Withdrawal Agreement: Legal Advice

Fiona Bruce Excerpts

Thursday 29th November 2018 Commons Chamber

[The Solicitor General]

The hon. Lady makes a proper point, but there is another important distinction to be drawn between today’s scenario and the Iraq war. With regard to the Iraq war, a decision was made by Government as to whether or not to use armed force in another country. The legality or otherwise of that decision was clearly a material and key issue as to whether or not an action should be taken. This is now a different set of circumstances: a Government taking a policy decision based on a range of outcomes, with potential risks and outcomes that would result. It is wholly different. I do not think, with respect to the hon. Lady, that the precedent of Iraq is appropriate.

[Fiona Bruce (Congleton) (Con)]

I draw the House’s attention to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. Is not maintaining the principle of legal privilege also essential to maintaining the confidence of every citizen in this country who seeks advice from a lawyer that they can expect the justice for which this country is globally renowned?

[The Solicitor General]

My hon. Friend, as a lawyer, knows that all too well. I have already explained the double importance of professional privilege and the constitutional centrality of the Law Officers’ convention.

Oral Answers to Questions

Fiona Bruce Excerpts

Thursday 29th June 2017 Commons Chamber

[Fiona Bruce (Congleton) (Con)]

I warmly welcome the new Minister to his place. What advice does he have for smaller regional museums such as Congleton Museum, which has an exciting expansion opportunity for which it needs to secure grant funding?

[John Glen]

Congleton Museum has already done extremely well to be awarded £65,000 to buy the hoards of Cheshire. There are a number of grants available and I would be happy to work with my hon. Friend and any other Member and give advice on how to secure those funds.

Oral Answers to Questions

Fiona Bruce Excerpts

Thursday 14th April 2016 Commons Chamber

[Mr Vara]

Pregnancy and maternity discrimination are unlawful and totally unacceptable. That is why the Government and the Equality and Human Rights Commission jointly funded independent research into the matter. I assure the hon. Gentleman that the review will take into account some of the findings of that research.

[Fiona Bruce (Congleton) (Con)]

15. What steps the Government are taking to increase the proportion of public appointments made to women.

[The Minister for Civil Society (Mr Rob Wilson)]

Increasing diversity is essential to appointing the best people to our public boards. We are making real progress in increasing the number of women who are appointed. In 2014-15, 44% of new appointments were made to women, which is up from 39% in 2013-14. The steps that we have taken to increase diversity include streamlining the application process and increasing the awareness of opportunities through outreach and other events, a central website and the use of social media. We have introduced unconscious bias training for senior personnel in the Cabinet Office, including permanent secretaries and, indeed, senior Ministers.

[Fiona Bruce]

I thank the Minister for that comprehensive reply, which has pre-empted my supplementary. I wonder whether, in some cases, it is a lack of confidence that inhibits women in making an application for a public appointment. Could more be done to communicate to women that their applications are encouraged and will be successful?

[Mr Wilson]

It is really important that we get the very best people into public appointments. Women will play a crucial role in that. We recently received a report from Sir Gerry Grimstone that was commissioned to make appointment processes much more efficient, effective and streamlined. We have hit the highest figures ever recorded for women in public appointments, but we have not done enough. We want to go much further and to hit the 50% target we have set ourselves.

Serious Crime Bill [Lords]

Fiona Bruce Excerpts

Monday 23rd February 2015 Commons Chamber

[Karen Bradley]

Let me give my hon. Friend this example. There is a further risk that publication of individuals excluded from the UK may undermine international relations and foreign policy objectives. That risk is intensified if the excluded individual has connections with a foreign Government or well known organisation that may be working in partnership with the UK to broaden our interests abroad. That is one example. Also, ongoing investigations into the activities of an individual could be jeopardised if they became aware of the fact that they were on the list. While I appreciate the objective of the new clause and the commitment to transparency, the Home Secretary’s primary objective in the use of her exclusion powers is to protect the UK from those individuals who wish to damage our national security or undermine our values. The new clause would weaken her ability to do so and could put the British public at risk.

Turning to new clause 20 on firearms licensing, I put it to the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North that the amendment is unnecessary. The police already have the ability to take into account evidence of violence and domestic violence when considering firearms applications, and rigorous new guidance was issued in July 2013 providing greater detail on how police should handle such cases.

The Government welcome the principle behind new clause 21, but the expert review panel made it clear in its report last October that the ban on the supply of new psychoactive substances needs careful consideration. Our priority is to frame correctly any new offence and ensure that it is robust yet proportionate and embedded in a comprehensive legislative package. The Government are moving swiftly so that the necessary primary legislation is ready to be introduced at the earliest opportunity in the new Parliament.

