Railways Bill (Ninth sitting)

Edward Morello Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 3rd February 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Jerome Mayhew]

I think we have to decide what GBR is going to be. Is it going to be a stand-alone organisation that is trying to run itself efficiently, providing value for money for the taxpayer and hopefully, one day, a check on the Secretary of State? Or is it going to be a creature of the Department for Transport that is told what to do and having its decisions second-guessed? This is a big decision that the Government have to take.

The clause creates a huge risk of stasis, as GBR gets bossed around and becomes a passive recipient of instructions from the Department for Transport. I worry that it is a recipe for future disaster, so I have questions for the Minister. What factors will the Secretary of State take into account when deciding the general level and structure of fares? Why is the Secretary of State in a better position to take those decisions than GBR is, given the objects that she has set the organisation? What additional information will she use that is not available to GBR? I will be grateful for the Minister’s answer. At least it is clear that any future failure of the railways will be down to the Department for Transport and the Secretary of State, not to GBR, since the power to guide and then direct and then set fares lies expressly with the Secretary of State.

My amendment 45 would remove the Secretary of State’s ability to give directions and set guidance as to the general level and structure of railway fares, thereby preventing ministerial intervention in how fares are set and making that decision separate from political influence. When considering amendment 45, Rail Forum said:

“We support this as it should be for GBR, as an arm’s length body and the directing mind, to determine fares not the Secretary of State.”

Amendment 148 in the name of the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage would remove the power to give binding directions over fares—another version of our approach.

The clause as drafted is overreach by the Department for Transport and exactly the kind of micromanagement that the Minister claims will not happen. Why do we need these powers?

[Edward Morello (West Dorset) (LD)]

It is an honour to serve under your chairship, Mrs Barker.

As the shadow Minister outlined, amendment 148 tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Didcot and Wantage is not overly dissimilar to Conservative amendment 45 in what it tries to achieve, but I will come at it from a slightly different angle. Clause 33, as drafted, gives the Secretary of State the power to issue binding directions to Great British Railways on the level and structure of fares. We have said many times that the Bill already grants the Secretary of State extensive influence over GBR. Allowing binding directions on fares risks tipping that influence into outright micro-management. It opens the door to the imposition of short-term political decisions, rather than long-term, evidence-based decisions about fares being made by those responsible for actually running the railways. It is a tool that can be misused, particularly in times of fiscal or political pressure.

Even if the current Government assure us that they would not misuse the power, the problem is that once it exists, it exists for all future Governments. I hope the Government will recognise the inherent risk in that and support amendment 148, thereby preventing not only themselves but all future Secretaries of State from being able to abuse the power.

[Keir Mather]

On the role of the Secretary of State in setting parameters for fares, we have had a lot of debate in the Committee about the need to ensure efficiency on behalf of taxpayers, who are also passengers on the railway. It is the Secretary of State who ultimately has the democratic responsibility to do so; therefore, it is right that the power exists to set broad parameters as they relate to fares. However, that process must be undertaken transparently. Parameters will be set through guidance and public service contracts, which will be published and open to scrutiny. The Bill says that the Secretary of State can direct on fares, but not that she will do so regularly. That is important to the point about overreach, and the exceptional circumstances in which direction might be a wise provision to have in the legislation. I will turn to that later.

[Keir Mather]

The right hon. Member is far too eager. I shall turn to that in due course.

Amendment 148 would prevent the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers from issuing directions to GBR relating to fares, and amendment 45 would do the same for directions and guidance. I remind hon. Members that, as I said when we debated the directions and guidance clauses earlier in the Bill, the strategic parameters and guardrails that the Secretary of State will set for GBR on fares may not ultimately be delivered through directions and guidance by default.

Clause 33 already allows for provisions on fares parameters and guardrails to be included in public service contracts awarded to GBR for operating passenger services. Nevertheless, it is crucial that the Secretary of State retains the powers to direct and give guidance to GBR on fares. It is necessary that the Government and GBR alike can respond to exceptional circumstances, which may necessitate a swift reappraisal of the strategic approach to fares. That is precisely what the Secretary of State’s directions-making power allows for, supplemented by the ability to issue guidance, to ensure a clear and speedy response if there is a crisis or unexpected change in context.

Amendments 148 and 45 would remove those options for the Secretary of State and, in fact, for Scottish Ministers where GBR is operating services that they designate. The Government strongly believe that that is not in the interests of passengers or taxpayers. I agree with Opposition Members that we do not want Ministers interfering with day-to-day fares policy. GBR will have the freedom to define its fares policy within the parameters and guardrails set out, simplifying fares, removing duplication and, in turn, improving value for money. It will therefore be set up to succeed from the outset. Contrary to what Opposition Members believe, the powers in clause 33 do not undermine that.

[Edward Morello]

I know it has probably been overused already in the Committee, but I keep returning to the NHS England example. The Government set up arm’s length bodies and Ministers are then invariably unable to resist the urge to tinker. The Government devolve responsibility out and then realise that having something completely arm’s length, which they have no control over, is very unattractive when they are politically responsible. What starts off being explained as happening only in exceptional circumstances invariably becomes day to day. The amendments are an attempt to protect against a repeat of the mistake with NHS England, which the Government are now having to unpick.

[Keir Mather]

We have repeatedly had this allusion drawn between NHS England and the NHS on the one hand and the Department for Transport and GBR on the other. I do not believe that these examples are analogous. NHS England replicated functions in a way that did not serve the interests of patients or taxpayers who paid into the health service. The entire principle here is to take decision-making power from DFT, which under this broken system remains the only body truly accountable for what happens on the railway, and to give it to GBR, in a way that empowers it to ensure that services run in the public interest and represent value for money. I cannot envisage that Members across the House would not think it reasonable, within very broad parameters, to retain some ability to have political accountability in the fare-setting process in exceptional circumstances, such as during the pandemic. That is wholly sensible in making sure the railway continues to offer value for money for both passengers and taxpayers, who are ultimately one and the same.

--- Later in debate ---

[Olly Glover]

I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention, although perhaps she is advocating another concept called gin miles, which would definitely be beyond the scope of our new clause. She makes the strong point that there have been examples along the lines of this idea in pockets of the network. The new clause would put the idea on a national footing, boost good practice and give GBR positive things to offer its customers from day one. Perhaps it would even compensate for the ghastly livery that GBR is telling us all is so wonderful.

[Edward Morello]

I want to speak in support of new clause 13, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Didcot and Wantage. The new clause is our proposal for a rail miles scheme, as he eloquently laid out, but I want to add a couple of things. First, a rail miles scheme would encourage people to return to rail time and again, reward passengers for regular use and provide additional flexibility and discount. As has been outlined, we have seen existing or similar systems in respect of Eurostar, supermarkets and air miles, and, in certain cases, within the UK railway system.

It is worth stressing that, importantly, new clause 13 does not mandate the introduction of a scheme. It would require a report on how a customer loyalty programme could work in practice, boost passenger numbers and be designed to remain affordable and cost-effective for the taxpayer and the Government. All we ask for is an evidence-based review of rail miles as an important step towards a fairer system. As it is not a mandate but simply a request for the Government to look into the idea, the new clause should be relatively easy for the Government to support.

[Keir Mather]

Let me start by reasserting the principle that we do not want Ministers to be micromanaging the railway. However, the point about gin miles was very well made and I shall relay it to GBR.