Army 2020

Bob Stewart Excerpts

Thursday 5th July 2012 Commons Chamber

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

The cuts have been particularly savage on English county regiments, especially given the fact that not one Scottish regiment is going. This is difficult, and will impact on the regimental system. English county regiments are meant to be linked to counties, but they are being dislocated, whereas Scottish regiments still have the regimental system. From now on, we will have a two-tier regimental system. Will my right hon. Friend explain how the system will work with regard to connecting regiments to the people of England?

[Mr Hammond]

As I said in my initial statement, I recognise the importance of the affiliations of individual units to regions and nations of the UK, particularly for recruiting. We intend to maintain that system. Much of the speculation in the media over the past few months has been about the suggestion that we would somehow abolish the regimental system and move to a continental-style army. Nothing could be further from the truth. I should remind my hon. Friend that many English territorial regiments—for example, the Royal Anglian, The Princess of Wales’s Royal Regiment, The Rifles, and the Duke of Lancaster’s Regiment—have not been touched by today’s announcement.

Defence Reform

Bob Stewart Excerpts

Tuesday 26th June 2012 Commons Chamber

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

As an ex-NATO officer, may I point out that the North Atlantic Council can sit in Prime Minister or President form, Foreign Minister form, Defence Minister form or permanent representative form? Governments are therefore represented on the North Atlantic Council, to which IBAN reports.

[Hugh Bayley]

Governments are represented, but Parliaments are not. The principle in the UK is that the National Audit Office belongs and reports to Parliament. It has reported to Parliament for 150 years on UK defence expenditure, while obviously keeping secret things that must necessarily be kept secret, so there is no reason why we cannot have public reporting of defence expenditure.

NATO’s international board of auditors audited 49 separate sets of NATO accounts last year. I recently met Tim Banfield, a director of the NAO who is responsible for UK defence audits. He told me that NATO’s financial statements are frequently audited late, sometimes by as much as three years, which is not compliant with decent accounting standards—auditors who are trying to track expenditure cannot find the answers to the questions they need to ask three years after an operation has closed down. I asked a Foreign Office Minister how good the audits are, because they are not published. He told me that of the 49 sets of accounts last year, 14 were qualified by the auditors because of irregularities.

In addition to the financial audits, five performance audits—value-for-money audits—were carried out last year, but there is little evidence that NATO changes how it works to improve value for money in response to their conclusions. Only one of those 49 sets of accounts has been put into the public domain, according to NATO’s website.

The failure to publish accounts reduces the pressure on NATO managers to respond to deficiencies when they are revealed by audits, and to improve their performance. I raise this matter with the Minister now because I believe there is a narrow window of opportunity to change things, because the NATO Secretary-General has commissioned the new deputy Secretary-General to review the audit function. I shall share with the House a brief extract from a document provided by the Secretary-General to national delegations, including the UK ambassador to NATO. The Secretary-General said:

“We must adopt best practices employed by other international organisations. NATO is very unusual in having its own auditing service…Organisations that employ external public-service auditors include UNESCO, WTO, OSCE and the OECD.

To bring us into line with best practice, I propose the adoption of the same approach, phased in to ensure continuity of work.”

He goes on to make the point that the only other body that does not have an independent external audit function is the EU, from which some hon. Members would not like to take lessons in that respect.

The NATO Secretary-General clearly wants change, but the decision will not be made by him; it will be made by the North Atlantic Council. Will the UK representative at the North Atlantic Council, whether our ambassador, one of our Ministers or the Prime Minister, support the change agenda? Will the deputy Secretary-General’s report be shown to the NAO and the supreme audit institutions of other member states, such as the US Government Accountability Office, for comment before it is shown to the North Atlantic Council? Will our ambassador lobby representatives of other member states to build a coalition to change the audit function within NATO and to bring the information, apart from that which necessarily must be kept secret for security reasons, into the public domain?

That information will drive improved value for money within NATO. NATO can hardly urge its member states to deliver more value for money if it does not take a lead by doing so itself.