Finally, let me turn now to new clause 28 on money laundering, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for North East Cambridgeshire (Stephen Barclay). The two of us have had many conversations about this. He knows that we are consulting on the suspicious activity reporting regime, and I urge him to respond to that consultation, as I am very keen to include all of those points.

In the light of my explanations, I ask my hon. Friends the Members for Esher and Walton, for North East Cambridgeshire and for Cambridge and the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North not to press their amendments, and I commend the Government amendments to the House.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 23 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 24

Codes of practice about investigatory powers: journalistic sources

In section 71 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (issue and revision of codes of practice), after subsection (2) insert—

“(2A) A code of practice under subsection (1) that relates (expressly or otherwise) to the exercise and performance, in connection with the prevention or detection of serious crime, of powers and duties conferred or imposed by or under Part 1 of this Act—

(a) shall include provision designed to protect the public interest in the confidentiality of journalistic sources;

(b) shall not be issued unless the Secretary of State has first consulted the Interception of Communications Commissioner and considered any relevant report made to the Prime Minister under section 58.”” .—(Karen Bradley.)

This New Clause requires a code of practice made under section 71 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 relating to the exercise of powers in Part 1 of that Act in relation to the prevention or detection of serious crime to include provision to protect the public interest in the confidentiality of journalistic sources.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 1

Termination of pregnancy on the grounds of the sex of the unborn child

‘Nothing in section 1 of the Abortion Act 1967 is to be interpreted as allowing a pregnancy to be terminated on the grounds of the sex of the unborn child.’—(Fiona Bruce.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Fiona Bruce (Congleton) (Con)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Dawn Primarolo)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss New clause 25 —Termination of pregnancy on grounds of sex of foetus—

‘(1) The Secretary of State shall arrange for an assessment to be made of the evidence of termination of pregnancy on the grounds of the sex of the foetus in England, Wales and Scotland.

(2) The arrangements made under subsection (1) shall be such as to enable publication of the assessment by the Secretary of State within 6 months of the date of Royal Assent to this Act.

(3) The Secretary of State shall consider the assessment made under subsection (1) and—

(a) determine and publish a strategic plan to tackle substantiated concerns identified in the assessment made under subsection (1); or

(b) publish a statement and explanation in relation to why a plan under subsection (3)(a) is not required.

(4) Any strategic plan under subsection (3)(a) must include, but need not be limited to, steps—

(a) to promote change in the social and cultural patterns of behaviour with a view to eradicating prejudices, customs, traditions and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority of women and which may amount to pressure to seek a termination on the grounds of the sex of the foetus;

(b) to ensure best practice exists in identifying women being coerced or pressured into seeking a termination on the grounds of the sex of the foetus, or at risk of being so, and in the provision of protection and support to potential victims; and

(c) to promote guidance to service providers, health professionals and other stakeholders.

(5) The Secretary of State must lay a copy of the plan, determined under subsection (3)(a), before each House of Parliament within 6 months of the publication date of the assessment under subsection (2).’

[Fiona Bruce]

New clause 1, which I wish to be put to a vote, is supported by more than 100 MPs. The arguments for it are straightforward. First, it is to clarify beyond doubt, in statute, that sex-selective abortion is illegal in UK law. This new clause is not seeking to change the law on abortion, as some have said, but to confirm and clarify it. It also provides the Government with an opportunity to address the problem by bringing forward best practice regulations and guidance to support and protect women at risk.

New clause 1 is necessary because there is no explicit statement about gender selective abortion in UK law. The law is being interpreted in different ways because when the Abortion Act 1967 was passed, scans to determine the sex of the foetus were not available. That has led to a huge amount of confusion and mixed messages. That is despite the fact that the Government have repeatedly said that abortion on the grounds of gender alone is illegal. Health Ministers have said so; the Prime Minister has said so; the Department of Health has published guidance to that effect; and the chief medical officer has written to doctors about it. Despite all of that, abortion providers and others, staggeringly, are still refusing to accept the Government’s interpretation of the law.

Only last week, the country’s largest abortion provider, the British Pregnancy Advisory Service, republished its controversial guidance in a booklet entitled, “Britain’s abortion law: what it says and why”. The following question is posed: is abortion for reasons of foetal sex illegal under the Abortion Act? To this, it answers, “No, the law is silent on the matter.” The former Director of Public Prosecutions, Keir Starmer, has said:

“The law does not in terms expressly prohibit gender-specific abortions.”

[Sir Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con)]

All we are trying to do is simply clarify what everyone in the House of Commons wants to be the law: we should not have abortion on the basis of gender. That is the reply to the DPP. We just want the law to be made absolutely clear.

