Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Geoffrey Cox Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 12th December 2023 Commons Chamber

[Yvette Cooper]

I will make some progress, and then I will give way to the right hon. Member.

The problem is that, even as the Bill stands, it risks breaking international law, and that makes it harder to get further returns agreements and to get the further security co-operation that we need with our nearest neighbours. It is also why, if the One Nation group supports it, that puts its members in a pretty impossible position. Clause 1(5) says that a safe country is

“a country to which persons may be removed…in compliance with…international law”.

Clause 2(1) says:

“Every decision-maker must…treat…Rwanda as…safe”,

even if it is not. So even if Rwanda does what it did over the Israel-Rwanda deal and breaches international law and sends people back for refoulement, even if Rwanda introduces new policies to send people abroad, even if there is a coup in Rwanda, even if Rwanda fails to stop organised gangs moving people to the border, even if asylum seekers are shot at in Rwanda—all things that the Supreme Court found had happened in the past—and even if the treaty is designed in good faith, if it fails, the Government are still saying that British courts cannot consider the facts.

[Sir Geoffrey Cox (Torridge and West Devon) (Con)]

Will the right hon. Lady give way?

[Yvette Cooper]

I will give way. I did promise to give way to the right hon. Member for Middlesbrough South and East Cleveland (Sir Simon Clarke), and I will come back to him in the moment.

[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

Is there a fundamental difference between the Government deeming Rwanda safe and the Labour Government, as they did in 2004, deeming a whole list of countries safe in precisely the same way and with precisely the same legislative technique?

[Yvette Cooper]

The right hon. and learned Gentleman knows that that is not the case, because what the Government have done is both to deem and to remove any capacity for the courts to consider the facts.

We can see how absurd even Government figures think this is. The Home Office’s legal guidance, published yesterday, quotes legal judgments. One says that

“the court should not shrink from applying the fiction created by the deeming provision”.

Another states:

“The statute says that you must imagine a certain state of affairs; it does not say that having done so, you must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries”.

The mind does indeed boggle. The problem for the Home Secretary and the One Nation group is that, even as it stands, the Government are effectively admitting that they are creating legal fictions. They are saying that rather than following the facts, the courts will have to follow those fictions instead, for the sake of a tiny scheme that costs not just £300 million, but possibly £400 million. It also sets a precedent.

[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

rose—

[Sir Simon Clarke]

rose—

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Geoffrey Cox (Torridge and West Devon) (Con)]

In defending the Bill, which I will attempt, one has to reckon with those who think that it goes too far, or may go too far, and with those who think it goes not far enough. Let me first address those who think that it goes too far, of whom the right hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Dame Diana Johnson) is an example.

The Bill is criticised on the basis that it deems Rwanda to be safe. It is said that that is an illegitimate legal technique. It is said that it perpetuates, or perpetrates, a fiction in law. That is precisely the same fiction that the Labour Government adopted in the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004.

[Sir Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

No.

[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

Yes, it is. It was changed two or three years later, but in the Nasseri case before the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords, their lordships upheld, as a matter of law, the deeming of countries to be safe and within the law. Indeed, they went on to say—Lord Hoffmann being one of them, I think—that while Parliament deemed it such, there were plainly risks if the Home Office did not keep an eye on the state and conditions in the countries that were thus deemed, but otherwise it complied with the law and the courts would respect Parliament’s decision.

What is being said in this case is that a Supreme Court decision has already held Rwanda not to be a safe country for the purposes of the guarantee against refoulement. It is said that for this House to overrule the decision of the Supreme Court in such an individual case is constitutionally undesirable and contrary to fundamental constitutional principle. I do not agree with that analysis. First, it is open to this Parliament at any point to take steps to reverse the effect of a judicial ruling—that is the consequence of parliamentary supremacy. It is clear that Parliament should be restrained in doing so in cases, for example, where individual rights in a case to reverse a determination made in favour of an individual would plainly be contrary to fundamental constitutional principle, but that is not what we are doing here. We are seeking to do precisely what the Labour Government did in 2004. We are saying that Parliament, legitimately weighing the evidence, has concluded that Rwanda will not engage in the refoulement of those sent to it. That is something the courts have already accepted. It is something that it is open to this House to do, and it is something that, in my judgment, it is perfectly legitimate for Parliament to undertake. It would be different if it were to reverse a decision against an individual.

But even if I am wrong about that, and even if as a matter of constitutional convention it were undesirable for this House to reverse the effect on a question of principle—namely, whether Rwanda is safe for the purposes of refoulement—the facts have changed. There is now a binding treaty, and it is binding not only in international law but in domestic Rwandan law. My hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash) has rightly analysed the situation of international law. In this country we have a dualist jurisdiction where treaties are not self-executing, but in Rwanda the treaty is self-executing, so it will be binding on the Rwandan Government not only as a matter of international law, but as a matter of their own law.