[Mark Lancaster (Milton Keynes North) (Con)]

I declare an interest as a member of the Territorial Army.

I listened with interest to the hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones), who has just left his place. I thought he was a perfectly competent Defence Minister, although not quite as competent as the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, my right hon. Friend the Member for South Leicestershire (Mr Robathan). Having listened carefully to the hon. Gentleman’s remarks, I am clear about several matters being pursued by the Government that he does not support, but, given his acceptance that there is a deficit and that it needs to be addressed, I am less clear about what exactly the Labour party would do to address it. I hope that in her winding-up speech the hon. Member for West Dunbartonshire (Gemma Doyle) will explain to the House exactly what the Labour party would do to deal with the deficit. Without that explanation, I fear that many of its claims will look rather hollow.

I want to focus on the plan for an integrated Army by 2020. I congratulate General Carter on his review. Frankly, he was handed a poisoned chalice, but he has managed to deliver an optimal military solution from very clear terms of reference. I want to be equally controversial by saying that sometimes arguments in the House about which regiments should be saved leave me slightly cold. I understand the historic significance of many regiments, and it is right that hon. Members should defend those regiments, but ultimately, if I were a senior officer, I would be holding my head in my hands, because, following this review, politicians are now tinkering with it and seeking to influence the decision for reasons based on political grounds, rather than optimal military grounds. It is not beyond the wit of the British Army to save various regimental cap badges, so I think that my hon. Friends should relax—I am sure that these cap badges will be saved. Instead, we must focus on the optimal military solution.

The integrated Army 2020 proposition, the skeleton of which was unveiled earlier this month at the Royal United Services Institute land warfare conference, is a neat solution to dealing with a period of strategic uncertainty at a time of economic austerity, and inevitably it involves smaller land forces. Indeed, it proposes a reduction in the regular force from 102,000 to 82,000, countered by an increase in the trained reserve forces to about 30,000, with an additional 8,000 under training. It aims to deliver an Army designed to meet the capability, aspirations and commitments of the strategic defence and security review 2010.

Equally, however, the proposal has to deliver contingent capabilities and meet the requirements of the Government’s “Building Stability Overseas Strategy”, published last year. Although I am confident that General Carter’s proposals provide an optimal military solution for the requirements of the SDSR, some cross-Government work is clearly still required to flesh out how this upstream engagement in fragile states will be delivered in order to meet the requirements of the overseas stability strategy. It is here, I believe, that the unique specialist skills that so many members of the reserve forces possess should be utilised. As I understand it, the proposed force structure aims to hold defence capabilities at different levels of readiness based on a balanced mix of reaction and adaptable forces. It is key, however, that to deliver this desired outcome, the Army must be able predictably to integrate its regular and reserve components, with the reserves likely to be required routinely to undertake roles such as providing for the UN battalion in Cyprus, as it has done sporadically in the past.

At the heart of the plan is a progressive move from a reserve force that provides individual augmentees for current operations to one that delivers a scalable, adaptable response by individuals to formed sub-units. This aspiration would certainly be welcomed by the TA, but will be welcomed by the Regular Army only if the TA can be relied upon to deliver. For the individual reservists, this calls for sustained commitment to regular training attendance and predictable periodic mobilisation. This is undoubtedly an ambitious target, but it can be achieved. It is important to realise, however, that there must be not only the military will to achieve it but significant political will and leadership, if the structure and reliance on reserves is to work.

[Bob Stewart]

There is one other requirement: money for the reserves to train properly. Otherwise, they cannot attain the same level as the regular forces.

[Mark Lancaster]

I agree. Indeed, I would argue that ambition without funding is simply hallucination, which is why I am delighted that £1.2 billion has been allocated for this upskilling of the reserves.

I have two concerns about the upskilling, however. First, I want to add to the comment from my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury (Mr Brazier). When it comes to the reserve units, we must be careful, because a larger TA might actually result in a smaller footprint. We must be careful about which TA units we close, simply because, as I know from my experience as an officer commanding a squadron, we cannot simply move personnel and expect them to move units and travel some 20 miles to continue training.