[Fiona Bruce]

Absolutely right. That is the purpose of new clause 1. I will come on to explain why it is so important to many of the women who are suffering as a result of the lack of clarity in the law.

This House must make the matter clear. If we cannot get a consistent line from abortion providers on whether or not it is illegal to abort a girl—it is usually girls but not always—for the sole reason that she is a girl, then the law is not fit for purpose. To do so constitutes a gross form of sex discrimination. Indeed it is the first and most fundamental form of violence against women and girls. Surely no one can object to a clause that simply states that that is wrong.

New clause 1 will do more than that, because if it is passed, by virtue of clause 79 (2) the Government will be able to issue guidance to help address this abuse and support affected women. That is why new clause 25 is inadequate when taken alone. What it is proposing is a Department of Health assessment or review of the issue. The Department can already do that. Without new clause 1, it is inadequate, because it fails to go to the heart of the issue and to clear up the very real confusion that exists. It fails to clarify the law, as new clause 1 does, that sex election abortion is illegal in this country.

Let me turn now to some of the objections to new clause 1. Much of them have misrepresented its impact and some have been plain scaremongering. First, it is said that it will criminalise women. That is flatly untrue. The clause applies only to authorising doctors; it does not affect an expectant mother’s standing in law. We have also heard that it will stop abortion for disability where there is a sex-linked condition. That is also totally incorrect. I can reassure colleagues that there is nothing in this new clause to prevent a doctor from diagnosing substantial risk of serious handicap via the sex of the baby. In such cases, the ground for the abortion is the risk of the disability, not the sex of the baby. New clause 1 will not change that, and I have been careful to obtain expert legal opinion to that effect.

[Kate Green (Stretford and Urmston) (Lab)]

The hon. Lady spoke rightly a few moments ago about the importance of clarity in law. Does she not agree that there would be reluctance and confusion when the grounds for a termination were the genetic disorder, but the only way in which that genetic order could arise is in relation to the gender of the foetus?

[Fiona Bruce]

Not at all. We can trust our medical practitioners to be professional in that respect. It is quite clear that the ground for the abortion in such cases would be the genetic condition and not the sex of the child.

[Glenda Jackson (Hampstead and Kilburn) (Lab)]

Will the hon. Lady give way on that point?

[Fiona Bruce]

I will, but then I need to make progress.

[Glenda Jackson]

There are certain genetic diseases that are transmitted by the mother to a male foetus. They are not passed on to a female foetus. So the hon. Lady’s argument is invalid.

[Fiona Bruce]

That is exactly the point that I am making. If the handicap, or the condition, is diagnosed via the sex of the baby, in such cases the grounds for the abortion, through that diagnosis, is the risk of serious handicap, and on that ground the abortion can be legitimately carried out.

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

Perhaps I can help my hon. Friend, although I do not think that she needs assistance. Of all the arguments that have been put forward on this matter, the one that has no traction at all is the suggestion that enacting this new clause would lead to the confusion that the hon. Member for Hampstead and Kilburn (Glenda Jackson) fears. It plainly would not. There might be other arguments that can be advanced and of course there will be different views across the House, but that could not possibly happen if the new clause were enacted.

--- Later in debate ---

[Fiona Bruce]

rose—

[Glenda Jackson]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Fiona Bruce]

No, I am going to continue. I thank the former Attorney-General for making that point so lucidly.

We have also heard that the new clause could introduce racial profiling of expectant mothers, but has anyone argued that for female genital mutilation? The term “family balancing” goes wider than any one particular community.

Then there is the argument that the new clause will do nothing to help abused women. It will indeed. It will clarify the law and as Polly Harrar of Jeena International powerfully told me:

“What we’ve found with the Forced Marriage Act 2007 was that we were able to use that piece of legislation as a bargaining tool to negotiate with parents, so a young woman could say, ‘You do realise this is a criminal offence?’”

In the same way, Polly says,

“with sex-selective abortion: having clarity in the law means that women could use this clarification to protect themselves against pressure to have a sex-selection abortion.”

She continues that

“as with FGM having a higher profile, legislation does effect a step change in cultural attitudes. So while legislation alone is not enough, it has real power to change behaviour, and that’s what is needed.”

That addresses clearly the Royal College of Midwives’ objection that new clause 1 will do little to alleviate the external pressures or coercion that these women face. As Mandy Sanghera said:

“We also we hope this will act as a deterrent—it will enable women to have more control over their own decisions.”

Is that not what many objecting to the clause want?

What does not help women under pressure to have an abortion simply because they are carrying a girl or a boy, whether that pressure comes from violence or coercion or is more subtle, is allowing that abortion to take place and sending the woman back to an abusive situation. To do so is to condone the very culture behind the pressure for such abortions and to exacerbate such abuse. The new clause does nothing to diminish services for those suffering abuse. Indeed, if it is followed by sensitively crafted regulations it should certainly improve them.

