Oral Answers to Questions

David Nuttall Excerpts

Tuesday 13th December 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Djanogly]

We are certainly promoting mediation as an alternative to court. That is always to be recommended when it is appropriate, which I admit is not always the case. The impact on providers in terms of their sex varies according to the nature of the organisations involved and the nature of the work being undertaken, but there is no real difference between the impacts on male and female solicitor providers of either civil or criminal legal aid services.

[Mr David Nuttall (Bury North) (Con)]

Did the impact assessment also cover the potential effect of the legal aid changes on men?

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

David Nuttall Excerpts

Tuesday 1st November 2011 Commons Chamber

[Kate Hoey]

I, too, wish to congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) on the way in which he spoke, because this issue too often becomes one of exaggeration, where inaccurate things are said on both sides. He gave a very reasoned outline of why this coalition Government are rather silly in proposing this measure at this time and in this way. I, too, have been in this place a long time and I have seen legislation go through as a knee-jerk response to something that has happened. Very often people later regret very much that such legislation went through.

It is quite wrong that something that has been introduced so recently, and where a substantial number of people in a consultation—90% of them—were opposed to it, is being put through in this way. As everyone else has said, this is, in reality, a Second Reading debate. No scrutiny will be provided in the House of Commons on the detail, so all these questions are being raised by different people about different aspects of it and we will not get a full answer. We are abrogating our duty and our responsibilities as Members of Parliament if we allow this measure to go through and hope that it will be dealt with in the other place. I am disappointed that Labour’s Front-Bench team is not taking a more robust view on this measure. There is always a danger for politicians in that regard, because they may worry about what the headline will say, but sometimes the headline is totally inaccurate and sometimes it has been devised because of the inaccuracies, the half-truths and the mistruths that have been put around over a period of time. Even at this stage, I hope that the Labour Front-Bench team will consider amendment (a) seriously.

I believe that the retrospective nature of the measure is quite wrong. I also believe that there is squatting and squatting. The public see the difference in the kind of squatting that we have all condemned, whereby people take over someone’s house because they are away on holiday. However, there is already a law to prevent that from happening and those Members of Parliament who say that that has not been observed in their area should talk to the police because it means that the police are not enforcing the law.

The kind of squatting that I support is the kind that the right hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark (Simon Hughes) mentioned, when large blocks of flats and houses that have deliberately been emptied early by a local authority or a private developer sit empty for months or years waiting either for some work to be done or to be knocked down. I see absolutely no reason why people who have come to London as the capital city of their country to try to get work and to live but who have nowhere to live and no chance of getting a local authority flat or of affording a private sector property should not live in those empty properties. Most of those squatters would be perfectly willing to sign something saying that they will move out as soon as work is to start. Instead, we see such places being left empty for years.

I am very sad indeed that we are seeing this knee-jerk response and that the Government are trying to introduce this measure so quickly. They will live to regret it and I hope that even tonight, at this late stage, Members who have come along thinking that there was no debate to be had and that this was a matter of, “Let’s just get this through”, will think very carefully and will at the very least support the amendment of my hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington.

[Mr David Nuttall (Bury North) (Con)]

I rise to support new clause 26 and I start by paying tribute to my hon. Friends the Members for Hove (Mike Weatherley) and for Finchley and Golders Green (Mike Freer) who, along with myself, have moved this matter up the agenda. I am grateful that the Minister has listened and that we now have some clarification over this area of law.

I have practised as a solicitor and I can tell the House that, regardless of the 1977 Act, this area of law is completely unclear. It is unclear to the police, to lawyers and to home owners and it certainly is not working. Millions of home owners will be grateful that the new clause is, I hope, going to reach the statute book. There could be nothing worse for someone returning from a holiday than to find that their home has been occupied by squatters. Insult is then added to injury if they are told by their lawyer that they need to embark on a long and complicated civil law procedure, and a costly procedure at that.

I note the point that has been made by Opposition Members about there being doubt about the exact numbers of properties that are occupied by squatters, but the fact remains that if a home owner returns to their property to find it occupied by squatters, it is 100% occupied by squatters and the overall statistics are, frankly, irrelevant.

Let me make one further point about the amendment on which I understand we are to divide. It provides that an offence would not be committed

“where the building has been empty for six months or more”.

One point that has already been touched on is of real concern to many people. When a family member dies and leaves a property empty the personal representatives might have to wait many months—often longer than six months—before they can obtain a grant of letters of administration. There are many instances of properties being occupied by squatters in that time and, for that reason if no other, I hope that the House will reject the amendment. The new clause is a great step forward. It is often said that an Englishman’s home is his castle and I hope that this will help to reinforce that.

[Caroline Lucas]

I share the concerns that have been expressed by many Opposition Members about the Government’s proposals further to criminalise squatting. I want to highlight just a few of them. My first concern is the justification for the proposals. Squatting can have devastating impacts, and I want proper redress and protection for anyone who returns from a two-week holiday to find their house squatted, or for someone trying to sell their house who leaves it empty only to find squatters have moved in. But the law already stands to protect people in those instances. The major problem in dealing with cases of squatting is not the law itself but the enforcement of the law, including the time it can take for the courts to issue an interim protection order, for example.

In theory, there is no reason why such an order cannot be issued far more swiftly. In practice, I accept that things can take far too long, often compounded by what appears to be a lack of understanding of the law by many police, who are the first port of call for home owners. That is unacceptable and it needs to be addressed, but those delays in implementing the law often result in cases being highlighted in the media, wrongly creating the impression that home owners are not protected in any way from squatting.

The law clearly states when a criminal act has taken place. For example, section 7 of the Criminal Law Act 1977 makes it clear that squatters asked to leave by home occupiers are committing a criminal offence if they fail to do so.

Access to a Lawyer

David Nuttall Excerpts

Wednesday 7th September 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Slaughter]

The hon. Gentleman makes part of my point for me. There are concerns about the operation of the European arrest warrant, but that is one of the reasons we wish to see the provision of good-quality legal advice and access to lawyers throughout the European Union. He might have his own solution on our relations with Europe, probably a rather more fundamental one than mine or the Minister’s, but we are where we are and it is therefore important that these safeguards exist.

I was going to mention a third case, that of John Packwood. There are unfortunately a large number of such cases, but those are the three famous ones that have featured heavily in the UK press, particularly the Daily Mail, which has championed many of the cases in which the most perverse decisions have been made in foreign jurisdictions. For the people involved and their families, the experience was a nightmare. They were in a foreign country trying to communicate with officials who spoke an unfamiliar language and subject to procedures that were often summary and perverse, and yet they had no knowledge or advice with which to challenge them. It should be a matter of concern to the Government to protect our citizens overseas and ensure that they are given the same consideration as we would grant citizens of other countries visiting Britain, and that they are given the opportunity to do so and, at least for the present, decline.

We should not be slow to see the high standards of justice that British people expect of our criminal justice system applied to other countries. The directive would assist that process. After all, it was the previous Conservative Government who enacted the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, which provided a suspect in police custody with a statutory right to legal advice. Section 58 of the Act states that a person arrested and held in police custody is entitled to consult a solicitor privately at any time. The detention code provides that the consultation may be in person, in writing or by telephone and that free and independent legal advice is available. Therefore, the decision not to opt in to a directive that has the same intention as those provisions seems strange, and I will move on to what the Minister says are the differences.

First, the directive’s requirements are broadly in line with current UK legislation. Where there are divergences—the Minister mentioned one or two—they are negotiable. This is a process of ongoing negotiation, and in some cases they are subject to the requirements of national law. The example of searches, which the Minister gave, is one of those.

Secondly, the negotiations are continuing. As the Minister said, many other countries are concerned that there is inadequate room for derogation and are questioning aspects of the directive. It is therefore unlikely that it will remain in its current form. It seems pointless to send negotiating teams, as the Minister proposes, when we are the only country that intends to opt out at this stage, which fatally undermines the authority and leverage that this country will have. We appear to be throwing away an advantage to British citizens for reasons that are at best unconvincing and at worst spurious. Why have the Government taken this position? The Minister might have seen the briefing from JUSTICE, which takes the Government’s points of objection and states that they are either points that can be negotiated, or points that the Government have got wrong. It looks as though the Government are looking for reasons to opt out at this stage.

Tomorrow, the Minister and I will meet again for the next Committee sitting of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill, and I look forward to that in Committee Room 12 at 9 o’clock. One of the first clauses that we will consider is clause 12, which gives the new director of legal aid casework and, by extension, the Lord Chancellor the power to decide who does and who does not get access to a lawyer in a police station—and to do so on the basis of an interests of justice test.

There has already been an outcry throughout the criminal justice system at that attack on a basic right, which was introduced to avoid the risk of a miscarriage of justice. PACE itself was in part a response to the appalling miscarriages of justice of the 1970s, but, in answer to the criticism that the Minister is taking on a power that will allow the state to regulate who does and who does not get advice in a police station, he says that he has absolutely no intention of taking away legal help from police stations, so why is he then arrogating to himself the power to do so?

Taken together with the premature decision tonight to opt out of the directive while negotiations continue and before any decision needs to be taken, clause 12 of that Bill suggests that the lessons that led to PACE are being forgotten by this Government.

May I ask the Minister three questions, which, if he replies at the end of the debate, he may wish to answer? First, why are the Government not going to do what they did with the earlier stages of the road map and continue negotiations before making a decision on opting out? Secondly, why are they opting out now when there is further time to negotiate? And, thirdly, can the Minister confirm that the Government are committed to the current system of access to counsel in a police station and do not intend to erode that right, and if so explain why they are pursuing clause 12?

The objections that the Government have raised are nugatory and susceptible to change, if there is any merit in them, whereas the advantages to British citizens abroad are clear and substantial. It is not good enough for the Minister to say that we can get all the benefits of the directive if it is enacted in 26 other countries, but that we do not need to bother with it ourselves. That sounds like a clear Eurosceptic “have your cake and eat it” voice from the Minister, and I am not sure that that is what he is saying, but it is a—[Interruption.] I am not sure that Government Members think that that is what he is saying, either, but it is a knee-jerk reaction to opt out at this stage.

[Mr David Nuttall (Bury North) (Con)]

The hon. Gentleman has on a couple of occasions in the past couple of minutes referred to opting out of the directive, but we are not opting out, we are simply not opting in, and in fact there is a big difference, because if we opt in we will never be able to opt out.

