The FCO and the Spending Review 2015

Daniel Kawczynski Excerpts

Tuesday 1st March 2016 Commons Chamber

[Crispin Blunt]

It has, and I have already attended that Committee’s first meeting. It is being excellently chaired by the hon. Gentleman—I forget his constituency, which will not help me much, but I have every confidence in the new Chair of that Committee, and when I recall his constituency, I will inform the House.

[Daniel Kawczynski (Shrewsbury and Atcham) (Con)]

I will get my hon. Friend out of that hole by intervening on him. I pay tribute to his chairmanship of the Foreign Affairs Committee, and he is correct to say that we are split five-five on whether we want the United Kingdom to pull out of or remain in the European Union. He is right to ensure that the report is balanced and that we do not come out for either side. A lot of my constituents want more impartial information so that they can make their own critical assessment on this matter.

[Crispin Blunt]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right, and I recall that it is my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Chris White), who served on the previous Committees on Arms Export Controls under the Stakhanovite chairmanship of Sir John Stanley, who is taking up that role. I am confident that he will do it extremely well.

Hon. Members will know that if I can chair a Committee that produces a unanimous report and has the hon. Member for Ilford North (Wes Streeting) and my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) agreeing on factors around our European Union membership, we will have done a singular service in producing a piece of analysis that everyone can have confidence in.

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[Mr Baron]

I made the mistake of not finishing my sentence; next time I will finish it. I was about to say that my examples included Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and, I would suggest, Syria. In Iraq, there can be no doubt that we went to war on a false premise: there were no WMD. We were all deceived; the job of Chilcot is to determine whether No. 10 intentionally deceived us.

On Afghanistan, I supported the initial deployment in 2001 to rid the country of al-Qaeda, and there is strong evidence to suggest that we succeeded in that objective in the very early years. Where it went disastrously wrong—this takes us back to the fact that we did not fully understand events on the ground—was when we allowed the mission to morph into nation-building. We went into Helmand without fully realising what it involved, and we certainly under-resourced our operations, which was a bad mistake.

In Libya, we knocked down the door—that was the relatively easy bit—but the country has turned out to be a complete and utter shambles, in part because we failed to understand that the opposition to Gaddafi would splinter into 100-plus groups with different objectives. Law and order has been non-existent in Libya ever since, which has led to more bloodshed and a vicious civil war.

[Daniel Kawczynski]

At this juncture, with my hon. Friend referring to Libya, I must interject that he was the only Conservative Member of Parliament to speak out against that British military involvement at the time. If I recall correctly from his speeches from that time, he put some prescient and important questions to the Government, in respect of which hindsight has proved him to have been correct.

My hon. Friend referred to the small number of people who make foreign policy in this country. Does he agree that in advance of British military intervention overseas, as in the case of Libya, there might need to be in future a greater period of engagement and deliberation for those such as my hon. Friend who do not fully support such actions, so that these problems can be avoided?

[Mr Baron]

I thank my hon. Friend and fellow Select Committee member for his kind words. I agree: there does need to be more time for reflection on these issues. I would also suggest that we need greater investment in the FCO. We need greater expertise and analytical skills because we need to make sure that we have analysed a situation correctly. Our system of government performs better when we have a well-informed Executive being questioned by the legislature.

What we have seen is a series of errors through which it has become increasingly evident that the Executive do not have that expertise to hand. That is one reason why the legislature has raised the bar on military intervention—because it has lacked the trust in the Executive to make their case, analyse a situation correctly and make sound recommendations. Once that trust is lost, the legislature will raise the bar when it comes to military intervention, as we have seen.

Let me return to some of the other errors that we have made. I suggest that there were errors in Syria. The Government line that we did not intervene early enough on behalf of the rebels, which accounts for the mess that is evident there now, is simply not correct. The Government’s intention was to arm the rebels in the hope that they could keep the weapons confined to the “good” rebels and not allow them to spread to the “bad” rebels—in other words, to track and trace the weapons. Anybody who knows anything about the region, or who has visited the country or travelled through it, should know that everything is tradeable in the bazaar. Also, given that the situation was so fast moving, the idea that we could have stopped the rebels from falling into the hands of al-Qaeda, al-Nusra or other extremists was pure make-believe.

