Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Chris Bryant Excerpts

Wednesday 13th July 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Harper]

That is not an analogy I would make with the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly and the Northern Ireland Assembly. When this House made decisions about setting up those bodies, we did not think it appropriate to give them the power to pick and choose their term of office. We set it out in the legislation that set the bodies up.

I am curious to know what the supporters of the Lords amendment think would happen if the next Parliament decided that it did not want a fixed term. It is not very clear from the amendments, how exactly the mechanisms would work. I shall take Members through the Lords amendments shortly and explain how I think they would work.

It has been suggested that a sunset clause would ensure that the issue of fixed-term Parliaments and the merits of this particular Bill would be subject to post-legislative scrutiny. That is not necessary, however. This legislation has already been scrutinised by four Select Committees: the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, the Lords Constitution Committee, the Joint Committee on Human Rights and the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. I am sure that any one of those Select Committees or another Select Committee will subject the Bill to some form of post-legislative scrutiny, which is something that the Government would welcome. I do not think that these sunset clauses, however, would lead to that type of sensible scrutiny.

I said that I would look at the effect of the Lords amendments on the working of the Bill. Lords amendment 9 talks about a resolution having to be

“approved by each House of Parliament”.

That is fairly straightforward. The most unclear provisions relate to clause 7(4), stating that a number of parts of the Bill will have effect

“only until the first meeting of the… Parliament”,

which would then decide whether to bring those provisions in. The provisions on early elections and confidence votes would not be clear and it would not be clear how Parliament would be dissolved. The schedule, which has a number of consequential amendments, would also not be in force. The schedule, which repeals the Septennial Act and a whole load of other provisions, would effectively cease to be in force and, presumably, all the repeals and amendments would be unrepealed and unamended. We would then end up with a very complicated constitutional proposition.

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

Unless I misheard the Minister, he referred to clause 7(4) of the Bill. I cannot find a clause 7(4).

[Mr Harper]

I am looking at the copy of the Bill as amended on Report from the House of Lords, which does have a clause 7. It is the final provision clause. It is the bit that is dealt with by one of the Lords amendments that we are debating. I think that the amendment will be confusing. It will make many of our constitutional provisions unclear. I do not believe that those who tabled the amendments and voted for them in the other place have fully thought through how they would work in practice.

Another important issue is the relationship that would be created between this House and the other place if the amendments stay in the Bill. The importance of establishing the primacy of this House came out clearly in our debate on the Government’s proposals on House of Lords reform. The amendments would give the House and the other place the ability to vote on whether we have a fixed-term Parliament, without going through the normal legislative process. That could lead to an unfortunate scenario in which this House voted overwhelmingly in favour of the motion that we have a fixed-term Parliament and that the provisions of the Bill, if passed, come into force, while the currently unelected House failed to vote for the motion, so we would not have a fixed-term Parliament. Important decisions about elections in this country, fixed-term Parliaments, the confidence procedures and the ability to trigger early general elections would effectively be made by the unelected House, and that would diminish the power of elected Members.

[Chris Bryant]

The Minister’s example is completely wrong. If this House voted—on the basis of the Government’s and, therefore, the Prime Minister’s majority—for a fixed-term Parliament, and the other place did not vote for a fixed-term Parliament, whether there would be an early election would be in the hands of the Prime Minister. The will of this House would always have carried.

[Mr Harper]

The hon. Gentleman confuses the will of the House and the will of the Prime Minister. The scenario that I set out stands. If the other place had chosen not to vote for fixed-term Parliaments, we would not have a fixed-term Parliament, despite this House having voted in favour, and that would give back to the Prime Minister the ability solely to decide whether there should be an election. We would have taken powers away from Members of this House who had voted, perhaps overwhelmingly, to ensure that the Bill was in force. We would have been thwarted by their lordships. Given the importance to Members of the primacy of this House, that effectively moves power in the opposite direction, which Members will find unwelcome.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Harper]

The hon. Gentleman is right. As I said, when this House decided to legislate to set up the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly and the Northern Ireland Assembly, it did not think that it was right to have variable terms; it decided that it was sensible to have fixed terms. If this House thought that that was good enough for them, it should be good enough for us.

Let me finish by reading out the following quote from the right hon. Member for Blackburn. [Interruption.] The hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent Central rightly says that I have already read out the quote, but I wanted to set out the conclusion that the Labour party should draw from it. The right hon. Gentleman said that

“parties in opposition that are in favour of fixed terms go off the boil on them when they come into government.” —[Official Report, 13 September 2010; Vol. 515, c. 645.]