[Mr Slaughter]

The hon. Gentleman makes my point for me. The Minister is at least open and clear about attempting to take the benefits. He wishes to do so, and in that I agree with him. Appalling miscarriages of justice occur regularly, and we want British citizens to be protected from that, but we cannot do so without engaging. We can negotiate what are for us as a country relatively minor changes, if changes at all are needed, but if we accept the experts who briefed Justice we find that the Government have misinterpreted those minor changes, to which the Minister alluded, in any event.

In the end, it comes down to this: do we wish seriously to see the proposals implemented, in which case we should be in the game and negotiating clearly, or do we wish to take the Government’s somewhat disingenuous position tonight? For that reason, and notwithstanding the Minister saying that he may change his mind in due course, we will oppose the Government this evening.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr David Nuttall (Bury North) (Con)]

I add my thanks to the European Scrutiny Committee and my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash) for ensuring that we are having another of our regular Wednesday evening debates on European matters. I am also pleased to say that for once I can support the Government’s present position on this issue, although I have to say that I am a little concerned that I might not be so readily able to support what might come in future.

When any of our constituents travel abroad, they do so in the full knowledge that they are entering a foreign country with foreign systems. It seems to me that the fact that there are inadequacies in some of the legal systems of other European Union member states is not a good reason to accept another dollop of European legislation.

I have heard no one suggest that our own procedures and legal systems in this country are not up to scratch. In fact, as far as I can see, it is a case of the rest of the Europe catching up with the systems and procedures that we already have in place. Of course, if we were ever to opt into the directive, we would have to change some of our existing procedures that have served us well. In my short time in the House, I have never had anybody complain to me about the procedures that we have in place in respect of access to a lawyer, the right to consult a lawyer when detained or any of our pre-charge procedures.

[Mr Nigel Dodds (Belfast North) (DUP)]

Whatever one’s view of the current procedures within the UK, surely it is for the House and the UK to decide whether there are to be changes, on the basis of the arguments, which should be fully explored and discussed beforehand, rather than changes coming about as the by-product of a European directive. That is the problem if there are to be changes in the UK system.

[Mr Nuttall]

The right hon. Gentleman makes an extremely valid point. I would have made the same point later, but I shall make it now. I have heard no complaints about our current procedures, but if there were a general acceptance that an aspect of them could be improved, it would be for the House to pass legislation to do so. We would then have the right to tinker with and change them as we wished. Indeed, we have done so. Only very recently, a Delegated Legislation Committee on which I sat altered the rules under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, because this House thought it appropriate to do so.

[Mr James Clappison (Hertsmere) (Con)]

My hon. Friend is making an important point in response to the one made by the right hon. Member for Belfast North (Mr Dodds). Has my hon. Friend turned his mind to the bigger picture? These opt-ins do not come before the House by accident or by way of judicious fine-tuning of our system. This measure is part of a political project that was put in place by the EU to create a European area of freedom, security and justice, whereby rules and laws on criminal procedures and other criminal matters will be made at the EU level rather than in this House, and whereby our law will be subject to that law.

[Mr Nuttall]

My hon. Friend makes another extremely valid point. Whenever I have discussions on European matters with constituents and other members of the public—not surprisingly, I have such discussions fairly frequently—time and again they refer to the fact that they are dissatisfied with our membership of the EU because they believed that the EU was to do with business and trade. They believe that the EU should have no part in justice or home affairs. When we entered the EU all those decades ago, it was never envisaged that the EU would play a part in justice and home affairs. That is one reason why I will continue to push for a referendum. Such things may have been in the minds of those who were pushing for the European project, but they were never in the minds of our electorate. They were never told about that and it was not part of their consideration when they went to vote back in the 1970s.

[Mr Cash]

May I remind my hon. Friend that the Conservative party, for the first time since 1972, was completely united in opposing the implementation of the Lisbon treaty? Only as a result of entering into the coalition agreement did we end up having to accede to many of the provisions that result from the introduction of a treaty that we were previously united in opposing.

[Mr Nuttall]

My hon. Friend makes an excellent point. That is one reason why opposition to our membership of the EU is growing in this country. As I often say to people, in many ways every directive that passes is another nail in the argument of those who will one day argue in a referendum—I believe we will eventually have one—that we should stay in the EU. People are increasingly fed up with the ever-growing competences of the EU. It is all very well to argue that the European Union Act 2011 will put an end to all these things, but we can see—day by day, week by week, month by month—that slivers of competence are going to Europe, and this would be another of those slivers. If the directive were adopted, it would be a classic example of this country’s handing over a further tiny piece of its competence. It might be only a sliver, but this is still a matter of sovereignty. At present, we can decide what our rules are.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

Is this not also a classic example of the European ratchet? First the European arrest warrant allows British subjects going about their lawful business in their own country to be arrested by foreign Governments; then it is decided that there must be basic standards to protect them from such action, because that is only fair and proper; and that then leads to the conclusion that there must be more harmonisation of the criminal law across Europe. In fact, what Her Majesty’s Government should be doing is not just not opting into this, but getting out of all the other measures to which they have agreed.

[Mr Nuttall]

My hon. Friend has made an excellent point, which I am sure would find widespread support outside the House. Far too much legislation from Europe is already foisted on our constituents, and we certainly do not need this as well. It is, in my view, an example of a solution looking for a problem. There is certainly no great clamour for it. When our constituents go abroad, they may well choose to go to Europe—there are, after all, another 26 countries in the European Union—but they may equally choose to visit any of the other 170-odd countries in the world, where none of this would apply. What do they do then?

We ought to consider speaking—quietly and diplomatically, of course—to plenty of other countries which have judicial systems that are far less helpful to the accused than any that might be found in the European Union. This is, I submit, a criminals’ charter. If it were to become law, the criminals and their lawyers would not only have to comply with the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, but would have recourse to this directive as well as the European Rights Act 1998 and the European convention on human rights. It would be yet another hurdle for our police to surmount in dealing with crime and disorder on our streets, and, in my opinion, a problem that we could well do without.

The other group of people who would profit from the directive are the lawyers, particularly legal aid lawyers. As has already been mentioned this evening, it has been suggested that advice be given face to face. I know from my own experience many years ago that when a suspect is arrested, advice is given quite adequately on the telephone, and I see no reason to change that arrangement. Again, there has been no clamour for it to be changed. I see no reason why this country should have to change its practices and procedures purely on the basis of this directive. It may well benefit other countries—indeed, it may well benefit some of our constituents when they travel abroad—but I feel strongly that there is no need for it to be adopted now or at any time in the future. I hope that even when the negotiations have been completed, this will be the last that we hear of it, and that we shall never see it back on the Floor of the House again.

Police Detention

David Nuttall Excerpts

Thursday 30th June 2011 Commons Chamber

[Nick Herbert]

We are seeking to bring forward legislation to deal with the problem sufficiently swiftly to avoid any such impact that may be caused in the interim. We will also seek to mitigate the situation to the greatest possible extent, and I will discuss that with ACPO. Clearly there are implications in respect of resources and also for defendants, because as I said in my statement, it is possible that people will be detained in custody for longer, so the judgment’s practical effects will have implications for both civil liberties and the sensible operation of police bail.

[Mr David Nuttall (Bury North) (Con)]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that judgments such as this, which fly in the face of common sense, run the risk of bringing our justice system into disrepute? How can someone who is free possibly be judged to be inside? At this rate, all our prisons are going to be empty.

[Nick Herbert]

I think that the best way that I could respond would be by quoting the legal expert Professor Michael Zander QC, whom my hon. Friend may have heard on the “Today” programme this morning. He said:

“The only justification for the ruling is a literal interpretation of the Act which makes no sense”.

Sentencing Reform/Legal Aid

David Nuttall Excerpts

Tuesday 21st June 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Clarke]

I agree with all that the hon. Lady has said and we will try to produce programmes that deliver what she obviously hopes we will do. First, we have all the work experience in prison that we are going to provide. We will try to organise serious work as much as possible with the collaboration of outside businesses which, for social responsibility reasons, are often very attracted to getting involved in this area. The work inside prison should be more meaningful and more like the ordinary disciplines of working life outside. It should, with luck, add to the training and employability of those inside. Then we have to tie in with the Department for Work and Pensions’ Work programme and what it is doing to try to get people skills and employment outside. Having a job to go to greatly increases the chances that an offender might not offend again and have more victims—that they might start to go straight—so this is a very important area and we are proposing to make very significant changes in tackling that side of the problem.

[Mr David Nuttall (Bury North) (Con)]

Last year’s Conservative party manifesto stated:

“Many people feel that sentencing in Britain is dishonest and misleading.”

In order to start to restore the public’s trust and confidence in our justice system, if it is a good idea to introduce minimum prison sentences for certain knife crimes, why cannot we have such minimum sentences for other classes of crime?

[Mr Clarke]

The honesty in sentencing issue concerns the fact that it is not currently explained to people that sentences are likely to involve so much time in prison and a further amount outside on licence but subject to recall. We will see whether we can address that and make people understand more clearly what sentences actually imply. It was the previous Government, not us, who moved the amount of sentences being served from two thirds to half—a move that we intend to reverse in the cases of the most serious sexual offenders and violent criminals when we move away from imprisonment for public protection sentences to a more sensible system of determinate sentences.

Prisons Competition

David Nuttall Excerpts

Thursday 31st March 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Clarke]

I think I can. A cohort will be allocated rather than some carefully selected group, so a positive result will reflect some move in reoffending rates, with the consequent reduction in the number of further crimes and victims. I give credit to Serco, because when I went to Doncaster I broached the subject slightly tentatively there, because we were already in a competition process and Serco could just have proceeded perfectly ordinarily on the basis it had already agreed for the tenders with the previous Government. Yet Serco was positively enthusiastic, and I think it sees the pilot as a way of finding out whether it can enter into more such arrangements elsewhere in the criminal justice system.

[Mr David Nuttall (Bury North) (Con)]

I too welcome the statement from my right hon. and learned Friend. Further to the previous question, in view of the fact that prisoners move around the prison estate, what proportion of a prisoner’s sentence must have been served at HMP Doncaster for that prisoner’s record to be taken into account in the statistics?

[Mr Clarke]

I will consult those who negotiated the details of the contracts and write to my hon. Friend with an answer to that extremely pertinent question.

Squatting

David Nuttall Excerpts

Wednesday 30th March 2011 Westminster Hall

[Mike Weatherley]

I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention and I very much agree with him. I will go on to make some specific points about “The Squatters Handbook” shortly.

I said that squatters know the law well but the absolute opposite is true when it comes to the public in general, who would be shocked if they knew just how powerless they are to take on squatters. Many members of the public do not find that out until it is too late. Section 6 of the Criminal Law Act 1977 makes it an offence to use violence, or threats of violence, to gain access to premises when

“there is someone present on those premises…who is opposed to the entry”.