Equally, I am convinced that there must be a compulsion to train. At the moment, we simply have a gentlemen’s agreement to turn up and train with the TA. Without that compulsion, I fear that the reserves cannot fulfil the commitment that they are being asked to make. We are fortunate that section 22 in part III of the Reserve Forces Act 1996 already allows for compulsory training, but we need to look carefully at how to implement it, so that we do not end up offending employers, who might then not wish to allow their reservists to go and train. It is a very difficult circle to square. Equally, we need to look at TA regulations to ensure that bounty, a tax-free payment for people who are fit for role, can be adjusted to ensure that such compulsion can be taken into account.

In my last 27 seconds, I would like to highlight to hon. Members that tomorrow is “wear your uniform to work” day, which is a celebration of our reserve forces, with some 1,900 of them currently being mobilised in support of the Olympics and some 700 on operations in Afghanistan. I hope that hon. Members will join me in celebrating their reservists, although they do not have to go as far as I will by wearing my uniform tomorrow.

Nuclear-powered Submarines

Bob Stewart Excerpts

Monday 18th June 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

The answer is about a quarter. Of the £1.1 billion, £500 million is investment in the capital infrastructure at the Rolls-Royce plant. The remaining £600 million represents the purchase of long-lead items for the production of the core for the reactor for the seventh Astute-class boat and the first successor-class boat.[Official Report, 26 June 2012, Vol. 547, c. 5MC.]

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

As a former Army officer, I point out to the House that no matter how many battalions we have, we may not be able to deter a determined enemy with a nuclear capability. Therefore we should have decent battalions in numbers and the nuclear capability to deter any potential enemy.

[Mr Hammond]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Ensuring this nation’s security involves two things—having a strategic deterrent capability and having highly capable, flexible, deployable and well equipped forces at the conventional level. The coalition Government will ensure that we have both.

Defence Budget and Transformation

Bob Stewart Excerpts

Monday 14th May 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

We have already announced the reductions in the size of the armed forces and a reduction in the size of the MOD civilian service. As a result of what I have announced today, there will be no additional reductions in head count. The downsizing that has already been announced is the limit of the downsizing that we need in order to deliver the programme. I can tell the hon. Gentleman, however, that there are many tens of thousands of jobs in the UK defence industries, and that by introducing a sustainable equipment programme that will give industries the confidence to invest, we will protect those jobs and technologies and help those industries to build their export markets.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

I welcome the Secretary of State’s announcement that we are going to balance the defence budget. I am also aware that the Royal Air Force is to have Rivet Joint aircraft, which will replace the Nimrod R1. Is there any intention for us to have a maritime surveillance capability again, given that we are an island nation?

Afghanistan (Troop Levels)

Bob Stewart Excerpts

Thursday 26th April 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his support and delighted, as will our armed forces be, that once again the cross-party consensus on a campaign that was entered into for reasons of our national security interest, and continues to be prosecuted for those reasons, has been reasserted by an Opposition Front Bencher.

I am sorry that the right hon. Member for East Renfrewshire (Mr Murphy), who leads for the Opposition on defence, is not able to be here. The hon. Member for Dumfries and Galloway (Mr Brown) says that this was because of the statement’s short notice, but I make it clear that the title of the statement was laid last night before the House rose, as is the proper procedure.

The hon. Gentleman asks about the US-Pakistan relationship. He is absolutely right that good relations between the US and Pakistan are crucial, and recent disruptions to those relations are a matter of concern. Good relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan will also be central to ensuring the stability of the region.

The hon. Gentleman talks about the Taliban’s capacity to mount attacks and refers, I think, to the Kabul attack. Yes, that attack caused significant disruption, but we need to be clear that it was a complete failure: the attack itself failed to inflict any casualties or any significant damage. A number of members of the Afghan security forces and some civilians were killed in the clearance operation afterwards, but there is no doubt that the attack was a failure.

