(1 week, 1 day ago)
Commons ChamberI will do my best, Madam Deputy Speaker. It is always a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Brentwood and Ongar (Alex Burghart). First, I want to reinforce, not just as a Minister, but as a parliamentarian, the Government’s deep regret about the collapse of the criminal case concerning the two individuals charged under the Official Secrets Act 1911. Everyone in the Government was hoping that the trial would go ahead and planning on the basis that it would.
As a reminder, following the arrests of Christopher Cash and Christopher Berry in March 2023 as part of a counter-espionage operation, counter-terrorism police requested that the deputy National Security Adviser act as a witness in the case. [Interruption.] Let me go through this, because it is important to the challenges made by the hon. Gentleman. The DNSA made it clear that he would provide evidence on the basis of the Government’s position at the time of the offences, and that is crucial to the judgment that has been made in this case. The first statement was drafted—
I will make some progress, and then I will give way to the shadow Home Secretary.
The first statement was drafted between August and December 2023. During that time, Counter Terrorism Policing was updated on progress, including the information that the deputy National Security Adviser would not be able to call China an enemy, as that was not the position of the Government at the time of the offences.
Okay, I will let the shadow Home Secretary intervene on that point.
The Minister has said twice in the last minute that the question was the policy of the last Government. Let me take him to page 4 of the letter from the Director of Public Prosecutions, dated Thursday of last week. In that letter, the DPP said—
Order. Interventions should be short.
The DPP said the opposite of what the Minister has said. He said that the issue was a question of fact, and not—categorically not—the policy of the last Government.
Oh dear, oh dear, oh dear! The right hon. Gentleman has just quoted page 4 of the DPP’s letter. Let me quote page 5 to him:
“The information that we required related to the period between 31 December 2021 and 3 February 2023. The position of the current Government was not relevant to the case.”
I suggest that the shadow Home Secretary look at the next page.
No, it is not misleading. Will the right hon. Gentleman give me a moment? It was the position at the relevant time. What is even worse, however, is that the word “enemy” was not the position at the time. It came out of the statement, and that happened under the previous Government, I am afraid.
“In my opinion, China poses an active and current threat to the United Kingdom.” That is all that the Government needed to say to the Crown Prosecution Service in order to secure this conviction, and yet they did not.
As recently as 12 days ago, the director general of M15 said that China posed a daily threat. In July 2022, he and his FBI counterpart said that China was posing a growing threat. The former Security Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge (Tom Tugendhat), said it in April 2024, from that Dispatch Box, and the July 2021 integrated review said that China posed the
“biggest state-based threat to the UK’s economic security.”
It is pretty simple. I have said it, and the Government could have said it, but they did not.
The Government’s commentary on this case has been evasive and sometimes misleading. For example, the Prime Minister claimed in India, on 7 October, that what mattered in this case was the previous Government’s designation of China. He said it again, from that Dispatch Box, on 15 October. He said that the issue was the position of the last Government, and the Paymaster General said it again in his opening speech. That claim, made by the Prime Minister and made again by the Paymaster General earlier today, is categorically untrue. We know it is untrue because on page 4 of his letter, the Director of Public Prosecutions said it was untrue. He said:
“The test was therefore positively not what the then Government was prepared to… say in public…whether framed as…policy or otherwise…but…whether China was—as a matter of fact—an active threat to national security.”
He said it again in evidence yesterday. He said:
“We were looking to the DNSA to provide evidence of the actual threat…and not what government policy was.”
The DPP has said that categorically in writing and in evidence yesterday. What the Prime Minister said was misleading, and I ask this Minister, the Security Minister, to retract it on the Prime Minister’s behalf.
Moreover, the Security Minister himself said on 15 September that the collapse of the case had come as a big surprise to the Government, and that they heard about it only that morning. He said:
“the decision was communicated this morning”.—[Official Report, 15 September 2025; Vol. 772, c. 1187.]
That, I am afraid, was not true. The decision was communicated on 3 September at the latest, and it most certainly did not come as a surprise to the Government.
It was not the case that, as the Minister claimed, he could not comment on why the case had collapsed, as if he did not know about it, because on no fewer than nine different occasions, according to the DPP, the Crown Prosecution Service pleaded with the Government—begged the Government—to say those simple words that I said a couple of minutes ago and the Government, over two years, refused to say. In June 2024, December 2024, February 2025, May 2025, July 2025—twice, on 3 and 10 July—August 2025, 3 September 2025 and 9 September 2025, the CPS begged the Government to say those simple words, and the Government would not say them. Why exactly was the Security Minister acting all surprised on 15 September, claiming that he did not know what was going on, when on nine separate occasions the CPS had pleaded with the Government?
