Public Order Bill

Eleanor Laing Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 23rd May 2022 Commons Chamber

Second Reading

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)]

The reasoned amendment in the name of the Leader of the Opposition has been selected.

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[Richard Burgon (Leeds East) (Lab)]

I thank the Home Secretary for giving way, and I hope she gives way to my Front-Bench colleague, my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper), in due course.

I have been listening carefully to the Home Secretary. In the context of this cost of living emergency, the Government are threatening anti-trade union legislation and pursuing voter suppression through voter ID, and draconian anti-protest laws are now being brought in. Will the Home Secretary come clean and admit that this Government know that their economic policies will be increasingly unpopular, so they want to remove everyone’s right to resist and fight back, whether through voting, industrial action or peaceful protest?

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)]

Order. The hon. Gentleman indicated to me that he would like to speak in the debate, and that he would like to speak not at the end of the debate. He has just made half of his speech, which puts me in rather a difficult position, and I hope everyone else will remember that. Interventions are good for debate, but they must be short.

[Priti Patel]

Let me put the hon. Gentleman’s remarks into context. First and foremost, the right to protest is part of the freedom and democracy that we all cherish in our country, and no one should interfere with that right at all. But I suggest to all hon. Members on the Opposition Benches—some of them write to me frequently to complain about the removal of criminals, foreign national offenders and so forth—that the types of protest specific to the Bill are those where a significant amount of disruption has been caused. He speaks about economic policies, the cost of living and costs to taxpayers. The protests around High Speed 2 have led to an estimated cost of £122 million. Policing Extinction Rebellion protests between April and October 2019 cost the public purse £37 million. The “Just Stop Oil” protests—as Essex Members of Parliament, Madam Deputy Speaker, we will appreciate this, along with our constituents—left Essex police alone with costs of £4.6 million. That is resource from the frontline that is used elsewhere. That resource could be used to protect our communities. That is why these measures are so important.

We all passionately believe in causes. The hon. Gentleman and others on both sides of the House speak with passion on a range of causes—we in this House are advocates and representatives of the people—but we do not make policy as a country through mob rule, or disruption in the way in which we have seen. No democracy can do that. No democracy needs to do that. The protesters involved in the examples that I presented have better, alternative routes to make their voices heard, and they know that.

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[Janet Daby]

My right hon. Friend is making a powerful speech. Does she agree that protests are noisy, and that in this Chamber we are also noisy when we are protesting or disagreeing during a debate? When the Prime Minister enters the Chamber, Government Members cheer as though they were at a football match—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)]

Order. This should be an intervention, not a speech. The hon. Lady should not be reading an intervention. Interventions should be so short that Members do not have to read them. If she has something brief that she wants to say to the shadow Home Secretary, she may do so.

[Janet Daby]

Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker. Does my right hon. Friend agree that the Government need to recognise that noise has a way of releasing tension so that people can get their point across and be heard and recognised?

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[Yvette Cooper]

A retrospective clause might affect not only the right hon. Gentleman but the Prime Minister —not that the Prime Minister has much of a record of taking seriously offences that he has committed or their consequences.

The problem with the Bill is that not only does it not respect the principles in respect of defending historic freedoms to protest, but nor does it contain sensible measures to safeguard national infrastructure. The Bill does not recognise the powers that the police and courts already have and the need to ensure that they can be used effectively; nor does it address some of the key changes currently faced by the police and authorities. The Bill does not include an effective strategy to avoid disruption to essential services, and there is clear evidence that some of its measures just will not work. At the same time, the Bill does not safeguard historic freedoms to protest—quite the opposite: it undermines those freedoms and targets peaceful protesters and passers-by instead.

Let me look at the proposals in more detail. The police and courts already have a range of powers that they can use in the minority of cases that involve serious disruption or criminal activity. They include powers in respect of wilful obstruction of a highway; criminal damage; aggrieved trespass; public nuisance; breach of the peace; breach of conditions on processions and static protests; harassment; threatening, abusive and disorderly behaviour; trespassory assemblies; preventing others going about their lawful business; and injunctions.

If someone blocks the road outside an oil refinery, they are already covered by the offence of wilful obstruction of a highway. If someone vandalises tankers, they are already committing criminal damage, which is an offence. Indeed, that is why more than 100 people have so far been charged by Kent police and Essex police as a result of Insulate Britain offences, and why the independent report on protests by Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary and fire and rescue services recognised that there were different views, even among police officers, about whether more powers were needed.

I have heard from police officers—including the chief constables and former chief constables of forces that have dealt with protests over many years—both about problems that the Bill does not deal with at all and about their concerns about the Bill’s extension of the powers that they already have, which they say are sufficient. One officer told the inspectorate that

“the powers are sufficient; it is the ability to implement them that is the challenge due to lack of resources”.

There are challenges for the police if they deal with people who are determined to break the law repeatedly and are not deterred by the fact there are offences, but police also referred to concerns that sometimes even when offences had been committed there was no enforcement by the Crown Prosecution Service or the courts because of

“substantial backlogs in court”

and

“so much time passing since the alleged offence that the CPS deemed prosecution to be no longer in the public interest”.