The hon. Gentleman talks about the handover of security responsibility to the Afghans potentially creating a power vacuum, but that is definitively not the case. ISAF is very clear that the draw-down needs to be measured and calibrated to match the building capability of the Afghan security forces, so that they can take over the ground-holding and security role, and we ensure that a power vacuum is avoided. I agree that it is not something we would tolerate.

I agree also that we need an inclusive political settlement. All Afghan citizens who are prepared to renounce violence and accept the constitution need to be brought inside the tent, and we need to see diversity in the way Afghanistan is run. I have to say that Helmand is leading the way: we have the significant engagement of female political and community figures in community councils and district councils in the area of operations for which we are responsible, and the Afghan peace and reintegration programme has so far recruited 4,000—admittedly, mainly low-level—Afghan fighters back into mainstream Afghan life. That is a basis on which we will want to build very significantly over the remaining two and a half years of ISAF combat operations.

The hon. Gentleman talks about the scrutiny of Afghan forces, referring, I think, to the very tragic recent “green on blue” incident in Lashkar Gah. There is in fact no evidence that that was an act of infiltration. Of course we have to be constantly alert to infiltration, but we have also to recognise the reality that Afghanistan is a society where people are used to settling personal grievances by resorting to violence, including violence with firearms. I have seen no evidence that the incident was an act of Taliban infiltration.

The hon. Gentleman asks me about the UK’s role and the size of force lay-down post-2014, but no decisions have been taken yet, other than that we will not be there in anything like our current force strength and we will not be there in a combat role. We have made a commitment to run the Afghan national officer training academy, but beyond that we will make our decisions with our allies over the coming months and, probably, years. It is not a decision that we need to make now; the process will start at Chicago but it will certainly not be completed there.

The hon. Gentleman asks me whether the UK contribution that I announced last week of £70 million, or about $110 million, to a fund of $4 billion—not £4 billion, as he said—to fund the future ANSF is likely to be increased at Chicago. That is not the case. That £70 million is the UK’s proposed contribution, and we have decided to make the announcement early to encourage others to make a commitment.

Of course we will co-ordinate with our allies on the timetable, but the timetable for draw-down will be responsive. It will depend on what is happening on the ground and on what our allies are doing, and of course the hon. Gentleman is right to say that any ISAF forces remaining in-country after 2014 will need a stationing-of-forces agreement.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

The battalion that I had the honour to command returned from Afghanistan two years ago with 12 men dead and more than 100 wounded, and it returns to the country in October. I am worried about two things. First, we must ensure that as we withdraw we retain our soldiers in sufficient strength so that there is a balance to deter attacks. Secondly, I am concerned that we have had too many instances of rogue Afghan national army soldiers turning their guns on our allies and on our personnel. We have to be very careful, and I ask the Secretary of State to look at that.

[Mr Hammond]

I hear what my hon. Friend says, and of course the so-called “green on blue” incidents are particularly tragic. I was in Lashkar Gah two days after the most recent incident, when I was able to speak to Afghan commanders about it. I can tell the House that they feel a deep sense of shame and betrayal about what has happened. They recognise that the future of Afghanistan depends on effective partnering between ISAF forces and Afghan forces, and they recognise the huge damage that those very rare incidents cause.

UK forces are in routine contact with their Afghan counterparts—there are thousands of contacts every day —and we have to see these tragic but very rare incidents in that context. I assure my hon. Friend that commanders on the ground have taken a number of sensible precautionary measures to ensure that UK forces are always in a position to defend themselves if necessary, and the Afghans themselves have taken a number of measures to ensure the more effective vetting and monitoring of their own soldiers.

Oral Answers to Questions

Bob Stewart Excerpts

Monday 26th March 2012 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for the Armed Forces (Nick Harvey)]

That is part of our ongoing review. I shall come back to the hon. Gentleman with more details as soon as we have finalised our decisions.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

I was with service families 10 days ago. They told me that, at the moment, what they are most worried about is redundancy. Does my right hon. Friend agree that we ought to get redundancy done as soon as possible, so that morale can improve?

