Productivity

Debate between Chris Leslie and David Mowat

Wednesday 17th June 2015 Commons Chamber

[Chris Leslie]

As I said earlier, different sectors face different productivity challenges. Ultimately, if we think that this is just a problem in one or two sectors, we would be wrong. We need to address this forensically and make sure that we look from sector to sector to assess the problem in a mature, evidence-led way. That is what we need to do.

I am aware that many Members want to join the debate because they believe that productivity is an important topic. I respect them for that, but it is important not to let this issue pass without seeing the connection between productivity and the health of our public finances. We still have a £75 billion deficit in this country and I would like the new Chief Secretary to at least acknowledge in his response to the debate the truth that stronger productivity is crucial for repairing the public finances.

We need sensible savings across non-protected Departments to reduce levels of public expenditure, but if the Chancellor makes the wrong fiscal choices in the forthcoming emergency Budget he could make the situation far worse. There is a hard-headed business case for protecting and prioritising those services that enhance investment, skills and innovation. That is the responsible fiscal approach the Chancellor should take. Productivity should not be adversely affected by his fiscal choices and that is the point that I hope the Chancellor will understand. Whether he does and whether he can see through his political ambitions to the economic consequence of the decisions he takes are the important issues.

I have written to Robert Chote, the director of the Office for Budget Responsibility, to see whether we can make some progress, working across parties, to try to get a better evidence-led approach to the impact of the choices the Chancellor faces on productivity and on levels of public investment. I think that an OBR review would acknowledge the centrality of the productivity challenge and would help to make the right choices for the country. It would be better to have that evidence-led understanding of the consequences of alternative fiscal choices.

[David Mowat (Warrington South) (Con)]

When my hon. Friend the Member for Thirsk and Malton (Kevin Hollinrake) intervened and mentioned the oil industry, which has become significantly less material to the national accounts and is massively productive in value-added for numbers of people, the shadow Chancellor did not answer the question properly. One of the productivity challenges is the significant relative demise of the oil industry, and the hon. Gentleman should not use words such as “forensic” without recognising that.

[Chris Leslie]

As one industry declines, others will have to fill the gap. It is also important to recognise that multiple aspects of energy activity and energy markets are coming on stream and we need to ensure that we develop them and exploit new opportunities for our country, for energy security and for our future economic prosperity.

Financial Services Bill

Debate between Chris Leslie and David Mowat

Tuesday 22nd May 2012 Commons Chamber

[Chris Leslie]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman, but no, I do not think that is a risk. Amendment 73 does not propose to outlaw interest rate swap products; indeed, it is not specifically related to those particular products. It is really about the powers of small firms to complain and to take proceedings if they feel that they have been mis-sold a particular product.

On the particular issue in the news about interest-rate swap products, there are some serious questions that the Financial Services Authority and the Minister need to answer. Were those interest-rate hedge products a requirement of loan agreements, or were they optional? Were the minimum and maximum parameters fair and balanced, or was the downside risk always likely to hit the consumer more than the banks? How frequently was there a mismatch between the term of the loan agreement and the term of the hedge product obligation? Sometimes the term of the hedge product obligation continued even though the loan term had concluded. Were there asymmetrical rights to cancel? In other words, could the banks cancel the arrangement for a particular product, with which the consumer or small firm had to continue? Those are some of the key questions.

[David Mowat (Warrington South) (Con)]

The hon. Gentleman is right to raise this serious issue. What I do not understand in his amendment, however, is what additional powers it would effectively give to a small business, given that the Financial Services Authority can already investigate all these things. Am I missing something?

[Chris Leslie]

When it comes to complaints procedures, particularly about market failure, which the Financial Conduct Authority can look at, there is a trigger that small firms could have, but it is not available in the Bill. Just as the Minister has given super-complaint powers to a certain number of consumer bodies, so a case can be made for doing a similar thing for representative bodies of small firms. I am not claiming that the amendment is drafted to the perfection that the Minister’s officials might want, but I hope he gets the gist—that there is a gap here. Small firms might have written to him, expressing the fact that they feel that they have no power. I have certainly had some of them writing to me to say that they feel intimidated about complaining—to the regulator or to their bank—because of the sheer power that the bank has to withdraw lines of credit if it feels that the boat is being rocked.

There is an important underlying issue here, which the business community wants addressed. To what extent were small firms told to seek independent advice before signing up to the swap contracts? How widespread was the take-up of these particular agreements? I know that the Financial Services Authority is beginning to look at these questions, but I want to see more action and a swifter response from both the Government and the regulator.

