Prisoner Transfer Agreement (Libya)

Debate between Damian Collins and Crispin Blunt

Tuesday 11th January 2011 Westminster Hall

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Mr Crispin Blunt)]

I would like to follow the usual courtesies and congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Damian Collins) on securing this debate. The prisoner transfer agreement with Libya has attracted significant parliamentary and media attention since the negotiations began in 2007, and I know that since his arrival in the House, he has sought information relating to those negotiations and the subsequent release by the Scottish Executive of Abdelbaset al-Megrahi. I hope during the course of my remarks to address a number of the points that he made, and I hope that I will have some satisfactory news about the Scottish Cabinet Secretary at their conclusion.

Let us be clear: Abdelbaset al-Megrahi was convicted of causing the largest peacetime loss of life on British territory. His actions and those of his backers resulted in the death of 190 Americans, 43 Britons and 19 people of other nationalities. Shortly before Christmas, families and friends of the innocent victims commemorated the 22nd anniversary of their murder. I am sure that their pain is still great, and that the memory of what happened that night will live with them always. The release of al-Megrahi on compassionate grounds can only have added to that pain. In that sense, I echo the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Harlow (Robert Halfon) at the conclusion of his remarks.

Al-Megrahi’s release from custody was a decision made solely by Scottish Ministers in accordance with Scots law. My hon. Friend the Member for Folkestone and Hythe will be aware that the Scottish First Minister and the Scottish Minister for Justice responsible for the decision have made that clear in their public statements, and that the Scottish Minister for Justice has also set out publicly the reasons for reaching that decision. Many hon. Members disagreed with it. At the time, my right hon. Friends the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary both condemned the decision to release al-Megrahi on compassionate grounds, and described it as wrong and misguided. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that the decision to release al-Megrahi was a legitimate decision for the Scottish Executive to make.

I now turn to the negotiation of the prisoner transfer agreement, but I should first make it clear, as my hon. Friends the Members for Harlow and for Folkestone and Hythe did, that it was not the means used to facilitate the release of al-Megrahi. Indeed, his request for a transfer to a Libyan prison was refused by Scottish Ministers, in line with the terms of the agreement.

Hon. Members will be aware that in May 2007, the then Prime Minister, Tony Blair, visited Libya for discussions with the President, Muammar al-Gaddafi, and that during the course of that visit a memorandum of understanding was signed between the United Kingdom and Libya which provided for the negotiation of four agreements in the field of judicial co-operation. The agreements related to extradition, criminal and civil law, mutual legal assistance and prisoner transfers. They were intended, in part, to mark the return of Libya to the international community following its renunciation of support for international terrorism and its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. That was an important policy objective of the UK Government and their European partners at the time.

Responsibility for the negotiation of prisoner transfer agreements on behalf of the UK rests with the Ministry of Justice. Since 1985, the UK has negotiated 23 bilateral prisoner transfer agreements, including the one with Libya. In addition, it is a signatory to two multi-party prisoner transfer agreements. In all, the UK has prisoner transfer agreements with more than 100 countries and territories, so the essence of the fact that there are only 20 Libyans in our prisons is not necessarily unique in terms of the arrangements that we have with other countries. There are not that many Rwandans in our prisons either; again, we have a prisoner transfer agreement with Rwanda.

Negotiation of the prisoner transfer agreement with Libya was conducted over several months by a small team of officials from the National Offender Management Service with the assistance of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, which is normal practice. The right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw), then the Secretary of State for Justice, was the Minister responsible for the negotiations. The officials responsible for negotiating the prisoner transfer agreement did so on the basis of a negotiating mandate agreed at each stage with Ministers. At the outset, it included a remit to exclude from the prisoner transfer agreement al-Megrahi and anyone connected with the Lockerbie bombing.

I am sure that my hon. Friend the Member for Folkestone and Hythe will understand that I am bound by convention in what I can say about the actions of a previous Administration. That is particularly the case in describing the motives of the previous Government in seeking to conclude a prisoner transfer agreement with Libya, and their subsequent decision not to insist on a clause that would exclude al-Megrahi from it. In that sense, I am unable to endorse the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Harlow about its being a secret deal, with devolution being a fig leaf.

The right hon. Member for South Shields (David Miliband), then the Foreign Secretary, made a statement to the House on 12 October 2009 in which he stated:

“In May 2007, Prime Minister Tony Blair made his second visit to Libya. His summit with Colonel Gaddafi at Sirte covered the full range of our interests with Libya. Mr. Blair signed a defence accord and witnessed the public signature of a major BP exploration contract. Also agreed was a memorandum of understanding on negotiations for a judicial co-operation package, including a prisoner transfer agreement and agreements on mutual legal assistance, extradition, and civil and commercial law.

