Ben Obese-Jecty
Main Page: Ben Obese-Jecty (Conservative - Huntingdon)Department Debates - View all Ben Obese-Jecty's debates with the Ministry of Defence
(1 day, 8 hours ago)
Commons Chamber
Dr Sandher
To be fair to the right hon. Member, it makes perfect sense to reduce expenditure after the cold war. I take that point, but let us be clear: the world also changed in 2022. The things we depended on for our safety—sacrosanct borders and our force in NATO—were not funded enough. If we truly were to prepare for war, that was the moment to start, and I agree that we have to do more.
Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)
Will the hon. Member just explain where we were in the standings for NATO defence spending in 2022 and where we stand today?
Dr Sandher
My point is not where we stand in the defence standings; my point is about what we need to do to prepare for war to prevent it.
Moving on to the things that we do agree on—and I think it is worth saying what we agree on, because we should not disagree across this House on this fundamental thing—the first and fundamental duty of this Government, of any Government, is to keep us safe at this moment in time. I want to talk a little about what that actually means, because we focus a lot on the percentage of GDP, but a defence economic strategy means far more than that. It is the fundamental question of how we produce more fighting forces, munitions, drones and soldiers. Clearly, that is changing, and at this moment, in a pre-war situation, we have to decide what that means. It means having production lines available, and crucially a supply chain of drones, as the innovation cycle is moving so quickly. It means being able to secure crucial input such as steel and training welders and engineers should we need them. Most crucially, it means the ability to scale up, because if we are to prevent war, we have to show that we are prepared for it. It is not just about spending 3%, 4% or 5% of GDP, although I take the point; it is about showing Putin and any other adversary that we could get up to 10% to 20% and use that effectively.
A defence economic strategy is a fundamentally different economic problem. It is not just about maximising production, as we do now, but about ensuring that we produce the most fighting forces possible. It is a type of economics that we are not used to. It means, first, capital control to ensure that investment goes to the right place; secondly, rationing so that we have the investment that we need; and thirdly, ensuring that we can prepare to fight the war that we face. A defence economic strategy goes far beyond the amount we spend on defence. I would expect the Treasury, the Government and No. 10, who take the defence of this country seriously, to be preparing for that right now. Of course they take it seriously; it is the first and most fundamental duty of any Government.
We stand here today a century on from people who failed on these Benches. In fact, we stand in a Chamber that is a testament to that failure. They did not prepare for war, we ended up in war in Europe, and this Chamber was bombed and had to be rebuilt. That failure should live with us and shock us. We should remind ourselves of it when we look in the mirror every single morning.
Let me share a story. I have a friend who serves in the Army, and I saw him for dinner not too long ago. He said, “Jeevun, here is the thing. I have a 30-year-old Land Rover that was in the Gulf war, in Bosnia and in the Baltics. All I want is a Range Rover that can drive.” This Government will absolutely ensure that we overcome all past investment failures so that our forces have what they need to defend our country. That is what falls to us now.
I say to Conservative Members that we must have the courage to face this moment and look forward. I could criticise them all day—I have done it before and I will probably do it again—but we must have the courage to face this moment, and to look in the mirror and know where we stand, at a moment when we must prepare for war in order to prevent it. History will judge us for this moment, and we should always bear that in mind.
Michelle Scrogham (Barrow and Furness) (Lab)
First, I should note that, for all their chatter outside this Chamber on defence, there is not a single Member of the Reform party here. They are utterly incapable of having a serious conversation when it comes to defence.
I would like to congratulate the shadow Defence team. I did not believe it was possible to reduce their credibility on defence any further, but they have managed to lower the bar once again and slither under it. To suggest that we should restore the two-child benefit limit to pay for defence spending shows such a lack of understanding of what is happening in society. Under their Government, for 14 years, the people living at the poorest edges were working—those people on benefits were working and still could not pay the bills to feed their families and put the heating on. That tells us that the Conservatives do not understand working people. They assume that anybody receiving a benefit is a scrounger or does not want to work. [Interruption.]
I will not give way, because I have heard so much from the Opposition on this. It is outrageous. The shadow Defence Secretary, the hon. Member for South Suffolk (James Cartlidge), was the Defence Procurement Minister who left 47 out of 49 programmes not on time and not on budget. The Tories’ legacy was a procurement programme that was overcommitted, underfunded and unsuited to the threats we now face. They cut frigates and destroyers by 25%. They cut minehunters by more than 50%. There was a lot of pearl-clutching when they were asking where HMS Dragon was, but we know why HMS Dragon was in dock: it was there because it was under maintenance. We could not send it because it is the only one we have, built under the Labour Government, and the Conservatives did not bother to build any more during their term of office.
Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)
I will start with a quote:
“Your path leads to war. You know that. So war is coming. What will you do when you feel its breath upon your neck?”