The Labour party is in danger of doing the opposite. It is in danger of being committed to this proposition when it was in government and then going off the boil on it when in opposition. The party should reconsider. In the time before the House is asked to make a decision on this, I hope that the Labour party will decide that we should disagree with their lordships on this group of amendments.

[Chris Bryant]

I am afraid that the Minister did not impress me with his arguments. In particular, he referred to the fact that the Conservative manifesto did not contain anything about introducing fixed-term Parliaments and then said that when good arguments come along people should bow to them. As far as I can see, the only good argument that came along was that the Liberal Democrats would not support the Government unless there was a fixed-term Parliament element in the coalition agreement. So the only reason why we have this Bill, particularly in its current form, is because of the attempt to create the coalition and then to keep it going for five years.

The Minister then tried to tease me a little with the idea that the former Prime Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath (Mr Brown), said that he wanted people who voted for Labour to be voting for fixed-term Parliaments. This amendment would allow us to vote in every Parliament for fixed-term Parliaments, so it gives more opportunities for people to vote for them, rather than fewer.

[Mr Cash]

Does the shadow Minister agree that the Bill has all the elements of an attempt to achieve a sort of permanent coalition arrangement? In fact, if one were to look at the current state of affairs, one might feel some sympathy for those on our side of the House who have found as a result of the mistakes that have been made by them and by others that they are now low in the polls and that the 56 seats that they won at the last general election might by all accounts be fewer than 20 if those opinion polls were to be believed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Bryant]

I think I agree with that, but I am not entirely sure. The bit I agreed with was in feeling sympathy for those on the Government side of the House.

The three amendments we are discussing come as a package. In essence, they are all there to do the same thing: to say that the present arrangements will remain, so that the coalition gets to hold itself together until 2015, but that after the next general election and at any subsequent creation of a new Parliament, unless other legislation is brought in, there would have to be a vote in both Houses for that system to remain in place. I shall come to the issue of both Houses in a moment.

[Mr Harper]

rose—

[Chris Bryant]

I was going to come to that matter in a few moments, but if the Minister wants me to come to it now I will of course give way.

[Mr Harper]

I wanted to question something the hon. Gentleman said. He says that at the start of each Parliament there would have to be such a motion, but that is not what the amendments say. They leave it completely open for that to happen at any point during the Parliament, and I think that would be deeply unsatisfactory.

[Chris Bryant]

The Minister is absolutely right. That was a small slip of mine and the vote could happen at any time. Any Government worth their salt would without a doubt table such a motion at the beginning of the Parliament so that there was clarity.

We should also know that Lords amendment 1 was not tabled by the Labour party. It was tabled by Lord Pannick with the support of Lady Boothroyd, Lord Butler and Lord Armstrong. Their arguments carried quite a lot of weight with the House—clearly, they carried enough weight to win the vote. Lord Pannick said when moving the amendment:

“The purpose of the amendments is to address the deep unease on all sides of the House, as expressed at Second Reading and in Committee, as to whether it is appropriate to confine the circumstances in which a general election may be called within a five-year term.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 10 May 2011; Vol. 727, c. 822.]

There has been that level of discomfort and unease in this House, too, although it was more marked down the other end. Lord Pannick also referred to the “constitutional damage” that all this might create and called the whole Bill an “unhappy Bill”. I have some sympathy with him.

It is true that I have previously commented—and I stand by those comments—that the Labour party is committed to fixed-term Parliaments. However, we think the right way to introduce legislation on something as constitutionally significant as changing the way in which a general election is called is to engage in consultation with all the parties in this House before tabling a Bill and to introduce pre-legislative scrutiny of that Bill. If the Minister had chosen to go down that route, he would have had a great deal of co-operation from Opposition Members and we would have ended up with a better piece of legislation. One issue that we might have been able to address in such circumstances is whether it is right to make the change through legislation or Standing Order, which might well have saved us from the danger of the question of calling a general election at any time being justiciable in the courts. Lord Pannick also made that point. He said that, as there had been no pre-legislative scrutiny, it was important that after a future general election there was an opportunity for each House to consider the matter again.

[Naomi Long (Belfast East) (Alliance)]

One definition of “fix” is:

“To place securely; make stable or firm”.