That section is what is usually referred to as squatters’ rights, but I do not believe that it exists to assist squatting. It is in place to prevent unscrupulous landlords from using violence or intimidation to evict legitimate tenants. Squatters, therefore, have such rights only by accident.

A local resident asked me a question in my local paper, The Argus:

“If squatting is a practice that is socially unacceptable, how is leaving a property empty for more than a year any more acceptable?”

My answer is simple—it is not acceptable at all. I have contacted my local council on a number of occasions about the issue of empty buildings belonging to exploitative developers. We should be careful, though, not to embrace squatting on the principle that “our enemy’s enemy is a friend”. We must get tough on bad landlords—and soon—but buildings can be temporarily empty for all sorts of reasons and many of those reasons are entirely acceptable.

[Mr David Nuttall (Bury North) (Con)]

One reason why a house remains empty is the death of the occupier. Such a house can very often lie dormant for months, sometimes years, while the family and the executors sort out probate, and it can be very worrying and distressing if squatters move in during that time.

Oral Answers to Questions

David Nuttall Excerpts

Tuesday 15th February 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Blunt]

Let me take this opportunity to convey, again, our commiserations to the family of Adam Rickwood, who died in such sad circumstances. The short answer to the hon. Gentleman’s question is, of course, yes.

[Mr David Nuttall (Bury North) (Con)]

17. What plans he has for the future of sentencing guidelines.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Mr Crispin Blunt)]

Responsibility for the issuing of sentencing guidelines rests not with the Government but with the independent Sentencing Guidelines Council. It is for the council to decide on what matters such guidelines should be prepared for the courts.

[Mr Nuttall]

I thank the Minister for his answer, but I think that many people outside the House will look to it for leadership on the issue of sentencing. Will he give a clear steer to the council that we must never see a repeat of what we saw last month, when a judge was unable to do what he wanted and send a house burglar to prison because of the sentencing guidelines?

Anonymity (Arrested Persons) Bill

David Nuttall Excerpts

Friday 4th February 2011 Commons Chamber

[Anna Soubry]

My hon. Friend makes an extremely important point. I am familiar with Loughborough Echo. For reasons that I shall not go into because they are completely irrelevant, I buy it and I read it. It is an example of a good local paper, but it is also an example of a paper that is struggling with its circulation. I am delighted that it has such a column. When I worked on the Alloa and Hillfoots Advertiser and Journal, one of the great sources of our stories was the sheriff court. As a trainee journalist, I was duly packed off to sit with my newly acquired shorthand skills, which were extremely limited, and report on what was happening there. One of the problems in our society is that because so many newspapers find themselves in a position where they cannot afford to employ the staff that they used to employ, they are not covering the magistrates courts or the Crown courts in the way that they did. I know that from my experiences at the Nottingham Evening Post, which had a reporter in almost every court.

[Mr David Nuttall (Bury North) (Con)]

I am interested to hear about my hon. Friend’s experiences in Scotland. Can she explain whether the procedures in Scotland were the same as in England and Wales? The Bill affects only England and Wales, and perhaps she can enlighten us on whether the code was the same in Scotland.

[Anna Soubry]

I thank, I think, my hon. Friend for that intervention, although it is the sort of intervention that is not terrifically helpful, in that unfortunately I do not know the answer and I will not pretend that I do. But I do know that throughout the United Kingdom the convention used to be not to report the name and address of someone when they were arrested. When they were charged, it was completely different.

To return to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Loughborough (Nicky Morgan), because people who committed offences, especially in their local community, were dealt with in the magistrates court where there was a reporter from the local press, upon conviction or a guilty plea, their name would be publicised locally. People would know that Bloggs down the road had had his hand in the till, or that Mrs Somebody had smashed the bus shelter. It was almost part of the punishment that people’s names would be in the local paper and that neighbours would know who had committed a criminal offence. It is a great shame that, for perfectly understandable reasons, so many of our newspapers now simply do not have the reporters to cover such cases. There is also a very good argument that they are missing a lot of good cases that they should be covering for reasons that I have explained, and also because they provide good copy.

The other reason why our newspapers and television networks are suffering a decline in circulation and are engaged in a war of ratings is the internet. All hon. Members, especially those of us who are new to this place and fought in marginal seats, are more than aware of the great power of the internet, Facebook, Twitter—truly not my bag; I leave that to people considerably younger than I am. But we are all urged to have our websites and update them regularly, and to send out our e-mail newsletters. We recognise the fantastic benefit that the internet has given to society, but there is a downside. With all good things, there is always a downside. The downside of the internet is that there is an abundance of information; as I have said, for false slurs can stay on the internet in perpetuity. The internet is a genuine alternative for sources of information, including news, to newspapers and television. I have a great deal of sympathy for newspapers that put a lot of their news on their website, which is free.

I have to make this point, because it is important. To their credit, by challenging effectively the financing of the BBC, the coalition Government are asking whether it is fair that its website is completely free to view. The BBC website is an outstanding source of news, but it means that newspapers in particular, as well as other broadcasting companies, operate their websites with one hand tied behind their back, because they do not have the advantages that the BBC has through the licence fee and the other freedoms that it enjoys which allow it to produce such an excellent website.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Soubry]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that intervention, because he makes another important point. That is why the Bill, to cover exactly that situation, enables the prosecution to apply to a Crown court judge for leave to allow the media to publish the name and address of somebody if they believe it is in the interests of justice, which means a belief or a suspicion reasonably held that other people might come forward either to make a complaint or to assist the police in some way in their investigations.

The same exemption exists for the arrested person, because there are instances whereby somebody who is arrested might want their name published, especially in the local paper. For example, somebody might be arrested following an allegation by their employer that they have been stealing from work, and their defence might be not just, “I haven’t done it,” but, “I know my employer has made the same allegation against other workers and they haven’t done it. Somebody’s got their fingers in the till. It’s not me, but they’ve now pointed the finger at me because it suits them and is convenient, so I want my name in the newspaper and I am quite happy for my address and the fact that I work at such and such a place to be published, because I believe that x workers there or other people may come forward with information that will assist my preparation of my defence.” I have allowed for all that, because I do not like blanket bans on anything, and it is always important to recognise that there are exceptions to every rule.

My hon. Friend the Member for Sherwood (Mr Spencer) mentions police investigations, and we forget that in many instances the police are appalled by the sort of coverage that we all saw in relation to the first man’s arrest in Bristol. It is an injustice to the police to say that, in those instances where names and addresses have been leaked to the press, it is always their fault, because it is not. No doubt there are instances when the police give the name and address to a member of the media, and some cash might change hands. I do not have evidence of it, however; I am working only on what others tell me.

In a high-profile case such as the Bristol murder, however, with all the media attention it is almost inevitable that, if somebody is arrested, a neighbour, especially somebody in the proximity of either the deceased or the place where the crime occurred, will see or know that Bloggins has been arrested. The neighbour or somebody else will often just happen to know the person, as people do in any community, not just small ones, and they will give the name to the press. The police do not always do so, and it would be wrong to place all the blame on them.

I do not want to get into a blame game, but if anybody is to blame then responsibility lies with the media and, ultimately, all of us—everybody who buys newspapers, watches television and listens to the radio. If only we could gather together and say, “Enough is enough. I am not going to buy this newspaper, watch that television news programme, listen to that radio station or subscribe to that television channel,” we might make the progress that we all want and, as I have said, cure the mischief that we all oppose.

I very much want to deal with the Contempt of Court Act 1981, to which we have alluded. I shall tread carefully, because we do not want a debate about jurisdiction or to pick over the Act in detail, but, having read it, I and others take the view that in its current form it is not the device to cure the mischief that we all agree must be sorted out. Although the strict liability rule that it imposes—indeed, the whole nature of the Act—deals with people who have been arrested, the rule is clearly designed to deal with cases that, in effect, are in the court process. But if one is arrested, one might never go to court. That is the whole point: unless one is charged, one will not go to court. I hope I am explaining my point fully and in non-legal terms, because the Act does not cover the misdemeanours and wrongs that we all want righted.

[Mr Nuttall]

Does the Act not apply to active cases, and is it not therefore just a problem of interpretation? If we interpreted the Act more strictly, we would capture all those cases.

[Anna Soubry]

With great respect to my hon. Friend, I wish it were as simple as that. The Act certainly deals with people who have been arrested, but it states:

“The strict liability rule applies only to a publication which creates a substantial risk that the course of justice in the proceedings in question will be seriously impeded or prejudiced.”

That is a very high test, and my understanding of its interpretation is that there have to be court proceedings that are likely to be impeded or prejudiced. When somebody is charged, they will go into court very soon afterwards—court proceedings are almost inevitable. At the moment, as soon as somebody is charged the sort of coverage in the press that we see when somebody has been arrested ends completely. That is because the press knows that subsection (2) deals with cases once somebody has been charged because, in effect, proceedings will have begun. There are no proceedings when people are arrested because they have merely been arrested. They can be arrested, taken to a police station but not interviewed, and “bailed back” to another day. That is why the Contempt of Court Act, as it stands, is inadequate.

Whatever happens to this private Member’s Bill, I very much hope that as a result of the publicity surrounding this debate and, particularly, that surrounding the first man arrested in the Bristol case, will turn the Government’s attention to the Contempt of Court Act. If that Act were amended, then people who are arrested could have their name and address published, but all the highly prejudicial material that we saw in the Bristol case would not be published because, in effect, it would be in contempt. Contempt is probably not the right word to use: to put it in lay terms, it is plain unfair and wrong. It may well be that through the Contempt of Court Act, or some other instrument, we can make things better and cure the mischief.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Buckland]

I agree with my hon. Friend about the assertion of facts that could be prejudicial to any future investigation, although I would say that I am now of the view that internet and print media are indistinguishable. The only difference between them is that today’s print is tomorrow’s firelighters—tomorrow’s chip paper, as I think I called it in another debate. The problem with the internet is that it is not just for Christmas, it is for life. I could give a number of examples of constituents who, years after having been exonerated and cleared of very serious allegations, still have to live with the fact that when a Google search is made against their name, a newspaper report about that false allegation comes up. It haunts people who are in that unfortunate situation. As I said earlier, that is a matter for DCMS input and for regulation, because we need consensus about how to deal with the sometimes baleful effects of internet reports that linger for years and years.