The Bill addresses none of those issues. The inspectorate also raised concerns about lack of training, guidance and co-ordination among forces and authorities—issues that we raised in Parliament when we discussed this issue last year but that the Government dismissed.

We have heard from officers who have said that the most effective measures that they use in the face of potentially serious disruption and problems are injunctions, but the problem is the delays involved in public and private authorities getting injunctions in place. The advantage of injunctions is that they can be targeted at the problem. They often come with much swifter enforcement processes than individual offences, with the courts taking them seriously and escalating penalties. Not only can they act as a deterrent but, crucially, they include judicial oversight, which ensures that powers are not misused. Yet we have heard from police officers frustrated by the slow response from private and public authorities that have the ability to seek such injunctions, but instead leave the responsibility to tackle disruption to the police rather than taking greater responsibility themselves. Police chiefs, too, have been frustrated by the fragmented institutional response; there are so many different private contractors and organisations involved that no one takes responsibility.

If the Government were serious about the resilience of our vital infrastructure, they would have much more effective partnerships in place to make sure that companies act and co-operate, and that everyone understood their shared responsibilities. They would make sure that they understood the right to peaceful protest and the responsibility to safeguard essential infrastructure, and could get injunctions in place fast. They would be working to get the capacity, training and guidance in place that the police and the authorities need.

Instead of all of that—instead of those common-sense approaches—the Government have chosen to widen hugely powers on stop and search and on banning orders, which will affect both peaceful protesters and passers-by. Stop and search powers are hugely important as a way of preventing crime, but they can also be very intrusive and humiliating powers, which, if used in the wrong way, can be counterproductive and undermine legitimacy and trust in policing. Rightly, they are designed to be used to prevent the most serious crime—knife crime and drug dealing—and the police themselves have recognised serious concerns about disproportionality and about those who are black being much more likely to be stopped and searched than those who are white. Those powers should be used sensibly and not as a political football.

The police already have the power to stop and search someone who they believe has equipment that could be used for criminal damage, but the Government want to widen that to cover anything linked to a public order offence, including public nuisance and serious annoyance. We should ask the Government what that includes. They believe that noisy protests are a public nuisance, but does that include stopping and searching for a boombox or even for a tambourine? We concede that tambourines can be annoying, but could that be covered by the stop and search powers? That would allow the police to stop and search people not because they suspect them of being involved in a protest but simply because they are passing by an area where a protest is likely to be held.

What would that mean? Let us imagine that police expect an angry protest in a town centre by local residents who are furious that their local library is about to close. Those local residents’ singing and shouting would undoubtedly be a serious annoyance to those who are studying or using the library and reading quietly. Under the Government’s new rules, they could easily be covered by public order offences. In response, a local police inspector could designate the town centre a section 60 area and stop and search not only peaceful protesters but passers-by.

Let us think, too, about what that means for Parliament Square, where there are protests all the time and sometimes, people go too far and commit public order offences and the police rightly have to step in. But the offences that can be used to justify a section 60 stop and search order in this Bill are really broad and now include noisy protests that cause public nuisance and serious annoyance. I have an office that overlooks Parliament Square and I can say that there is definitely noise, loud music and serious annoyance every Wednesday before and after Prime Minister’s questions. With gritted teeth, I defend their right to be seriously annoying but the Government do not, so, again, under this Bill, a police inspector could designate Parliament Square every Wednesday and stop and search MPs, our staff and civil servants on their way to work, and also tourists and passers-by. Does the Home Secretary really think that we should all be stopped and searched every time the Prime Minister comes to Parliament? It sounds totally ludicrous, but that is what this Bill does.

The Government also want to be able to apply serious disruption prevention orders to people who have never been convicted of a crime. They want to be able to restrict where someone goes, who they meet and how they use the internet, even if they contributed only in some broad way to people causing disruption to two or more people. Again, the Government are extending powers that we would normally make available just for serious violence and terrorism to peaceful protest. Police officers themselves have said that this is,

“a severe restriction on a person’s rights to protest and in reality, is unworkable”.

[Interruption.] The Minister for Crime and Policing says that they have not, but that is what it says in the inspectorate’s report.

The inspectorate also said, that it agreed with the view shared by many senior police officers. It said that

“however many safeguards might be put in place, a banning order would completely remove an individual’s right to attend a protest. It is difficult to envisage a case where less intrusive measures could not be taken to address the risk”.

The inspectorate’s report also said:

“This proposal essentially takes away a person’s right to protest and…we believe it unlikely the measure would work as hoped.”

The Policing Minister is right: that is the view not of a police officer, but of the Home Office, which was submitted to the inspectorate.