Surely the Lords amendment does the reverse on two counts, in that it neither makes it the fixed position that there will be fixed-term Parliament nor sets in stone the time at which that decision would be taken by future Parliaments. What it creates is the opposite of “fixed”; it creates an insecure situation.

[Chris Bryant]

My contention and, I think, Lord Pannick’s contention is that this is a fix in a different way, because it is essentially rigging the constitution so as to make it possible for the coalition to remain in government until 2015—against the manifesto commitment.

[Mark Durkan]

rose—

[Naomi Long]

rose—

[Chris Bryant]

Let me finish my point. Lord Pannick also cited the Constitution Committee in the House of Lords, which said:

“the origins and content of this Bill owe more to short-term considerations than to a mature assessment of enduring constitutional principles or sustained public demand.”

I think their lordships were right. I will now give way to my hon. Friend the Member for Foyle (Mark Durkan) and then to the hon. Member for Belfast East (Naomi Long), who is slightly my hon. Friend.

[Mark Durkan]

I thank my hon. Friend for giving way. Earlier, he indicated to the Minister that he assumed that the resolution provided for under the amendment would be moved at the start of a Parliament on the basis that any Government worth their salt would do it then. Can he tell us what he believes any Opposition worth their salt would do in relation to such a resolution? Would not the scenario that he is arguing for, of a Government doing that at the start of a Parliament, mean that the very unedifying spectacle that we have seen in this Parliament of a Government fixing the term to suit themselves would happen in every Parliament?

[Chris Bryant]

I suppose it is true that every Opposition will always want to take an opportunity to have an early general election. The nature of opposition means wanting to become the Government, so the Opposition would want the chance to have a general election. I think that is the drift of what my hon. Friend said. As I have said, I think we would have a better piece of legislation if we had had pre-legislative scrutiny and had been able to sit around a table, not just with the main parties but with the smaller, minority parties too.

[Naomi Long]

On the issue of fixing, would it not appear to be more of a fix if the Bill affected only one Parliament in which we happen to have a coalition and then fell into abeyance and had to be resurrected for future Parliaments than if the system were changed to introduce fixed-term Parliaments on a permanent basis, thereby requiring future Governments to rescind that decision if they wanted to change it?

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Bryant]

No, I do not accept that, because the experience over the rather sad course of this Bill has been that there has been no consultation with the Opposition about a major constitutional change. The hon. Member for Broxbourne (Mr Walker) said earlier that the system has lasted for 300 years, but I do not think it has been a good system or that it has been perfect for the British constitution, because it has on occasion allowed too much power for a Prime Minister to call a general election at his or her—well, very rarely at her—convenience. In that regard, it is better that we should proceed in a different direction. For us the key issue is whether a term should be four or five years.

[Mr Charles Walker]

No system is perfect, but we have had a fairly dynamic democracy over the past 350 years and by fixing parliamentary terms we will lose some of that dynamism.

[Chris Bryant]

I have sympathy with that argument, but I also think that this is one of the changes towards a fixed-term Parliament that would assist in that and would be another part of the steady progress of parliamentary evolution to which he referred.

[Mr Cash]

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that there are really interesting historical analogies? I am thinking of the vote of 311 to 310 that led to Lady Thatcher’s becoming Prime Minister and of the debate after Munich on 10 May 1940. If we had had fixed-term Parliaments at those times, the whole thing would have been completely undermined despite the fact that the country was in uproar and wanted change. That would have been the case with a fixed-term Parliament of the kind that he wants as well as with one of five years.

[Chris Bryant]

No, I disagree, but we will come to that issue when we debate the second set of amendments about the measures concerning early general election. We have some disagreements with the Government, as the hon. Gentleman knows, but that is a matter for us to debate later.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr MacNeil]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Chris Bryant]

If the hon. Gentleman does not mind, I will not, as I am keen to conclude my remarks.

The Minister asked whether both Houses should decide. That goes to the heart of the matter. Yes, we believe that both Houses should decide, but if the Minister had wanted to change that, he could have tabled an amendment in lieu of the Lords amendment, which could have said that just as in the provisions on an early general election, there would be a vote in one House—this House. There could have been a vote in this House on whether it was a fixed-term Parliament. The Government’s response tries to bind a future Parliament in an inappropriate way. I think that is a mistake, so we will support the Lords amendment.