Now we come to the meeting of 1 September, a meeting that the Home Secretary, quoted in The Telegraph on 5 October, claimed did not happen. Well, we now know that it did happen. What we do not know, however, is precisely what was discussed at that meeting. We have not seen the minutes of it, and we do not know the actions arising from it. We do know that it was chaired by Jonathan Powell, the National Security Adviser. We know that many people were there. We know that the deputy National Security Adviser, Matt Collins, was there. We also know that on 14 August, two and a half weeks before that meeting, he attended a conference that included the First Treasury Counsel, at which it became clear that Mr Collins would not change his evidence, and the case would therefore collapse. So Mr Collins went into that meeting on 1 September, most likely knowing that the case was unlikely to proceed. Was that discussed? Was the possibility of providing more evidence discussed in that meeting? We do not know. That is why the minutes need to be published.
We know for a fact that, on 3 September, the Director of Public Prosecutions informed the Cabinet Secretary and the DNSA that the case was not going to be proceeding on the evidence as it stood. The DPP also said in page 6 of his letter:
“It was agreed that”
the Cabinet Secretary
“might inform a limited group, including some ministers.”
I therefore ask the Security Minister to tell the House now which Ministers were informed pursuant to that meeting on 3 September, and whether they took any action as a result—for example, deciding to provide better evidence, which they could have done. It was recently reported in The Sunday Times that the Home Secretary got wind of this around that time, and decided to try to intervene.
I did ask the Security Minister this in an urgent question last week, and many of my hon. Friends did as well, but he did not answer the question, so perhaps he now can: when did the Home Secretary become aware of the collapse of the trial? Did she try to intervene? If so, how? It is quite clear that the Government, had they wanted to, could have intervened between 3 September, when the Cabinet Secretary was informed and was given permission to inform Ministers, and the meeting on 9 September, six days later, when the CPS tried, one last time—at least the ninth time—to get the evidence it needed, but, once again, it was not forthcoming.
Did the Government have any discussions in that period, between 3 and 9 September, about further evidence that they might have provided? If they did not, why not? A few simple words were all that were needed—words not about the previous Government’s policy, but about the facts as they stood on the ground. I uttered those words just a few minutes ago—it was simple enough—and if this Government had said what I said a few minutes ago, this case would have proceeded. Why did they choose not to do that?
Members of this Parliament have been spied on by a hostile state: a state that has stolen intellectual property on an industrial scale, both covertly and through acquisition; a state that plans to build a large embassy, probably for espionage purposes among other things; a state that has opened secret police stations; a state that has put bounties on the heads of people living in the United Kingdom; and a state that has actively supported Russia in its war against Ukraine. The Government could not produce evidence that it was an active and current threat, even though I think it is quite clear to everyone in this Chamber that it was.
Why did the Government not provide the evidence they were asked to provide at least nine times? Is it because they are more interested in getting some sort of economic bailout from the Chinese, to fix the mess they have created, than they are in our national security? That is the question they need to answer.
If this House and the country are to understand exactly what happened with this case, we need full transparency and full disclosure: the minutes of those meetings, the actions arising from them, and the correspondence with the CPS. If they really want transparency—as the Minister for the Cabinet Office said earlier—all they have to do is support this motion and put this material where it belongs: in the public domain.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman served in a Government a number of years ago. I can give him an assurance that this Government work collaboratively across Government with other Departments, and therefore it seems to make perfect sense that other Departments would be represented at such a meeting.
I will try to reflect some of the points that have been made in this debate, including the point from the shadow Home Secretary, who asked specifically about the Home Secretary. I can tell him and the House that no Minister—no Minister in this Government—was involved in any aspect of the production of evidence.
The Liberal Democrats spokesman, the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Max Wilkinson), offered his service as a marriage guidance counsellor. I would advise him not to give up his job.
(2 weeks, 2 days ago)
Commons Chamber(Urgent Question): To ask the Home Secretary to make a statement about Home Office involvement in the alleged China spying case.
I thank the shadow Home Secretary for the question, and I thank you, Mr Speaker, for the opportunity to respond to it today.
As I have repeatedly set out to the House, the Prime Minister, the Home Secretary and the wider Government are extremely disappointed that this case will not be heard in court. I have heard the strength of feeling right across the House and I share Members’ concern about the threats we face from espionage. The witness statements released last Wednesday vindicate what the Prime Minister and other members of the Government have stated repeatedly: the deputy National Security Adviser faithfully, and with full integrity, set out the various threats posed by the Chinese state to the UK, and he did so in order to try to support a successful prosecution.