I return to what I regard as the grey area between arrest and charge, and the somewhat cumbersome nature of the Contempt of Court Act 1981. As I said in an intervention on my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe, the leave of the Attorney-General is needed before any prosecution is brought, which can often be a cumbersome way of doing things. Such things take time, because obtaining that leave can interrupt proceedings and lead to a delay before a decision is made, which can be damaging in itself. As she said, the test set out in that Act—whether there is

“substantial risk that the course of justice…will be seriously impeded or prejudiced”—

is a high one. It mentions the course of justice, however, and at the point of arrest we do not know whether there will be a course of justice in the sense of a charge. I can see many a clever lawyer—much cleverer ones than me, although I have received a degree of praise today that I perhaps do not deserve—taking that point firmly by the reins and running with it.

In short, the Act, which is celebrating its 30th year, needs revision, and here is my suggestion. We should consider the point between arrest and charge in a different way from the point from charge to trial or conviction. There should be a presumption against the publication of details of an arrested person prior to charge; then that presumption should be reversed post-charge. In other words, we should apply the interests of justice test, but with safeguards in place, acknowledging that the decision to charge is significant. It means that the prosecution has formed the view that there is a reasonable prospect of conviction, and that it is in the public interest to charge. That is an important and simple test that everybody can understand, both in this place and elsewhere, and it should trigger more disclosure.

Prior to that point, unless there are public interest reasons such as those clearly set out in the Bill, the presumption should be the other way around and there should not be publication unless there is a clear public interest such as that my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley (Philip Davies) rightly referred to. I can imagine, and in fact I know of, scenarios in which there is a tight-knit local community or an estate in which a particular issue arises, and it would be in the local public interest to know that suspect A had been arrested. That person may well be known to local people, and it would give them a sense of confidence that the criminal justice system was working. Most importantly, if there were any perceived injustice at that stage, people in the local community could come forward and say, “We think you’ve got the wrong person—will you investigate why?” I can imagine a whole host of community and wider public interest reasons why publication could and should take place.

The observation that my hon. Friend the Member for Dartford (Gareth Johnson) made earlier about limiting the details that can be published to someone’s name and address has merit. In the spirit of the comment of my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe that the Bill is not necessarily the precise device needed to cure the mischief, it could well be that if the Bill proceeds further, or in the course of a wider review of the Contempt of Court Act, we should consider carefully whether setting out clearly in statute a provision for the publication of name and address could cure the problem of the grey area that I have been talking about.

I have mentioned the exceptions that my hon. Friend has set out in clause 2. I welcome them, with one caveat. Subsection (2)(c) and (d) state that it will be in the interests of justice to make a direction when

“it may lead to information that assists the arrested person”

or if

“the conduct of the…defence at trial is likely to be substantially prejudiced if the direction is not given.”

I wonder whether we need the word “substantially”. Perhaps it would be far better to take it out and make the point that if the defendant wants the provision to apply, that is a matter for them. The burden of proof is not on the defendant, as we all know, so perhaps that word should be taken out.

[Mr Nuttall]

I will hopefully have the chance to make this point in my own comments later, but does my hon. Friend agree that subsection (2)(c) and (d) could be removed from the Bill, so that we could have a far easier process whereby the defendant would sign some sort of statement, having taken legal advice, that they were happy for their name to be released?

[Mr Buckland]

I am always attracted by arguments that lead to simplicity, and indeed, that could work. I believe that an interests of justice test should be construed widely, and that when we list particular circumstances, lawyers tend to take a prescriptive view. There is a highly attractive aspect to what my hon. Friend says, and I am sure that my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe would consider such an amendment carefully.

Perhaps we are getting into legalese, and I apologise for that. I shall move on to highlight an interesting local debate in my constituency. My local daily newspaper, the Swindon Advertiser, quite properly has an interest in reporting local crime and antisocial behaviour, and it does so in a largely responsible way. Once or twice I have taken issue with the editor, perhaps when a photograph has been a little insensitive, but broadly speaking I am very much in support of my local newspaper’s work. An interesting debate recently occurred in the paper about whether the names of young people who have been made subject to interim antisocial behaviour orders should be published. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear.”]

I thought that would arouse some interest. My view is that, whenever possible, the names of young people who are on full or interim ASBOs should be published. That goes back to my earlier point about the immediate local community and its clear interest in helping the police enforce ASBOs. As we know, enforcement of ASBOs has been one of the main criticisms of the mechanism, which has existed for the past 10 years. Far too often, ASBOs have failed because of poor implementation.

The problem arises with the interim ASBO. There is a legal halfway house between a full hearing, in which the evidence is set before the court, the court is satisfied to a high standard that the case has been proved, and an ASBO is issued—frankly, publicity should follow that because due process has occurred—and the interim stage, for which the test is whether the judge thinks that it is just to impose an interim ASBO. That is a wide test. In reality, a judge is faced with a wealth of documentary evidence, which the complaining authority in civil proceedings—usually the local authority—has amassed, and reached the view that there is a case to be made and that, in the circumstances, the interim ASBO is just. However, no formal findings of fact have been made at that stage. Again, it is a grey area, and I can see both sides of the argument. However, I believe that when we reach such a stage, the presumption should be in favour of publication. I hope that my analogy between civil proceedings and the criminal process after charge is clear.

I read with interest several leaders in national daily newspapers that either support or oppose the Bill. The Daily Telegraph’s leader struck me particularly as falling into the trap of eliding two issues. It brought together the Bill and celebrities such as footballers obtaining injunctions to prevent the publication of their names and details in relation to salacious stories about them. I see no correlation between that scenario and the purpose of the Bill. Why? In the celebrity scenario, we are dealing with behaviour that has not been denied. It is not a question of celebrity X saying, “Prove it. This never happened.” Instead, the celebrity is saying, “It’s my private life. I’m not getting into whether it happened; I’m not making a big fuss about that—I just want privacy.” That is different from the problem that the Bill addresses.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr David Nuttall (Bury North) (Con)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe (Anna Soubry) on her success in the ballot for private Member’s Bills and on securing the right to bring the important matter addressed by her Bill before the House this morning. Let me also remind Members that I have an interest to declare, as a solicitor and notary public, although I am non-practising and have not practised in criminal law. This debate deals with matters that I have not previously been engaged with.

Let me pick up one or two matters mentioned by earlier speakers. My hon. Friend seemed almost to be suggesting that the Bill should amend the Contempt of Court Act 1981. I can well see from the arguments that have been brought out this morning that there is perhaps a good case for doing that, although that is not what we are being asked to consider this morning. What we are being asked to consider is the Anonymity (Arrested Persons) Bill. However, the whole problem is that the people concerned are not anonymous. We know exactly who they are—or some people do. The difficulty is this: how we do, as a legislature, try to control what other people gossip about? I hope to set out some reasons why I think this will be a very difficult task, indeed, if not nigh impossible.

In reply to an intervention, my hon. Friend the Member for South Swindon (Mr Buckland)—who I see is just leaving the Chamber—was drawn into considering the respective strengths and merits of newspaper reports, as compared with the believability of internet reports. As the years progress, it seems to me that there is increasing parity between the two. Indeed, I submit that what often tends to happen is that something will immediately be released electronically and disseminated on the internet, and then the next day—or perhaps a day or two later—it will be picked up by the mainstream media and the printed newspapers. It does not seem sensible to suggest that the initial disclosure of that information—in this context the name, address and details of an accused person—is any less likely to be believed because it is read on the internet than it is because it is read in a newspaper a few days later, because ultimately that information may have come from the same source.

There can be no doubt that, if passed, this Bill will have an important and wide-ranging impact on the lives of those accused of committing criminal offences. It will also have a substantial impact on the media and, in particular, their crime reporters, one of whom, in a previous life, was my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe—

[Anna Soubry]

rose—

[Mr Nuttall]

To whom I shall happily give way.

[Anna Soubry]

Does my hon. Friend accept that all I am asking for is that we revert to what used to happen? In the past, the name and address of an arrested person—not an accused person: an arrested person—was not published. All I seek to do is to revert to the old convention, which means that we would not have the sort of reporting that we have seen in Bristol.

[Mr Nuttall]

I think that that could be dealt with by the code of conduct for newspapers, which I understand already exists. There is no reason why that could not happen. In any event, the difficulty nowadays lies with the explosion of information on the internet. Therein lies the real problem. Everyone would agree that it is entirely laudable and sensible to ensure that the innocent accused should have their right to anonymity protected. The difficulty is whether we can achieve that in this day and age.

[Philip Davies]

The issue that my hon. Friend seems to be coming to is that people are not just innocent until they are charged, but innocent until they are convicted. Does he not think that what is being proposed could become a Trojan horse, and that the next move could be to say that nobody’s details should be released, not just until they are charged, but until they are convicted of something?

[Mr Nuttall]

My hon. Friend makes a good point. The Bill seeks to suggest that someone who was accused of a criminal offence and then arrested should be entitled to anonymity, but that that anonymity would be lost the moment that a charge was brought. Logically, if the reason for going down that road is the rule that someone is innocent until proven guilty, we ought to maintain the anonymity of the accused right up to the trial, although I can appreciate that there may be reasons why they may not want that.

[Anna Soubry]

Surely the distinction is that, as soon as someone is charged, the Contempt of Court Act 1981 comes into full force. The Act prohibits any publication that would prejudice the court proceedings. The point about the material published in the Bristol case was not only that it breached that man’s privacy but that it would undoubtedly have prejudiced any trial. We all want to ensure not only that justice is transparent but that it is not prejudiced.

[Mr Nuttall]

My hon. Friend makes a valid point. I submit that the reporting in that case fell foul of the Contempt of Court Act. As I said earlier, this raises the question of whether these matters would be better dealt with by an amendment to that Act. Such an amendment, combined with a strengthened code of practice enforced by the Press Complaints Commission, could be the way to address what we all accept is a genuine problem.

Every year, thousands of cases would be affected by this proposed change in the law, and, as with any law that we pass, it is imperative that we should get it absolutely right for the sake of everyone who would be affected by it. The basic tenet of English law that everyone is presumed innocent until they either plead guilty or are found guilty in a court of law is one of the cornerstones of our criminal justice system. I suspect that few, if any, people would dispute the sense of that basic principle. It is perfectly sensible that the Bill should seek to protect any innocent individual who runs the risk of having their character blackened, possibly for the rest of their life, merely as a result of having been arrested by the police. That arrest could well have come about as a result of the malice of someone who was entirely ill-intentioned, and the arrested person could be entirely innocent of having committed any crime.

My concerns about the Bill lie not so much in the principle behind it or in the fact that it seeks to put right an area of the law that is clearly wrong; they lie in the problem of enforceability. My first question is: why should there be a change in the law now, when we have managed without one for centuries? The answer lies in the development of the media. I am not just talking about the printed media—sometimes rather unfairly referred to these days as the “dead wood” or “dead tree” media—or the radio and television; we are now in the age of the internet and the social media.