[David Mowat]

Many of us want to see more action, but what I do not understand is the extent to which the hon. Gentleman believes that the FSA does not have the powers to investigate mis-selling of this type. If mis-selling has occurred—the hon. Gentleman provided some good examples of unfair and asymmetric contracts—surely the FSA is already able to investigate it.

[Chris Leslie]

Indeed it can, but it is the way of triggering an FSA investigation that is the case in point. The FSA can choose not to listen to the voices of dozens or hundreds of small businesses, not necessarily in regard to this product but in regard to other products in the future. It is a question of giving some power to small firms, as consumers, to trigger an investigation by the regulator. This is not just a pro-consumer amendment; it is a pro-business amendment, as I hope can be agreed on all sides.

I have spoken about the amendments tabled in my name; there are others on the list. I shall be interested to hear what the Minister has to say.

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[Chris Leslie]

Let me start by thanking those of my colleagues who served on the Committee that considered the Bill, as well as the trade bodies, consumer groups and others who made representations about it. In particular, I thank members of the Treasury Committee for the time and attention they gave to trying to improve the legislation. I thank also the members of the pre-legislative scrutiny Committee, who did a phenomenal amount of work in the months ahead of the legislative process, albeit to make a series of recommendations that the Government then promptly ignored. However, we will come to that when the Bill goes to the other place. I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Foyle (Mark Durkan). His contributions were from a different political party but he made a very constructive contribution to the Committee. I also thank the officials and others who work hard behind the scenes on legislation such as this.

It is a shame that we have had such woefully insufficient time to debate this massive piece of legislation, which consists of more than 300 pages and hundreds of clauses. We tabled more than 200 amendments but the best we could get from the Government, even though they have nothing else going on in the Chamber—they are padding out the legislative process—is one and a half days, with three hours for the second day on Report. We ran out of time to debate some of the key, critical issues concerning how the Governor of the Bank of England and the Chancellor of the Exchequer would manage in a crisis, and we did not even get an opportunity to debate those crisis-management arrangements. However, I am glad that we extracted one major achievement from the Government and No. 10: when it comes to public funds, when there is a direction to the Bank of England from the Treasury, the Government will now require the Bank to report back on its progress on that direction. That is a positive change, which we did not get a chance to debate in discussions on the previous section of the Bill. I am grateful for the change.

When it comes to some of the other problems to do with crisis management, the Government are relying on a non-statutory memorandum of understanding between the Bank of England and the Treasury, which leaves gaping holes in knowing how things would work in a crisis. They say that there will be a temporary standing committee or an ad hoc committee but there is no sense of who will be on it or how it will be constructed. No advance thought is going into that and I worry that if we get into a crisis we might waste hours or even days figuring out how on earth to convene this ad hoc committee.

Similarly, there are serious difficulties to do with whether the heads of the new regulators and bodies that the Bill creates will have a direct line of communication with the Treasury or whether everything will have to be filtered through the Governor of the Bank of England, in whom enormous new powers will be vested under this legislation. There is an irony in that yesterday or the day before the Bank conceded—this was dragged out of it—that it ought perhaps to have minor reviews and partial inquiries into what went on in parts of the financial crisis. We still have not had a fundamental review by the Bank of England about its role in the crisis, and that is a great shame. It should be big enough and have the humility to undertake the review that the Treasury and even the FSA have undertaken. It is time that the Bank also opened up and looked inwardly and seriously at its own capabilities.

There are positive aspects to this legislation. We agree with the concept of prudential regulation and we wait to see the detail. The Minister said that he is going to consult on some of the macro-prudential tools. It is very important that we get right the concept of the greater systemic overview of the system—the eagle-eye view that needs to be taken rather than getting too bogged down in the detail of firm by firm, company by company regulation—but the theory needs to be translated properly into practice. That is where the devil is in the detail. In a number of respects, the Bill falls short and could have done with massive improvement. The Opposition tried their best to make recommendations, including many of those made by the pre-legislative scrutiny Committee and the Treasury Committee. I sometimes see the Minister as—I will not call him an irresistible force—an immovable object resisting time and again attempts to improve the Bill.

We need more transparency and accountability for the regulators that the Minister is creating. The degree to which the new Financial Conduct Authority will publish its minutes is still unclear—we need a firmer commitment from the Government on that—and as I have said, the crisis management memorandum of understanding is still insufficient. There is a severe risk that costs that firms pay in their levies to the new regulators will be duplicated and that there will be inefficiency in the expense of splitting the regulator and having two new regulators. We know that the PRA is already in aggrandising mode, securing beautiful new offices in Moorgate right next door to Threadneedle street because, apparently, Canary Wharf is far too far away. It is about 12 or 13 minutes on the tube, but apparently that is a major problem. So millions more pounds are to be spent on those offices in Moorgate, and the Government have resisted attempts to bring about greater efficiencies by means of the Bill.