[Mr Philip Hammond]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right: uncertainty saps morale. That is why the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force have completed the announcements of redundancies required. Because of the rebasing, the drawdown from Afghanistan and the return from Germany, it has not been possible for the Army to complete that process, but we will make announcements as soon as we can to provide as much certainty as possible.

Hostage Rescue Operation (Nigeria)

Bob Stewart Excerpts

Tuesday 13th March 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

I am sure that the Foreign Secretary could, but as he is not here, I will have a go instead. I assure the right hon. Gentleman that there have been extensive contacts with the Italian Government and authorities since the expressions of unhappiness that we heard on Thursday and Friday, and I think it fair to say that the situation has been clarified to the satisfaction of all parties.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

In these very difficult operations, surprise is vital. I have not yet seen the statement because it has not been distributed, but I believe that the operation began at 10.58 am, and that the area was secured by the Nigerian army. I do not know whether my right hon. Friend is allowed to answer this question, but was the timing of the operation precipitated by the fact that security had been breached and we were forced to go in? Will he confirm that the timing was not of our choice?

[Mr Hammond]

My hon. Friend is right. The judgment was that, first because of the apprehension of members of the group earlier in the week and secondly because of the presence of significant numbers of Nigerian troops not very far from the compound in question, it would be taking too great a risk to defer the operation. The military judgment was that despite the risks involved, there was a greater chance of rescuing the hostages alive by acting immediately.

Afghanistan (Civilian Killings)

Bob Stewart Excerpts

Monday 12th March 2012 Commons Chamber

[Nick Harvey]

It is important to stress that there is a US and Afghan investigation now under way into exactly what happened. However, I agree with the hon. Gentleman that this would appear to be the action of one isolated individual, completely outwith the control of the chain of command, and he is also absolutely right that it is in no way indicative of the behaviour of the rest of the ISAF forces who are there.

The hon. Gentleman asked me about force protection. We were already operating on an enhanced set-up for force protection in the light of the Koran-burning incident; following this incident, vigilance will be even greater, and at a local level, commanders on the ground will be making whatever sensible arrangements they think are necessary. Operations in the night are increasingly led by Afghan forces, and I think this is likely to be the case even more so in the foreseeable future.

The hon. Gentleman quite rightly raised the issue of trust. It is absolutely essential to what we are doing that there is trust between the international forces, and the Afghan authorities and the Afghan people. There is no doubt whatever that that trust will have been tested severely by the incidents of the last few weeks. Of course, this is not one-way traffic, because we have seen incidents where both British and French troops have been killed by Afghan troops they were mentoring. These are delicate relationships, but I was impressed when I was there two weeks ago that the commander of ISAF took this aspect of his work extremely seriously and had been very quick to get on the front foot and go to President Karzai and the Afghan authorities to apologise and make clear the profound regret that he and the west felt for the incidents that have happened.

As for the post-2014 situation, it is important that everybody understands—both in the west and in Afghanistan—that the end of western troops being in Afghanistan in a combat role does not mean the international community walking away from Afghanistan. It is certainly the case that we will continue to have troops stationed in Afghanistan, providing training and mentoring for Afghan troops. Specifically, we have made a commitment, as the hon. Gentleman will be aware, to take the lead internationally in running the officer training programme from 2013 onwards. However, as we begin and continue the process of transition, we expect to see a greater number of international partners coming in and helping Afghanistan to build up, in terms of both aid and, increasingly, ordinary trade and economics. We cannot allow the setbacks of the last few weeks to put us off that overall objective, which in my view, notwithstanding all the pressures, remains on course.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

We have got two years and about nine months left of combat operations in Afghanistan, and we have lost 404 soldiers so far. The idea that we can start challenging the plan to withdraw early worries me a great deal, because soldiers need certainty. It is needed for the officers to plan and for the soldiers to get used to it. It is going to be increasingly challenging for our soldiers over the next two years, as we move towards withdrawing from combat operations. Does the Minister agree with that assessment? We have got to support our soldiers utterly and completely. The plan is set and must now remain set.