In the past, it was relatively easy to monitor the media, and I suspect that the media were rather more deferential in their reporting of the private lives of individuals. As my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe has said, in the past, the reporting simply of a name and address would have been sufficient for many newspapers. Nowadays, we have the 24-hour rolling news service on radio and television that we all enjoy, although I am not sure that many politicians would use the word “enjoy” in connection with the demands of those news media. There is now an insatiable desire for more facts, of even the smallest nature, that can be released to keep the whole show on the road.

[James Morris (Halesowen and Rowley Regis) (Con)]

Is my hon. Friend saying that we should not seek to update the law to reflect those momentous changes in the way in which information circulates on social networking sites? Does he think that we should just abnegate responsibility for the content of the internet, saying, “Well, actually, the law can’t deal with this, so we should not seek to update it to protect the interests of the public”?

[Mr Nuttall]

My hon. Friend raises a crucial point. The difficulty that I have with the Bill is that I am not sure how enforceable it would be. I am not suggesting for a moment that we should not attempt to deal with the problem merely because it is difficult. However, because of the nature of the internet, it might not be possible for us sensibly to enforce the law in any meaningful way. The fact that the media in all their forms—particularly, in this context, the electronic media—publish the identity of an accused person has led to the Bill being brought to the House today. That is also what gives rise to one of the Bill’s potential flaws.

[Mr Spencer]

May I draw my hon. Friend’s attention to the weight that the public attach to a news report? If that report is on Sky News or the BBC, or in a newspaper, the general public will attach great merit to it and expect it to have been researched. However, if it has been posted on a social networking site by, say, my brother’s uncle’s mate’s niece, it will simply be viewed as gossip and will have no impact on someone’s ability to get a job in the future.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Nuttall]

The initial release of such information could well come from someone who had seen their neighbour being taken away by the police in the early hours of the morning, and who had used a social media platform such as Twitter to tweet the news to their followers. Would their friends think, “This information has come from Fred, and I don’t believe it”? I suspect that their friends would think, “Yes, I do believe that.” One of those friends could be a journalist at Sky, who might think, “This has come from Fred, so it must be true,” and, within minutes, the information could be on Sky News. I am not sure that my hon. Friend’s scenario works.

[Philip Davies]

I tend to agree. Does my hon. Friend accept that when certain websites about which we know very little are competing with the more respectable end of the media and the press to report a particular case, people might choose to say, “I believe the stuff that’s on the BBC and in the newspaper that I read, rather than the stuff on that website”? If, however, there were no information about the case on the BBC or in the respectable press, the public would not be able to differentiate in that way, and they would have to accept that what they were reading on the website was true.

[Mr Nuttall]

My hon. Friend makes a good point. That raises the question of whether the BBC and the other outlets would then have to release a story denying what was on that website. These issues would all arise from the operation of the Bill. I referred to the case of someone who tweets that their next-door neighbour was taken away in the early hours by the police. Would that be caught by the Bill? I am not sure. The Bill has been released without explanatory notes, so I apologise if I refer to matters that might have been clarified in them.

How far must publication go before an offence is committed? Does one tweet count as publication, or is it only published when a neighbour passes it on or when the tweet is picked up by mainstream media? It is a minefield.

[Anna Soubry]

With great respect to my hon. Friend, one tweet would not amount to publication. Many statutes prohibit the publication, notably, of a child’s name. There is no difficulty with somebody tweeting a name. However, there is profound difference in publication. Such details can be thrashed out in Committee, but should not impede the Bill’s progress.

[Mr Nuttall]

I raise such matters for the very reason that they could be considered in Committee, and I am sure that they will be.

As the House will be aware, before an individual can be charged with a criminal offence, the police must consider whether there is a reasonable prospect of securing a conviction. That is far less onerous than having to decide on the civil law standard of balance of probabilities, or having to apply the test of “beyond all reasonable doubt” that will ultimately be applied by the court and, in more serious cases, by a jury. That raises the question of whether the Bill goes far enough. My hon. Friend the Member for Shipley (Philip Davies) referred to the fact that amending the Contempt of Court Act might be another way of dealing with the matter. In the case of persons who are arrested and subsequently charged, but for whatever reason the charges are dropped—whether because of new evidence coming to light, some other person confessing to the crime, or the prosecuting authorities changing their minds about the prospects of success—their identity would already have been revealed, so they would not benefit from the operation of the Bill.

We should ask ourselves this question: in this modern era, is it possible to afford any individual the protection that the Bill seeks to provide? Within minutes, any article published on an individual private website can spread to millions around the country and indeed the globe. I am conscious of the intervention made by my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe, and if one tweet does not constitute publication, how many tweets would do so? As with the spreading of rumour, that is the problem. Such people will have no knowledge of any media code of conduct or concern about the concept of genuine public interest, which we are discussing. They will be concerned not about legality, but about simply passing on an interesting titbit of information that has come their way. It is the modern-day equivalent of a good gossip over the garden fence.

As all Members will be aware, a rumour that has started to circulate is very difficult to stop, and the damage is already done. An allegation might damage a person’s reputation for the rest of their life, especially if it relates to child abuse or a crime of a sexual nature. For anyone who wishes to protect the identity of an arrested person, the challenge is how to prevent an individual who is in possession of the information about the suspect’s identity from passing on that information. The Bill would deal with publication but not subsequent dissemination, especially by social networks. In essence, it is virtually impossible for the House to pass effective legislation against the spreading of rumour. I doubt that it would ever have been possible, even in the past when rumours would have spread mainly, if not exclusively, by word of mouth. With the prevalence of the internet and the almost universal use of mobile electronic communication devices, such legislation would be virtually unworkable.

Clause 1 states:

“Where a person is arrested for an offence then neither their name nor address, nor any still or moving picture, of that person shall—

(a) be published in England and Wales in any publication available to the public in written, electronic or any other form; or

(b) be included in a relevant programme for reception in England and Wales”.

Immediately, we see another of the potential pitfalls and problems with the Bill, which can extend only to England and Wales. Consequently, we could have the bizarre situation in which a newspaper can publish in its Scottish or Northern Irish edition the full details and photograph of the arrested person, but not in England and Wales.

[Anna Soubry]

That is because Scotland continues, rightly, to have its own system of justice. The provision has been lifted from all the other Acts that deal with such issues. Exactly the same argument could be made about the Contempt of Court Act, which works extremely well to ensure that once somebody is arrested there is no prejudicial reporting. With great respect to my hon. Friend, the issue that he understandably raises is a red herring.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Nuttall]

I am not sure whether my hon. Friend is saying that the law in Scotland would prevent such publication. Will she come back to me on that?

[Anna Soubry]

My point is that we have two co-existing systems of law that work well together. We have a Contempt of Court Act that prohibits prejudicial material being printed and published in this country, and it does not have an impact on Scotland in relation to any publications up there that prevent someone from having a fair trial. We already have laws that protect individuals after they have been charged, that ensure non-prejudicial trials and so on. All the Bill would do is extend that protection to people who are arrested.

[Mr Nuttall]

I accept that, but I still think that the Bill leaves open the possibility that media outlets will publish information outside England and Wales, although perhaps not in Scotland or Northern Ireland. There are international news agencies nowadays, and the Bill makes no reference to publication by foreign media outlets. It is fairly easy for anyone with access to the internet to access any foreign media publication. The identity of the person concerned might well be a secret to people in England and Wales, but billions of people around the planet would know exactly who that person was.

As well as the problem of how to control the worldwide media, another problem would almost certainly arise if the Bill were passed: that of piecemeal identification, which is apparently also known as “jigsaw identification”. Clause 1 would not prohibit the publication of any information at all about the arrested person; it merely prohibits the prohibition of the person’s name or address or

“any still or moving picture”.

So what will happen? One newspaper will publish, perfectly legally, the information that the suspect is a male, thus promptly halving the number of possible suspects. A radio station will then broadcast the fact that, although it cannot broadcast any information, it knows that the suspect owns a dog. Another newspaper will publish the fact that although it, too, cannot reveal any information, it does know that he is a prize-winning daffodil grower. We can see where this is going. It is clear that, taken together, those pieces of information will narrow the field of identification to a point at which it is possible to identify the person concerned. We will know everything about that person’s lifestyle, gender, age, hobbies and interests and even—possibly—workplace.

The whole of the protection afforded by clause 1 commences only when a person is arrested: in other words, when a police officer says to the suspect, “You do not have to say anything, but it may harm your defence if you do not mention when questioned something which you later rely on in court. Anything you do say may be given in evidence.” The clause provides no protection before that point.

My hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe said earlier that nowadays, because of the use of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, the old phrase “helping police with their inquiries” is used less frequently than it once was, but I think she would agree that in those circumstances the Bill would not cover people who were “helping police with their inquiries”, because they would not have been arrested. Anyone can, of course, choose to help the police with their inquiries, and if someone did so of his or her own free will, the Bill would offer no protection.

Clause 2 sets out the exceptions to the reporting restrictions specified in clause 1. As I said briefly earlier, my concern relates to paragraphs (c) and (d) of subsection (2), which refer to the ability of the person who has been arrested to make an application if

“it may lead to information that assists the arrested person”

or

“the conduct of the arrested person’s defence at trial is likely to be substantially prejudiced if the direction is not given.”

The direction referred to is that given by a Crown court judge under clause 2(1)

“that section 1 shall not apply to a person who has been arrested where satisfied that such a direction is—

(a) required to comply with the Human Rights Act 1998;

(b) in the interests of justice; or

(c) otherwise in the public interest.”

It seems to me that it would be easier and, perhaps, better for the accused person if, rather than going down that route, he could simply sign a written statement to the effect that he was happy for clause 1 not to apply in his particular case. He could be afforded protection from some over-zealous and over-keen media outlet that wanted simply to push the piece of paper in front of him by requiring it to be witnessed by an independent legal adviser, who would have to certify that he had advised the accused person of the effect of giving up his rights under the Bill.

Clause 3 states:

“If any matter is published or included in a relevant programme in contravention of section 1, the following persons shall be guilty of a summary offence—

(a) in the case of publication in a newspaper or periodical, any proprietor, any editor and any publisher of the newspaper or periodical;

(b) in the case of publication in any other form, the person publishing the matter”.

