Lord Hanson of Flint
Main Page: Lord Hanson of Flint (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Hanson of Flint's debates with the Home Office
(1 day, 19 hours ago)
Lords ChamberI apologise to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. I did want to hear what she had to say, but my enthusiasm to move on overtook me, unfortunately. I must learn to ignore nods from the Government Bench opposite as well.
As I said, the Committee stage will be a long haul, but I hope that we can continue this level of discussion and scrutiny throughout. On these Benches, we are not entirely sure of the need for new anti-social behaviour laws, and the validity of the proposed measure will be touched on more thoroughly in group 3. We feel the focus should be on enforcement first and foremost.
But as this proposal will become law, there are several individual parts of it that would benefit from being amended. I begin with Amendment 2 in my name, which is intended to probe the age at which a person can be given a respect order. The Bill states that this will be 18 and that younger offenders will be subject to a youth injunction. I cannot see why there should be two different powers to deal with the same behaviours. One of the benefits of anti-social behaviour injunctions is that they can apply to any person over the age of 10, rather than having different powers for different age groups.
To set the age minimum at 16 seems like common sense, and I would be surprised if the Minister disagrees with me. It is, after all, his party that believes in treating children of that age as adults. Why should 16 year-olds be allowed to choose the people who create anti-social behaviour laws, but simultaneously be exempt from those laws? Perhaps the Minister can explain the rationale, should he oppose the amendment.
Amendment 6 aims to ensure that an issued respect order does not place excessive restrictions on the recipient. It is similar to Amendment 5, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, in seeking to ensure that orders are “necessary and proportionate”. As it stands, respect orders may require the recipient to do anything specified by the court—a power that does not contain any internal safeguards. This could lead to massive judicial overreach. The amendment in my name seeks to ensure that this is not the case. It is fair and proportionate that a recipient may be prohibited from doing anything that may cause a repeat of that which required an order in the first place. Prohibiting those actions is just, but that is where the powers of prohibition should end. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response to this potential issue with the proposed policy.
Amendment 11 would remove perhaps the most egregious part of this clause: giving the Secretary of State complete discretion not only over which authorities fall under the scope of respect orders, but the definitions that define respect orders themselves. It means that the already strong and limiting orders can be altered and twisted by whichever Home Secretary happens to be in office. I am sure each noble Lord could think of a different set of hands that they would not want this power to reside in. The amendment in my name would prevent that occurring and leave this already forceful power as it is.
Amendments 13 and 14 seek to improve the clarity in the chain of command in issuing orders. In a policy with so many moving parts, efficiency is key. A respect order would currently appoint a supervisor, who would then have the discretion to inform an
“appropriate chief officer of police”
if the offender lives in more than one area. This adds an extra layer of responsibility to a supervisor already charged with monitoring the respect order’s recipient. I can foresee potential mix-ups and miscommunications whereby either no or multiple chief officers believe themselves to be responsible for a recipient. The easy solution would be to specify the relevant chief officer alongside the supervisor, disaggregating the chain of appointments and improving clarity. I hope the Minister considers this point.
Amendment 20 seeks to require that risk assessments are the basis of respect order applications. It seems wrong that, despite being required to carry out a risk assessment, an applicant can apply for a respect order without having to reference it to the court. Respect orders are potentially very freedom-limiting; the court that issues them should be able to reference the risks posed by the recipient as a justification for these sanctions. As always, I look forward to the Minister’s response.
I am grateful to the noble Lords who have spoken in this debate on the first day in Committee on the Crime and Policing Bill. I feel like I am at base camp at the start of a climb to Mount Everest—but, as ever, Mount Everest has been conquered, as I am sure the Bill will eventually be as well. It feels like we are at the very start of a long, fruitful and productive process.
I will start by outlining a little about respect orders, because it is important to put them into the general context of why the Government are doing what they are doing. There were over 1 million recorded incidents of anti-social behaviour in the last year for which records exist. That is an awful lot of anti-social behaviour and does not include even the underreporting that may well exist.
There is a government manifesto commitment to take action on respect orders. The new orders will enable courts to both ban offenders from engaging in harmful anti-social behaviour, and/or—as the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, noted—impose positive requirements to tackle the root cause of anti-social behaviour. That could be anger management or alcohol or drug awareness courses, which will hopefully tackle the root cause of that anti-social behaviour and stop it occurring.
Unlike existing ASB civil injunctions, breach will be a criminal offence enforceable by arrest and tried in the criminal courts. That goes to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. This goes to court only if an individual breaches the order put on them—the purpose of the order is to stop the behaviour taking place. Penalties for breach will include community sentences, unlimited fines and potentially prison time for the most serious breaches, but only on a breach. That is a really important point to recognise in our discussions today.