[Nick Harvey]

Let me assure my hon. Friend that the internationally agreed plan remains firmly in place. It was reiterated two weeks ago at the NATO ministerial conference. It is important for all those who are engaged in the operations in Afghanistan to understand that the plan remains in place and that there is no question whatever of our cutting and running early because of these events or any others. Two out of five phases of transition—area by area, district by district—have so far taken place, and both appear broadly to have gone off very well. The three remaining phases will take us through this year and into next year. Within the time frame between now and 2014, the nature of the work that our troops are doing will increasingly shift to a supportive role, but they will still be there bearing arms until the end of 2014. It is important, particularly for those who grieve for the losses that we have suffered, that they should not believe that those losses have been in vain. We are not going to give up; we are going to see this through and finish the job off according to the internationally agreed plan.

Oral Answers to Questions

Bob Stewart Excerpts

Monday 20th February 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Howarth]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for the question. It is important that we recognise that in the United Kingdom we are fortunate. We do not rely just on major defence companies such as Thales, BAE Systems and QinetiQ. We have a raft of medium-sized companies such as Cobham, Ultra, Chemring and Martin Baker, well known for its ejector seats, and those companies have a rich supply of high technology to offer other countries. I can assure my hon. Friend that we are working hard to promote those companies as well.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

However successful civil servants may be in trying to get defence exports, will the Minister reassure the House that they will not get bonuses in excess of what a colonel might make in salary every year?

Strategic Defence and Security Review

Bob Stewart Excerpts

Thursday 26th January 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Julian Brazier (Canterbury) (Con)]

I will not respond to the right hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne East (Mr Brown), because I am confident that one or two of my hon. Friends will do so. Instead, I will talk for a few minutes about defence procurement.

Twenty-five years ago, I was responsible for carrying out a survey with three colleagues as a management consultant to compare the procurement systems in seven western powers. It is depressing, a quarter of a century on, how little things have moved on from the issues at that time. I remain convinced, as I was at the end of that process, that Britain is about average or a little above average, and not as inefficient as it is presented to be by some commentators.

I share the view of the Chairman of the Defence Committee that Bernard Gray is exactly the right man in the right job and that his report is excellent. I am deeply concerned that much of Lord Levene’s report will undermine some of Bernard Gray’s best and most important ideas, much as I respect the noble Lord and the work that he did in procurement at about the time I was a consultant.

There is time to touch briefly on only four points, of which two relate to the procurement function and two to the Ministry of Defence. My first point is that Bernard Gray is absolutely right to point to weaknesses in the contract staff, who are grossly underqualified for the job of stacking up against the highly competent lawyers employed by the other side. In project after project, we have found ourselves badly damaged by the small print.

My second point is about project managers. Gray, Levene and everybody else who has looked at this matter have concluded that we need more continuity in project managers and that they need to be professionally trained. Nevertheless, we are out of line with most other countries in concluding that project managers should be civilians. The most efficient procurers in the world remain, in my view, the Swedes. Their project managers are overwhelmingly military. They are in post typically for four to five years and they are properly trained before they become project managers. The problem, particularly on the army side where there are large numbers of comparatively cheap interlocking projects, is that if civilians are in charge of the projects, as in France, one ends up with lots of detailed user-problems that would have become obvious earlier if they had been before a military project manager. That is why France, despite spending far more on research and development than any other continental country, does not have a particularly good record on land vehicles.

My third point goes more to the heart of the distinction—in my mind, anyway—between Levene and Gray. The heart of Gray’s report—perhaps his single most important recommendation—is at point 4 in his summary, where he says that we must

“Clarify roles and create a real customer-supplier relationship between the capability sponsor (MoD centre)”—

—this is a distinction that we, alone in the whole world, developed before the second world war—

“and project delivery (DE&S)”.