This urgent question asks about the involvement of the Home Office. Following the charging decision made in early 2024, under the previous Government, the Crown Prosecution Service advised the witness that he could not share the evidence with others in government. The Home Office’s involvement following the charging decision that was taken under the previous Government was therefore heavily restricted to avoid breaching the CPS’s requirements.
Last Wednesday, the Prime Minister told this House that no Minister or special adviser was involved in the handling of the China spy case, yet The Sunday Times has since reported that the Home Secretary had
“heard that the case might collapse and had made representations to ensure the evidence put forward was as ‘strong as possible’.”
So I ask the Minister: when did the Home Secretary become aware that the case might collapse, and what representations did she or her proxies make about the evidence and to whom? Why has the House been told—including just now—that Ministers and advisers were not involved in any way when The Sunday Times reports that they were?
The Sunday Times also reported on a key meeting that took place on 1 September—a meeting that the Government originally denied took place. Is it true that Jonathan Powell chaired that meeting? Did that meeting discuss the CPS view that the evidence provided to that point was inadequate, and the possibility of providing further evidence in the case? Will the Minister agree to publish the minutes of all meetings in which this case was discussed and the correspondence relating to it?
The Sunday Times reported that following the meeting, the Attorney General’s Office was asked to speak to the CPS. Did anyone from the AGO speak directly or indirectly to the CPS after that meeting? Can the Minister confirm that Dan Chugg from the Foreign Office was at the 1 September meeting, and that it was the same Dan Chugg who approached the Lord Speaker with a proposed deal in which the Chinese ambassador would be allowed back into Parliament? The Sunday Times also reported that the DNSA is understood to have acknowledged privately that the decision not to say that China is an ongoing threat was political in nature. Is that true?
Finally, the current Government’s position has been that all the evidence provided related to the previous Government’s policy, but we now know that that is categorically not true. In paragraph 8 of Matt Collins’s third statement, from August this year, which he copied and pasted from the Labour manifesto, he stressed the importance the current Government attach to a “positive relationship” with China, weakening the evidence compared with 2023 and bringing in current Government policy, contrary to what we have been told in recent weeks. Why have the Government been providing this House with inaccurate information, and why did Ministers know what the CPS wanted but refuse to give it to the CPS?
With great respect, a lot of what has just been said does not actually relate to the urgent question that was initially asked by the shadow Home Secretary. I have to say, the Opposition’s position is confusing. They initially criticised the Government for intervening. Then—[Interruption.] I will answer the question. I am answering it. I think it is important that on these matters of national security, we try to debate things in a reasonable and sensible way. That is the approach that this Government will seek to take. If Members opposite—[Interruption.]
I do wonder whether at any point the shadow Home Secretary and certain Conservative Members—not all, but certain Members—have considered the need to have some humility and acknowledge their part in this. These activities took place on their watch, when they were in government, and under the legislation of the time.
Order. Mr Philp, you have had the benefit of an urgent question. I have had the benefit—some might say—of listening to you, so I want you to have the benefit of listening to the Minister.
(1 month, 3 weeks ago)
Commons ChamberLet me start by thanking the Security Minister for the briefing and information he provided ahead of his statement. Let me also join him in paying tribute to the officers in our police force and in the security service. They work so hard and take personal risks to keep us safe.
Let us start with Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee’s assessment of China, published a year or two ago. It found that China had penetrated every sector of our economy. When the Security Minister a moment ago said that China merely posed a “challenge”, he was wrong I think to use that word. China poses a threat. It poses a threat because it participates and organises systemic espionage into our public institutions, including Parliament. It purloins intellectual property from universities and from companies, particularly in the technology sectors, and it routinely spies on the UK as a state. They also engage in transnational repression of Chinese citizens here, for instance running secret, undeclared police stations and putting bounties on the heads of individuals. The word “challenge” is not strong enough; the state of China poses a threat.
The Security Minister said that the Government would “robustly challenge China”, but let me gently point to some of the decisions that the Government have taken in practice. We saw a signal back at the G7 last year, when the Prime Minister was, I am afraid to say, obsequious in dealing with President Xi, appearing to prioritise economic links above security considerations. We have not seen any decision to place China in the enhanced tier of the FIRS scheme, although that regime has been in place for several months, and the Government seem to be viewing with favour the application for a new super-embassy in London, to which our allies, including America, are urging us not to consent and which many of our intelligence services say will be used as a base for espionage activities. So the Government’s record on China causes deep concern, but of equal concern is this specific case—and, Mr Speaker, you explained why that is of particular concern to Parliament, given that the alleged espionage activities touch directly on Parliament and the way in which Members of Parliament do their duty.