Then the quite offensive point is made that there is no evidence for sex-selective abortions in the UK. That is offensive as it is insulting to women such as those I have mentioned who have been campaigning for many years to stop this practice. Yes, the numbers are small compared with those in China or India, but they are real. Should we have to wait until those numbers grow before we take action? Rani Bilkhu, who, incidentally, is pro-choice, says:

“I have been supporting women dealing with sex-selective abortions…for almost a decade. Saying that there is no evidence is tantamount to saying that the women we work with are lying and that my organisation”—

Jeena International—

“is making things up.”

Interestingly, Rani also says that “nobody is collecting data”, so it is no wonder that opponents of the new clause say that there is none.

I know of many examples of women who have suffered. One had one daughter, conceived a second girl, had an abortion and then could not conceive again. Another had three abortions on the basis of gender, including of twins. Another’s husband punched and kicked her in the stomach when he discovered she was having a girl. Yet another says that

“women suffer depression after these abortions. What is not always considered is the emotional and psychological impact.”

These women deserve our support in the manner that they say will really help—through legislation and by clarifying the law. That does not stop a review, but it is essential that we clear up the confusion, support these women and pass new clause 1. In doing so, we would reflect the overwhelming public mood. A recent ComRes poll showed that 84% of the public agree that aborting babies because of their gender should be explicitly banned by law. More than that, we should support new clause 1 because it is, quite simply, the right thing to do.

[Ann Coffey]

I am grateful for the opportunity to speak in support of new clause 25, tabled by me, the right hon. Member for Cardiff Central (Jenny Willott), my right hon. Friend the Member for Dulwich and West Norwood (Dame Tessa Jowell), my hon. Friend the Member for Walsall South (Valerie Vaz) and the hon. Members for Truro and Falmouth (Sarah Newton) and for Totnes (Dr Wollaston). I will seek to test the opinion of the House on the new clause.

The Offences Against the Person Act 1861 makes it a criminal offence intentionally to unlawfully procure a miscarriage, including for a woman to procure her own miscarriage. The Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 makes it a criminal offence intentionally to kill a child capable of being born alive before it has a life independent of its mother. The Abortion Act 1967 creates exceptions to those offences in limited circumstances and abortion on the grounds of gender is not one of those exceptions. It is therefore illegal and subject to criminal prosecution. Indeed, guidance was reissued as recently as May 2014 by the Department of Health that said again categorically that abortion on the grounds of sex was illegal. I am therefore not quite sure why the new clause proposed by the hon. Member for Congleton (Fiona Bruce) is needed or how inserting it into the 1967 Act would address her concerns.

--- Later in debate ---

[Luciana Berger]

I thank the right hon. and learned Gentleman for his intervention, but, as we have heard, many legal experts dispute that position. I refer to the specific text of the new clause, which says nothing about, and is in direct conflict with, paragraphs (a) to (d) of section 1(1) of the Abortion Act.

The Genetic Alliance has said that

“the consequences of this amendment could be devastating to women and couples at risk of having a child affected by a serious x-linked condition.”

I have heard from one family where two sisters were carriers of x-linked severe combined immunodeficiency, a disease that affects only boys. After years of thinking, one sister decided not to have any children, because she did not want to risk the chance of having to choose between having a very poorly son or a termination. Her sister decided—also after many years of consideration—to have children and went on to have three healthy daughters. Those were the choices that those women made after much consideration and deliberation with their families. How can Parliament take that decision away from them? I am sure that no one would wish to deprive their daughter, sister or partner of that choice. It is surely not for Parliament to rush this through in the short time available and deny families the opportunity to have children or a healthy baby.

Another serious concern is that new clause 1 is not just a clarification of the law, but a fundamental reform of the essential principles on which existing abortion law in this country been based for 47 years. The Abortion Act 1967 places the physical and mental health of the woman as the overriding concern of a doctor authorising abortion. Our current legislation refers to the foetus rather than the unborn child. That is because, across our legislation and common law, children are accorded a wide range of protections and rights that Parliament has previously agreed should not be accorded to the foetus.

Changing the language of the Abortion Act, as this new clause would do, would send a very different signal to the courts and open up different judicial interpretations of abortion or new consequences and restrictions that would go far beyond the issue of sex selection. For the first time since legislation in 1929, new clause 1, if passed, could afford the foetus rights that would be in conflict with those of the mother and it could seriously jeopardise the future of safe, legal abortion in the UK.

[Fiona Bruce]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Luciana Berger]

I am not going to give way. I am going to wrap up, because I am conscious of the time and Madam Deputy Speaker wants me to conclude.

