West Midlands Police Debate

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Department: Home Office

West Midlands Police

Chris Philp Excerpts
Wednesday 14th January 2026

(1 day, 19 hours ago)

Commons Chamber
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Chris Philp Portrait Chris Philp (Croydon South) (Con)
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This is a shameful episode. West Midlands police had evidence that Islamist extremists based in Birmingham planned to attack Maccabi Tel Aviv fans. Let us call that what it is: vicious antisemitism. We cannot allow violent Islamists to impose their will on our country, yet that is exactly what West Midlands police, through weakness and fear, allowed to happen. The force should instead have confronted the Islamist extremists. In fact, it should have investigated the extremists for inciting racial hatred, as Jonathan Hall KC said only yesterday. Instead, the force capitulated to the Islamist mob by banning the Maccabi fans.

But it gets worse. The West Midlands police force then tried to hide what it had done. The police fabricated a claim that it was the Maccabi fans who were the dangerous ones. They claimed that a previous game in Amsterdam had led to violence by the Maccabi fans. That claim was a pack of lies from start to finish. The Mayor of Amsterdam and Dutch police have now confirmed that West Midlands police simply made the whole thing up. The chief constable must be fired.

A moment ago, the Home Secretary claimed that she has no powers to dismiss the chief constable, but she failed to mention section 40 of the Police Act 1996, which remains in force today. Under that, she as Home Secretary has the power to direct the police and crime commissioner to do things—including dismissing the chief constable—where

“any part of a…force is failing to”

act

“in an effective manner”.

That test is clearly met: part of the force—the chief constable—is indeed failing to act in an effective manner, by the Home Secretary’s own analysis. If she is unfamiliar with that legislation, I have a copy of it here. The Home Secretary must today use her section 40 powers to direct the police and crime commissioner, Simon Foster, to dismiss Craig Guildford. She must stop pretending to have no power and actually act.

We now come to the role of the Home Secretary in this scandal. In a briefing to the BBC on 17 October, a source close to the Home Secretary—we all know that means her special adviser, acting with her authority—said that the Home Secretary first knew about the possibility of a ban on 16 October, the previous evening. We now know that is untrue. From evidence given to the Home Affairs Committee last week, and from the Home Secretary’s own admission just now, we now know that Chief Constable Guildford personally briefed the Home Secretary on 8 October that it was likely that away fans would be banned, and that that was the police’s recommendation. Will she apologise for allowing her adviser to give the BBC untrue information on 17 October?

The Home Secretary must now answer this. She knew on 8 October that it was likely that away fans would be banned. That was over a week before the final decision was taken on 16 October, yet in those critical eight days, it appears that she did nothing to investigate further, or to try to stop the ban. In evidence to the Home Affairs Committee last week, the chief constable said that when he briefed the Home Secretary on 8 October about the likelihood of the ban, she merely “noted”—that was his word—what he said; she did not ask further questions, or show curiosity about what she was being told. She did not personally convene any meetings attended by her in the following eight days, or take any personal steps to clarify the situation. She expressed concerns and took action only after the decision became public on 16 October, by when it was too late. She was asleep at the wheel at the critical time.

Given the disgraceful events that followed, does the Home Secretary now accept that she was wrong to personally ask no questions—officials may have done, but she did not—between 8 October and 16 October? Does she accept that it was wrong to stand by and do nothing during those critical eight days? By the time she did take action—after 16 October—it was too late. By standing by during those critical eight days, she allowed the ban to happen and let the Islamists win. Will the Home Secretary apologise to the House for that inexcusable inaction during those critical days? Will she also commit to exercising her section 40 powers to direct the police and crime commissioner to dismiss the chief constable?

Shabana Mahmood Portrait Shabana Mahmood
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Let me first say to the shadow Home Secretary that I have long and very personal experience of standing up to extremists in Birmingham, not least in the last general election campaign. I think my track record speaks for itself, and I am a woman who knows of what she speaks—clearly unlike him. He appears to be unfamiliar with the law, and indeed with Sir Andy’s findings in his report. Let me remind him of a few things.

First, it was the Conservative Government who removed the Home Secretary’s direct power to remove a chief constable. That power used to be in section 42 of the Police Act 1996, but it was repealed by the Conservatives; the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 explicitly removed the power. I will quote from the explanatory notes to that Act. I suspect that the hon. Member for West Suffolk (Nick Timothy) drafted and approved them when he advised the former Home Secretary, Baroness May, so he will be aware of what is in them. They say:

“The Secretary of State does not have power to direct a police and crime commissioner to suspend or remove a chief constable.”

That is the law passed by the previous Conservative Government.

Chris Philp Portrait Chris Philp
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I am talking about section 40.

Shabana Mahmood Portrait Shabana Mahmood
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If the shadow Home Secretary made himself familiar with how the law is to be interpreted and implemented, he would well know that section 40 of the 1996 Act, which remains in force following the 2011 Act, cannot be read in isolation. When such matters are litigated before a court, a court would be aware of the direct powers removed by the repealing of section 42—we cannot read the two sections in isolation. If he paid any attention to the detail, he would know that, and he would know that the Home Secretary does not have the power that he claims I have.

Secondly, I suggest that the shadow Home Secretary and other hon. Members, in their own interests, pay attention to what Sir Andy has written in his report of today. On page 11 he deals with what the chief constable has suggested was the reading of the meeting that took place on 8 October. Let me give the House a bit of context. That was a meeting of police chiefs that I called following the attack in Manchester on 2 October. I had already announced that I was going to look at police protest powers and I had asked the most senior chief constables in the land, the National Police Chiefs’ Council, the College of Policing and, indeed, Sir Andy Cooke to attend a meeting with me.

Towards the end of that meeting, we did some horizon scanning of other difficult decisions coming up that might have public order consequences, and this was one such matter. It was mentioned briefly by the chief constable, and his recollection of it is absolutely untrue. The chief constable did not say to me, or indeed to anybody else in that room, that West Midlands police had already made the decision to reduce the allocation of tickets for Maccabi Tel Aviv fans to zero but that it was ultimately a decision for the safety advisory group when it next met—that is categorically untrue. If that had been the case, given the seniority of everybody who was in the room and heard what was said, that would have elicited a reaction not just from me and my officials but from many of the other senior policing officials present.

What was made clear to me was that the ban was a possibility but it was one of a number of options being considered. As late as 15 October, the football policing unit made it clear to Home Office officials and the Policing and Crime Minister that all options were still on the table. The next thing that we or anybody else knew about it was when the decision was taken on 16 October.

It is important that all hon. Members stick to the facts on this matter. As Sir Andy has made clear in his factual findings in his report, there will be those who wish to play politics with this matter, but I am afraid that does not meet the test of evidence as set out in the report. I recommend that the shadow Home Secretary pays some attention to the detail.