Then, within a couple of years, the Government, having been stopped by the House from intervening in a key vote in 2013, again proposed to intervene—but against the rebels. I would not be so unkind as to suggest that we swapped sides in a civil war within two years, but to the general public, it damn well nearly looks like that. It well illustrates how we have failed to analyse the situation correctly.

In the brief time left to me, I would argue that in many respects our interventions have been a distraction. I, for one—like many Members on both sides; some are in their places today—have long advocated the need to spend more on defence. The military interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and indeed Syria have perhaps distracted us from the greater threat of nation states, not necessarily friendly to the west, re-arming and reasserting their power and influence. One thinks immediately of Russia and China, but there are others as well.

To those who suggest that the straits of Hormuz or the South China seas are far away and of little significance to us, I say that a country based to such an extent on maritime trade—about 90% of our trade comes by sea—would certainly know about it if those straits or seas were ever blocked. My suggestion is that we have been distracted and that that is partly a function of the fact that we are not investing enough in what I call our ears and eyes—in other words, our ability to understand what is happening out there.

We must have a margin of safety or comfort as regards our capability, because no one can confidently predict where the next trouble spot is going to be. History is littered with examples of our facing the wrong way. I suggest that without that margin of comfort, that margin of safety, in our analytical capability, we may well be caught short again if we have not made the necessary investment. I suggest that, without that investment, we make expensive mistakes—indeed, we have made them—and that it is therefore a false economy to talk about savings, particularly when the budget is so small relative to Government expenditure generally. If I may take the point to the extreme, avoiding unnecessary conflict is vastly cheaper than committing ourselves to conflict that is costly in terms of both lives and treasure.

We often talk about hard power in the House, but perhaps we do not talk enough about soft power, which is increasingly important. In the present information age, those who win the argument will be just as important as those who win the conflict. This is about a battle of ideas, a battle of ideologies. It is about persuading others to want what we want, rather than just rattling the sabre, which—as we have seen so many times in our recent history—can often be counterproductive. We do not attach enough importance to soft power in this country, certainly not when it comes to the making of foreign policy.

There are clear examples of our putting our soft power capability at risk. Past cuts to the BBC World Service have hindered our ability to reach out to people; the World Service budget has been transferred from the FCO’s ambit, but that was one example before the transfer.

An example that currently sits in the FCO is the British Council. That venerable organisation is doing tremendous work in spreading the word, encouraging people to want what we want, providing an educational service, and trying to bring peoples together to improve understanding for the benefit of all concerned, but what are we doing? We are making cuts there. What is the British Council having to do as a result? It is having to become even more commercial in trying to make up for those cuts.

Members may think that a 10% cut is very little, but given that 10% is sometimes the profit margin, the British Council must achieve a 100% increase in its revenue when engaging in commercial activities to make up for that cut. We, as a country, must think again about short-sightedness of that kind, because it is not serving us well—and, I would argue, not serving the international community well.

We need to ensure that our ears and eyes are working, because when they are not, we tend to make expensive mistakes in the world. The fact that we have not properly funded our analytical skills and our capabilities, and have not been as well-sighted as we should have been, has certainly contributed—although it has not been the only reason—to a series of errors that have proved exceedingly costly in lives first and foremost, but also in terms of treasure. That brings me back to the point about false economies. It is a false economy to make cuts in our ears and eyes—our Foreign and Commonwealth Office capabilities—if, as a result, we then blunder into interventions that cost us dearly in lives and treasure.

I am pleased to see that my right hon. Friend the Minister for Europe is present. Through him, I urge the Government to increase expenditure on the FCO in real terms. We will be better sighted for it, and will make fewer costly errors.

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[Richard Benyon]

The right hon. Gentleman must have read the next page of my speech. I shall answer that question precisely in a moment; I think he will agree with what I have to say.

What President Putin would want first is for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office budget to be curtailed. He would also want a weaker NATO that was riven by infighting and that continued to run down its armed forces, as it has done in years gone by. He would also want a NATO that did not respond to an escalation in aggressive actions against states on Russia’s western border. He has had a bit of bad news in that regard, however, because there has been a reversal in the decline in defence spending, not least by Britain but also by some of our allies. This situation requires massive efforts of diplomacy to keep our alliances moving in the right direction, showing resolve and showing the ability to stand up to the actions of his regime.