There are many other points that I would have liked to address, particularly the issue of custom and practice and why new clause 25 addresses the issue of coercion in communities, which is something we all want to deal with.

Voting against new clause 1 is not an indication of support for sex-selective practices, but an acknowledgement that it would do nothing to address the causes or reduce the incidences of sex-selective abortion and that some serious negative unintended consequences would result from enacting this proposed change to the Serious Crime Bill.

Few people would support the idea that families should be able to have abortions on the grounds of gender alone. That is why it is illegal under our current law. New clause 1 represents a significant departure from the current principles on which abortion law in this country is based. Instead, new clause 25 would require a review of the evidence relating to abortion on the grounds of gender alone, to ensure that we have a full understanding of the practice and the extent of the problem, and for that to be followed by a Government strategy to tackle it accordingly, based on the evidence of what works. I sincerely hope that Members on both sides of the House will vote against new clause 1 and in support of new clause 25.

Abortion Act

Fiona Bruce Excerpts

Wednesday 9th October 2013 Westminster Hall

[Fiona Bruce (Congleton) (Con)]

Honourable Members, has it come to this? People in this country have spent 40 years fighting discrimination, but no action is to be taken when one of the most blatant forms of discrimination—the deprivation of life on account of being a girl—is highlighted. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate (Mr Burrowes) on bringing forward the debate, and I entirely agree with him that the time has come to review the moral, legal, ethical and practical framework in which the Abortion Act operates.

This is not the only form of discrimination against the unborn child in this country. Over the course of more than a year, the cross-party parliamentary inquiry into abortion on the grounds of disability, which I had the privilege of chairing and which published its report in July, took evidence from 300 witnesses. The full report can be seen at the website abortionanddisability.org. Just as people are shocked that abortion can be allowed on the grounds of sex, people we spoke to were shocked to discover, in an age when we go to extensive lengths to accept, support and respect disabled people, seeing them as wholly equal, that a child can be aborted right up to the moment of birth on the grounds that they may be disabled. In contrast to the situation for non-disabled babies, there is no 24-week time limit. Indeed, we heard that many expectant mothers felt funnelled into having an abortion when they were told that they were expecting a potentially disabled child.

The inquiry highlights the lack of clarity in the abortion regulations about what constitutes a serious disability. Some mothers who were told they were expecting a disabled child told us the diagnosis was wrong. Others were told that abortions would be allowed on the grounds of a cleft palate or a club foot, and indeed they can be. Those are minor disabilities, as I know, because I have a son with a club foot. In an era of enormous support for the disabled and their families, we cannot allow this form of discrimination to persist. We must take action to review it.

Equally, we must take action to prevent any hint of discrimination against an unborn child on account of their sex. We have had much more than a hint that this is happening; we have the investigation from The Daily Telegraph. The time it took to look into that investigation—19 months—is deplorable. In his statement of 7 October about the investigation, the DPP said:

“on balance, there is just sufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of a conviction.”

We are talking about conviction for a criminal offence, according to the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. What kind of message does that decision send? It sends the shocking message that authorities in this country will turn a blind eye to involvement in acts preparatory to the commission of an unlawful abortion—authorities in whom trust is vested to apply and uphold the laws made by this Parliament.

The reason the DPP gave for not proceeding with the prosecution was that it would not be in the public interest. Prosecutors have also pointed out that the issue has become sensitive and political. How can it not be in the public interest to state firmly and clearly that abortion on the grounds of a child’s sex is wrong? It is wrong morally and legally, and if the law is not sufficiently clear on this point, it is our duty as parliamentarians and politicians—I see nothing wrong in politicians being involved in this issue—to make it clear.

The grounds on which an abortion is legal have never included the sex of the child, and that is true not just in this country. The UN convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women, which the UK has ratified, is a legally binding treaty in UK law. The convention recognises the right to choose the “number and spacing” of one’s children, but not the sex. International law is very clear: sex-selective abortions are not legal.

We recognise that in this country when we fully condemn China’s one-child policy, which has resulted in a disproportionate number of young men, running into the millions. The ratio of young men to young women in many parts of China is now 30:1. This country prides itself on respecting human rights, and we cannot be so hypocritical as to condemn that policy and then do nothing when such things occur within our own borders. I said that there was more than a hint that that is happening; in January 2013 I tabled an early-day motion, citing

“recent confirmation by the Department of Health that there are discrepancies in the balance between the number of boys and girls born to groups of women from some overseas countries to an extent that”—

in the Department’s words—

“‘falls outside the range considered possible without intervention’”.

The motion called on the Department of Health to put procedures in place to address the issue, and it was supported by more than 50 parliamentarians. There are a number of parliamentarians here today, but I know from the EDM alone that there are far more who support the views that have been expressed today.

