NATO and the High Arctic

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Wednesday 4th March 2026 Westminster Hall

[Alex Ballinger]

The Foreign Affairs Committee is going to Greenland in a couple of weeks. We hope to meet the Foreign Minister of Denmark, among other leaders of the Greenlanders, and that sounds like the kind of sensible suggestion that we should be talking about.

Certainly, there are lots of opportunities for NATO to base troops in Greenland already; we did not need a change in sovereignty to do that. I am pleased that that has fallen off the radar. It is concerning that Trump’s interest in Greenland is not a one-off. The US security strategy is explicit that the Arctic is becoming more important to America and to American national security, whether it is because of Russia, China, geography or critical minerals. We should not pretend that this was just a single passing storm.

In the Arctic, NATO is responding, but we need to be honest about the scale of the task. With the Arctic sentry, the alliance is trying to pull together a more coherent posture in the High North, with better visibility, better co-ordination and a clearer framework for operating in the sea, air, space and undersea environments.

We should also underline the importance of the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap. That strategic choke point is vital to NATO. It affects how Russia can move submarines into the wider Arctic, it affects the security of reinforcement routes in a crisis and it sits alongside the undersea infrastructure that we rely on every day.

I will raise the joint expeditionary force, which my hon. Friend the Member for Dunfermline and Dollar (Graeme Downie) raised earlier. The UK-led JEF has real value in this part of the world; it is practical, northern-focused and moves faster than the full NATO machine in the early stages of a crisis. That is exactly the sort of framework we should use to build readiness, interoperability and credibility.

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

The hon. and gallant Member is making a hoofing speech. He mentioned the Greenland-Iceland gap. We have committed to Operation Firecrest later this year, which will see the carrier strike group go to the High North as a deterrent against the Russian northern fleet breaking out of the Kola peninsula and moving across the Barents sea and into the open ocean. With the emergence of the conflict in the middle east, a potential commitment to a post-conflict force in Ukraine, a commitment to troops in Norway and Operation Firecrest, does he share my concern that we may have to make some very difficult decisions about how much capability we are able to deploy to ensure that our interests are looked after across all those fronts?

[Alex Ballinger]

The hon. Member makes a good point. Our naval capability has sadly diminished; we have fewer destroyers and frigates than we used to, and we are rightly deploying some of those to the Mediterranean and the middle east at the moment.

There will have to be hard choices as we approach that timescale. I think those will depend on the situation in the middle east at that point, but maybe the Minister can address that in her remarks. Later in my speech, I will raise what we might want to do about capability. It is important that NATO is backed by increased capability regarding ships, aircraft, sensors, munitions, trained people and deployable logistics; otherwise, our response will fall short.

The First Sea Lord has made the case for UK action in the High North repeatedly. In recent speeches, he has said that the High North is a critical area, that Russia’s submarine force is a huge concern and that we need more warfighting readiness now, not a peacetime posture. He has also said that

“the advantage that we have enjoyed in the Atlantic since the end of the Second World War is at risk”

unless we take action soon.

I want to ask the Minister whether we are resourcing this crucial area sufficiently. We continue to retire Type 23 frigates—anti-submarine ships. Five have retired since 2021, including HMS Lancaster most recently, but are we retiring them before replacements are ready? We have the Type 31 programme coming on soon, but it would be nice to have reassurance on the timelines and the risk that we are taking if there are gaps. If we are relying on future ships for future threats, we need confidence that they will arrive before the threat does.

We cannot talk about the High North without talking about the vital contribution of the Royal Marines—our Arctic-trained troops—who are ready to operate alongside Norwegian, Dutch and other forces. That is a genuine strength, but cold weather expertise must be backed by enablers—lift, sustainment and surveillance assets.

That brings me to the most important point: the defence investment plan. We can announce deployments, launch missions and make speeches about the High North, but if we do not publish a clear investment plan that is costed and credible, our adversaries will conclude that the UK strategy is stronger in rhetoric than in reality. The Chairs of the Defence Committee and the Public Accounts Committee have warned that delay sends damaging signals to our adversaries, and they are right. We are serious about the Arctic. We need serious choices, and we need them now, not in a year’s time.

There is a practical, day-to-day test. We are facing concurrent pressures in other theatres, including recent deployments to the middle east. The question is not whether we can deploy ships to other regions on paper; it is whether we can do it without hollowing out our commitments to other parts of the world.

I want to put three questions to the Minister. First, when will the defence investment plan be published? Secondly, do we have sufficient ships that are suitable and available to operate credibly in the north Atlantic and respond to the serious crisis in the middle east at the same time? Thirdly, what steps are the Government taking bilaterally and through NATO to reassure Denmark and strengthen stability around Greenland while making it clear that sovereignty is not negotiable and that influence operations will be resisted?

The High Arctic is becoming a sharper edge of competition. Climate change is opening access, Russia is militarising, undersea vulnerability is rising and NATO is adapting. The UK has a choice. We can treat this as a niche theatre and muddle through, or we can treat it as what it is: a direct test of our seriousness as a north Atlantic power. Deterrence is built on credibility, credibility is built on capability, and capability requires investment. That is why the defence investment plan and ship availability matter.