To answer the question from the right hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Tom Brake), Putin wants a west in which influential countries such as Britain become less influential. I think the right hon. Gentleman can see where I am going here. Putin wants a weakened European Union. Let us remember that it is the EU, not NATO, that can impose damaging sanctions against his regime. He hates having an economic rule-setter on his western border.

As the leader of the UK delegation to NATO, I recently attended a meeting with other delegation leaders at NATO headquarters. Informally and formally, our allies crossed the floor to ask me, with varying degrees of incredulity, whether Britain was really going to leave the EU. I hope that the Foreign Affairs Committee’s report will look not only at the costs of a possible Brexit but at the impact it would have on the geopolitics of our European foreign policy. These people, including Americans, were coming up to me and saying, “Now? At this time? Really? With all that threatens Europe, economically, militarily and societally?” There is much that our diplomats and intelligence services have to do in the coming years: shore up our alliances, particularly NATO; encourage more spending on defence among our allies; and use all methods, through both our hard and soft power postures, to deter Russia. This is about how we invest; how we work with our allies; and how we exercise our armed forces and show strength.

[Daniel Kawczynski]

When we met Jens Stoltenberg in Brussels last week, he not only concurred with a lot of what my hon. Friend is saying, but discussed the other side of the coin, which is the importance of dialogue with Russia. Does my hon. Friend agree that it is important to attempt to engage with Russia, despite these tensions, to try to defuse them?

[Richard Benyon]

I entirely agree with that. I am certainly not somebody who believes in confrontation; my hon. Friend probably knows that well, as he knows how I operate in this House, and exactly the same applies in how we deal with a potential aggressor. The purpose of what I am saying today is that not only should we be strong, showing that our alliance is strong and that we are not going to see the envelope of article 5 pushed by people such as President Putin, but we should engage diplomatically with him and with his regime to try to get some common sense. We should use resources such as the World Service and the British Council, which my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay talked about earlier. Very movingly last week, a Romanian who works at NATO said that the greatest treat of her day used to be sitting under her bedcovers listening to the British World Service, as it kept her in touch with what was going on in the west and the freedoms that we enjoy, and she just used to want some of that—she has now got it. Through such means, we can also influence people in Russia.

[Daniel Kawczynski]

When I used to go back to Warsaw to see my grandfather in communist times, we always listened to the BBC World Service, albeit very quietly and with the curtains drawn, as of course it was illegal to do so. That was a great comfort to my grandfather and his generation of Poles, as they knew there were people outside, beyond the iron curtain, who were struggling for them and ensuring that they were kept informed.

[Richard Benyon]

As always, my hon. Friend makes a very powerful point, and he and his family perhaps understand this more than any of us in this House.

Let me conclude by talking about one concept in foreign policy, which is our will—our will to make a better world and to extol the virtues of the kind of society that we enjoy in this country and that most of our European colleagues also enjoy in the west. We face difficulties in that; we get on with our lives as independent members of different alliances, be it NATO, the EU or other arrangements we have, whereas an aggressor such as Russia is one country controlled pretty much by one individual, and so our will is tested. On the face of it, we should not be alarmed, because across NATO 3.2 million troops are under arms and the four largest NATO members spend $740 billion a year on defence compared with Russia’s figure of £65.6 billion. But that statistic, stark as it is, does not describe the depth of the problem we are seeing in places such as Ukraine, Georgia and Syria, and the threats, be they actual or subversive, faced by NATO countries such as the Baltic states. We have to have a strong will, and proving that we have it requires resources, commitment and the hard slog of soft power and diplomatic efforts. It requires language skills and a real in-depth understanding. Of course there are other problems in the world, for example, in the South China sea, in Africa and elsewhere, which draw many of those resources away from a particular problem.

As so many people have said in this debate, we do not know what is coming round the corner next, but I am certain about one thing: Russia will tweak NATO’s nose, push the envelope of article 5, be it through cyber, by playing on Russian-speaking nationals in certain countries or just by threatening countries that are friendly to us but not members of NATO, such as Sweden, through incursions into their waters or airspace. Today, in the Defence Committee, we were told that

“any weakness on our part, Russia exploits.”

Making sure that Russia understands that the west will respond and will punish it if it attacks a NATO state must remain a key foreign policy objective—but it is one that needs proper resourcing.