There is an alternative approach for the Government: to work sensibly with the police, local authorities and those who run public and private infrastructure; to support the right to peaceful protest; to work together to safeguard essential infrastructure; to review the measures that they have just introduced before coming back for more; to work on training, guidance and resources that public order teams need; to work on streamlined plans for injunctions that could protect the smooth running of essential infrastructure if needed; to work in partnership with essential services such as the NHS and not just with oil and gas supplies; to accept that protests that this Government find seriously annoying are a vital part of our democracy; and, ultimately, to drop this Bill.

The Government should use this time to bring in a victims’ Bill that could increase the rape prosecution rate; that could provide more support for victims of crime; and that could take more action to get dangerous criminals behind bars or more community penalties to prevent repeat offending by first-time offenders. Instead of wasting time stopping and searching people outside a library protest, they should do something to tackle the serious antisocial behaviour and rising crime across the country; do the job of a Home Secretary instead of grandstanding and making headlines; and do the proper, practical work of keeping our communities safe.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)]

I hope that we will manage this afternoon’s debate without a formal time limit, but that will depend on everyone taking less than eight minutes. I am sure that that can be achieved. It will be a much better flowing debate if we do not have a time limit, so I trust Members not to abuse the privilege of having the Floor.

[Nickie Aiken (Cities of London and Westminster) (Con)]

As is seen week after week, my constituency of the Cities of London and Westminster tends to be the epicentre of political protest in this country. That is hardly surprising, as it is home to the Government, to Parliament and to the UK’s financial heart in the City of London.

I am sure that many hon. and right hon. Members can imagine that the effective management of protests, particularly the most disruptive, is of interest to my constituents. They have first-hand experience of having to negotiate their daily lives with the rights of others to protest.

In the hundreds of letters and emails that I have received from constituents highlighting the disruption that they have suffered during the days and weeks of organised protests, not one has called for the right to protest to be curbed. When it comes to public order, it is especially important to ask ourselves why the measures outlined in this Bill are proper and necessary. What has been made clear to me by both the Metropolitan police and the City of London police is that existing legislation has not kept pace with the evolving tactics of modern-day protesters.

Specifically, the lack of a lock-on offence makes it almost impossible for the police to balance lawful protest and basic civil rights. Provisions in this Bill will change that. Clauses 1 and 2 will allow police pre-emptively to stop highly disruptive, and in some cases dangerous, lock-ons. Clause 1 is of particular importance, as it will make locking on an offence where such an act,

“causes, or is capable of causing, serious disruption”.

That is absolutely right. We have seen individuals glue themselves to vehicles or use lock-on devices on the public highway.

Last August, those tactics were used on Tower Bridge by protestors who brought parts of Central London to a standstill for hours. Protestors have encased their arms in tubes filled with concrete and locked themselves to makeshift structures at huge heights. We have even seen reports of protesters inserting nails and blades into those pipes in an effort to make removing them more difficult and dangerous for our police officers.

We cannot overlook the very real concerns of thousands of ordinary people who are disrupted by demonstrations that go well beyond what is necessary. I utterly disagree with the suggestion that just because we agree with a cause, the disruptive activity is right. It is not. Protest tactics using lock-on devices are not just inconvenient for many, but can have real-life consequences—emergency vehicles unable to attend 999 calls, missed hospital appointments or someone unable to get to a dying loved one to say goodbye.

It also frustrates me and many of my constituents that police officers involved in policing those protests are taken away from policing their neighbourhoods and concentrating on their local policing priorities. It is not just Westminster and City of London police officers being taken away from their daily duties. During a number of major days-long protests, I have seen officers from the home counties and Bedfordshire policing central London. I have even come across police vans in Covent Garden with the word “Heddlu” on them, which is Welsh for police.

Removing lock-on devices safely requires specialist policing teams to be deployed in what can be high-risk environments, which takes time and significant resources. Just one protest group, Extinction Rebellion, had a total of 54 days of protest between 2019 and 2021, costing some £1.2 million a day. I therefore welcome clause 2, which would allow officers to act on reasonable suspicion that satisfies visual and intelligence-based qualifications to prevent the use of highly dangerous lock-ons.

Since the publication of the Bill, I have listened to the argument that the offence is not necessary, and that the offences of wilful obstruction of the highway and aggravated trespass cover these actions. To an extent, that is true. However, they are only applicable after assembly of the structure, by which point we will have seen a chain of events that will ultimately lead to serious impositions on the surrounding area, businesses and local people.

The sticking point in the Lords on the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 was provisions specifically relating to noise or limiting freedom of expression. I recognise that, and I accept that, for this kind of legislation, we need to reach an agreement that satisfies both this and the other place. However, I stress that clauses 1 and 2 of this Bill are absolutely necessary to rebalance lawful protest and civil rights. After all, in non-violent protests, the duty of the police is to take a balanced and impartial approach towards all those involved in or affected by the protest—an approach that is consistent with both human rights law and domestic legislation. We must ensure that both lawful protest and everyday life can continue without the basic rights being infringed in respect of either. I believe that the Public Order Bill does exactly that.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)]

I call SNP spokesman Anne McLaughlin.

Public Order Bill

Eleanor Laing Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 18th October 2022 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for Crime, Policing and Fire (Jeremy Quin)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government new clause 8—Injunctions in Secretary of State proceedings: power of arrest and remand.