There is further evidence. Dr Vincent Argent, a former medical director of the British Pregnancy Advisory Service, has been quoted as saying that the practice is “fairly widespread” in the UK; and there are data from Dr Dubuc of the university of Oxford, who has studied the issue for 35 years, suggesting that sex-selection abortions are happening with increasing regularity among certain groups in the UK because of the increasing availability of technologies to determine the sex of an unborn child. The statistics show that the practice is particularly prevalent when a third child is expected.

[The Attorney-General (Mr Dominic Grieve)]

I should explain that I have only Department of Health statistics to go on, but this may be helpful. As far as the UK as a whole is concerned, the statistics on gender balance in births fall squarely within what are regarded as acceptable norms. As to mothers who were born in other countries, there is, with only one exception, no clear evidence of such a divergence from the norm. Interestingly, the country in question is Sri Lanka and, curiously, the birth ratio for mothers born there is 99.2 male children for every 100 female children, which suggests the opposite of what my hon. Friend is talking about. There again, however, there is nothing to suggest that the ratio is outside the statistical norm.

[Fiona Bruce]

If my right hon. and learned Friend will allow me, I shall send him Dr Dubuc’s data and research, which show figures that at least need to be looked into.

I ask for not only Ministers but the British Medical Association to take action. The 2012 third edition of its guide, “Medical Ethics Today”, does not clearly prohibit sex-selection abortions. The doctors we heard of in the investigation by The Daily Telegraph clearly felt uncomfortable. I should have thought it would help the many other doctors who might feel uncomfortable in such circumstances if the BMA medical ethics committee were to take a clear stance against the discriminatory practice in question, and support practitioners accordingly. As to the reference by the Director of Public Prosecutions to the General Medical Council taking action on the investigation by The Daily Telegraph, it is worth remembering that the GMC has no powers on criminal actions and cannot prosecute breaches of the law.

Finally, in April, I presented a ten-minute rule Bill on the very issue that we are debating. It was interesting to note that there was no opposition from any Member of the House. My purpose was to raise the issue and to remind the police and Crown Prosecution Service that abortions on the ground of gender are illegal in this country. My Bill called on the Department of Health to establish procedures to record the gender of babies aborted under the Abortion Act 1967, when the sex can be determined, and to consider a review of the penalties for anyone found to have facilitated the abortion of a child because of their gender. The United Kingdom prides itself on striving for gender equality and tackling discrimination in all its forms, and any indication of that most fundamental form of gender discrimination and violence against women must surely be investigated further.

Assisted Suicide

Fiona Bruce Excerpts

Tuesday 27th March 2012 Commons Chamber

[Fiona Bruce (Congleton) (Con)]

Thank you, Mr Deputy Speaker, for calling me to speak to my amendment. I understand that although I am not able to move it yet, other Members may speak to it throughout the afternoon. I support the motion in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South (Richard Ottaway) and I oppose the amendment in the name of the right hon. Member for Lewisham, Deptford (Dame Joan Ruddock).

Britain has been ranked first in the world for quality end-of-life care in a survey by The Economist intelligence unit of 40 OECD and non-OECD countries, including the USA, the Netherlands, Germany and France. We should be proud of and support services that are providing care to enable patients to live as well as possible, while accepting natural death and doing everything to keep patients comfortable during dying.

[Mr Robert Buckland (South Swindon) (Con)]

Will my hon. Friend join me in paying tribute to organisations such as the Prospect hospice in my constituency, which offers world-class palliative care, not only in-house but within the community that it serves?

[Fiona Bruce]

I will, and I pay tribute to the entire hospice movement in this country. The care and treatment of patients provided by such services embodies the culture that we have in this nation of prioritising care at the end of life, and does not prioritise foreshortening life by months or years at the end-of-life stage.

The DPP has said that the guidelines that he operates are working well; indeed they are. Prosecutorial discretion is part of our criminal law and applies across a wide range of crimes. We cannot fetter it in law because each case is different. The law gives a clear message that one person should not encourage or assist another’s suicide.

[Robert Halfon (Harlow) (Con)]

I am proud to be supporting my hon. Friend’s amendment today. Does she agree that this is not about choice, but is about people being forced to make choices? Does she also agree that rather than having debates about assisted dying it would be much better if we had more debates and discussions about how we could improve palliative care?

[Fiona Bruce]

I do, and that is entirely the intent of my amendment.

[Mrs Eleanor Laing (Epping Forest) (Con)]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Fiona Bruce]

I will continue now, if I may, to allow for the many other speakers who want to speak this afternoon.

