Courts and Tribunals Bill

Geoffrey Cox Excerpts

Tuesday 10th March 2026 Commons Chamber

[Sir Geoffrey Cox (Torridge and Tavistock) (Con)]

I should declare an interest at the beginning. I am a member of the Bar—that is not uncommonly known—I still practise at the Bar, and I have the honour to be a criminal barrister and a member of the Criminal Bar Association. I have spent 44 years at the Bar. I have defended and prosecuted in some of the largest criminal trials that this country has ever seen—and some of the longest.

I have been experienced in seeing how juries react to circumstances of adversity and circumstances that challenge and test the very boundaries of humanity in the appalling nature of the crimes they are forced to adjudicate upon. Without exception, they have responded in a manner that I think generally gives rise to the hugest admiration, not to say awe, from those who are otherwise engaged in the administration of justice.

There is something about the gathering of 12 ordinary citizens, chosen at random and brought together into the crucible that a criminal trial produces, that strips away ideological and racial prejudice or preconception, and that causes them to focus upon a single question: is the allegation true, or is it not; and can we be sure, or is there any doubt?

Again and again, throughout our legal history, the wisdom and capacity of juries have been repeatedly vindicated every time they have been analysed, tested or sought to be examined by those who research these matters.

[Pam Cox]

Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman give way?

[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

Not just now, but I will come back to the hon. Member.

We in this House are engaged in ideological strife. Every day of our lives we are engaged in a political battle, and frankly, sometimes we do not always live up to the highest standards that even our own parties have set. In the course of my legal career, I have been led—when I say “led”, I mean that I was a junior in the courts—by some distinguished Labour Members of Parliament who continued to practise in the criminal courts and regarded it is a noble honour to do so. Peter Archer, the former Solicitor General, led me in the early 1980s; John Morris led me just eight weeks before the ’97 election, when the Blair landslide swept in—oh, halcyon days to those across the aisle, or some of them, anyway; and Bob Marshall-Andrews led me right up to the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords. What remarkable men they were.

Those men would never have countenanced—not for a single second—the compromise of principle that Government and Opposition Members are now being asked to make. I knew these people, and I knew them well. John Morris would never have countenanced it. Peter Archer would never have countenanced it. Bob Marshall-Andrews would never have countenanced it.

[Pam Cox]

Will he give way?

[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

Not now—later. I will.

I want to appeal to Labour Members. We are engaged in ideological strife. But in the Venn diagram that any society depends upon for the sustaining of sufficient points of common ground to keep a society together, jury trial is one of those that appear in a point of intersection between the vast numbers of this House and outside it.

[Catherine Atkinson (Derby North) (Lab)]

Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman give way?

[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

I will give way to the hon. Member for Colchester (Pam Cox) first, if she can give me just two seconds. I want to develop this theme, because it is very important to me.

There are some things that have to be above politics. If there are not, we have no society to defend. Jury trial is one of those institutions that have been defended by those across the aisle from me, on the opposite extreme of the political spectrum, and by those on our side of the House, out to the furthest waters of the right. Why is that? Because the administration of justice must be a non-ideological space. Jury trial unites us all for a simple reason: it is the most powerful instrument and engine of social justice that this country has ever invented. It is a safeguard against oppression. It is a built-in defence against establishment and administrative power.

[Catherine Atkinson]

On that point—

[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

I will give way to the hon. Member for Colchester first.

[Pam Cox]

We could think of this exchange as Cox v. Cox. The right hon. and learned Gentleman mentions legal history. I have more than a passing interest in that and am minded to think of the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1879, which moved a lot of cases from a jury system into the magistrates system. The architect of that was Disraeli, a former Conservative Prime Minister. Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman not agree that many politicians across this House have acted to shape jury trials over time?

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

There has always been a summary jurisdiction—invariably never for offences of dishonesty, and invariably never for offences that might lead to the destruction of the reputation of those who are facing it.

If one Member of this House, who must be disqualified if there is a sentence of imprisonment of more than 12 months, after the passage of this Bill is arraigned before a court on a case that might involve 12 months and one day, he or she will lose the right to a trial by jury, despite the fact that that might be an offence of protest. It might well be an offence where the Member of the House has felt so powerfully that they must breach the law that they are arrested and arraigned on a potential sentence of up to three years. Three years is a long time. As that could easily be an offence of protest, are we therefore saying that those who seek to go to jail, such as the suffragettes, should lose their right to trial by jury—a jury that is not obliged to follow the diktats or directions of a judge on the law; a jury that is entitled to reach its decision on its judgment about what is fair? I say—

[Catherine Atkinson]

Will he give way?