New clause 1—Guidance on locking on—

“The Secretary of State must by regulations issue guidance to police forces about the protest technique of locking on, which includes—

(a) examples of best practice, and

(b) detailed guidance on addressing new and developing forms of locking on.”

New clause 2—Consolidated protest guidance—

“(1) Within three months of Royal Assent to this Act, the Secretary of State must by regulations issue guidance which consolidates into a single source—

(a) the College of Policing’s authorised professional practice for public order guidance,

(b) the National Police Chiefs’ Council’s operational advice for protest policing, and

(c) the National Police Chiefs’ Council’s protest aide memoire.

(2) The Secretary of State must regularly review the guidance and, if appropriate, must by regulations issue revised consolidated guidance.

(3) The consolidated guidance must include specific updated guidance about the protest technique of locking on.”

New clause 3—National monitoring tool—

“(1) The Secretary of State must develop a consistent national monitoring tool, accessible by all police forces, to monitor the use of or requests for specialist protest officers across England and Wales.

(2) Data collected under this section may be used to evaluate capacity and demand for specialist protest officers across England and Wales.

(3) The monitoring tool must be accessible on a national, regional and local basis.

(4) The monitoring tool must include—

(a) examples of best practice from policing protests across the United Kingdom, and

(b) data on how many trained officers have been required for any protests during the period in which monitoring took place.”

New clause 4—Injunction to prevent serious disruption to effective movement of essential goods or services—

“(1) Upon an application by a person under subsection (4), an injunction may be ordered by a Judge of the High Court against ‘persons unknown’ in order to prevent a serious disruption to the effective movement of any essential goods or any essential services occasioned by a public procession or public assembly.

(2) The “persons unknown” may be—

(a) anonymous persons taking part in a public process or public assembly who are identifiable at the time of the proceedings; and/or

(b) persons not presently taking part in a public procession or public assembly protest but who will in future join such a public procession or public assembly.

(3) The conditions under which such an injunction may be granted are as follows—

(a) there must be a real and imminent risk of a tort being committed which would result in a serious disruption to the effective movement of any essential goods or any essential services;

(b) a method of service must be set out in the order which may reasonably be expected to bring the proceedings to the attention of the “persons unknown”;

(c) the “persons unknown” must be defined in the order by reference to their conduct which is alleged to be unlawful;

(d) the acts prohibited by the order must correspond with the threatened tort;

(e) the order may only prohibit lawful conduct if there is no other proportionate means of protecting the effective movement of essential goods or essential services;

(f) the terms of the order must set out what act(s) the persons potentially affected by the order must not do;

(g) the terms of the order must set out a defined geographical area to which the order relates; and

(h) the terms of the order must set out a temporal period to which the order relates, following which the order will lapse unless a further order is made upon a further application by the applicant.

(4) An applicant for an injunction to prevent serious disruption to effective movement of essential goods or services may be—

(a) a local authority with responsibility for all or part of the geographical area to which the proposed order relates;

(b) a chief constable with responsibility for all or part of the geographical area to which the proposed order relates; or

(c) a person resident in, or carrying on a business within, the geographical area to which the proposed order relates.

(5) A “serious disruption to effective movement of essential goods or services” includes a prolonged disruption to—

(a) the effective movement of the supply of money, food, water, energy or fuel;

(b) a system of communication;

(c) access to a place of worship;

(d) access to a transport facility;

(e) access to an educational institution; and

(f) access to a service relating to health.”

New clause 5—Definition of “serious disruption”—

“(1) For the purposes of this Act, ‘serious disruption’ means—

(a) significant delay to the delivery of a time-sensitive product to consumers

of that product, or

(b) prolonged disruption of access to any essential goods or any essential service, including, in particular, access to—

(i) the supply of money, food, water, energy or fuel,

(ii) a system of communication,

(iii) a place of worship,

(iv) a place of worship,

(v) an educational institution, or

(vi) a service relating to health.

(2) In subsection (1)(a) a ‘time-sensitive product’ means a product whose value or use to its consumers may be significantly reduced by a delay in the supply of the product to them.”

New clause 6—Offences impeding emergency workers—

“(1) This section applies where—

(a) the court is considering for the purposes of sentencing the seriousness of an offence under sections 1 (Offence of locking on) or 3 (Obstruction etc of major transport works) of this Act, and

(b) the commission of the offence had the effect of impeding an emergency worker in exercising their functions, subject to the exception in subsection (2).

(2) The exception is that the emergency worker was exercising their functions in connection with the offence for which the person is being sentenced or in connection with any action which the court considers to be related to that offence.

(3) The court—

(a) must treat the fact mentioned in subsection (1)(b) as an aggravating factor (that is to say, a factor that increases the seriousness of the offence), and

(b) must state in open court that the offence is so aggravated.

