Asked by: Cat Smith (Labour - Lancaster and Wyre)
Question to the HM Treasury:
To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, on what evidential basis his Department set the disability cost of living payment at £150.
Answered by John Glen
At Autumn Statement 2022, the Government announced it will provide a further Disability Cost of Living Payment of £150 in 2023/24. This was on top of the previous one-off Disability Cost of Living Payment, worth £150, announced in May 2022.
Cost of Living Payments, available to those on means-tested benefits, are also designed to support those on low incomes with the rising cost of living, with a £650 payment announced in May and a £900 payment announced at Autumn Statement 2022.
Disabled people and those with long-term health conditions will also benefit from other forms of Cost of Living support. This includes the Energy Price Guarantee, Energy Bills Support Scheme and the Council Tax rebate.
Asked by: Cat Smith (Labour - Lancaster and Wyre)
Question to the HM Treasury:
To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, what estimate he has made of the number of bank branches which have closed in (a) Lancashire and (b) England in each year since 2015.
Answered by Andrew Griffith - Shadow Secretary of State for Business and Trade
The way people bank in the UK continues to develop at pace, with more consumers and businesses than ever enjoying the convenience, security, and speed of digital banking. In 2021, 86% of UK adults used a form of remote banking, such as an app, online or on the phone. Banking customers have never had more choice in how they fit their banking into their everyday lives.
The Government believes that all customers, wherever they live, should have appropriate access to banking services. However, decisions on opening and closing branches are a commercial issue for banks and building societies. The Government does not intervene in these decisions or make direct assessments of these branch networks.
Guidance from the Financial Conduct Authority sets out its expectation of firms when they are deciding to close their branches or free-to-use ATMs. Firms are expected to carefully consider the impact of planned branch closures on the everyday banking and cash access needs of their customers and consider possible alternative access arrangements. This ensures that the implementation of closure decisions is undertaken in a way that treats customers fairly.
Alternative options for access can be via telephone banking, through digital means such as mobile or online banking, and the Post Office. The Post Office Banking Framework allows 99% of personal banking and 95% of business banking customers to deposit cheques, check their balance and withdraw and deposit cash at 11,500 Post Office branches in the UK. New shared bank hubs are also being piloted, providing basic banking services and dedicated space where community bankers from major banks can meet customers of that bank.
As part of the Financial Services and Markets Bill 2022, the Government has introduced legislation to protect access to cash. The Bill protects access to cash by establishing the Financial Conduct Authority as the lead regulator and providing it with appropriate powers to ensure reasonable provision of withdrawal and deposit facilities.
Asked by: Cat Smith (Labour - Lancaster and Wyre)
Question to the HM Treasury:
To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, what assessment he has made of the implications for his policies of the number of court cases relating to persons filing fraudulent self-assessment tax claims without the claimant's knowledge.
Answered by Lucy Frazer
HMRC has a duty to protect the tax system from potential fraudulent repayment claims being made which undermine both public confidence in the system and reduces the amount of money available to fund our vital public services.
Over 90 per cent of HMRC’s Income Tax Self-Assessment repayment requests come from a genuine person and are paid without suspension or intervention. However, their systems are continually under attack from fraudsters.
Over the last 8 years, HMRC have successfully countered fraudulent repayments through rigorous risk assessment and other upstream initiatives. However, the volume of attempts to defraud them has also increased and they must continually adapt their response.
A release of the information requested in these questions, including the numbers of cases worked and the outcome of those cases, could undermine the compliance activity which HMRC are undertaking. This could in turn prejudice any investigations into suspected repayment fraud.
Where a fraudster has been identified, HMRC will not give them agent codes and will suspend any codes that may already be active in order to maintain the integrity of the tax system, safeguard customer data, and protect revenues.
Asked by: Cat Smith (Labour - Lancaster and Wyre)
Question to the HM Treasury:
To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, where fraudsters have been identified by HMRC, if they have been issued an agent code.
Answered by Lucy Frazer
HMRC has a duty to protect the tax system from potential fraudulent repayment claims being made which undermine both public confidence in the system and reduces the amount of money available to fund our vital public services.