Therein lies a potential difficulty. Although “publication” is defined in clause 7, which deals with interpretation, “publisher” is not. I submit that there could be some difficulty in establishing the identity of the publisher involved, especially in the case of an internet publication. The question arises of whether an internet service provider or a domain host would be caught by the provisions. I accept that the answer to that question may well be found in clause 4, which states

“A defence is available to a person charged under section 3 where at the time of the alleged offence they were not aware, and neither suspected nor had reason to suspect, that the publication or programme in question was of, or included, the prohibited matter in question.”

In clause 5, the Bill goes on to provide for criminal penalties. I think that my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe said that she had a general aversion to creating new criminal offences, so I wonder whether she has considered whether the problem might have been addressed with a civil procedure and damages, rather than by creating another criminal offence.

[Anna Soubry]

It is right that the man in Bristol, for example, can use the civil courts in relation to what has been printed about him, should he believe—and I think that there is a good argument—that he has been defamed, and in due course he might receive damages. My argument, however, is that the damage has been done, so I am seeking to prevent publication in the first place. That is how we should cure the mischief, as we put it.

[Mr Nuttall]

According to clause 5, if someone is found guilty of an offence under clause 3, they are

“liable on conviction for a term not exceeding 6 months, or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum”.

I am not sure what the statutory maximum is.

[Anna Soubry]

Six months.

[Mr Nuttall]

I do not know how much the maximum fine is.

[Anna Soubry]

I do not know off the top of my head the maximum fine in the magistrates court for a summary offence, but it will be in the range of thousands. I do not know what scale is used. We need the assistance of my hon. Friend the Member for South Swindon (Mr Buckland), who unfortunately is not in the Chamber at the moment.

[Mr Nuttall]

My hon. Friend will agree that a fine of that nature would probably not deter most international media outlets, but the threat of prison might do so.

[Philip Davies]

Does my hon. Friend not see great irony in the fact that, while we appear to be moving in the direction of letting lots of people out of prison, and allowing people to commit multiple burglaries and violent crimes without being sent to prison, the Bill could send a newspaper editor to prison simply for stating a fact?

[Mr Nuttall]

There is a risk that someone convicted under the measure could be sent to prison, as the Bill provides for that, and it is possible that it could happen to an editor. Clause 6 helpfully sets out exactly who might be affected, and applies

“if an offence under this Act is committed by a body corporate”.

If

“the offence is proved to have been committed with the consent of connivance of—

(a) a senior officer of the body corporate, or

(b) a person purporting to act in such a capacity,

the senior officer or person (as well as the body corporate) is guilty of the offence and liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.”

Clause 3(3) provides the relevant definitions:

“In this section—

‘director’, in relation to a body corporate whose affairs are managed by its members, means a member of the body corporate,

‘senior officer’, in relation to a body corporate, means a director, manager, secretary or other similar officer of the body corporate.”

The term “manager” is rather vague, because there are lots of managers in an office, and we would not want all of them to be affected by the Bill. My hon. Friend the Member for Shipley is right that, theoretically, the editor of a publication could be imprisoned if their publication was found to have contravened its provisions.

[Anna Soubry]

My hon. Friend will be aware that a breach of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 can result in a maximum sentence of two years. The corporate bodies identified in my Bill are merely copies of what exists in other pieces of legislation without any difficulty, to make sure that when it is right and proper, the anonymity of certain people is maintained. I am sure that he will agree that it is not the Government’s intention to release from prison people who have repeatedly committed violent offences or who have repeatedly committed offences of dwelling-house burglary.

[Mr Nuttall]

I do not want to stray from the debate into the general subject of the prison population. Suffice it to say that the Bill would, if enacted, create an additional offence—we can all agree on that. The basis of enforcement would rest on the threat of sending individuals to prison, so there is a theoretical possibility of the prison population increasing.

My argument so far has focused on the impact of the internet and its role in media coverage. The matter was considered by the Government last year, following the suggestion that anonymity should be provided in rape cases. The report issued in November 2010 stated that anonymity for those accused of rape has implications for media reporting. We know that under section 2(3) of the Contempt of Court Act, media coverage of active proceedings must not create a substantial risk of serious prejudice to the case by unduly influencing jurors.

Concerns are often raised about such influence in high profile cases, some of which have been mentioned, so I will not refer to them again. Legal judgments about whether media coverage amounts to such strict liability as contempt are usually based on what is called the fade factor—the idea that media reporting is less likely to affect the jurors, the further away it is from the trial. One of the ways that we could consider to right the perceived wrong is to reduce the fade factor, and give a definition in law to try to eliminate it as a factor to be taken into account in contempt cases.

The availability of rolling 24-hour news on demand presents new challenges to media coverage of criminal cases. When a jury is sworn in, the judge will often tell jurors not to look for information about their case on the internet, and will repeat at the end of each day that they are not to go on the internet and make inquiries into the case. Nevertheless, the internet exists, the explosion in its use is likely to continue, and therein lies the greatest difficulty in trying to enforce such a Bill. I shall now allow others to contribute to this important debate.

--- Later in debate ---

[Philip Davies]

My hon. Friend is right. There is the added complication that the law might be applied differently depending on the characters of the individuals who happen to hold the positions, so there is scope for tension.

[Mr Nuttall]

Regardless of the outcome of the debate on the extent of the Contempt of Court Act, one thing of which we can all be sure is that it does not apply to Australia, for example. The Australian, which is on sale in newsagents in London, could easily publish the kind of information under discussion.

[Philip Davies]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. One need only visit any newsstand in London to see a huge number of foreign newspapers being sold. Because they are being sold in this country, those editions might well be covered by the Bill—

Estates of Deceased Persons (Forfeiture Rule and Law of Succession) Bill

David Nuttall Excerpts

Friday 21st January 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr David Nuttall (Bury North) (Con)]

I remind the House that I am a solicitor and notary public, although I no longer hold a practising certificate for either profession.

I congratulate my right hon. Friend the Member for East Yorkshire (Mr Knight) on using this opportunity to introduce his Bill in such a selfless way. Few could have anticipated that debate on a Bill with as dry a title as Estates of Deceased Persons (Forfeiture Rule and Law of Succession) Bill would have resulted in references to unprotected sex in the back of a motor vehicle; that will certainly enliven those who read Hansard, I am sure.

I thank my right hon. Friend for clarifying, in response to an intervention by my hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch (Mr Chope), the difference between tax avoidance and tax evasion. All too often in recent months, Members on both sides of the House, including those on the Treasury Bench, have got those two terms muddled up, and have muddled them in the minds of the electorate. Historically, there has been a clear division in law between tax avoidance and tax evasion. If the Bill comes into use, by way of a disclaimer somebody might say, “That’s tax evasion, or avoidance,” but there is a big difference between the two terms, and I am grateful to my right hon. Friend the Member for East Yorkshire for making that clear.

Many Members, if they had come fifth in the private Members’ Bill ballot, would understandably be tempted to go down the road of popularism, and to use the opportunity to jump on whichever bandwagon happened to be passing. It says a great deal about the public-spiritedness of my right hon. Friend that rather than go down that path, he used the opportunity that he gained in the ballot to bring before the House this Bill, which, with the best will in the world, can be described only as a legal and technical measure. As I shall mention later, it has gone through what can only be described as a very long and tortuous period of gestation to be with us this morning. The Bill may be a technical measure, but it could affect many people in years to come. Many a family may well be profoundly grateful for the changes to the law of succession that the Bill seeks to introduce.

So what problem does the Bill seek to solve? Essentially, it would prevent grandchildren from being punished for the sins of their parents. In common law, it has long been the rule—often referred to as the forfeiture rule—that when someone unlawfully kills a person, they cannot benefit from the person’s estate. In short, they cannot inherit property from the deceased person whom they have murdered or otherwise unlawfully killed. Of course, even non-lawyers may be familiar with that common-law rule, as it has featured in many a murder mystery story over the years. Fans of Agatha Christie-type whodunnits may well have come across the rule as part of an interesting subplot to many a gripping yarn.

The forfeiture rule is an example of the general legal principle that a person should not be allowed to profit from his or her crime. That general common-law rule was, of course, enshrined in the Forfeiture Act 1982, which has been mentioned. I should like to clarify that the Act makes it clear that when someone is convicted of murder, the court has no discretion over whether to enforce the rule; it is only when a person is convicted of manslaughter that the court is given discretion over whether to apply the forfeiture rule in full.

As the House will be aware, a person who dies without making a will is said to have died intestate. When someone dies intestate and leaves no spouse surviving, but only a child, the law would, in the ordinary course of events, provide for that child to inherit the mother’s or father’s estate, but of course, in accordance with the rule to which I just referred, a problem arises if the son or daughter has unlawfully killed their parent.

That is more or less what happened in what is usually referred to as the leading case on the subject, which set in train the whole sequence of events that led to the Bill being brought before us this morning, and that is the case Re DWS (deceased), which was eventually quoted in the Court of Appeal in 2001. To understand the background to the Bill, I submit it is essential that the facts of that case, and the details of the judgment given, be examined, because it gives the best explanation of why the Bill is so essential.

In 1993, the son, whom I shall refer to as RS, murdered not one parent but both—Mr and Mrs S. Neither Mr nor Mrs S had made a will, and they were survived not only by their son, the murderer, but by his son—their grandson, T. T was a minor, and claimed in the court action the estates of his grandparents through his mother, who was acting, in legal terms, as his next friend, as he was of course too young to bring the action himself.

To understand the case fully, it is essential that we know what other surviving relatives there were. Mr S did not have either parent surviving him, but he did have his sister, Winifred. Sadly, by the time the case was heard, Winifred had died; she died in April 1995. The House will recall that the murder took place in 1993. Her estate was therefore represented by the persons who became the first, second and third defendants in the action. Mrs S was in a similar position; she did not have a surviving parent, but she did have a brother, Jack, and a sister, Gladys. However, although they both predeceased Mrs S, the sister, Gladys, had two children, who became the fourth and fifth defendants in the case.

The proceedings on behalf of T, the young grandson, were launched in 1995. T, through his mother, sought grants of administration covering the estates of both his grandparents, and he sought a declaration that he was entitled to those estates once he reached the age of 18. The grants of representation were made, and the only issue with which the judge—His Honour Mr Justice Blackburn, in the first instance—had to concern himself was the entitlement of T to the estates. It was accepted at the trial that the son, R, was disqualified from benefiting from his parents’ estate under the principle of public policy enunciated in a number of cases, the leading case being the 1892 case of Cleaver v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association.

As Mr S died intestate, the devolution of his estate fell to be determined in accordance with the provisions of sections 46 and 47 of the Administration of Estates Act 1925. Section 46(1)(ii) states:

“If the estate leaves issue but no husband or wife the residuary estate of the intestate shall be held on the statutory trusts for the issue of the intestate”.