He goes on to stress that the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Capability) is the man who has to drive this. In contrast, Peter Levene suggests that DCDS (Capability) should be merged with one, or possibly two, other functions out of a long list—that it should be downgraded—instead of having, as Gray recommends, one board whose secretariat and day-to-day policing should be provided by DCDS (Capability) to oversee the process. In Levene’s structure we would end up with a complete muddle, with, in effect, four different bodies considering these matters—the new Defence Board, which is all-civilian except for the Chief of the Defence Staff, and the three armed forces themselves. That would take us halfway back to pre-1936.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

If the move is to make the CDS the commander-in-chief, and therefore in charge of the Army, with the same going for the other two services, surely it is proper that such people are represented on the Defence Board, if not particularly within the Ministry of Defence?

[Mr Brazier]

I thoroughly agree with my hon. Friend. I was about to come to that as my fourth and final point, but let me first finish my remarks on capabilities.

There is a very important reason, which Bernard Gray fingers exactly in his original report, for having a proper supplier-customer relationship. In the second world war, the Luftwaffe had a much more powerful research and development and industrial base, but the RAF, because it had a separate capabilities group, was able to make sure that all the pieces interacted so that we did not have problems with fighters that could not talk to bombers, and so on.

The A300M is a modern example of where that structure has broken down because—Gray criticises this—the capabilities staff have got weaker, and they will get a lot weaker still if the Levene recommendations are adopted. This aircraft is being bought for the Air Force—I have huge respect for Air Transport Command because of the brilliant work it has done in Afghanistan—but the user is the Army. Bizarrely, we have managed to arrive at a point where we are choosing to buy an aeroplane that is much more expensive than its tried and tested competitor, the Hercules, on the grounds that it can carry one armoured vehicle per aircraft whereas the Hercules cannot. If asked, the Army would say that armoured vehicles usually go by sea—it has C17s if it has to move them by air—and that it could not afford most of the armoured vehicles it wanted anyway. A strong central capabilities directorate would probably have been able to get a grip on that. Furthermore, the problem is as much in the detail as in the big picture.

That brings me to my fourth and last point, which was anticipated by my hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart). Some countries, particularly on the continent, do not allow executives on to their company boards; we would say that their company boards are all non-executive. Putting those countries to one side, in all my years as a consultant—I worked on all six continents—I never came across a successful company anywhere in which the heads of the main operating divisions were not on the main board. Peter Levene’s recommendation that the individual chiefs of staff should not sit on the Defence Board is bizarre. If one puts that alongside my third point about capabilities, with the greater powers that the individual services are going to take back from the centre to monitor projects, one can see that it is a recipe for increased in-fighting and for a reduction in interoperability. That is a big step away from joined-up defence.

I should like to end on a more positive note. With Bernard Gray, who is probably the best informed and best equipped man in the country, being put in charge of procurement, there is a fair chance that he will manage to overcome many of these problems. Certainly, under his leadership the performance of the procurement function itself will move from being a little above average internationally to being among the best. However, if we simply implement at the centre the Levene reforms as they are constituted—I have mentioned two of the weaknesses, and I could go into some of the others in detail—there is a risk that, in this area and in several others, we may undermine long-term defence planning.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Woodcock]

That is a very important point with which I shall deal at some length in a moment. Suffice it to say for the moment that it is not simply the Liberal Democrats’ review; it is the Government’s review. They have commissioned it. The Conservative Under-Secretary of State for Defence, the hon. Member for Mid Worcestershire (Peter Luff), looks like he is in two minds about it, but his own party’s former Defence Secretary sanctioned and announced it. The right hon. Member for North Somerset (Dr Fox), was clearly not booted out because of that particular misdemeanour.

We have to ask whether it is right for the UK to maintain its independent deterrent. It strikes me as strange that it is often the very people who rail against the hegemony of the United States of America in world affairs who are prepared to sit quietly under its nuclear umbrella and suggest that the UK should not take responsibility for its own defence. I do not include my right hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne East (Mr Brown) in that comment. I am glad to see him back in his place for my speech—I think.

We should redouble our efforts to tackle the proliferation of nuclear weapons. I am proud that the previous Labour Government were explicit in setting the ultimate target of zero nuclear weapons—of a world free from the threat of nuclear weapons—but we should not accept the argument that renewal is an act of proliferation. It is not. In fact, non-renewal would be an act of unilateral disarmament. It is right that our party has left those days behind.