[Mr Syms]

It is this House that determines who the Government are. This is the majority House. As we know, the upper House is a hereditary or semi-hereditary Chamber. Even under the proposals for election, it will not be the majority House. It is therefore proper and responsible that this Chamber should determine whether there should be a fixed-term Parliament. That is not the business of the upper House. The decision has to be made in this House.

The only question to debate is whether it is the Prime Minister who makes the decision or the House. Historically, it has been the Prime Minister. We have had a constitutional change. I am a conservative with a small c and I do not generally like change, but one has to acknowledge the fact that in order to command a majority in the House, the measure is part of the deal. That is a good reason for doing it. If that was not part of the deal, one would not necessarily be in government and doing many other good things for the country under our programme.

We all know that Prime Ministers lose the confidence of the House. There are occasions when Prime Ministers are challenged, and one of the things that bolsters unpopular Prime Ministers is the threat of Dissolution. It is up to them. They can throw the cards up in the air and call a Dissolution, even if they lose the confidence of their own party. That has always been one reason why Prime Ministers have stayed in Downing street when there was good reason for moving them out and having a vote of no confidence in a political party.

The other factor, which is one of the different features of modern politics, is that there are now more parties in the House—we have the Greens in this Parliament—more of a fracture in the current political system and more regional parties. It will probably be more difficult in the longer term for a party always to be confident of a majority in the House. My hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash) is right. Coalitions may be more a part of the future than some of us who prefer majority government would like to think.

The Government’s position is tailored to that situation, so I will support what they are doing today. Circumstances have changed, and if one has to make a decision, it is better that political parties and the usual channels in the House determine a Dissolution than an unpopular Prime Minister who may have a different agenda from others in the Chamber.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Harper]

I recognise that. The Government set out our reasons for disagreeing with that view, and I believe that their case was accepted by Members of both Houses. We have already debated the matter at length, and I do not think that there is a feeling that we should resurrect that debate now.

In Northern Ireland, there will be consultation with the Northern Ireland Executive and all the political parties, which will begin when the Northern Ireland Office has received reports from both the chief electoral officer and the Electoral Commission on the May 2011 polls, which involved three combined elections. The chief electoral officer’s report has just been received and is being examined by officials, and the report of the Electoral Commission is expected to be received shortly.

Given that the amendments were accepted in the other place and there was a fair degree of consensus, I urge Members to agree with the Lords.

[Chris Bryant]

I broadly agree with what the Government have said. I would point out, however, that the Government, and the Minister himself, have developed a rather irritating habit of opposing measures at this end of the building and then agreeing with them at the other end. That is bad for the way in which we conduct our business in this House. It applies particularly to the replacement for clause 2, in Lords amendment 6. All the changes in these amendments were contained in amendments that we tabled at this end of the building—

[Mr Harper]

rose—

[Chris Bryant]

I will not give way to the Minister, I am afraid.

The Minister chose to oppose the amendments in this House, and then accept them in the other Chamber.

[Mr Harper]

rose—

[Chris Bryant]

I am not going to give way to the Minister. He has spoken plenty.

This is the second occasion on which the Minister has done that today. This morning he tabled a written ministerial statement that basically consisted of an amendment that he voted against during our debates on the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill. I wish he would stop doing it.

All I will say to the Minister about the improved clause 2 is that part of it, the “two-thirds majority” provision, remains foolhardy. Requiring a special majority to secure something constitutes a complete change in the practices of the House. It is also completely unnecessary, because it is almost inconceivable that on any occasion on which the Government tabled a motion for an early general election, the Opposition would not agree with it. There would always be a two-thirds majority. Let me say to Liberal Democrat Members who may think that that would protect them if the Prime Minister opted for an early general election before the planned date for the next general election, that it will do no such thing.

Lords amendment 4 agreed to.

Lords amendments 5 to 8 agreed to.

Lords amendment 9 disagreed to.

Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 83H), That a Committee be appointed to draw up Reasons to be assigned to the Lords for disagreeing to their amendments;

That Mr Mark Harper, Mr Philip Dunne, Chris Bryant, Jonathan Reynolds and Mr Mark Williams be members of the Committee;

That Mr Mark Harper be the Chair of the Committee;

That three be the quorum of the Committee.

That the Committee do withdraw immediately.—(Mr Goodwill.)

Question agreed to.

Committee to withdraw immediately; reasons to be reported and communicated to the Lords.