effectively unarmed in the face of a near-peer aerial adversary against which we cannot expect to have day one air superiority.

In July, the previous Minister for Defence Procurement, the right hon. Member for Liverpool Garston (Maria Eagle), told me:

“Block 4 modernisation will include the integration of UK-unique weapons and upgrades to air-to-surface and air-to-air weaponry.”

That would appear to be an aspiration, not a guarantee. Options for future Meteor development are still under consideration by the Meteor partner nations of France, Germany, Spain, Italy and Sweden, and the aim is to have reached consensus by the end of the year. Can the Minister provide an update on the progress made at the recent working-level discussions in September and October?

This issue was also recently identified by the Public Accounts Committee in its excoriating report, “The UK’s F-35 stealth fighter capability”, which highlighted:

“The Joint Programme Office…has invited the UK…to include a UK weapon in its so-called digital accelerator which it hopes will speed up delivery. In the meantime, the Department told us that as part of its Defence Investment Plan it is considering buying other weapons that are already available and integrated.”

In his response, can the Minister outline what off-the-shelf weapons the Government are currently considering buying as an interim solution to this problem? How do they intend to integrate an interim stopgap weapon?

At present, the solution is actually Typhoon. Yes, in order to use our very expensive, top-of-the-range, invisible-to-radar, fifth-generation F-35s, we have to fly them alongside our not-very-invisible-to-radar, fourth-generation Typhoons, because only they can carry the payload to defend them in air-to-air combat. I am not sure this is exactly what was intended by the hybrid airwing outlined in the strategic defence review.

That is before we point out that an independent carrier strike group is irrelevant if we need a land-based plane to support our carrier-based capability, and that for the F-35B to be in range of a target, the carrier would have to be in range of hostile ballistic missiles that we cannot feasibly protect them against. The future air dominance system, which will be its primary air defence shield, comes in the form of the Type 83 destroyer, for which the final business case is not due to be submitted to the Treasury until 2028—the 2035 initial operating capability for Type 83 already looks ambitious. I digress, and discussions on the limitations of designing our military strategy around our capability, rather than the other way around, are for another day.

The F-35’s out-of-service date is 2069, by which point some of our 138 airframes will be over 50 years old—older than any combat jet the RAF has ever had in service. What will be the final fatigue index of those airframes by then? Given the rapid development of uncrewed platforms, are we really going to rely on an ageing crewed jet as the backbone of our combat air capability in 2069?

Having covered a fair amount of ground, I close by reiterating that the recent Typhoon deal with Turkey is a good thing, but I fear there are an awful lot of unanswered capability questions regarding our air power. While the answers to all these questions are for the next month, when they will be published in the defence investment plan, the Minister knows well that I will circle back on every single one of those points—he probably suspects I have a tracker monitoring their status.

With that in mind, we need a clear and concise air power strategy, because talk of autonomous collaborative platforms and hybrid air wings is premature. It should be noted that the Chief of Defence Staff, in his previous role as Chief of the Air Staff, stated this summer that the RAF has

“no major equipment programmes planned for the next 15 years. We have what we have for the near and medium term.”

The question is not when the defence investment plan will be published, but whether it will have anything in it when it is.