(4) In this section, ‘emergency worker’ means—

(a) a constable;

(b) a person (other than a constable) who has the powers of a constable or is otherwise employed for police purposes or is engaged to provide services for police purposes;

(c) a National Crime Agency officer;

(d) a prison officer;

(e) a person (other than a prison officer) employed or engaged to carry out functions in a custodial institution of a corresponding kind to those carried out by a prison officer;

(f) a prisoner custody officer, so far as relating to the exercise of escort functions;

(g) a custody officer, so far as relating to the exercise of escort functions;

(h) a person employed for the purposes of providing, or engaged to provide, fire services or fire and rescue services;

(i) a person employed for the purposes of providing, or engaged to provide, search services or rescue services (or both);

(j) a person employed for the purposes of providing, or engaged to provide—

(i) NHS health services, or

(ii) services in the support of the provision of NHS health services, and whose general activities in doing so involve face to face interaction with individuals receiving the services or with other members of the public.

(5) It is immaterial for the purposes of subsection (4) whether the employment or engagement is paid or unpaid.

(6) In this section—

‘custodial institution’ means any of the following—

(a) a prison;

(b) a young offender institution, secure training centre, secure college or remand centre;

(c) services custody premises, as defined by section 300(7) of the Armed Forces Act 2006; “custody officer” has the meaning given by section 12(3) of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994;

‘escort functions’—

(a) in the case of a prisoner custody officer, means the functions specified in section 80(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1991;

(b) in the case of a custody officer, means the functions specified in paragraph 1 of Schedule 1 to the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994;

‘NHS health services’ means any kind of health services provided as part of the health service continued under section 1(1) of the National Health Service Act 2006 and under section 1(1) of the National Health Service (Wales) Act 2006;

‘prisoner custody officer’ has the meaning given by section 89(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1991.”

New clause 9—Publication of data about use of stop and search powers—

“(1) The Secretary of State must publish data about the use of the stop and search powers under sections 9 and 10 within three years of—

(a) if sections 9 and 10 come into force on the same date, the date on which they come into force, or

(b) if sections 9 and 10 come into force on different dates, the later of those two dates.

(2) The data published under this section must include—

(a) the total number of uses of stop and search powers by each police force in England and Wales, including whether the powers were used on suspicion or without suspicion,

(b) disaggregated data by age, disability, ethnicity/race, sex/gender and sexual orientation of the people who have been stopped and searched, and

(c) data relating to the outcomes of the use of stop and search powers.”

New clause 10—Review of the use of stop and search powers—

“(1) The Secretary of State must appoint an independent reviewer to assess and report annually on the use of the stop and search powers under sections 9 and 10.

(2) In carrying out their review, the person appointed under subsection (1) must—

(a) consider the impact of the use of stop and search powers on groups with protected characteristics under the Equality Act 2010, and

(b) consult such civil society organisations as appear to the person appointed under subsection (1) to be relevant.

(3) The person appointed under subsection (1) must ensure that a report on the outcome of the review is sent to the Secretary of State as soon as reasonably practicable after the completion of the review.

(4) On receiving a report under this section, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament—

(a) a copy of the report, and

(b) the Government’s response to the findings.

(5) The first report under this section must be completed no later than one year after the date provided for under section [publication of data about use of stop and search powers](1).”

New clause 11—Offence of interference with access to or provision of abortion services—

“(1) A person who is within a buffer zone and who interferes with any person’s decision to access, provide, or facilitate the provision of abortion services in that buffer zone is guilty of an offence.

(2) A “buffer zone” means an area which is within a boundary which is 150 metres from any part of an abortion clinic or any access point to any building or site that contains an abortion clinic and is—

(a) on or adjacent to a public highway or public right of way,

(b) in an open space to which the public has access,

(c) within the curtilage of an abortion clinic, or

(d) in any location that is visible from a public highway, public right of way, open space to which the public have access, or the curtilage of an abortion clinic.

(3) For the purposes of subsection (1), ‘interferes with’ means—

(a) seeks to influence,

(b) persistently, continuously or repeatedly occupies,

(c) impedes or threatens,

(d) intimidates or harasses,

(e) advises or persuades, attempts to advise or persuade, or otherwise expresses opinion,

(f) informs or attempts to inform about abortion services by any means, including, without limitation, graphic, physical, verbal or written means, or

(g) sketches, photographs, records, stores, broadcasts, or transmits images, audio, likenesses or personal data of any person without express consent.

(4) A person guilty of an offence under subsection (1) is liable—

(a) in the first instance—

(i) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months,

(ii) to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale, or

(iii) to both; and

(b) on further instances—

(i) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years, or to a fine, or to both, or

(ii) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, or to a fine, or to both.

(5) Nothing in this section applies to—

(a) anything done in the course of providing, or facilitating the provision of, abortion services in an abortion clinic,

(b) anything done in the course of providing medical care within a GP practice, hospital or other healthcare facility,

(c) the operation of a camera if its coverage of persons accessing or attempting to access an abortion clinic is incidental and the camera or footage is not used for any of the purposes listed in subsection (3), and

(d) a police officer acting properly in the course of their duties.”