Because there are so many amendments in this group, although it is a slow process I will take the amendments in turn. Amendment 1, supported by the noble Lords, Lord Bailey of Paddington and Lord Clement-Jones, the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, my noble friends Lady Whitaker and Lord Hacking, and the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, would require a Home Secretary within six months of the Bill becoming law to undertake a review of existing powers under the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, prior to introducing respect orders.
First, the introduction of respect orders was a manifesto commitment, so the Government have put some thought into it. I also assure noble Lords that the Government are committed to ensuring that the powers to address anti-social behaviour remain effective. As such, they are subject to continuous review. I do not want to disappoint the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, but there will not be a pilot on this, because the Home Office has regularly engaged with front-line practitioners and with the ASB sector to better understand how the powers of the 2014 Act are used and where improvements can be made.
In addition, under the last Government the department launched a public consultation in 2023 to understand how powers could be used more consistently and effectively. That consultation has helped inform the measures in Part 1 of the Bill. I draw noble Lords’ attention to Clause 7 of the Bill, which, to aid this ongoing evaluation process, provides for new requirements for local agencies to report information about anti-social behaviour to the Government to help us continually improve and review.
Therefore, the provisions in Clause 1 deliver on the manifesto commitment. We need to press ahead with respect orders as soon as possible to ensure that the police, local authorities and others have the effective powers to tackle the 1 million cases per year. Amendment 1 would require us to have a costly and unnecessary review, and it would slow and cause delay in the rollout. Therefore, with respect, I cannot accept it either today or on Report.
Amendments 2 and 3 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Blencathra, seek to lower the age at which respondents can receive a respect order from 18 to 16, or indeed to 14. Again, I hope the noble Lords understand that the Government do not wish to criminalise young people unless it is absolutely necessary, which is why our manifesto was clear that respect orders were aimed at tackling anti-social behaviour perpetrated by adults. The noble Lord, Lord Bailey, made some very valid points on that in relation to the potential criminalisation of younger people.
That does not mean there is no provision for the relevant agencies to deal with youth-related anti-social behaviour. The respect order, while replacing the civil injunction for adults, will remain in place for those under the age of 18, renamed as the youth injunction. Importantly, this will enable youth courts to impose behaviour requirements on younger offenders without resulting in criminalisation if they breach the injunction. There is still the potential for those orders to be placed, but it does not involve criminalisation.
Amendments 4 and 5 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and others would amend the legal test for issuing a respect order. Amendment 4 would mean that a respect order could be issued only in relation to ASB that a respondent had already engaged in, and not where the respondent had threatened to engage in this behaviour, as is the case with existing civil injunctions.
I stress to the House that respect orders are fundamentally preventive in nature. They are designed to stop bad behaviour by putting in place a restraining order that says, in effect, “Don’t do these particular actions”. If the offender abides by the terms of the order, there will be no further sanctions. That is an important point for the House to understand and grasp from the Government’s perspective. Anti-social behaviour can be insidious and difficult to prove and it can take many forms. We know that the threat of aggressive or anti-social behaviour can often escalate quickly into more serious, violent and criminal behaviour —a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. That is why it is crucial that we retain the ability to issue an order against those threatening to engage in ASB, in order to prevent that harm before it happens.
Amendment 5, in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, would change the legal test for issuing a respect order, so that that the court would need to find it “necessary and proportionate” to issue the order to prevent the respondent engaging in anti-social behaviour, rather than using the legal test as currently drafted, in which the court must find it “just and convenient” to do so. The current “just and convenient” language mirrors that of the civil injunction and is therefore familiar to the courts.
Let me be clear—this again goes to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick—that the current threshold still requires a judge, with all the relevant legal duties and safeguards that that entails, to be satisfied that the issuing of an order is just, reasonable and fair. Courts will already take the necessity and proportionality of an order into account as a result of their duties under the Human Rights Act. Given these considerations, the benefits of amending the legal test in this way are limited.
Moving on to Amendment 6—
Lord Pannick (CB)
Since the Minister rightly accepts that there is a test of proportionality under the Human Rights Act, would it not be better to put it in the Bill, so that everybody understands—whether they are magistrates, judges, solicitors or counsel—that that is the test? That would provide a great deal of comfort and protection for those who may be subject to the orders.
I have great respect for the noble Lord’s contributions. I have heard what he said, but I believe that this is the right way forward. We can always examine his comments again and I appreciate the way in which he has contributed to the debate.
