All 1 Debates between Bob Seely and Ruth Edwards

Huawei and 5G

Debate between Bob Seely and Ruth Edwards
Wednesday 4th March 2020

(4 years ago)

Westminster Hall
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Ruth Edwards Portrait Ruth Edwards (Rushcliffe) (Con)
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I start by declaring an interest: I used to work for BT’s cyber-security team before I was elected. I have spent 10 years working in the cyber-security industry, and I refer the House to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests.

The security of our telecoms network is vital as we move towards an ever more connected society and economy. It does not, however, rest on the presence or absence of equipment from any single supplier. Strong cyber-security for any system, including our telecoms networks, is determined by: the security architecture principles that have been followed in its design; how the system is managed in-life, including the security controls and monitoring around it; the contingency planning that has taken place, which enables any risks that materialise to be dealt with effectively; and the testing of that contingency planning.

I will address each of those briefly, but the key thing I wish to emphasise is that there is no risk-free option. Regardless of the equipment used, our telecoms networks, Government bodies, businesses and critical national infrastructure operators will always be targets for nation states, aggressors, criminals and hackers. The key thing is to manage the risk and reduce it to an acceptable level. That is what, in my view, the telecoms security requirements achieve.

Bob Seely Portrait Bob Seely
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I am sorry to interrupt; I know that time is short. Is my hon. Friend saying that there is no implication for 5G security, never mind the geopolitics and politics, of having a high-risk, untrusted vendor from a potentially adversarial state in the system? Is it not like giving the burglar the keys to our house, while pretending that we have a safe that is safe?

Ruth Edwards Portrait Ruth Edwards
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For a start, there are no trusted vendors. Most companies operate a zero-trust policy when it comes to all cyber-security vendors. Secondly, the key point is how we manage that risk. I will go on to answer the question in a bit more detail, if my hon. Friend will bear with me.

The TSRs establish a baseline for security in telecoms, and put it on a statutory footing. They prohibit the use of high-risk vendors in sensitive functions of the network, and cap the use of such vendors at 35% across the network as a whole. As a result of their implementation, we will have some of the most secure networks in the world. The TSRs provide a clear and exhaustive list of sensitive functions related to the control, orchestration and virtualisation of our networks where high-risk vendors cannot be used. They will not be used in the intelligence or control planes of the network, and therefore will not interact with customer traffic in a detailed manner. Any impact of failure will also have a limited, localised geographical reach.

Many understandable concerns have been raised that moving to 5G networks will somehow merge those sensitive functions, often referred to as core functions, with less sensitive parts of the network in which equipment from high-risk vendors will be used. Moving to 5G network technologies could enable us to move sensitive functions out to the edge of the network, but “could” does not mean “should”. Were we to do so, using a high-risk vendor would be the least of our problems.

The further restrictions of only one high-risk vendor in the network and the hard cap of 35% further enhance the security standards. Security architecture principles are not a desperate measure to enable us to use a high-risk vendor; they are part of every network deployment everywhere, whether it is a telecoms network at national level or a business network at company level. More sensitive information and functions with higher risk are treated differently from those with lower risk. A blanket approach of doing away with all higher-risk vendors or technologies would mean that we could not use emerging technologies that offer so much benefit when deployed appropriately.

Today’s motion specifically references Huawei. The UK has globally leading insight into Huawei’s operations, processes and products through the Government-chaired Huawei cyber-security evaluation centre. Whoever the vendor is, any responsible telecoms provider will fully test all hardware and software before deploying it into their networks.

Bob Seely Portrait Bob Seely
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Is that not the problem? So much of our kit is not being tested, which is why we need a fuller security audit. Also, the Cell is becoming increasingly concerned about Huawei, saying that Huawei is not delivering the improvements that the Cell needs. The Cell highlights those concerns in its reports.

Ruth Edwards Portrait Ruth Edwards
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I thank my hon. Friend for that point. There are engineering problems in Huawei, and the Government and many UK customers have been very clear that they want Huawei to solve them. The news that I must give him is that if he started looking at the code of any supplier, he would see security issues. In security engineering, I am afraid that people make mistakes when it comes to software.

Equipment and performance is monitored in-life by telcos, and threat hunting is carried out across the whole network. Technologies are increasingly powered by artificial intelligence. AI look for anomalies of behaviour both inside the network, in terms of patterns of incoming traffic, and suspicious outbound traffic. Attempts to sabotage equipment or exfiltrate data at scale will be detected.

The National Cyber Security Centre, my former employer BT and many other telcos have all been very clear that they have not previously detected attempts at malicious activity by Huawei. If they had, they would hardly be doing business with them for their 5G networks. However, we cannot rely on the past to determine the future. That is why the cap on the amount of equipment provided by one supplier is so important, as it stops an over-reliance on one supplier in the network. Other arrangements, such as the escrow of source code, enable providers to isolate equipment in their networks and take over full operation of it, should that be deemed necessary due to mounting international tensions.