Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fifth sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateEmily Darlington
Main Page: Emily Darlington (Labour - Milton Keynes Central)Department Debates - View all Emily Darlington's debates with the Department for Science, Innovation & Technology
(4 days, 13 hours ago)
Public Bill Committees
Emily Darlington (Milton Keynes Central) (Lab)
I have a few questions for the Minister. I appreciate the clarity that the Bill brings to many of the services in its scope. I would like to understand how the definition of “incidents” will relate to hardware vulnerabilities that are discovered within a company, as we heard from some of the people who gave evidence to the Committee. It is unclear in the Bill. Perhaps it will be further defined in secondary legislation.
I want to understand how an incident in which someone discovers a vulnerability in hardware—such as in a system-in-package—is reported, and how that information is then delivered by the regulator to other companies in the sector that may have similar technology, and to the other regulators, which may also want to flag that technology as a particular vulnerability. Is that defined as an “incident” or is it defined somewhere else in the Bill? I am a bit confused and am looking for some clarity.
Kanishka Narayan
Having been promoted from a position of mere confidence to faith, I will tackle questions from the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge first and foremost. On the question of thresholds of incident, the Bill sets out the severity of the sorts of incidents that we expect reporting obligations to apply to, and at the same time it ensures that it is proportionate in understanding that sector-specific thresholds ought to be precisely that—sector specific, set closely with relevant entities in that sector, and working with the expertise of the relevant regulators. For that reason, it has not been specified more fully on the face of the Bill.
On information sharing, not only is there provision for the specific sets of purposes for which information sharing ought to take place between regulators, but there is a further check on the proportionality of that, through a particular requirement, to ensure that information that is shared in incident contexts is done precisely for the purposes set out in the Bill, and in a way that is proportionate.
My hon. Friend the Member for Milton Keynes Central raised the question of hardware impacts. While the focus of the Bill is primarily on network and information systems, the test, as I think of it, would look at whether any compromise in network and information systems related to a piece of hardware triggers the severity of the impact, or potential impact, to be reportable. In the event that it is reportable, in its severity and potential impact, it will require notification—to the regulator and, when customers are directly impacted in the way that is set out in the Bill, also to the customers. The test is focused on whether network and information systems are engaged, and whether the impact of any incident is likely to be severe enough, in light of the thresholds set out in the Bill.
Clause 18, which the Government seek to modify through amendments 14 to 18, creates new pathways for information sharing between regulators, public authorities and Government Departments. It also creates a power for NIS enforcement authorities to share information with relevant overseas authorities for specified purposes. The new regime is intended to remove gaps and ambiguities in the existing framework governing the sharing of information obtained in the course of competent authorities and the oversight role of NCSC, and to create legal certainty in this domain.
In turn, it is anticipated that greater information sharing will assist with the detection of crime, enforcement activity and awareness of emerging cyber-risks and with ascertaining the effectiveness of the NIS regulations in building UK cyber-resilience. In particular, the Bill creates a new gateway to ensure that NIS regulators can share information with UK public authorities, and vice versa, as well as sharing and receiving information from organisations outside of the NIS framework, for example other regulators or bodies such as Companies House.
The Bill strengthens safeguards on how information can be used once it has been shared under the NIS regulations by restricting onward disclosure. More effective information sharing will be vital for competent authorities to keep up to date with emerging risks and building resilience in their sectors, and the new measures were broadly welcomed by regulators in our oral evidence session.
However, industry bodies such as techUK have called for further detail on the new information-sharing regime. What steps are the Government taking to ensure that regulators share responsibility for protecting sensitive data, and that information-sharing processes are coherent, proportionate and secure? Could the Minister elaborate on the discussions he has had with regulators on those matters, and on how secure information sharing will work in practice?
Finally, on the detail of the text in Government amendment 14, proposed new paragraph (aa)(ii) refers to persons
“otherwise in connection with…any other matter relating to cyber security and resilience,”.
Given that this is an information-sharing power, that seems a remarkably broad “any other matter” provision. What disclosures that are not already covered in the Bill does the Minister conceive will come up in that scope? What guidance or consultation will the Minister produce to make sure that such powers are proportionate and not at risk of abuse?
Emily Darlington
Again, I welcome the Government amendments and clause 18; they are important to enabling us to share our vulnerabilities in an appropriate way with those people who may be involved. However, some of the aspects of those vulnerabilities that security services—GCHQ, His Majesty’s Government Communications Centre and others—raised with us relate particularly to not only foreign interference, but the potential for interference through technology embedded in our networks. How does the Minister see the measures working within our co-operation with different foreign nations, particularly during these volatile times?
Kanishka Narayan
In response to the shadow Minister’s first question about ensuring sensitive handling of shared information and proportionality, all information handled by regulators ought to be treated carefully and with awareness of its importance. The regulators have to act reasonably, and the NIS regulations specifically require information obtained from inspections to be held securely. Of course, data protection laws apply to regulators as well. Alongside that, regulators will be required to consider the relevance and proportionality of sharing their information to the purposes set out in the Bill; as I have mentioned, the Bill includes specific purposes for why information might be shared.