New clause 12—Justice impact assessments for Wales—

“(1) Within six months of the passage of this Act, the Secretary of State must issue a justice impact assessment for any provision of this Act, or any regulations which have been made under this Act, which impact on matters which are devolved to Senedd Cymru.

(2) Within one month of the date on which they are made, the Secretary of State must issue a justice impact assessment for any regulations made under this Act which are not included in the assessment required under subsection (1) which impact on matters which are devolved to Senedd Cymru.

(3) The Secretary of State and the Welsh Ministers must jointly prepare and publish guidance on the implementation of the provisions on which justice impact assessments have been issued under subsections (1) and (2).”

New clause 13—Intentional harassment, alarm or distress on account of sex—

“(1) A person (P) commits an offence under this section if—

(a) P commits an offence under section 4A of the Public Order Act 1986 (intentional harassment, alarm or distress), and

(b) P carried out the conduct referred to in section 4A(1) of that Act because of the relevant person’s sex In this subsection ‘the relevant person’ means the person to whom P intended to cause, harassment, alarm or distress.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b) it does not matter whether or not P carried out the conduct referred to in section 4A(1) of the Public Order Act 1986 for the purposes of sexual gratification.

(3) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b) it does not matter whether or not P also carried out the conduct referred to in section 4A(1) of the Public Order Act 1986 because of any other factor not mentioned in subsection (1)(b).

(4) A person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is liable–

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court, to a fine or to both;

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years, to a fine, or to both.

(5) If, on the trial on indictment of a person charged with an offence under subsection (1), the jury find the person not guilty of the offence charged, they may find the person guilty of the basic offence mentioned in that provision.

(6) References in this section to P carrying out conduct because of another person’s (B’s) sex include references to P doing so because of B’s presumed sex.”

New clause 14—Harassment, alarm or distress on account of sex—

“(1) A person (P) commits an offence under this section if—

(a) P commits an offence under section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986 (harassment, alarm or distress), and

(b) P carried out the conduct referred to in section 5(1) of that Act because of the relevant person’s sex.

In this subsection ‘the relevant person’ means the person to whom P intended to cause, or caused, harassment, alarm or distress.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) it does not matter whether or not P carried out the conduct referred to in section 5(1) of the Public Order Act 1986 for the purposes of sexual gratification.

(3) For the purposes of subsection (1) it does not matter whether or not P also carried out the conduct referred to in section 5(1) of the Public Order Act 1986 because of any other factor not mentioned in subsection (1).

(4) A person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is liable—

(a) on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale;

(b) on conviction on indictment to imprisonment to a term not exceeding 6 months, or to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale, or to both.

(5) If, on the trial on indictment of a person charged with an offence under subsection (1), the jury find the person not guilty of the offence charged, they may find the person guilty of the basic offence mentioned in that provision.

(6) References in this section to P carrying out conduct because of another person’s (B’s) sex include references to P doing so because of B’s presumed sex.

(7) It is not a defence under this section for P to claim that they could not reasonably have foreseen that their behaviour may constitute an offence.”

New clause 15—Public inquiry into the impact of policing of public order on Black, Asian and minority ethnic people—

“Within six months of the date of Royal Assent to this Act, the Secretary of State must set up an inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005 into the impact of the policing of public order on Black, Asian and minority ethnic people.”

New clause 16—Equality Impact Analyses of provisions of this Act—

“(1) The Secretary of State must review the equality impact of the provisions of this Act.

(2) A report of the review under this section must be laid before Parliament within 12 months of the date of Royal Assent to this Act.

(3) A review under this section must consider the impact of the provisions of this Act on—

(a) households at different levels of income,

(b) people with protected characteristics (within the meaning of the Equality Act 2010),

(c) the Government’s compliance with the public sector equality duty under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010, and

(d) equality in the different nations of the United Kingdom and different regions of England.

(4) A review under this section must include a separate analysis of each section of the Act, and must also consider the cumulative impact of the Act as a whole.”

New clause 17—Public inquiry into the policing of protests—

“Within six months of the date of Royal Assent to this Act, the Secretary of State must set up an inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005 into the policing of public order and protests, including investigation of the use of—

(a) force,

(b) kettling,

(c) police horses,

(d) policing powers contained in the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, and policing powers contained in this Act.”

Amendment 3, page 1, line 4, leave out clause 1.

Amendment 28, clause 1, page 1, line 6, after “they” insert

“, without reasonable excuse, and using a device or substance that impedes detachment”.

This amendment, together with Amendment 30, would give effect to a recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights by taking the burden of proving “reasonable excuse” away from the Defendant and make it an element of the offence. It would also narrow the meaning of “attach” to focus on the use of devices or substances that make removing the protester difficult.

Amendment 29, clause 1, page 1, line 10, leave out paragraph (1)(b) and insert

“that act causes, or is likely to cause, serious disruption to the life of the community, and”.

This amendment would give effect to a recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights by replacing the current threshold of serious disruption with a higher threshold based on serious disruption to the life of the community (defined in Amendment 32).