[Andrew Cooper]

Will he give way?

[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

Not just now.

I say to the House, in all conscience, that jury trial is precious. Why? It is precious because it unites all parts of the political spectrum. It is precious because it allows the people of this country to be directly engaged in the adjudication of guilt or innocence in thousands of cases across the country.

At a time, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Hertsmere (Sir Oliver Dowden) pointed out when he rose to intervene, when our institutions are under unprecedented attack, is now the time to transfer a massive chunk of the administration of criminal justice and the decisions on the guilt or innocence of a fellow citizen to a representative who unquestionably will be seen as a representative of the state? It is the jury that protects us from the allegation that the state is deciding upon that citizen’s future. That is what protects, preserves and enhances the reputation of the administration of justice.

[Karl Turner]

It was telling when Jo Hamilton OBE wrote to the Justice Secretary—I think it was yesterday—to respectfully remind him that, as a victim of the Post Office Horizon scandal, under the legislation proposed, not one of the 900 sub-postmasters who were convicted would have been entitled to a trial before their peers. What does the right hon. and learned Gentleman say to that?

[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

I agree entirely with the hon. Gentleman. Postmasters, postmistresses, postmen—those whose honesty and integrity are integral to their employment and who, for a breach of trust, would not receive three years’ imprisonment—would all be deprived of their jury trial, and at a time when the sharks and the vultures are circling around the institutions of this country. We are now on the brink of undermining—I believe irredeemably—one of the most precious of those institutions, which commands almost universal assent. Let me say why.

[Catherine Atkinson]

Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman give way?

[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

No, I am not giving way. I am mindful of time and I must complete what I have to say.

This is a time when not just this House but the judiciary and the courts are under attack. The unprecedented attacks upon the judiciary and the legal profession are deplorable. Institutional trust is under siege, and now is not the time—[Interruption.] I am trying to make a speech that is non-partisan—[Interruption.] It really is not. I remember vividly when I sat where the Lord Chancellor now sits and he was on this side of the House. I remember the fire that breathed from his soul as he spoke about justice. I can hear him now, in my mind’s eye, speaking on this subject, and I know that he would have been saying the direct polar opposite of what he is advancing today in the House. I would say that he was his wiser self in those days. He was his best self then, because at that time he was motivated by those who were oppressed, who were poor and who faced the full phalanx of the state reined against them. It was this Secretary of State in a different guise who was their champion and their voice.

A jury trial is the most potent weapon and instrument against oppression and injustice. It serves not just those who are wealthy but those who are poor, and not just those who have a voice but those who do not. It is the 12 members of a jury who will give a hearing to people who otherwise have no hearing—

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

I will not take interventions now, and certainly not if they are of the quality that we have had up till now.

The reality is that jury trial is the cornerstone of our justice system. Do away with it and we are in trouble. Let us look at the way in which this Bill operates. It automatically presumes jury trial for everything that will have a likely sentence of three years, and those will involve some grave offences. However, in relation to serious, complex or lengthy cases, it could cover any allegation, so long as a judge concludes that it is appropriate that it should be dealt with without a jury. Apart from the excluded offences, which I accept exist, it is not just fraud trials but all kinds of trials that will be tried without a jury if a judge concludes that is appropriate.

The moment we make jury trials subject to the individual view of a judge as to whether that is appropriate or not, we drive a hole through the fundamental, accepted right that all of us on both sides of the House have accepted over so many years, which is that if someone is accused of a serious crime that could destroy their reputation, disqualify them from the House of Commons, wreck their professional reputation or result in the loss of their employment—as with the postmasters and postmistresses—they should be able to be judged by 12 people.