Amendment 6, from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, seeks to ensure that any positive requirements placed on the recipient of a respect order are restricted to those which would prevent a future breach of the order. Positive requirements to address the underlying causes of the behaviour are an important aspect of the respect order. That is a key point that I want to impress on noble Lords today. While the legislation sets out a number of restrictions on how positive requirements can be used, it is the Government’s view that the amendment is unnecessarily restrictive and that courts and agencies should have the discretion to tailor positive requirements to the particular needs of each case.
Amendment 7, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and also spoken to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, would limit the amount of time that a respect order may be in effect to two years. As it stands, there is no limit on the time a respect order might be in effect for, and I think that is the right thing to do. Again, there will be secondary action under the respect order only in the event of a breach taking place. If, for example, someone has previously been a persistent offender and the order puts in place an unlimited time, that would be reasonable until such time as the behaviour is noted. Implementing a two-year time limit might be of some difficulty and would not necessarily tailor against the individual’s behaviour. I come back to the central point that, ultimately, no action is taken against the individual if they do not breach the order.
The duration of a respect order is dependent on the specific circumstances of each case. That will be determined by the courts. I do not expect that every respect order will be imposed for an indefinite period, but that option should be available if there are relentless adult ASB perpetrators. The legislation makes provision for respect orders to be varied or discharged depending on the circumstances of the case.
Amendment 9, again tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, would make it a requirement that an applicant must gain full council approval for all local authority-led applications for a respect order. It is proper quite that, while some councils may seek full council approval for PSPOs, there is no legislative requirement for them to do so. It should be noted that respect orders, unlike PSPOs, are granted by the courts, which provides additional safeguards to ensure that respect orders are used proportionately—this goes back to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. Whereas PSPOs impose prohibitions on the general public, respect orders will be for individuals who have a history of disruptive, anti-social behaviour.
I return to the fact that, if individuals do not breach an order, the matter will go no further. It is the Government’s view that, given this distinction, it would not be appropriate to require full council approval for all respect orders—which quite honestly is self-evident. I have been a councillor and spent time in council committees, so I know that there is potential for delay. It might take a long time to make an order, which would risk us not taking action quickly and supportively for the benefit of victims and communities at large. The amendment might also require a full public consultation when applying for a respect order, but I do not believe that that is the way to run respect orders or to impact on individuals.
Amendment 10, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, seeks to add non-crime hate incidents to the definition of anti-social behaviour. I respectfully say to him that we are going to use the phrase “non-crime hate incidents” during the course of the Bill in relation to a number of amendments, including those tabled by his noble friend, the noble Lord, Lord Young. As I have previously said publicly in the House, the College of Policing—under the chairmanship of his noble friend, the noble Lord, Lord Herbert of South Downs—will very shortly produce a review of non-crime hate incidents. There has also been discussion by the Metropolitan Police on what it is doing. I hope that the review will help inform later stages of the Bill. At this stage, I believe that, while we should not kick Amendment 10 down the line—we will come back to the subject of the amendment—we should not deal with it in relation to Clause 1.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
I may have misheard the Minister, but if I heard him correctly, I want to correct what he said. I do not want to add it to the Bill; I want to add to the Bill a provision that it is not included under prevention orders.
I appreciate that. If I have misunderstood his intention, I apologise. None the less, the principle is still the same for me. There are specific amendments about this downstream. By the time we reach them, I hope that we will have further enlightenment from the College of Policing and that we can determine government policy on non-crime hate incidents in the light of that review. That is what I have said on a number of occasions in response to similar questions. Therefore, I respectfully suggest that Amendment 10 is slightly premature at this stage, and we will discuss that matter in full detail downstream.
Amendment 11, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Davies, seeks to remove the provision for the Secretary of State to amend, by regulations, the list of relevant authorities that can apply for a respect order. The Secretary of State needs that power to look at the range of contexts, and a multiagency approach is often needed to tackle anti-social behaviour. To ensure that we have that, I believe that the Secretary of State needs to retain that power—that may be a source of disagreement between us, but that is where I think we stand. The Secretary of State should be able to add an agency to the list. It would not be done unilaterally; new regulations would have to be laid. Those made under new Section B1 of the 2014 Act would be subject to the draft affirmative procedure and, as such, subject to debate and approval in both Houses. It is not an unfettered power for the Secretary of State.