Amendment 30, clause 1, page 1, line 16, leave out subsection (2).

Amendment 31, clause 1, page 1, line 20, leave out

“the maximum term for summary offences”

and insert “three months”.

This amendment would give effect to a recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights by reducing the maximum penalty for the offence of locking on.

Amendment 32, clause 1, page 2, line 1, leave out subsections (4) and (5) and insert—

“(4) For the purposes of subsection (1)(a), in determining whether a person has a reasonable excuse, particular regard must be had to the importance of the right of peaceful protest in a democracy by virtue of Article 10 and Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

(5) For the purposes of subsection 1(b), “serious disruption to the life of the community” means a prolonged disruption of access to any essential goods or any essential service, including, in particular, access to—

(i) the supply of money, food, water, energy or fuel,

(ii) a system of communication,

(iii) a place of worship,

(iv) a transport facility,

(v) an educational institution, or

(vi) a service relating to health.”

This amendment would give effect to a recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights by inserting an express requirement to have particular regard to the right to peaceful protest when considering whether an individual has a “reasonable excuse” for their actions when locking on. It also provides detail on the meaning of serious disruption to the life of the community.

Amendment 4, page 2, line 11, leave out clause 2.

Amendment 33, clause 2, page 2, line 13, leave out

“may be used in the course of or in connection with”

and insert “will be used in”.

This amendment would give effect to a recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights by narrowing the scope of this offence.

Amendment 5, page 2, line 20, leave out clause 3.

Amendment 6, page 3, line 23, leave out clause 4.

Amendment 7, page 4, line 19, leave out clause 5.

Amendment 8, page 4, line 35, leave out clause 6.

Amendment 34, clause 6, page 4, line 36, leave out subsection (1) and insert—

“(1) A person commits an offence if—

(a) the person obstructs the undertaker or a person acting under the authority of the undertaker—

(i) in setting out the lines of any major transport works,

(ii) in constructing or maintaining any major transport works, or

(iii) in taking any steps that are reasonably necessary for the purposes of facilitating the construction or maintenance of any major transport works, or

(b) the person interferes with, moves or removes any apparatus which—

(i) relates to the construction or maintenance of any major transport works, and

(ii) belongs to a person within subsection (5), and

(c) that act causes, or is likely to cause, significant disruption to setting out the lines of, the construction of or the maintenance of the major transport works affected, and

(d) the person intends their act—

(i) to obstruct the undertaker or person acting under the authority of the undertaker as mentioned in paragraph (a) or to interfere with or remove the apparatus as mentioned in paragraph (b), and

(ii) to have a consequence mentioned in paragraph (c) or are reckless as to whether it will have such a consequence.”

This amendment would give effect to a recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights by narrowing the scope of this offence to ensure it criminalises only conduct that would cause or be likely to cause serious disruption to major transport works. It would also introduce a requirement of intention or recklessness.

Amendment 35, page 5, line 9, leave out

“It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (1) to prove that”

and insert

“A person does not commit an offence under subsection (1) if”.

This amendment would give effect to a recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights by taking the burden of proving “reasonable excuse” or that the act was part of a trade dispute away from the Defendant and making it an element of the offence.

Amendment 36, page 5, line 14, at end insert—

“(2A) For the purposes of subsection (2)(a), in determining whether a person has a reasonable excuse, particular regard must be had to the importance of the right of peaceful protest by virtue of Article 10 and Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights.”

This amendment would give effect to a recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights by inserting an explicit requirement to have particular regard to the right to peaceful protest when considering whether an individual has a “reasonable excuse” for their actions.

Amendment 9, page 6, line 42, leave out clause 7.

Amendment 37, clause 7, page 7, line 5, leave out

“It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (1) to prove that”

and insert

“A person does not commit an offence under subsection (1) if”.

This amendment would give effect to a recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights by taking the burden of proving “reasonable excuse” or that the act was part of a trade dispute away from the Defendant and making it an element of the offence.

Amendment 38, page 7, line 10, at end insert—

“(2A) For the purposes of subsection (2)(a), in determining whether a person has a reasonable excuse, particular regard must be had to the importance of the right of peaceful protest by virtue of Article 10 and Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights.”

This amendment would give effect to a recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights by inserting an explicit requirement to have particular regard to the right to peaceful protest when considering whether an individual has a “reasonable excuse” for their actions.

Amendment 39, page 7, line 18, leave out “to any extent” and insert “to a significant extent”.This amendment would give effect to a recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights by narrowing the scope of the offence to prevent it sweeping up minor interference.

Amendment 40, page 7, line 22, after “means” insert “an essential element of”.This amendment would give effect to a recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights by narrowing the meaning of “key national infrastructure” to exclude inessential elements of infrastructure.

Amendment 51, page 7, line 31, at end insert—

“(j) farms and food production infrastructure.”

Amendment 10, page 8, line 17, leave out clause 8.

Amendment 41, clause 8, page 8, line 24, leave out “or B”.