Given the magnitude of destruction that the use of nuclear weapons would inflict, nuclear weapons are rightly an uncomfortable issue for all hon. Members and the country, but they are a deterrent. Our holding of nuclear capability is designed to make a nuclear war less not more likely. So far, that has been successful.

[Bob Stewart]

To slightly corrupt the saying, if we wish to avoid war, we should prepare for it and have the means to stop it. I fully support what the hon. Gentleman says about deterrence.

[John Woodcock]

The hon. Gentleman is quite right—he put it far more succinctly than I did and I am grateful to him for doing so.

I want to stress in the concluding part of my speech that the current Administration are creating a level of risk around the deterrent. That should be a matter of concern to Members on both sides of the House. As an aside, I hope the Minister who winds up could address the matter that was raised this week—

--- Later in debate ---

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

I congratulate my right hon. Friend the Member for North East Hampshire (Mr Arbuthnot), the Chairman of the Defence Committee, on which I sit. His leadership is outstanding.

I want to talk about what might be the most important thing: morale. As we all know, Napoleon called morale the sacred flame—the thing that matters more than anything else. He said that morale is to the physical as three is to one. When I was a captain, I used to teach leadership at Sandhurst and I could not quite understand what he meant. Ten years later, when I was a British military commander in Bosnia, people would ask me—Serbs, Croats or Muslims—how many men I had under my command. I would reply, “Lots. How many do you think?” They said, “Between 3,000 and 4,000.” I had 800. Morale made the difference.

High morale is definitely a force multiplier. It is not quantifiable statistically, but we can feel it. My experience is clear. When we go into a unit, we can feel what morale is like from the way people talk, stand and behave. Let us be clear: the British armed forces have the highest morale in the world on operations. Anyone who has visited our troops in Afghanistan can see that. Wherever British soldiers go in the world, their morale is high on operations. I am worried about what happens when they are not on operations.

In all the years I have been involved with the Army, and it goes back a long time—1967—I have never seen such low morale among personnel when they are not on operations. There is a difference. On operations they come up to the plate; they are fantastic. They are everything one would always expect. It is the British way of doing it. But off operations—boom! Down they go.

Obviously, the SDSR has an impact, because there is massive uncertainty on job security and life for the future. There is a pay freeze, and rising inflation has made life very difficult for the junior ranks. Some service personnel are involved in change programmes. They see an increase in work load and fewer resources being given to them. Obviously, barracks and the accommodation are not great. The Welsh Guards in Cavalry barracks are looking forward to having a hot shower when they go to Afghanistan—and they are in west London.

I hope last night’s Evening Standard is wrong that anyone above the rank of sergeant is going to lose his or her London weighting, because if that is the case a sergeant will get a 4.5% pay cut in London, when he or she has no choice over where they are deployed. Do we take a pay cut? Do we lose our London weighting? Do civil servants lose their London weighting? It is not fair.

Many people, of course, serve away from home for a long time, and the tour interval for some people is now down to about a year. Families do not like it, clearly, and they put pressure on soldiers. The biggest contributory factor to low morale is the fact that our armed forces are taking such a cut in personnel.

Leadership is essential. Leadership in the Ministry of Defence is about heart as much as statistics. Soldiers need to know they matter and are cared for by the people who look after them. Military commanders should look downwards first before they look upwards. I am slightly worried because I seem to think—I hope I am wrong, but perhaps I am not—that too many generals are trying to be political or be civil servants rather than looking down at their soldiers.

I will end, because I know we are short of time, by concluding on morale. If we want to be the best—to use the Army’s phrase, “Be the best”—we must get morale right. It is not right at the moment, particularly when our soldiers, sailors and airmen are not serving in the field. Addressing morale is the top priority of everyone in the Ministry of Defence, from the Secretary of State downwards. It is very important that everyone in a position of power and influence puts their heart and soul into getting that vital aspect as good as it can be. Thank you for calling me, Mr Deputy Speaker.