A number of important issues have been raised in relation to Amendment 12, which seeks to remove the power to exclude a person from their home as part of a respect order in cases of violence or risk of harm. As noble Lords have said, including the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Meston, excluding a person from their home is of course not something that should be taken lightly. However, we know that anti-social behaviour is not always trivial and can escalate into violence. We also know that, sadly, in some cases, anti-social behaviour is accompanied by domestic abuse. The ability to exclude perpetrators from their homes in such scenarios is a valuable safeguard in protecting vulnerable victims and ensuring that they do not face eviction for the wrongs of their perpetrator.
The key point on Amendment 12—this goes to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Meston—is that an exclusion can happen only when there is a significant risk of violence or harm. This will be key for protecting vulnerable victims who live with perpetrators or are in the same building. The applicant for the respect order will be able to make a proper risk assessment; that is the purpose and focus of that. The power to exclude remains a decision for the court and will be used only when it considers it necessary, in order to protect victims from the risk of violence or harm. I do not know whether that satisfies the noble Lord, but that is the Government’s rationale for the discussions we are bringing forward today.
This is a long group of amendments, so I apologise to the Committee for continuing to deal with them. Amendment 13 from the noble Lord, Lord Davies, seeks to ensure that
“the appropriate chief officer of police”
is specified where a respect order has been issued. The Bill also provides that a supervisor must provide details of the respondent’s compliance with positive requirements to the chief officer of police. While the police are among the agencies that can apply for these orders, the operational responsibility for enforcing requirement lies with the designated supervisor and not with the chief officer of police. It is intended that positive requirements would be managed by those closest to the respondent’s circumstances.
Amendment 14 from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, seeks to ensure that the supervisor does not make the final decision on who the relevant chief officer of the police would be, where it appears that the respondent lives in more than one police area. Supervisors are directly involved in managing the positive requirements of respect orders. They have first-hand knowledge of the respondent’s living arrangements and which police areas are most impacted by the respondent’s behaviour. Specifying the chief officer of police prior to issuing a respect order could be an unnecessary burden on police forces that have minimal involvement, and therefore it is appropriate that the supervisor makes the final decision on these matters.
Amendment 18 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, seeks to remove the provision enabling courts to make interim respect orders. Again, I highlight that interim court orders are not a novel concept; they are generally available to courts in exceptional cases. There is currently the possibility for a civil injunction, and it remains the case for the respect order where it is necessary for the courts to grant an interim respect order to prevent serious harm to victims.
Victims are central to the proposals we are bringing forward. If an interim order has been granted, it is because there has been a case made to a court that victims need some assistance to prevent serious harm to them. An interim respect order can be granted by the court only when all the relevant legal duties and safeguards that that entails are met, and it requires the court to be satisfied that it is just to make an order. That goes back to the point the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, made. If that order is placed, it is because the court has determined on the evidence before it that there is a real risk of threat to an individual and therefore that order has to be made.
Amendment 20 from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, seeks to ensure that a respect order is based on a risk assessment. The introduction of the risk assessment offers a further safeguard in ensuring that respect order applications consider contextual vulnerabilities and agencies take a joint multilateral approach. I hope I can make it clear to the noble Lord that this is a statutory requirement, and all agencies must complete a risk assessment prior to applying for a respect order, so we have met the provisions that he wants in Amendment 20 to date.
Amendment 21 from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, would place a duty on the Home Secretary to conduct a public consultation before introducing new statutory guidance for practitioners on respect orders. I make it clear to the Committee that any updates or additions to the ASB statutory guidance are already subject to extensive consultation with relevant stakeholders. That will include the front-line practitioners for whom the guidance is intended. This will be the case for statutory guidance on respect orders, and I hope that satisfies the noble Lord. As respect orders partially replace an existing power, the civil injunction, a large portion of the guidance will therefore already be familiar to practitioners.
Finally, Amendment 22, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington, seeks to add for-profit registered social housing providers to the list of relevant agencies that can apply for a respect order. For-profit social housing providers have grown in prominence since the 2014 Act came into force, and I recognise the importance of the relevant agencies having the powers needed to tackle anti-social behaviour. That is why, for example, we are giving both for-profit and non-profit social housing providers the power to apply for and issue closure notices. However, these are powerful tools, and it is also important that further challenges to the agencies that can use the powers, including respect orders, are considered carefully. But the noble Lord has raised some very important issues, and we will consider them carefully. I really appreciate his bringing them to the Committee today.
My Lords, I think it is the Matterhorn at this stage, rather than Everest, but we will see. I thank the Minister for his very full reply, and I thank all noble Lords for their support for this set of amendments that I and my noble friend Lady Doocey put forward. The Minister has set out his stall; he is clearly very wedded to the current wording, and that will merit careful consideration. I recognise the point he made about this being a manifesto commitment, but Amendment 1 is not designed to negate respect orders; it is designed to review the existing suite of anti-social behaviour legislation in order to make sure that it is effective.