If encouragement or assistance is given for others to commit suicide, individuals are answerable for their actions, but when appropriate, the law takes a compassionate approach. Patients at the end of life are very vulnerable to influence, particularly from those providing care. Just yesterday a specialist consultant in palliative care told me of his concerns about any change in the law in this area. He told me of an incident which, he said, was not isolated, but typical. He said: “I had a single male patient who was dying of cancer. Life was difficult for him; he had an estranged daughter who confided in me that her father had asked to be taken to Switzerland because his life was not worth living. His daughter had left home quite early in life and they had lost all contact. I talked with him and he told me how proud he was that she had become a head teacher, he himself having been a teacher earlier in his life. I encouraged him to get to know his daughter again, to tell her he loved her, and that he was proud of her. They did so and they spent the last two weeks of his life together in the hospice having these conversations, which meant so much to both of them.” Is not that the approach that we should take towards those at the end of their life?

The consultant continued, “We”—that is, doctors—“have real concerns that it would place us in a very difficult position if the law is changed, since at the heart of what we do is the tenet that we should do no harm to our patients. So for someone to have their life terminated would place our relationship on a very different footing.” Doctors do not want the relationship of trust between doctor and patients fractured. That surely is why the DPP guidelines tend towards prosecution if assistance with suicide is given by a doctor or nurse as part of their clinical relationship with the patient.

Several disability groups have told me that they would be extremely concerned should there be any change in the law—that is, in this relationship—a change which could well occur should doctors, such as the consultant I mentioned, have the “option to kill”—as he put it—their patients as one of their choices.

Unlike Oregon, where assisted suicide was made legal in 1997, we have specialist palliative care in the UK, with a full four-year training programme. Oregon has had a four and a half-fold rise in assisted suicides since it legalised the practice in 1997, a practice that would result in over 1,100 assisted suicides in this country on a population basis. And Oregon’s safeguards are paper-thin. The Royal College of Physicians has stated that physician assisted suicide

“would fundamentally alter the role of the doctor and their relationship with their patient. Medical attendants should be present to preserve and improve life—if they are also involved in the taking of life, this creates a conflict that is potentially very damaging.”

Help the Hospices says:

“It is right that actions by a care professional are treated differently from actions by a friend or family member”.

Baroness Campbell of Surbiton, speaking on behalf of disabled groups, has said that a change in the law

“wouldn’t just apply to the terminally ill, no matter what the campaigners may say. It would affect disabled people too, not to mention the elderly. A change in the law. . . would alter the mindset of the medical and social care professions, persuading more and more people that actually the prospect of an ‘easy’ way out is what people such as me really want. Well, the vast majority of us do not.”

The motion should keep the DPP guidelines as they are, and support improved care at the end of life.

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[The Solicitor-General]

If a future DPP overturned the guidelines, he would be judicially reviewed for behaving in a rather whimsical way. I also suspect that the right hon. Lady would be one of the first to stand up in the House and censor him for doing so. I can assure her that placing things in statute will not assist her cause. She and I share the view that the DPP’s guidelines are a good thing. Why not leave them where they are and let them remain a good thing?

As I said, I hope that by considering the guidelines the House will not only commend them but also note that they are based on the principle of independent prosecutors exercising their discretion in their decision making, which, ultimately, is in all our interests. The guidelines inform others how he will exercise his discretion, but as with any guidance or policy issued by the DPP, it is subservient to the law of Parliament and the decisions of the higher courts. If the law changes, any relevant prosecutor’s guidance must also change. It will change the more flexibly if it is not ossified in statute.

I make a trite point, but the law cannot do everything. We need flexibility in its application, and to be able to apply the law and to make decisions about whether or not to prosecute on the facts and the surrounding circumstances of each case and on a case-by-case basis. In this area of law, perhaps almost if not exclusively above all others, we need to approach the question of whether to prosecute with sensitivity and with care. Indeed, the High Court, in its judgment on 29 October 2008 in the Purdy case—the very action that, once it had been considered by the House of Lords in 2009, gave rise to the guidelines—said that the nature of the offence created by section 2(1) of the Suicide Act is such that

“the variety of facts which may give rise to the commission of that offence, and therefore which may result in a person being prosecuted, is almost infinite”.

The section 2 offence is very widely drawn. It covers all situations and creates no exceptions, which is why, I suggest, the DPP’s consent to a prosecution is so necessary, and why the House of Lords directed the DPP to publish the policy that we now have before us.

Guidelines or a policy statement are not required in every criminal case, but I invite the House to consider that such guidelines are best issued by prosecutors and for prosecutors, although available for public inspection and comment. Quite apart from the propriety of guidelines for prosecutors being a matter for prosecutors, there are some practical considerations to guidelines remaining on a non-statutory basis. Surely to place them in statute would be to attempt to confine the infinite. Policies and guidance are there to provide practical assistance to prosecutors on how particular categories of cases should be approached and the internal processes that should be followed. Therefore, there needs to be a certain amount of flexibility, not least because, as case law develops and public opinion and our collective moral view alter, the law changes and these guidelines and the policies will need to change in response, often quickly.