That treaty contains a range of important safeguards, including, as a longstop, the fact that no individual removed to Rwanda from this country can be removed to a third country without the consent of the United Kingdom. If that longstop is in place, if the treaty is binding in Rwandan law and if it is binding, as it is, in international law, then I would suggest that there is simply no credible risk of refoulement if treaties and legal rules mean anything in the United Kingdom and in Rwanda. If the risk of refoulement has been removed, then there is nothing inappropriate in this House determining, as the Labour Government did in 2004, that Rwanda is safe for the purposes of refoulement. So I say to the House that this is appropriate, and it is a judgment that we can make as a House to take the step that we are now taking.

[Joanna Cherry]

Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman give way?

[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

I cannot give way; I do not have time.

Let me move to the third and most important question, which relates to the exclusion of access to courts. This Bill carefully preserves the right of individuals to come to court in extreme cases of individual justice. I listened, impressed, to my right hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Robert Jenrick), and I submit to those who think the Bill goes far enough that we cannot sacrifice the principle of access to a court. If we eliminated it entirely, not only would the Bill collapse because it would be interminably impeded in the House of Lords, but it would probably lead to the Rwandan Government withdrawing; and it is conceivable that the courts could entertain, for the first time, a complex challenge about the right of this Parliament to do away with fundamental constitutional principles such as access to a court. The supremacy of this House does not necessarily mean that it does not operate within a complex system of constitutional institutions, each of which has its own place as a component part in that system.

[Sir William Cash]

Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?

[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

No, I cannot give way; I simply do not have time.

Constitutional principles compete in creative tension. Parliamentary sovereignty is the most important of them, but there are others that are fundamental and one of them is access to a court in extreme cases. That is what this Bill preserves. I say to my right hon. Friends that I understand their frustration and their deep, intense dissatisfaction with the current situation; I share it. I think that there is tightening that we could do, particularly on rule 39. But on the preservation of the right to go to court in an extreme case, I say that is part of the British constitution that our fathers and our party have supported, and for which they have fought, for generations, and it would be wrong of us to compromise on that—

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Sir Roger Gale)]

Order. I am sorry to have to interrupt the right hon. and learned Gentleman, but he is fully aware that we have to stick to the time limit. After Sir George Howarth, whom I shall call next, I am afraid that, given the number of hon. Members who wish to participate, I shall have to reduce the time limit to six minutes.

Illegal Migration Bill

Geoffrey Cox Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 26th April 2023 Commons Chamber

[Robert Jenrick]

I will not give way to the hon. and learned Lady a second time, if she does not mind. We have been very clear that we take our treaty obligations seriously. In respect of the ministerial discretion in the clause, the Home Secretary, or whichever Minister of the Crown exercised that discretion, would of course take those obligations seriously and judge the individual case.

[Sir Geoffrey Cox (Torridge and West Devon) (Con)]

Is my right hon. Friend not in effect asking the House to give legislative sanction to at least the possibility that a Minister of the Crown will deliberately disobey this country’s international law obligations? Is not that really the effect of what is being asked?

[Robert Jenrick]

No. As I have already said, we take our treaty obligations very seriously and the Minister who exercises this discretion would have to do so. This discretion would be exercised highly judiciously and would ultimately be judged on the facts and be very fact-dependent.

[Joanna Cherry]

rose—

[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

Will my right hon. Friend give way on that point?

[Robert Jenrick]

I am not going to give way to the hon. and learned Lady. I will give way one last time to my right hon. and learned Friend; then I must make some progress.

[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

A Minister always has the ability to ignore an indication under rule 39, because there is no obligation under the convention for the Government to heed one—it is an indication. Why, then, does it need legislation if what is not in fact being asked is that this House should approve, quite consciously and deliberately, a deliberate breach of our obligations under the convention? That is the truth. The Minister could ignore an indication and it would be a matter between states, but the provision invites this House to give legislative authority to the Minister who does that, if she chooses to ignore it. Is that not the position?

[Robert Jenrick]

My right hon. and learned Friend is correct in saying that rule 39 indications are just that, and that there are circumstances in which Ministers have chosen not to apply them—a small number of circumstances, but a number. The clause does not mandate a Minister to ignore rule 39 indications; it says clearly, to ensure that there is no doubt whatsoever, that the Minister has the discretion to do so. It gives a non-exhaustive list of reasons that they should consider, and in doing so they would clearly, as I have said on a number of occasions, take their treaty obligations very seriously.