The key aspect that is missing is proper attention to the necessary parliamentary scrutiny of those macro-prudential tools. Many of our constituents would baulk at that phrase and ask what on earth it means. It is about the regulator and the Bank of England deciding, for example, that the minimum repayments on their credit card may need to change at a moment’s notice. The Governor of the Bank of England will have the power to say, “I’m sorry, we’ve got a particular issue coming on, so instead of paying back 2% a month, you’ve got to pay back 10% a month on your credit card.” The Governor of the Bank of England will have the power to intervene on business lending, on the terms and duration of loans, and possibly even on the cost of those loans, and will be able to do that at a moment’s notice.

We have a bit of a debate about whether loan-to-value ratios and loan-to-income ratios on mortgages will also be in the hands of the Governor. Interestingly, one of the deputy governors has said, “This is a bit too hot to handle. Maybe this is for the Treasury, which is accountable to do that.” The point is that there are phenomenal powers invested in the Bank of England, and we need that thread of accountability to come back to Parliament at some point. This is why we have suggested that there should be a super-affirmative process, rather than a rubber-stamping statutory instrument Committee which many Members have attended and where they know orders go through on the nod with a formal vote.

I detect some cynicism on the part of the Government Whips, but of course they want to nod these things through. We should give Parliament a proper opportunity to consider the impact of those phenomenal powers on our constituents and on the economy. I hope that in the other place the Government will think again about the need to improve the parliamentary scrutiny of the new powers.

When it comes to consumers, the Bill has not properly addressed what we wanted to see, particularly the powers of the Financial Conduct Authority. There has been no movement on compulsory financial education. The Money Advice Service, which is the body tasked with trying to improve the financial literacy of the population, will not be adequately focused in statute on the most deprived in society and those who are most financially excluded. We saw the Government rebut attempts today to give the FCA a proper mandate on the regulation of high cost credit. The Government refused to give the FCA a proper role to take account of social investment, charity finance and other needs. We know they have a chip on their shoulder about charities and philanthropy generally, but it is a shame that they did not recognise those needs in the Bill.

There are a number of consumer aspects, whether debt management plans, helping customers plan ahead for their mortgage finances, or giving firms a fiduciary duty to have regard to the best interests of consumers, on which the Bill should have been improved. We have spoken separately about how the corporate culture in the financial services sector could have been improved. Today we tried to press the Government on improving the stewardship, the corporate governance arrangements and the actions of remuneration committees in reining in some of the excessive bonuses and pay packets.

It is with particular reference to the impact on the economy that I close my remarks on Third Reading. A powerful new committee is created in the Bill—the Financial Policy Committee, which will make the decisions about macro-prudential tools. It will be under no proactive obligation to have regard to growth and employment in this country. We may well see a mismatch between the obligations under which the Monetary Policy Committee remains: it must have regard to the growth and employment objectives of the Government, but the FPC does not mirror that obligation on the MPC. It is told, “Don’t do anything to harm growth”, but it is not given an obligation to have regard to the Government’s proactive—we hope—strategy on growth. Maybe that is because they do not quite understand what the growth agenda ought to be, or they do not know how to get there. They cannot see why that is important. In addition to that general obligation, it is also important that there should be an assessment of the impact of each of the macro-prudential tools on the economy—on growth and employment—but the Government have neglected to do that. Also, there was not a sufficient duty placed on the Bank of England to take care of public funds. Those are some of our concerns.

The Bill does not properly fit with the European level of supervision for financial services. There is the sense that it was dreamt up on the back of a cigarette packet by the Chancellor in opposition, when he wondered how the previous administration, the FSA, could be blamed for all the ills of the global financial crisis. But he forgot to recognise that most of the financial regulations in this country come from Brussels, the EU and Commissioner Barnier, on that conveyor belt as it throws out all the directives and regulations. The regulators that we are creating in this legislation are merely there to transpose a lot of the decisions taken in Brussels. That is essentially their function. The Bill does not properly recognise how our regulators should fit with the European decisions and those realities. We should be framing legislation not just to influence those European decisions, but to steer those decisions. The Government still have not addressed that point properly.

[David Mowat]

The hon. Gentleman makes the point that the twin peaks structure that we are implementing here does not fit with the European sectoral structure. Is it the Opposition’s position that we should have had a sectoral rather than a twin peaks Bill?

[Chris Leslie]

I am pointing out that there is a fundamental mismatch. We know that the supervisory authorities have gone for a thematic approach and the Government have gone for a twin peaks approach. Then there is this bizarre committee or secretariat in between to try and be an interlocutor. It is a tremendous spaghetti, diluting our influence on those supervisory decisions. We can already see that the Government have had to cave in on a number of ways in which the European Banking Authority can overrule many of the capital requirement arrangements. Perhaps that is the result of a deeper weakness in the Government’s diplomatic stance.