The answer is: not enough. The defence investment plan was due last autumn, then by Christmas, and then it was to be delivered as soon as the MOD finishes working flat-out. If the MOD spent as much time on the DIP as it has done telling everyone that it is working at pace, maybe it would have been delivered by now.
Let us look at the impact of the delay. In the air, we are yet to see investment in the capability that has been committed to. The Chief of the Defence Staff, in his prior role as Chief of the Air Staff, last year confirmed that the RAF has
“no major equipment programmes planned for the next 15 years. We have what we have for the near and medium term”.
Given the evolution development cycle of current capability, is that really a tenable position? The F-35B is due to graduate as a Government major projects portfolio programme by the end of this month, but will it? Will we see the delivery of the remaining seven F-35Bs by the end of next month, as scheduled?
The Royal Air Force is yet to even place an order for the 12 F-35As that are due to qualify us to join NATO’s dual capable aircraft nuclear mission. That was announced nine months ago, with no orders placed and no progress made. It might as well just be a poster on the Defence Secretary’s bedroom wall. Likewise, the next tranche of F-35Bs has also not yet been ordered from Lockheed Martin. This goes back to my point regarding overstretch. Operation Firecrest will see the carrier strike group deploy with 24 F-35Bs. There are six deployed forward in Akrotiri, seven are awaiting delivery, and one fell in the sea. That leaves us with just 10 planes for training and to cover any other tasks. We are maxed out.
Later this year we may be in a position where we have no realistic spare capacity of our only fifth-generation platform, with no current plans to purchase any more—and if/when we do purchase more, they are years away from delivery. But are we actually going to buy any more? Given our limited resources, putting all our chips on the global combat air programme and inevitably short-cutting our way to never truly fleshing out the accompanying system-of-systems does not augur well. We are already struggling to find the funding for the next phase of that project, delaying the signing of the trilateral contract for the next phase from last September because of the delay to the DIP, creating tensions with Japan and Italy and threatening the 2035 timeline that is crucial for Japan. When I challenged the Prime Minister on the delay, he would not commit to when the contract would be signed.
On the high seas, Britannia most certainly does not rule the waves. HMS Dragon has finally arrived in the eastern Mediterranean, but it was one of only three Type 45s available. I use the term “available” loosely, as it had to be withdrawn from its NATO Maritime Group One commitment—a commitment that starts in a few weeks and for which we currently have no replacement ship available. The Government have no plan to facilitate that commitment and are presumably hoping that HMS Dragon can be recalled.
The Royal Navy has to deliver Type 26 and Type 31, with all ships coming into service, optimistically, within the next nine years. Type 83 will see its outline business case submitted by June, but my understanding is that that programme may not make the cut, which raises serious questions about the future air dominance system. I would be surprised if Type 91 made the cut either, given that it is currently being assessed for feasibility and affordability.
Decisions are pending on: the future cruise anti-ship weapons system; batch 1 offshore patrol vessels; the global decision support system, the maritime aviation transformation programme; Project Beehive; and Project Vantage. Charting a course to a much vaunted hybrid Navy looks perilous at best—I hope the Minister has his sextant to hand.
On land, despite all that, the Army arguably has the most work to do. The Army has a huge transformation programme that will make it almost unrecognisable by the next Parliament. If there is one capability that we should be throwing the kitchen sink at, it is Project Asgard, which the Chief of the General Staff spoke effusively about last year in his Royal United Services Institute land warfare conference speech. He said:
“It’s a project that, through AI-fuelled, software-defined and network enabled capabilities we are confident has made 4 Light Brigade capable of acting 10 times faster and 10 times further than it could last year.”
John Cooper (Dumfries and Galloway) (Con)
It is an old quote—I am sure my hon. and gallant Friend will recognise it, given his service—that while veterans talk logistics, amateurs talk tactics. He is outlining a dire situation, because we are not gripping the logistics problem.
Ben Obese-Jecty
I concur. There is a huge need to ensure we have the correct amount of logistics, and that includes supply of troops, in particular in munitions and energetics. The Government have pledged to build factories; we are still not entirely clear where they will be, but ammunition supplies will be key to anything we do going forwards.
Project Asgard is the programme in defence that could arguably be delivered quickest and to the most immediate effect, trading space for time and allowing us to develop our most exquisite capabilities with longer lead times in slow time. Alongside its RAF equivalent, Project Boyd, it presents the vanguard of future capability and outlines where the armed forces are going in these domains. There is a painful conversation to be had about the use of AI in the kill chain in the not-too-distant future.
The Government must commit to 3%, must commit to delivering the right capability and must commit to armed forces that are fit to fight the next war, not the current war or the last war.
“Your path leads to war. You know that. So war is coming. What will you do when you feel its breath upon your neck?”