I recognise the point the Minister made about the 1 million incidents, but we do not know at this stage, other than from the Minister’s assertions, that the respect orders are going to be effective in dealing with those, or, indeed, whether existing powers would have themselves been effective.
The Minister did not really explain why the current legislation is inadequate. He also did not for one second admit that the current regime of PSPOs and CPNs had its faults.
The real difference between this legislation and the existing legislation is that action can be taken immediately. I think I did touch on that point, but if it was not to the noble Lord’s satisfaction, I apologise. We can take action immediately on a breach.
I think we are going to need some more convincing that that is the case, compared to anti-social behaviour injunctions. So, we remain somewhat unconvinced.
We have the common aim across the House of achieving an effective system that is fair and proportionate. The one chink in the Minister’s armour was that he was prepared, in response to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, to consider the wording “necessary and proportionate”. I very much hope that he will consider that as a possible amendment to his proposal.
I agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, that Governments reach for the statute book; we need to consider whether existing legislation is sufficient. The noble Lord, Lord Hacking, called for a pause. Whether it is a pause or a review, we will definitely want to return to this on Report. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 1.
My Lords, I have just a few comments. I am quite concerned that the latest figures show that the magistrates’ courts’ backlog of cases to be heard reached 361,000 as of September 2025, a record high and a significant increase on previous years. In the other place, the Minister said the legal test for respect orders was being kept “broad and flexible” to enable them to be used for a wide range of anti-social behaviours. Again, this suggests significant extra pressure on courts. Jamming up the system further is not going to help victims. Can the Minister say what the Government’s assessment is of the impact on the wider criminal justice system?
Giving evidence in the other place, the Police Federation also pointed to the pressure these orders would put on custody places, saying that infrastructure was needed to make new legislation “effective and believable”. Perhaps the Minister could also address that.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for their comments. I am sorry: I am just getting my pages in order; it came slightly more quickly than I expected. I thought we would have a few more contributions.
The amendments all relate to the role of the courts in the Government’s new respect orders, and it is fair and proper that they do so. These new orders will enable courts to ban offenders from engaging in formal, harmful anti-social behaviour and—again, as we have discussed—tackle the root cause. Amendments 8 and 16 seek to allow magistrates’ courts to issue respect orders. I have been clear that the respect orders are civil behaviour orders intended to prevent further anti-social behaviour occurring. They also aim to encourage rehabilitation through the positive requirements that I discussed in the previous group of amendments. Because they are civil in nature, applications should be heard in the civil courts, which have the appropriate procedures and expertise for handling these types of orders.
Magistrates’ courts deal primarily with criminal matters and summary offences. Hearing civil applications in a magistrates’ court would risk treating preventive orders as punitive measures, when, actually, as I mentioned, they are designed either to try to stop people undertaking negative behaviour or to encourage people to undertake what I will term positive behaviour, such as anger management or alcohol awareness courses.
Amendment 15 seeks to ensure that the interim respect orders are not issued by the courts unless specifically said otherwise, and where an application has been made without notice. Again, anti-social behaviour can escalate quickly and cause great harm, and an interim respect order enables rapid protection in urgent cases involving immediate risk. Judges can make decisions based on the individual facts of the case and ensure that victims receive immediate relief in cases which they deem to be appropriate. On occasion, these will have to be issued without giving notice to the respondent, and it is important that judges retain the ability to do so on or without request from the relevant agency. I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Davies, that the court would be required to apply itself to the question of whether it was appropriate to make an interim order. There is no question of one being made without an express determination to that effect, but speed is still required.
Amendment 17 seeks to ensure that, if an appeal is made against the decision by the courts to refuse an interim respect order, the respondent is duly notified. I reiterate that interim respect orders are designed to provide urgent temporary relief to protect victims and the public from serious harm before a full hearing. If the respondents were notified of an appeal, it could undermine the immediacy and effectiveness of the interim order, and doing so would likely complicate proceedings, prolonging risk to victims and communities. I come back to the fact that all the measures in the Bill are designed to tackle anti-social behaviour at source and provide either interventions to prevent or interventions to encourage positive behaviour. The law allows appeals without notice to maintain speed and efficiency in safeguarding measures.