Amendment 42, page 8, line 27, after “Act)” insert

“, but excludes infrastructure that is not essential for the purposes of transporting goods or passengers by railway”.

This amendment would give effect to a recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights to narrow the scope of the offence by narrowing the meaning of “rail infrastructure” so as to ensure the offence does not extend to interference with inessential elements.

Amendment 43, page 8, line 39, after “Act)” insert—

“(c) but excludes infrastructure that is not essential for the purposes of transporting goods or passengers by air”.

This amendment would give effect to a recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights to narrow the scope of the offence by narrowing the meaning of “air transport infrastructure” so as to ensure the offence does not extend to interference with inessential elements.

Amendment 44, page 8, line 41, leave out “or in connection with”.

This amendment, together with Amendments 45 to 48, would give effect to a recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights to narrow the scope of the offence, and reduce uncertainty, by narrowing what amounts to key national infrastructure.

Amendment 45, page 9, line 5, leave out “or in connection with”.See the explanatory statement for Amendment 44.

Amendment 46, page 9, line 20, leave out “or in connection with”.

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 44.

Amendment 47, page 9, line 35, leave out “or in connection with”.

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 44.

Amendment 48, page 10, line 1, , leave out “or in connection with”.

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 44.

Amendment 49, page 10, line 18, leave out

“‘newspaper’ includes a periodical or magazine.”

This amendment would give effect to a recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights to narrow the scope of the offence by narrowing the meaning of “newspaper” so as to prevent it extending to any periodical or magazine.

Amendment 52, page 10, line 18, at end insert–—

“(16) “Farms and food production infrastructure” means—

(a) any infrastructure, used for the commercial growing of crops and horticultural produce or rearing of livestock for human consumption or as an ingredient in items for human consumption; or

(b) any premises on which items for human consumption are processed, produced, or manufactured for commercial purposes; or

(c) any abattoir.”

Amendment 11, page 10, line 20, leave out clause 9.

Amendment 12, page 11, line 1, leave out clause 10.

Amendment 13, page 12, line 29, leave out clause 11.

Amendment 14, page 13, line 9, leave out clause 12.

Amendment 15, page 13, line 33, leave out clause 13.

Amendment 16, page 14, line 6, leave out clause 14.

Amendment 17, page 14, line 15, leave out clause 15.

Amendment 1, page 18, line 7, leave out clause 16.

Amendment 2, page 20, line 15, leave out clause 17.

Amendment 20, page 22, line 11, leave out clause 18.

Amendment 21, page 23, line 12, leave out clause 19.

Amendment 22, page 24, line 12, leave out clause 20.

Amendment 23, page 25, line 20, leave out clause 21.

Amendment 24, page 26, line 9, leave out clause 22.

Amendment 25, page 27, line 1, leave out clause 23.

Amendment 26, page 27, line 8, leave out clause 24.

Amendment 27, page 27, line 26, leave out clause 25.

Amendment 53, page 29, line 33, leave out clause 26.

Amendment 54, page 30, line 28, leave out clause 27.

Amendment 55, page 31, line 8, leave out clause 28.

Amendment 56, page 31, line 23, leave out clause 29.

Amendment 57, page 31, line 30, leave out clause 30.

Amendment 58, page 32, line 10, leave out clause 31.

Government new schedule 1—Injunctions in Secretary of State proceedings: powers to remand.

Government amendment 50.

[Jeremy Quin]

I thank hon. Members who have joined us for this important debate today and I look forward to the lively discussion that we are bound to have over the course of the afternoon. Although there will inevitably be differences of opinion, which I will come on to, I hope we can all agree on the fundamental point that should be underpinning this discussion—namely, that it is completely unacceptable for a selfish minority to wreak havoc on the lives of people going about their daily business. I would like to open the debate by speaking to the amendments in the Government’s name, and I will respond to other amendments in my closing remarks.

I will also touch on new clause 11, which covers abortion clinic buffer zones. We totally endorse the sentiment behind the new clause, but I look forward to setting out in my summing up why measures in existing legislation combined with the growing use of public space protection orders—PSPOs—can be used and are effective.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sammy Wilson (East Antrim) (DUP)]

rose—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)]

The right hon. Gentleman cannot intervene because he was not here at the beginning of the hon. Lady’s speech. He can intervene later, but he cannot intervene halfway through a speech when he was not here at the beginning of it. I appreciate that the hon. Lady is proposing amendments that everybody wants to hear about, but she has held the Floor for 15 minutes. We have three hours for this debate and I have more than 20 people who wish to speak, so I have to appeal for brevity. I would rather not put on a time limit, because that curtails debate. I hope the hon. Lady will appreciate the position of everybody else in the Chamber who also has to have an opportunity to speak.

[Stella Creasy]

Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker; I promise I was just about to wind up. I hope the Minister will address the issue in new clause 14 about foreseeable harassment and that perhaps over the course of the debate he will rethink his opposition to new clause 11. I know many of us across the House would welcome that.