There is a reason why summary justice is called “summary”. There is a reason that summary justice was always subject to a complete rehearing. It has been suggested that there is no right to a jury trial. Of course there is no written right, but there has always been an accepted consensus, on both sides of this House and throughout the system of this country, that jury trials are precious for those kinds of cases, particularly those involving allegations of dishonesty. The right to elect is crucial. That is what this Bill is undermining. That is what is so dangerous about it. And undermining it on what basis? Arbitrary rules and arbitrary divisions. Why three years? Why not next year four or five? Why not extend it gradually, little by little, until we reduce—

[Catherine Atkinson]

Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman give way?

[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

No, I am not giving way. Let me make that clear now. I want to finish in a moment.

The reality is that jury trial is too precious a thing to lose. We are faced with a question of principle here. The savings that the Government claim will be made are contested by many expert analyses from the profession, the Institute for Government and others. They are based on questionable assumptions. Are those savings sufficient for us to abrogate a fundamental principle that attracts almost universal assent across the political spectrum, which is so rare in our institutional and political life? Are they sufficient for us to take this highly unprecedented and questionable step? I would submit that they are not.

I would submit to the House that we should pause long and hard before we encroach upon this fundamental principle. I have seen it work in practice over 40 years and, as I have said, I have never failed to be awe-inspired by the sheer quality of attention and fairness that a jury brings to its deliberations. Summary justice can never replicate that. We are about to take a step that will irretrievably damage the quality of justice in this country.

I do not watch television much, but sometimes I watch something called “Digging for Britain”. It is apparent from that programme that we can tell when a civilisation starts to degrade when the quality of its architectural constructions changes; they start to look cheaper, and there is less attention to detail. If we take this step, we will be degrading our system of justice. A summary justice trial is summary—the clue is in the name—but that has always been corrected by the power to have a full rehearing in the court above: the Crown court. The Bill is even taking that away. We are ensuring that many thousands of people will be dealt with summarily in cases of great importance to their life and reputation.

I can only appeal to the House—ineffectually, perhaps; and I regret that I have attracted comments from Labour Members suggesting that my comments are controversial. They come from the heart, and from my 44 years’ experience of a system and a profession that I love. If I have attracted the ire of Labour Members, I apologise for that; I was hoping to induce reflection on the sheer importance of the institution about which we are to take this important decision.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Edward Leigh]

I hope my hon. Friend will forgive me, but Madam Deputy Speaker wants me to proceed.

The backlog did not arise because juries exist; it arose because the system itself has been placed under strain for many years. Opposition Members, like others, have a responsibility here. If the courts are struggling, the answer is to repair the system rather than weaken the principle. Many sensible proposals have been suggested, such as restoring bigger and longer court sitting patterns, opening additional courtrooms, and treating the backlog as a genuine national crisis that requires urgent resources.

Many people have pointed out the flaws in the Lord Chancellor’s plan. Several senior legal figures have written to The Times explaining that the proposals are “unworkable”. Perhaps there is one possible compromise: to at least preserve the absolute right of those of good character to a jury trial. If a person of good character—perhaps a Member of Parliament—is accused of something such as shoplifting, which would be quite a minor case, it can have a devastating impact on their career and life.

[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

The other logical absurdity is that, under the Government’s proposed reforms, somebody with a previous conviction may well go above the three-year threshold, so those who have a string of previous convictions will get a right to jury trial, but a person of good character will not.

[Sir Edward Leigh]

That is a very fair point.

I ask Members to look to their conscience. If they, a Member of Parliament—a person of good character—were accused of shoplifting, what would they choose? They would choose trial by jury, would they not? They would not choose to be tried by a magistrate. The task before us is to solve this practical problem without undermining our constitutional safeguards. The danger that we face is the temptation to sacrifice a long-standing liberty for the sake of short-term administrative convenience.

The Lord Chancellor is a friend of mine and a good man. He is not a villain; he approaches things with the best of intentions—I say that without doubt. The problem is that we may not always have individuals as good natured and well intentioned as him. We accept that he is genuinely trying to solve a problem, but I fear that he is doing it with the wrong mindset. Constitutional safeguards are not designed for moments when power is exercised by good men; they exist precisely because future holders of power may not always be so wise or so restrained. We have become so used to our state of freedom that we are in danger of imagining that it is the natural state of mankind. History teaches us that it is not. We have reached our advanced state of structured freedom, responsible government and parliamentary democracy through centuries of slow, organic growth. They grew through the common law, through Magna Carta, through Parliament and through the principle that the community—the people—participate in justice.