When Mr S died, he left issue in his son, RS, and his grandson, T. With RS ruled out because of the forfeiture rule, the question was whether the grandson could inherit. I cannot put it more succinctly than the trial judge, who said:

“The plaintiff’s entitlement arises, if at all, under the statutory trusts set out in section 47(1)(i).

Under the terms of that provision, however, the plaintiff, as the son a child of the intestate, can qualify only if he is within the definition of: ‘issue living at the death of the intestate who attain the age of eighteen years or marry under that age of the intestate who predeceases the intestate’.

On its face therefore, section 47(1)(i) requires:

(a) that as issue of a child of the intestate, the plaintiff should

(i) be living at the death of the intestate”—

which of course T was—

“(ii) attain the age of 18 or marry under that age”—

although that was not yet achieved, the grandson might have gone on to do so—

“(b) that his father, RS, being a child of the intestate, should have predeceased the intestate”—

which was not the case. The judge concluded:

“Literally applied, therefore, the plaintiff cannot satisfy the conditions laid down for him to take.”

The counsel instructed to represent T, Mr Barlow, submitted that the crucial section 47(1)(i) should be construed as though RS had predeceased his father. Not surprisingly, the judge rejected that submission:

“Persuasively though the argument was put, and sympathetic though I am to the plaintiff’s plight, I cannot accept Mr Barlow’s submissions. In my view the relevant authorities do not justify such an approach. If anything they assume that as happened of course, the offender must indeed be taken to have survived his victim.”

It was then necessary to determine whether Winifred’s executors—the House will recall that Winifred was the murdered man’s sister—should inherit. The difficulty was that, if her estate was to benefit, compliance with section 46(1)(v) was required. That provision requires the intestate to have died without husband or wife, or issue or parent. However, there was issue, because both the son, RS, and the grandson, T, had survived. There were two possibilities for the court to consider.

First, as the conditions set out in subsection(1)(v) had not been satisfied, Winifred’s estate could not take, in which case, the estate of Mr S would pass to the Crown as bona vacantia. In view of the current state of the public finances, some people in the Treasury may well think that there ought to be more cases in which the Treasury stands to benefit, but that was not a matter that the court took into account. Secondly, notwithstanding the non-satisfaction of the conditions required for the operation of that subsection, the next available class could nevertheless take, where a person from an earlier class, although in existence, is disabled from taking.

Although it appears from the situation that prompted those questions that Winifred’s estate was entitled, it was not one that, according to the research undertaken by counsel, had been the subject of a decision in any previous reported case. The question had arisen—and had been considered in the context of a disclaimer, rather than in the application of the forfeiture rule—in the case Re Scott (deceased) and Widdows v. friends of the Clergy Corporation in 1975. I do not propose to go into the facts this morning; suffice it to say that the decision in that case was that if one class of potential beneficiaries had disclaimed, and there were no members in subsequent classes, that did not prevent members of a class with a lower entitlement from inheriting.

[Mr Knight]

My hon. Friend is dealing with two important cases, but does he agree that they illustrate that our intestacy provisions are defective, and that the Bill seeks to put that right? The intestacy rules are a default mechanism, designed to help people who did not make a will, by channelling their property to their nearest blood relatives. Those cases show that there is a defect in that mechanism that is enabling further, distant relatives to benefit in those narrow cases, which is something that the Bill seeks to put right.

[Mr Nuttall]

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. Reading in even more detail the transcripts of those judgments, it was clear to me that the judges, certainly at first instance and again in the Court of Appeal, struggled with that dilemma, because they knew that in cases of intestate succession the will of Parliament was that the closest issue to the deceased should inherit, whereas the operation of this rule meant that more distant relatives were taking. In the case Re DWS, they concluded reluctantly that, with the best will in the world, they could not override the wording of the 1925 Act.

The judge decided that the case provided a common-sense if not entirely logical answer to the problem arising from RS’s disqualification from benefit. The Treasury was not represented in that case and decided that it would not even appear, so I think that the judge was looking for a way to ensure that at least someone in the family benefited, which is why he seized on the case of Scott as a way out. He stated that, if necessary—and he did not think that it was—the same result could be achieved by implying that the words “capable of taking” were added after the words “no issue’” in section 46(1)(v). The inclusion of those words was another way around the problem.

When I read the details of all the cases, it seemed rather odd that the judge was prepared in effect to add the words “capable of taking” into an Act. However, when it came to the previous rule, there was no way round it. Had he not made that decision, and found a way to get round the forfeiture rule, perhaps we would not be here today and there would be no need for the Bill. As a result of that approach, the estate of Mr S did not pass to the Crown as bona vacantia, but to Winifred’s executors.

That, of course, all led on from a murder in 1993. The case began in 1995 and reached the Chancery Division at Newcastle-upon-Tyne in March 1999. The decision was appealed on behalf of the grandson and the case went to the Court of Appeal in November 2000. Three years later, in July 2003, the Department for Constitutional Affairs asked the Law Commission to review the relationship between the forfeiture rule and the law of succession. In particular, the terms of reference specified that the review should be carried out with reference to the difficulties highlighted in the case Re DWS (deceased).

[Mr Knight]

Will my hon. Friend confirm that there was no suggestion at all in the case Re DWS that the grandchild had in any way aided and abetted the murder? He was an innocent potential beneficiary who lost out. Indeed, I believe that at the time of the murders the grandchild was only two years of age.

[Mr Nuttall]

I was not aware of the precise age of the grandchild, only that he was a young minor. I apologise: the preamble to the law report does state that RS had a two-year-old son, so it is fair to say that at that age he was entirely innocent. His mother, as I mentioned earlier, was acting on his behalf to ensure that he would not suffer as a result of the acts of his murderous father.

The Law Commission embarked on an investigation of the matter. It was asked to explore ways in which the law might be reformed to prevent the apparently unfair outcomes of the sort that occurred in that particular case. In October 2003, the Law Commission published a consultation paper entitled “The Forfeiture Rule and the Law of Succession”. It was in July 2005—another two years having passed—that the commission published its report. We can see how the years passed—it was 10 years since the start of the case and 12 years since the original murder.

In the introduction to its report, the Law Commission stated:

“It is clearly right to exclude a murderer from inheriting, but it seems unfair to exclude the murderer’s children as well. This outcome appears arbitrary: it is not based on public policy, but it is a by-product of the way the intestacy legislation is drafted.”

The Law Commission’s recommendations in its report of July 2005 were, first, that there should be a statutory rule that when a person forfeits the right to inherit from an intestate through having killed that intestate, the rules of intestate succession as laid down in sections 46 and 47 of the Administration of Estates Act 1925, as amended, should be applied as though the killer had died immediately before the intestate.

The Law Commission recommended, secondly, that when a person forfeits a benefit under an intestacy through having killed the deceased, but as a result of the reforms, property devolves on or is held for a minor descendant of the killer, the court should have the power to order that the property be held by the Public Trustee, who should administer it so as to avoid benefit to the killer. Thirdly, when a person forfeits a benefit under a will through having killed the testator, the will should be applied as though the killer had died immediately before the testator unless the will contains a provision to the contrary.

The fourth recommendation was that where a person forfeits a benefit under a will through having killed the deceased, but as a result of the reforms property devolves on or is held for a minor descendant of the killer, the court should have power to order that the property be held by the Public Trustee, who should administer it so as to avoid benefit to the killer. Fifthly, when a person disclaims an inheritance either under a will or under the law of intestacy, the inheritance should devolve as if the person disclaiming had died immediately before the deceased. The sixth and final recommendation was that when a person loses a benefit under intestacy by dying unmarried and a minor but leaves children or remoter issue, the property should devolve as if that person had died immediately before the intestate.

The following year, in 2006, the then Labour Government accepted the Law Commission’s recommendations and included the provisions to implement them in part 3 of a draft civil law reform Bill which they put out for consultation in December 2009. Seven of the eight respondents to part 3 of the consultation on the Bill supported the reforms and agreed that the new law would be fairer and simpler to operate.

[Lyn Brown (West Ham) (Lab)]

I have been listening with rapt attention to this modern-day “Bleak House”, although I am sure the hon. Gentleman will agree that the prose is not quite as eloquent as that of Charles Dickens. Given that the Bill proposes a remedy to the particular difficulties that the hon. Gentleman has highlighted in the cases that he has placed before us, is he not prepared to accept the Bill and allow it fair passage through to its Report stage?

[Mr Nuttall]

I certainly wish the Bill well. I am about to express my concern at how long it has been held up in the legislative process. The report from the Justice Committee referred to that.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I am loth to disagree with the hon. Member for West Ham (Lyn Brown), who always makes fine points, but on this occasion may I encourage my hon. Friend to give us a full explanation so that we can thoroughly understand why the Bill is necessary? Legislation is a big and weighty matter and should be brought in only for major issues where there is real concern. We need to understand that, and I am grateful for the fullness of my hon. Friend’s explanation, which I hope will be even fuller.

[Mr Nuttall]

I am extremely grateful to my hon. Friend for that intervention. The Bill would not be before the House had it not been for the original case. It raises the question how many other cases in solicitors’ offices throughout the land have been determined on the back of that Court of Appeal case without ever going to court because the solicitors would say, “We know what the law is because of the Court of Appeal ruling in that case.” Many cases may have been dealt with in that way.

It has now been 18 years since the murder, and 10 years since the judgment, which raises the question of how fast we have progressed with the matter.

[Mr Knight]

As far as I can ascertain, having looked at the figures, the Bill will affect about 200 cases a year.

[Mr Nuttall]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for that helpful information. If we extrapolate from that, disregarding the fact that the legal proceedings took six years from their launch to their conclusion, we can calculate that in the past 10 years around 2,000 cases have been affected by the delay in bringing the matter to fruition.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Sir Alan Beith) referred to the evidence that Professor Beale gave to the Justice Committee when it prepared its sixth report, which was part of the pre-legislative scrutiny procedure for the draft Civil Law Reform Bill. Professor Beale had indicated the difficulties in implementing the Law Commission’s recommendations. With regard to limitation periods, one problem was that the delay had been so long that new cases had come along in the meantime and changed the legal position.

The Secretary of State for Justice at the time, the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw), had accepted that there had been delays in implementing the Law Commission’s recommendations. He said that the draft Civil Law Reform Bill had “been in process” since he had been at the Ministry of Justice. He said:

“One of the difficulties… is that this is an important measure but there have always been other… demands on the legislative programme in the past which have meant that it has been squeezed out, because it is worthy—I actually think very important in terms of what it is doing—but it has not been seen as such a high priority.”