Amendment 19 seeks to ensure that the interim respect orders are made only when the court considers the respondent likely to engage in harassment. Again, I just say to the noble Lord that the definition of anti-social behaviour is broad: it is intended to capture behaviours that may not meet the criminal threshold but which can cause severe harm to victims and communities. As I pointed out, interim respect orders are a necessary thing to provide immediate relief, preventing harmful behaviour from escalating and causing further damage to victims and communities. I would have thought that the noble Lord would have supported that general direction of travel. They are a preventative order, not a punitive order; they are punitive only in the event of a breach. Again, the purpose of the order is not to have that breach in the first place but to send a signal that says, “This behaviour is unacceptable”, or “This support mechanism is required”, and if you do not attend the support mechanism or if you breach the preventive mechanism, you are facing a potential criminal sanction.
Just briefly, because this is a very important aspect of the enforcement of respect orders, I ask whether the Minister is saying that all that is needed is that it is shown beyond reasonable doubt that the respect order has been breached, or does one go back to the original decision on the civil balance of probabilities—the reasons for the respect order? Is it purely that you have to show beyond reasonable doubt that the respect order has been breached, in which case it is still a civil balance of probabilities requirement for the original respect order to be enforced?
There is a determination, and I believe the legislation before us today is clear on that matter. We will debate this still further, undoubtedly, but there is essentially a respect order where the court will consider the potential breach and will make a judgment on it, and having examined that, it will determine the issue in relation to that breach. The noble Lord raises that issue now, but as regards Amendment 19 before us today, which is the point I am making now, limiting the scope of where an interim respect order can be issued risks further harm for communities as a whole.
I will just focus on the points that the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, mentioned. She covered in the last series of amendments the same issue, in a sense, about capacity, which is important. It will be a matter for discretion of the applicant and the court to determine what requirements will be most suitable in line with the resources and options that are available in a given area. So, again, that discretion is there at a local level to determine; for example, if an alcohol awareness course is required, then self-evidently an alcohol awareness course has to be available for the individual to take up that course. Those judgments will be made at a local level by the local individuals who are determining these matters.
Again, I refer noble Lords to the economic impact assessment that we have published. The ASB package is expected to lead to
“an overall reduction in prison places”.
The respect order replaces the civil injunction, and we are not expecting additional cases per se. Once in a steady state, annual prison places for respect orders will stay more or less the same, and we expect respect orders to have a neutral impact on prison places, given that they are replacing civil injunction powers. So I hope that that again reassures the noble Baroness in relation to the resource question of the additional impact of these matters. With those comments, I respectfully request the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Before the Minister sits down —I love that expression—can I just check? I think he said that respect orders were not going to be piloted. Is that correct? Diana Johnson, the Policing Minister in the other place, in the third session in Committee, said:
“We will pilot respect orders to ensure that they are as effective as possible before rolling them out across England and Wales”.—[Official Report, Commons, Crime and Policing Bill Committee, 1/4/25; col. 104.]
So, what has changed between then and now that the Government have changed their mind?
The Government have considered the reflections in another place, and we have now determined that we want to get on with this. Remember that the Bill has 12 days in Committee, and then Report, and we have a long way to go before Royal Assent. The Government want to have a manifesto commitment that they made in July 2024 implemented in good time. Even now, that manifesto commitment will take us potentially nearly two years to put in place. That is a reasonable process, we have consulted widely on the respect orders and that is the Government’s position now.
Can the Minister say whether anything else has changed that we would not be aware of because it has not been written down anywhere?
That is a very wide question, my Lords. Let me say that the purpose of Committee is to provide a significant number of days for Members from all sides of the House—as we have had today, from the government side as well as from the Opposition and the Liberal Democrats—to test Ministers and raise points. If the noble Baroness has points she wishes to raise during the passage of the Bill, as ever, I will try to answer them, either on the Floor of this House or in writing afterwards.
The noble Baroness asks whether things have changed. Even today, there are a number of amendments that the Government have brought forward in the groups of amendments that we are deliberating on today. Things move; the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, was saying with regard to the immigration Bill that a number of things have changed over the course of time, and things move. It is now 16 months since the King’s Speech which introduced this legislation. We continue to monitor and move; where necessary we bring forward amendments, and I am open to testing on all matters at all times. But I would welcome the noble Lord withdrawing his amendment today.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister and to those who have contributed. I know we all have the interests of a functioning justice system at heart, and the discussion has reflected that. We must approach this debate with pragmatism as our guiding principle. That means that, when legislating for new crimes, the best outcome is the one that sees offences prosecuted. In a perfect world, perhaps the Crown Courts and the county courts alone would have the capacity to handle these new respect orders. But, as I have outlined, the courts system is incredibly backlogged, and it is therefore necessary to use as many courts as possible to deliver the policy.