I am not saying that the Bill cannot be salvaged. There are ways in which it falls short, but there is still time for the Government to listen. The Bill is deficient, but it can be improved, and I hope that the noble lords in the other place will take the opportunity to do so. We agree with the concept of prudential regulation. There is virtue in some of the theory in the legislation. But it is because of the way in which the Government are yet again incompetently putting that theory into practice that we have our doubts. We will not oppose Third Reading, but I hope that the other place, perhaps with the more time that they have under the rules, will do a serious job and pick up on some of the issues that the Government, by timetabling the Bill in such a draconian way, failed to give the House of Commons the proper opportunity to do.

Financial Services Bill

Debate between Chris Leslie and David Mowat

Monday 23rd April 2012 Commons Chamber

[Chris Leslie]

This goes back to the odd statement from the Minister in Committee, when he said it would be wrong for the Bank of England and the FPC to be asked to have regard to the impact of its decision on economic growth and employment. I ask the hon. Gentleman to pause and reflect on what he is saying, which is that it is not the Bank’s and the FPC’s job to think about jobs and growth. If he goes to his electorate and says that that is what he is legislating for, I doubt he will get much of a response, but it is important. The FPC will be a vital player in our economy. The Monetary Policy Committee has this objective in its remit; it seems only reasonable to have it mirrored in the Financial Policy Committee’s remit.

This attitude, which we called the Fareham doctrine of compartmentalism, that it is for the Treasury alone to think about jobs and growth—that it would be wrong and somehow dangerous for the Bank of England to think about such issues too—is an extremely dangerous way to think about this vital and extremely powerful institution. The Chair of the Treasury Committee said that, in certain ways, the Governor of the Bank of England could become even more powerful than the Chancellor of the Exchequer. I want all the players in our economy to be thinking about the impact of their decisions on our constituents, their employment prospects, their business prospects and the prospects of growth.

I think the amendment should be made. It is exceptionally important, and I feel strongly that we should press the matter. In a sense, it is similar to amendment 24. In the Bill, we enter new verbal territory with descriptions of how policy will be made. I know that many Members are intimately familiar with macro-prudential regulation, but essentially, it is that suite of rules and powers that the Bank of England and the FPC will be able to use to intervene in their systemic oversight of the economy as a whole. We suggest simply that every time the Bank of England produces a financial stability report it should give an assessment of the impact that each of the new macro-prudential measures will have on employment and growth—a simple assessment of their impact on the real economy. As the Bill stands, there is no requirement on the Bank of England, when exercising those massive powers, to provide that assessment. As the House knows, in many policy areas, we require frequent regulatory impact assessments to be made; this is a parallel requirement. We want the Bank of England properly to analyse the impact of the measures.

Let me give hon. Members some examples, so that they understand what macro-prudential regulation is. It is about setting maximum leverage ratios; sectoral capital requirements; rules on the terms of or the conditions on a loan, either to businesses or to consumers; loan-to-value ratios and loan-to-income ratios in mortgages; haircuts on secured finances or derivative transactions; disclosure requirements; and minimum credit card repayment levels. All those things are of real and great concern to our constituents. If the FPC and the Bank are able to assess the impact of their policies on credit availability, they should also be able to assess and analyse their impact on jobs and growth. Amendment 24 would achieve that.

[David Mowat]

I thank the shadow Minister for his lecture on macro-prudential tools. I was on the Joint Committee and I certainly did not recommend the inclusion of a growth objective, because I believe that stability and growth are potentially competing objectives. We are passing the Bill because of what happened in October 2008. I was concerned that anything that diluted the absolute requirement for stability might give an excuse for failure, which I did not want to arise.

[Chris Leslie]

It was the Chancellor of the Exchequer himself who warned against the stability of the graveyard. We have to have joined-up Government and co-ordinated economic policy—I hope hon. Members accept at least that much. It should not be impossible to ask the Bank of England simply to have regard to Her Majesty’s Government’s strategy—not the Opposition’s; obviously, ours would be different—and objectives on growth and jobs. That is all we are saying. We are not saying that that should overrule the broader stability objective of the FPC. It is a simple bit of wiring to make sure that we have joined-up Government and that all the branches of Government talk to one another.

--- Later in debate ---

[David Mowat]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Chris Leslie]

I was just coming to my conclusion and am conscious that other Members wish to speak, so I will not give way. I simply urge the House to vote for the amendment in the hope that the House of Lords will improve clause 5.