I am sure that those affected by that in the 2,000 cases would think that it is an extremely high priority. He continued:

“That is the honest trust about it… There has also been an extensive period of consultation.”

Well, he is certainly right there. He continued:

“The original proposals, for example, in respect of damages following fatal accidents, which were in the Law Commission proposals, have themselves been refined since then. But if you are saying: ‘Does that take 11 years?’, the answer to that is no.”

There are clearly problems with the procedures. If the case highlights anything—it is perhaps something that the House should look at—it is how the recommendations of the Law Commission are put into legislation. The Minister might have something to say on that later.

The Justice Committee did much pre-legislative scrutiny on that draft Bill and produced an excellent report on it, so it is interesting that the coalition Government have now announced that they do not intend to proceed with it. Were it not for the good fortune of the decision by my right hon. Friend the Member for East Yorkshire to adopt the Bill after his name was drawn in the ballot, I wonder how long the work of the Law Commission and the subsequent legislative scrutiny of the Justice Committee would have languished in the parliamentary waiting room.

If the Bill passes into law, the position would be clarified by virtue of the inclusion of proposed new section 46A, which provides that where a person is entitled to inherit on an intestacy but has either disclaimed their right or is precluded from inheriting by the forfeiture rule, that person is to be treated as having died immediately before the intestate. Clause 2 makes a similar provision to cover cases in which a person dies having left a will and a beneficiary under that will either disclaims or is precluded from inheriting by virtue of the forfeiture rule. Clause 3 provides that in the tragic case of a single parent under the age of 18 dying intestate and leaving a child or children surviving, the estate of the intestate—

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

Would my hon. Friend explain a little more about the circumstances under which a testator could leave provision that would not be affected by the Bill? I have been unable to work out how a person who is murdered could have expected and anticipated that in their will. Would he elaborate on that point?

[Mr Nuttall]

My hon. Friend makes an excellent point. One of the problems is that the affairs of a person who is murdered are left hanging in mid air. If they have not made a will, their affairs might be left to the vagaries of the intestacy laws. If they have made a will and have been murdered by their son, law might provide for the estate to pass to that son anyway.

[Mr Knight]

My hon. Friend, like me, is a lawyer, so I hesitate to suggest this to him, but is not the answer to that question that any good will has a default position? If a testator gives to a son a share of the estate, which might be a 100% share, and that son then murders the testator, thus becoming prohibited from inheriting under the forfeiture rule, a good will would state that in the event that a son does not inherit, the estate should go to person A, B, C or whoever. Does my hon. Friend agree that a well-drafted will should cover that eventually? In my view, a will that does not do that and merely gives money to one person, without stating what will happen if that person cannot inherit, is an appallingly drafted will.

[Mr Nuttall]

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right, and I am sure that my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Jacob Rees-Mogg) has taken that comment on board. It was exactly the point I was about to make. I would add that I am sure that professionally drawn wills would, in the vast majority of cases, make further provision for substitution. As I know from experience, many wills are made at home—home-made wills—in which case people might not be so careful or think that it is even necessary to think beyond their nearest and dearest. They simply write their will at home, with two witnesses, and leave it at that. In such circumstances, if that person had an only child and that child murdered the testator, there would of course be nothing that the testator could do about it. However, if the person dies within a year of the act, it can still be classed as murder. The person might linger and still have appropriate testamentary mental capacity to make another will and change it. I could imagine those circumstances arising, although I accept that they would do so rarely.

Clause 3 provides that in the tragic case whereby a single parent under 18 years old dies leaving a child or children surviving, the estate of the intestate is distributed as if the single parent had died immediately before the intestate. That point was covered adequately in the comments of my right hon. Friend the Member for East Yorkshire.

My right hon. Friend thinks that the issue will affect 200 estates a year, but in future many thousands of estates will benefit from the proposals in the Bill. One thing is certain: many families will be for ever grateful that this measure was brought before Parliament. I certainly wish it well, I am pleased to see that Members on both sides of the House support it, and I trust that it will have the support of the whole House.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Nuttall]

I think that, in fact, my right hon. Friend was a little more successful: he was drawn fifth.

[Mr Djanogly]

I am very grateful for being put right on that point, so fifth place it was. My right hon. Friend could no doubt have chosen any one of numerous topics from his own extensive experience without consulting anyone, and I am sure that it would have been a topic well worth debating and, perhaps, legislating on. Instead, however, he decided to consult the Law Commission and ask whether any of its recommendations, as he said earlier, were suitable for a private Member’s Bill and unimplemented. Those discussions led him to the commission’s draft law reform (succession) Bill, which was published in the Commission’s 2005 report, “The Forfeiture Rule and the Law of Succession”.

The provisions of that draft Bill had, by the time my right hon. Friend was considering what to do with his place in the ballot, been published with minor modifications as part 3 of the draft Civil Law Reform Bill. Those provisions, which my right hon. Friend adjusted in the light of the response to the distribution of estates provision in the draft Civil Law Reform Bill, form the basis of the Bill that we are debating today.

As the Minister responsible for the general law of succession in England and Wales, and as a Minister in the Department that sponsors the Law Commission, I am doubly pleased to be able to announce the Government’s support for this Bill on the law of succession; and I was pleased to hear from the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent South (Robert Flello) that the Opposition support the Government’s position in that context.

My hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch asked why the commencement date is not three months after Royal Assent, and the simple answer is that that is to allow the professionals and others to prepare for commencement: there will be wills to be re-looked at and so forth. Before considering the substance of the Bill, I should like to record the Government’s thanks to the Law Commission for its work on the forfeiture rule and the law of succession.

Law Commission Bills are by their nature likely, legally speaking, to be very technical, and this Bill is no exception. There is more to a law reform Bill than technical accomplishment, however; we have to be sure that it delivers the desired policy outcome effectively and efficiently. In that respect, the Bill has the additional advantage of having already in effect been carefully scrutinised by the Justice Committee. I know that my right hon. Friend the Member for East Yorkshire has paid careful attention to the Committee’s conclusions, and I thank my right hon. Friend the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed, who as Chairman of the Justice Committee considered the draft Civil Law Reform Bill and, I am delighted to say, has returned to that role in the current Session. I am also grateful to the other hon. Members who served on that Committee with him when they scrutinised the draft Civil Law Reform Bill.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed, the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent South and my hon. Friend the Member for Bury North asked in different ways about the Law Commission’s wider Bill and the Government’s attitude to the commission. The Government are committed to ensuring that the law is modern, simple and accessible, and we hold the commission’s work in high regard. I am confident that the measures flowing from the Law Commission Act 2009, both the protocol and the duty to report annually to Parliament, along with the new House of Lords procedure for Law Commission Bills, will help to improve the implementation rate of commission proposals. A higher rate of implementation will help to ensure more effective and accessible law, delivering better value for money as valuable Law Commission work is put to good use.

Five reports have been implemented or received Royal Assent over the past year: those on the rules against perpetuities and excessive accumulations, third parties’ rights against insurers, trustee exemption clauses, on reforming bribery and parts of its murder, manslaughter and infanticide reports.

My hon. Friend the Member for Bury North also asked what we are doing about the wider Civil Law Reform Bill issues. Decisions not to take forward the Law Commission’s excellent work are always difficult, and they are not taken lightly. It is a difficult time at the moment, and the Government have to be realistic about what they can achieve when there are other pressing priorities and a reduction in resources.

A great deal of the Law Commission’s work requires primary legislation to implement it, and it is very difficult at present to secure parliamentary time for legislation that is not a high priority or that does not deliver significant financial savings. Deciding not to take forward the proposal in the Law Commission’s reports on damages, personal injury, medical, nursing and other expenses, claims for wrongful death and pre-judgment interest on debts and damages, was not easy. However, in the current financial climate we need to focus our resources on delivering key priorities.

Having said that, I think that the new protocol on best practice between the Government and the Law Commission, agreed in March last year, should help. The protocol aims to ensure that the Law Commission takes forward only projects to which Departments are fully committed; that there is a close working relationship during the project; that the Law Commission produces impact assessments looking at the costs and benefits of proposals; and that Departments respond quickly once the Law Commission reports.

The Law Commission will soon be putting forward proposals for its 11th programme of work. That will be the first programme agreed in the light of the new protocol, and I am confident that it will assist in reducing delays both in responding to the Law Commission when proposals are accepted and in implementing them.

However, neither the Law Commission nor the Justice Committee could function as effectively as they do without the support of those who respond to consultations and calls for evidence. The experts who give freely of their time and experience are perhaps the unsung heroes of law reform work. It is invidious to single out organisations or individuals, but I note that the Law Society and the Bar Council replied not only to the Law Commission’s 2003 consultation and the Ministry of Justice’s 2009 consultation, but gave evidence to the Justice Committee in 2010.

I would like to thank all those who have replied to the Law Commission, the Committee and my own Department over the years. Unsurprisingly, the Bill does not reflect all their views, but I can assure them that their comments were all carefully considered and taken into account. I am confident that this Bill would command the support of the overwhelming majority of them.

I will now explain why the Government are supporting this Bill. Obviously, we are pleased that the Bill represents a return on the investment of public money in the Law Commission. The Government are committed to ensuring that the law is modern, simple and accessible. Usually, and properly, it is the Government who introduce Law Commission Bills; there is, however, no reason at all why the introduction of Law Commission Bills should be the preserve of the Government alone. Indeed, I would encourage hon. Members who in future years find themselves well placed in the ballot for private Members’ Bills to consider whether they might imitate the example of my right hon. Friend and discuss with the Law Commission whether any of its Bills might be suitable for debate. My right hon. Friend has set a very good example, and I thank him for that.

However, more fundamentally, the Government support this Bill because it will make the law fairer. To understand what is wrong with the law, it is necessary to go back to 1994 when a certain individual was convicted of the murder of both his parents; various hon. Members have referred to the incident. He was described in the press as an “evil conman” and

“a grasping son who repaid his parents’ lifelong devotion by bludgeoning them to death”.

He duly received two life sentences, but it is not the monstrosity of his crimes that underlie the Bill before us today—rather, it is what happened to his parents’ property, which was apparently worth more than £1 million and highlighted the problem with the law.

Apparently, the killer’s parents had made it clear to their son that they would not provide for him on their deaths; they would provide only for his young son, their grandchild. To go back to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset, if only they had made clear wills in favour of the grandchild, their apparent wish to support him would have been accomplished. However, no wills were found and their property was distributed according to the statutory intestacy rules.