Considering the scope of respect orders on top of that, my amendments and the amendments of my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel and my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie are perfectly reasonable. To consider causing alarm as on the same level as causing harassment, as prosecuting them in the same courts effectively does, defies sense. Making use of magistrates’ courts is both the rational and practical solution to this problem.
Similarly, approaching interim respect orders from a more conservative standpoint would be prudent. They are very illiberal measures and should be used only in the most necessary circumstances. Amendments, such as those tabled in my name, to create presumptions against them and to narrow the preview of their power seek to ensure that this is the case.
I hope that the Minister will agree with the important principles behind these amendments and will perhaps take them away and consider them, but for the time being I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
I am grateful to noble Lords for the discussions that we have had today. I will start by saying something that I hope is helpful and which is meant to be helpful. Respect orders are not something in their own right. They are part of a suite of tools that the Government are looking at to help tackle anti-social behaviour.
I take some issue with what the noble Lord, Lord Davies, has said about police numbers. I was Police Minister in 2009-10, and immediately after we lost office, the coalition Government reduced police numbers by around 20,000. The figure of 20,000 officers that the noble Lord says are being put on the streets really represents a replacement of ones who were taken off the streets by the very same Government that he supported.
The noble Lord asked whether we have additional police officers on the ground. This year we have put around another 3,000 police officers on the ground, and we are looking at providing around 13,000 extra pairs of boots on the ground—specials, PCSOs and, indeed, direct warranted officers—during this Parliament. That is again a commitment in the manifesto that we are doing. Many of the measures in the Bill that we will come to later around phone theft, the use of anti-social vehicles and all sorts of other measures are still part of the suite of measures to try to tackle anti-social behaviour as a whole.
If I take the challenge from the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, head on, I cannot give him a figure as to what the impact is going to be directly on those matters as of now. I will reflect on what he said and see whether I can bring further light to that. The key point is that this legislation before the Committee today—this clause stand part notice that the noble Lord is testing the Committee on—is a measure whereby in the event of a breach of those orders, speedier criminal action can be taken, which is different from where we are currently with other forms of anti-social behaviour legislation.
Again, I reaffirm what I said in earlier contributions: we are not seeking to be punitive; we are seeking to be preventive. I hope that nobody will be sanctioned by the legislation for breaching an order. The whole purpose is to put some behaviour modification in place to stop a poor behaviour or to encourage help and support to overcome the reasons why that poor behaviour has taken place in the first place.
This goes to the heart of what the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, said because, from my perspective, this is part of a suite of measures. That is the point I want to put to the Committee today. We know that the powers in the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 did not always go far enough to tackle anti-social behaviour and I believe that the whole Committee wants to tackle that anti-social behaviour. It is why the Government committed in our manifesto to introducing the respect order and cracking down on those making our neighbourhoods, town centres and communities unsafe and unwelcome places.
The 1 million police-recorded incidents and over a third of people experiencing or witnessing some form of anti-social behaviour are key issues that any Government should address. The respect order partially replaces civil injunction powers for persons aged 18 or over but, like the civil injunction, will enable courts to set prohibitive conditions by banning disruptive ASB perpetrators from town centres or engaging in a particular behaviour or by providing a rehabilitative, positive requirement, such as attending an anger management course or, potentially, a wider drug or alcohol awareness course to help tackle the root causes of their offending.
My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for responding to my question about projections of the effect of these measures. The purpose of me asking him these questions, just as I did on another Bill, is not just to ask awkward questions and give his officials more work but a genuine focus on performance. We have a very serious issue in the country and we all agree on anti-social behaviour. The price for the Committee, in essence, agreeing to broader powers is some degree of confidence that they are likely to have a significant effect. Of course, it is incredibly difficult to quantify what that effect may be, but some guidance on it would help the Minister’s cause, which is always a cause close to my heart.
I accept that, but it would be fair to say that I would be making promises or guessing about issues that I could not guarantee. But I can guarantee for the noble Viscount that we will monitor the use of this and that the measures that I have already outlined—those in the Bill, those on police numbers and the focus that we are putting on certain police initiatives through central government discussion with the National Police Chiefs’ Council—will make a difference. They will be judged on that.
Self-evidently, a manifesto commitment to reduce and tackle anti-social behaviour requires this Minister, this Government and this Home Secretary to go back to the electorate, at some point, to say, “That is the difference that we have made”. While I cannot give the noble Viscount an aperitif today, I hope I can give him a full-course meal after the discussions have taken place further down stream.
It is important, as we have just heard, that if perpetrators breach an injunction multiple times, the police cannot take action unless they take them to court. Under this measure, there will be a criminal action so police can take action immediately.