The UK had a model agreement, based on Council of Europe arrangements, that was the starting point for negotiation on our prisoner transfer agreements with any country and that provided the starting point for negotiations with the Libyans. Four points are relevant. First, a PTA provides for prisoner transfer, not prisoner release. Secondly, it provides a framework for transfer, not a right to transfer. Thirdly, a PTA cannot be used when appeals, including by the prosecuting authority, are outstanding, as in this case. Fourthly, Ministers in the sentencing jurisdiction—in this case Scotland—have an absolute right to veto any transfer.

This standard draft had no provision for any carve-out for any named prisoner. However, the Scottish Executive made strong representations for us to seek to alter the standard PTA so as specifically to exclude Mr. Megrahi. The UK negotiation team, led by the Ministry of Justice, sought in good faith to achieve this goal.

The Libyans insisted that the only PTA that they would sign was a PTA without any exclusions. So the Government had a clear choice. We could agree to a standard PTA with no exclusions, retaining for Scottish Ministers an absolute veto over any request for prisoner transfer in the case of Megrahi—a veto which they used in August this year”—

August 2009—

“or we could have ended the negotiations to prevent an application for prisoner transfer. This would have set back our wider national and commercial interests that flowed from normalised relations, as the Justice Secretary has made clear.”

I note the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Folkestone and Hythe that some of his disappointment with the actions of the previous Administration is caused by the fact that they were not prepared to be clear about the interests at stake. The then Foreign Secretary continued:

“Since the PTA involved no prejudice to the rights of the Scottish Executive, nor pressure on the Scottish Executive, the Government decided it was right to go ahead. The PTA finally took effect in April 2009.”—[Official Report, 12 October 2009; Vol. 497, c. 30-31.]

On whether that decision was correct, I do not think I can add anything to the description of the negotiating process.

There has been speculation surrounding the role that commercial interests—primarily those of BP—played in the decision not to seek the exclusion of al-Megrahi from the terms of the PTA. In July 2010, my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary wrote to Senator Kerry, chairman of Senate Foreign Relations Committee, setting out the extent of BP’s involvement. During the several months of discussion in 2007 about Libyan opposition to the possible exclusion in the PTA, there were a number of conversations between BP and the then UK Government. Specifically, there were three discussions between BP and the right hon. Member for Blackburn, or his office, between October and November 2007; at least two contacts in the same period between BP and the then Prime Minister’s foreign policy adviser; and contacts with Her Majesty’s ambassador in Tripoli. During those discussions, the progress of negotiations on the UK-Libya transfer agreement and the likely timing of the agreement being signed were discussed. As BP made clear in its statement on 15 July 2010, it had been made aware by the Libyans that failure to agree the PTA could have an impact on UK commercial interests, including Libyan ratification of the BP exploration agreement signed in May 2007, and it wished to bring that fact to the attention of the UK Government.

[Damian Collins]

For the record, I want to make it clear that the contact of Sir Mark Allen of BP with the right hon. Member for Blackburn coincided with the change in the British negotiating position on the PTA and the decision to withdraw the exclusion of al-Megrahi.

[Mr Blunt]

I confess that I have insufficient detail on the times and dates of all the contacts between BP and the various parts of the Government to be able to agree with my hon. Friend, but I imagine that what he says is probably broadly correct and probably not a matter of dispute. As my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary made clear to Senator Kerry, it was perfectly normal and legitimate practice for a British company to draw to the attention of the UK Government the interests at stake.

A significant amount of information relating to the negotiation of the PTA, including correspondence between the then Justice Secretary and Scottish Ministers, has already been made public, and I have drawn upon it in my remarks this afternoon. However, to ensure the fullest possible explanation of the circumstances surrounding the decision, the Prime Minister has instructed the Cabinet Secretary to review the papers to see if more needs to be published about the background to the decision. I know that my hon. Friends eagerly anticipate that report. I can tell them, in civil service language, that it will be published “very shortly”, so I hope that they will not have to wait very long for more information to be placed at their disposal and to see whether it brings new matters to our attention.

I am limited by convention on what can be said about a previous Administration. My hon. Friends have properly drawn the matter to the attention of the House.

[Damian Collins]

The report of the US Senate suggested that the UK Government had legal authority to intervene in the matter. In my remarks, I asked whether that was the view of the Ministry of Justice.

[Mr Blunt]

I am grateful for that intervention; I meant to pick up on my hon. Friend’s point. I am advised that, no, it is not a matter on which the UK Government would be in a position to intervene. It is properly a matter for the sentencing authority—in this case, that is Scottish Ministers—to make the decision. They cannot be second-guessed by the UK Government exercising a different authority under the agreement.

My hon. Friend also asked about judicial review of the Scottish decision. The truth is that any prisoner could seek judicial review, and the outcome would be up to the judge who heard the review, but I am advised that it is very difficult to see how a review in those circumstances would meet the test for judicial review or for a decision to be overturned.

Following the request from the Prime Minister, we can look forward to more information from the Cabinet Secretary in a short time. I note that my hon. Friends have urged that the review be brought to a rapid conclusion, and I am confident that their request will be noted and accepted.