Over 90 per cent of HMRC’s Income Tax Self-Assessment repayment requests come from a genuine person and are paid without suspension or intervention. However, their systems are continually under attack from fraudsters.
Over the last 8 years, HMRC have successfully countered fraudulent repayments through rigorous risk assessment and other upstream initiatives. However, the volume of attempts to defraud them has also increased and they must continually adapt their response.
A release of the information requested in these questions, including the numbers of cases worked and the outcome of those cases, could undermine the compliance activity which HMRC are undertaking. This could in turn prejudice any investigations into suspected repayment fraud.
Where a fraudster has been identified, HMRC will not give them agent codes and will suspend any codes that may already be active in order to maintain the integrity of the tax system, safeguard customer data, and protect revenues.
Asked by: Cat Smith (Labour - Lancaster and Wyre)
Question to the HM Treasury:
To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, with reference to fraudsters who have been identified by HMRC, did those persons fraudulently register as authorised tax agents or advisers.
Answered by Lucy Frazer
HMRC has a duty to protect the tax system from potential fraudulent repayment claims being made which undermine both public confidence in the system and reduces the amount of money available to fund our vital public services.
Over 90 per cent of HMRC’s Income Tax Self-Assessment repayment requests come from a genuine person and are paid without suspension or intervention. However, their systems are continually under attack from fraudsters.
Over the last 8 years, HMRC have successfully countered fraudulent repayments through rigorous risk assessment and other upstream initiatives. However, the volume of attempts to defraud them has also increased and they must continually adapt their response.
A release of the information requested in these questions, including the numbers of cases worked and the outcome of those cases, could undermine the compliance activity which HMRC are undertaking. This could in turn prejudice any investigations into suspected repayment fraud.
Where a fraudster has been identified, HMRC will not give them agent codes and will suspend any codes that may already be active in order to maintain the integrity of the tax system, safeguard customer data, and protect revenues.
Asked by: Cat Smith (Labour - Lancaster and Wyre)
Question to the HM Treasury:
To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, how many cases have there been identified by the HMRC team looking into cases of false self-assessment filing to date.
Answered by Lucy Frazer
HMRC has a duty to protect the tax system from potential fraudulent repayment claims being made which undermine both public confidence in the system and reduces the amount of money available to fund our vital public services.
Over 90 per cent of HMRC’s Income Tax Self-Assessment repayment requests come from a genuine person and are paid without suspension or intervention. However, their systems are continually under attack from fraudsters.
Over the last 8 years, HMRC have successfully countered fraudulent repayments through rigorous risk assessment and other upstream initiatives. However, the volume of attempts to defraud them has also increased and they must continually adapt their response.
A release of the information requested in these questions, including the numbers of cases worked and the outcome of those cases, could undermine the compliance activity which HMRC are undertaking. This could in turn prejudice any investigations into suspected repayment fraud.
Where a fraudster has been identified, HMRC will not give them agent codes and will suspend any codes that may already be active in order to maintain the integrity of the tax system, safeguard customer data, and protect revenues.
Asked by: Cat Smith (Labour - Lancaster and Wyre)
Question to the HM Treasury:
To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, whether SA1 registration forms for Self-Assessment are retained by HMRC after processing.
Answered by Lucy Frazer
Paper SA1 Registrations forms are retained for three years after processing. In cases where the SA1 cannot be processed because there is insufficient information, a letter is sent to the customer requesting that information and the SA1 is deleted. The letter tells the customer to complete a new registration form.
SA1 forms submitted online are not retained.
Asked by: Cat Smith (Labour - Lancaster and Wyre)
Question to the HM Treasury:
To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer, what recent estimate he has made of the loss to the Exchequer of tax revenue through tax scams.
Answered by Lucy Frazer
The information requested is not available as HMRC does not make an estimate of the amount of revenue lost through tax scams.
HMRC estimates the tax gap which is the difference between the amount of tax that should, in theory, be paid to HMRC, and what is actually paid. For the tax year 2019-20, the tax gap arising from criminal attacks on the tax system was £5.2 billion.
Tax gap statistics are available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/measuring-tax-gaps