I wish to tell the noble Lord, Lord Davies, that, for a respect order to be issued, two tests must be satisfied. First, the court must be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the respondent has engaged in or threatened to engage in anti-social behaviour as defined. Secondly, the court must be satisfied that issuing the respect order is just and convenient. A further safeguard introduced is that the relevant authorities carry out risk assessments prior to the respect order being put in place.
These clauses, about which the noble Lord has quite rightly asked questions, are important and I wish to see them retained in the Bill. I am grateful for his overall indication that, when it comes to determining that, he will not oppose these clauses, but I will take away his comments and I hope to continue our discussions in the positive way that we have to date.
I am grateful for the contributions made and to the Minister for his response. Of course, I have no intention of opposing the passage of respect orders. They were part of the Government’s election manifesto and, as such, shall become the law of the land. This does not prevent my criticising them. Indeed, simply because they were part of the Government’s manifesto does not mean that they are a good idea that would have a positive impact on the streets of Britain.
I have provided substantive justification for why I believe that respect orders are, simply put, an effort to paint a picture of a Government bearing down on crime and anti-social behaviour when, in reality, they are not. The proof will be in the pudding; we will see whether the Prime Minister’s so-called tough new respect orders have any actual impact, in due course. For now, I will leave it there.
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to this thoughtful debate on Clause 4 and associated amendments. The discussion has reflected the balance that must be struck between proportionate enforcement and ensuring that penalties remain effective and fair. As anti-social behaviour seems to be increasingly present on our streets, it is right that the clause is given careful consideration.
The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, raised concerns in Amendment 23 about the overuse or inappropriate issuance of fixed penalty notices. Those are indeed legitimate points for consideration, and I am sure that all noble Lords agree that such powers should be exercised carefully and with a proper sense of proportion. Fixed penalty notices are designed and intended to deal swiftly with low-level offending without recourse to the courts, but they must always be used responsibly and in accordance with proper guidance. However, it seems that Clause 4(3) and (4) will help to act as a proper deterrent to anti-social behaviour, as they will play an important part in ensuring that the penalty levels remain meaningful. I look forward to hearing the Government’s thoughts on this matter.
I turn to the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Blencathra. We are grateful to my noble friend for his focus on practical enforcement. His Amendments 24 and 25 seek to strengthen the collection of fines by introducing automatic confiscation provisions and modest administrative charges for non-payment. It is right that those who incur penalties should expect to pay them, and that local authorities are not left to have to chase persistent defaulters at the public’s expense. We therefore view my noble friend’s proposals as a constructive contribution to the debate in order to ensure that enforcement is both efficient and fair.
The noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, has given notice of her intention to oppose the Question that Clause 4 stand part of the Bill. We respect this view, but we cannot agree to the removal of the clause. Clause 4 contains a number of sensible and proportionate measures that are designed to improve compliance and to strengthen the effectiveness of penalties. Many of these reforms build on the Criminal Justice Bill brought forward by the previous Conservative Government.
This debate has underlined the importance of maintaining confidence in the fixed penalty system, ensuring that it is used appropriately and enforced consistently. The system exists to fulfil the wider aim of upholding law and order in our communities. In these endeavours, we on our Benches will always be supportive.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, with the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, for discussing and tabling Amendment 23, and to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for his Amendments 24 and 25. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, for his broad support for the Government’s approach to the main thrust of the issues, although he, like us, slightly diverges from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, which I will come back to in a moment.
I cannot agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Fox—I am afraid that is the nature of political life. These offences are used for things such as dog fouling, littering, vandalism and drunken, aggressive behaviour. They are not trivial or low level; they are things that impact on people’s lives, and the abandonment of the clause would mean the abandonment of the people who are victims of those particular instances. The debate for me is around whether £100 or the £500 that we have put in the Bill is a reasonable figure. I argue to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, that it is practitioners who have said to us that the current £100 limit does not always carry enough weight to stop offenders committing further anti-social behaviour.
I also say to him that, under existing legislation, relevant agencies may already issue fixed penalty notices of up to £500 for environmental offences such as littering, graffiti or fly-posting. We expect that the prospect of a higher fine will act as a stronger deterrent, as the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, has said. These measures were consulted on by the Home Office in 2023, before this Government came to office, and received majority support as an effective deterrent to anti-social behaviour. I do not know offhand whether the Manifesto Club contributed to that consultation, but the point is that a majority in the consultation accepted that the increase was necessary. Increasing the upper limit does not mean that every person breaching an order will receive a fine of £500. The figure could be lower, proportionate to the individual circumstances and the severity of the case.