I have in front of me a briefing provided to the press by the Crown Prosecution Service, dated 26 April 2024, when these charges were first laid. That briefing states that one of the subjects was commissioned over a period exceeding a year, between December 2021 and February 2023, by a Chinese intelligence asset. There are 34 reports on what this note describes as “very specific topics”, some of which relate directly and personally to Members of Parliament. One of the deputy national security advisers told the Crown Prosecution Service that he assessed this information to be “directly or indirectly, useful” to the Chinese state, and said that it was
“prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.”
Given the gravity of that assessment, it is astonishing that these charges have now been withdrawn. The Crown Prosecution Service clearly assessed these allegations, and the evidence, against the law—against the 1911 Act —in 2024, and found the test to have been met; so why today, more than a year later, have we suddenly been told that the test is no longer met? My question to the Security Minister is a simple one: given the gravity of the charges that I have just read out, what has changed between last year and this year? Why has a case that met the threshold and met the test in April 2024 all of a sudden been determined not to do so?
May I ask specifically whether anyone in the Government put any pressure on the Crown Prosecution Service in relation to this case? Did the Government co-operate fully with the police, the security services and the CPS in providing the information required, including information relating to the definition of “an enemy”? Can the Security Minister give the House those express assurances? I certainly share your concern, Mr Speaker, and, I am sure, the concern of many others, that what appears to be extremely serious espionage, assessed as such in the written disclosure that I read out—assessed by the deputy national security adviser as being prejudicial to our national interests—has all of a sudden, and with no explanation, been dropped, even though previously, just a year and a bit ago, it was assessed that this case did meet the threshold. The House and the country need to know what exactly has changed.
Let me seek to address the shadow Home Secretary’s points. He raised the question of whether China constitutes a threat or not. I think I was very clear in the language that I used. As the right hon. Gentleman will know, and as the Government set out in the strategic defence review, China presents a “sophisticated and persistent challenge”. The reality is that, in government, there is an absolute requirement to co-operate with nations all around the world. When there are areas in which we need to challenge China, of course we will do so. I am sure the right hon. Gentleman and other Opposition Members will completely understand that when there are areas, in terms of economic co-operation, in which we need to work closely with China, of course we will do so, because it is absolutely in our national interest.
I referenced the comments of the previous Foreign Secretary, and the shadow Home Secretary might want to look back at what was said following the China audit. The previous Foreign Secretary was absolutely crystal clear: we will take a long-term, strategic approach to China that is rooted in the UK’s national interest. I understand why the shadow Home Secretary wants to boil down such a complex bilateral relationship into a single word, but the reality is that it is neither helpful nor sensible to do so.
The shadow Home Secretary will not be surprised to hear that I do not agree with his characterisations of what he described as the “signals” that this Government have sent to China. In truth, I will not take any lessons from him on that, not least because—I have said this to him previously—it was not so long ago that a Conservative Prime Minister took the leader of China to the pub. When it comes to signals, I am not sure that the shadow Home Secretary speaks with a huge amount of authority.
The shadow Home Secretary spoke about FIRS. He knows that the Government’s position is that no decision has been taken with regard to the enhanced tier and China, and any decision taken by the Government will be announced in the normal way. FIRS is a crucial tool, and I am proud that this Government have got on and implemented it as of 1 July.
The shadow Home Secretary specifically raised the issue of the embassy in London, as I am sure other hon. Members will. He will know that China’s application to build a new embassy in London is going through an independent planning process. A final decision on planning permission will be made in due course by the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government, but I can be absolutely clear, in relation to FIRS, the nature of the threat and the embassy, that national security has been, and will continue to be, a core priority for this Government throughout the process.
The shadow Home Secretary asked about the CPS decision. I know that he understands that he is asking me about decisions made by the CPS that are entirely independent of Government. This was an independent decision made by the CPS, and it is not for any Government Minister to speculate on the reasons behind it. As I have said—I have been crystal clear—the Government are extremely disappointed with the outcome in this case, and we remain extremely concerned about the espionage threat posed to the United Kingdom.
(9 months, 2 weeks ago)
Commons ChamberThe hon. Gentleman is right to raise the concerns of his constituents; I am not surprised they are frustrated and even angry at the lack of delivery under the previous Government. There was no credible plan—[Interruption.] Let me read the Infrastructure and Projects Authority’s verdict on what we inherited—
Order. I expect better from those on the Front Bench, Mr Philp, and I am sure you are going to show better.