I therefore urge the House, as a matter of good practice, to conclude that the current flexible and—I admit—pragmatic approach should be retained. That said, we are all entitled, inside and outside the House, to comment on the guidelines themselves or on a decision to prosecute or not prosecute in any given case, subject to any temporary constraints imposed by the law of contempt and defamation. We should not build into the process a sclerotic arrangement that will not improve the application of the law from year to year.

The CPS has published a number of policies and guidance documents over the years. They are available on its website and are there to help the public understand how decisions are taken by prosecutors. During the past two years or so, that has included policies on prosecuting human trafficking cases, public protest cases and cases about perverting the course of justice when victims in rape and domestic violence cases make false retractions. Should these policies be codified, too? Should they be placed on a statutory footing? As my noble Friend Baroness Berridge said in the other place when this matter was debated last month:

“It is imperative that DPP policy and decisions are free from, and seen to be free from, Government interference…If the House were asking how the Government are assessing the application of DPP policy for prosecutions in cases of phone-hacking, constitutional alarm bells would, I believe, have gone off immediately.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 13 February 2012; Vol. 735, c. 629.]

I agree with her.

My hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South said that the application of the existing law and, by implication, the application of the guidelines in this area is a pressing issue. It is not so much the application of the existing law that is the issue, but what the substance of the existing law is. I leave others to decide how pressing the issue might be. At the risk of repeating myself, I will say that if Parliament wishes to change the law in this area, that is a matter for Parliament, but we should not confuse the way prosecutors apply the law with what the law is or should be.

As I draw my remarks to a close, I will briefly address the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Congleton and supported by a great many right hon. and hon. Members. She is encouraging—I assume—the Government to develop specialist palliative care and hospice provision further and, in responding, I transmogrify my role as a desiccated, boring and apolitical Law Officer to that of a thoroughly exciting political Minister.

The Government recognise that many people, their families and carers do not receive the quality of end-of-life care that we would all wish to receive. Hardly a month passes without our reading in the national or local press or hearing in the broadcast media of some terrible episode of personal suffering endured by an elderly person at the end of their life. Every such story demands of us that something more should be done to ensure that the care of the terminally ill, no matter what age they are, should be improved. The Government are committed to developing and supporting end-of-life and palliative care services to ensure that the care people receive, whatever their diagnosis, is compassionate, appropriate, of good quality and permits the exercise of choice by patients. That choice is, of course, within the current legal framework. For many, that means being able to choose to be cared for and to die at home, or in a care home when that has become someone’s home. However, we know that most people die in hospital, the place where they would least prefer to be.

Although realistically many people will continue to die in hospital, we know that more people could be cared for and die at home. We want services to be set up to help people make that choice, and commissioners and providers need to ensure that the right services are available in the right places and at the right time. Much needs to be done to make that happen, and we will review progress in 2013 to see how close we are to being able to offer that choice. It is very much part of the work to implement the Department of Health’s end-of-life care strategy. Published in 2008 under the previous Government, the strategy received cross-party support. It aims to improve care for people approaching the end of life, whatever their diagnosis and wherever they are, including enabling more people to be cared for and to die at home.

[Fiona Bruce]

I am extremely pleased to hear my hon. and learned Friend say that. It will build on what is a very high standard of care in many parts of the country, as I have already mentioned. The point I was seeking to emphasis, in particular, was that evidence shows that where there is a high standard of palliative and end-of-life care, there are fewer requests for assisted suicide. That is why it is so important that we focus on supporting and developing further end-of-life care specialism and treatment in this country.

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[Caroline Lucas (Brighton, Pavilion) (Green)]

I very much welcome this debate, and I commend the Backbench Business Committee for giving it time, and the hon. Member for Croydon South (Richard Ottaway) for tabling the motion.

I am a vice-chair of the all-party group on choice at the end of life, and I am personally supportive of a change in the law on assisted dying for terminally ill, mentally competent adults. That said, I want to reiterate that today’s debate is about the application of the existing law on assisted suicide, and not about a change in the law. Of course, I fully support the development of palliative care provision, and I welcome the amendment tabled on that. I am encouraged that the evidence from countries such as Belgium and the Netherlands, as well as from states such as Oregon, shows that a change in law to support greater choice at the end of life often goes hand in hand with improvements to palliative care.

[Fiona Bruce]

Are those improvements not due to the progress made on scientific and medical developments in recent years?