Let me move on. As I have said, the Bill provides for two kinds of suspensive claims and sets out a fair but rigorous timetable for the submission of any claims, their determination by the Home Office, and any appeals. It is important that those who receive a removal notice should be able to receive appropriate legal advice to help them to navigate this process; accordingly, new clause 20 makes provision for legal aid. I trust that this new clause at least will be welcomed by the hon. Member for Glasgow Central, given that it covers similar ground to her new clause 18. The provision of legal aid will reduce the opportunities for challenges and speed up removals.

On serious harm suspensive claims, new clause 17 augments the existing provisions in clause 38, which enables regulations to be made about the meaning of serious and irreversible harm for the purposes of the Bill. We consider it important, and indeed helpful to the courts, to provide them with guidance as to what does or does not amount to serious and irreversible harm, albeit that ultimately the judgment will be for the upper tribunal, to be taken on a case-by-case basis. New clause 17 also makes it clear that the serious and irreversible harm must be “imminent and foreseeable”, which aligns the test in the Bill much more closely with Strasbourg practice.

Amendments 114 to 119 relate to foreign national offenders. In the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, we legislated to disapply certain modern slavery protections to FNOs who have been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 months or more, and to certain other categories of persons who present a risk to public order. The amendments introduce a statutory presumption that the public order disqualification applies to FNOs who have been given an immediate custodial sentence of any length.

Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill

Geoffrey Cox Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 25th January 2023 Commons Chamber

[Sir Robert Buckland]

I think that there are two things: time and capacity. I do not criticise officials. I have never believed in doing so: it is a bad Minister who blames their officials, just as a bad workman blames his tools. Officials have a lot of work to do under immense pressure, and obviously they want to get it right. I want to get it right, too—we all do—but the Bill might be our last chance to do so in this Parliament. My goodness me, if we cannot get it right here, the Government are really going to have to get it right in the other place.

Let me deal further with the identification doctrine. Opposition new clause 40, which is very well worded, alludes to the US concept of respondeat superior. In effect, it is a wrap-all approach to vicarious liability that captures the acts or omissions of even very junior members of a corporate, which can lead to that corporate being liable. In some ways that has proved advantageous to prosecutors in the US: they have been able to identify more junior officials in corporates and, in effect, get them to co-operate with the authorities, which has opened up evidence that might not otherwise have been available.

The Law Commission looked at that approach. It also looked at what I might call the corporate culture approach in Australian Commonwealth law, and at Canadian legislation on the acts and mental states of senior managers. The Law Commission said—rightly, I think—that neither the US approach nor the Australian approach would be right for our jurisdiction.

The wording of my new clause 5 reflects the Law Commission’s recommendations in two ways. First, as the Law Commission’s report sets out, it would allow conduct to be

“attributed to a corporation if a member of its senior management engaged in, consented to or connived in the offence.”

Senior management is defined as

“any person who plays a significant role in the making of decisions about how the whole or a substantial part of the organisation’s activities are to be managed or organised, or the actual managing or organising of the whole or a substantial part of those activities.”

We have taken the Canadian approach.

[Sir Geoffrey Cox (Torridge and West Devon) (Con)]

I draw the House’s attention to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests.

I am intrigued by and have a great deal of sympathy with my right hon. and learned Friend’s amendments. As he knows, we discussed the issue when we served as Law Officers together. In the light of the Law Commission recommendation from which he has just quoted, I wonder why his new clause 5 includes the

“neglect of a senior manager.”

It seems conceptually a rather odd proposition that a fraud could be committed by neglect. The Law Commission did not go that far. Why has my right hon. and learned Friend included that provision?

[Sir Robert Buckland]

That is a fair question. What I seek is to tease out from the Government the juxtaposition with the money laundering regulations. My right hon. and learned Friend will remember my making mention of regulation 92 of the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017, which uses the word “neglect”. To be frank, I think that there is a problem with that, but it is important for us to tease out from Ministers a way to find a wording that is comprehensive.

[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

I have enormous sympathy with my right hon. and learned Friend, who is doing the House a service by bringing these amendments to its and the Government’s attention. However, is it not reasonable—Opposition new clause 40 has this purpose in mind as well—that there should be quite a detailed consultation within the financial services industry and among any other commercial organisations that might be affected? New clause 5’s use of the word “neglect” creates an extraordinarily broad possibility for the application of the criminal offence.

I know what my right hon. and learned Friend is doing, and I applaud it. However, it seems to me that it is reasonable to require of the Government that they get it right, but, as the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill (Liam Byrne) said, that must not become an excuse simply to say “mañana” and kick this into the long grass.

[Sir Robert Buckland]

I am always grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend; I greatly enjoyed our time working together as Law Officers, and I yield to no one in my respect for him. He is right to make that point. I think I couched my remarks in a way that was faithful to the Law Commission’s options, which say that the Government do not necessarily have to do it all—there is a choice here, potentially. On a wider basis, I think that the identification doctrine needs to be looked at. There could be an opportunity for further refinement, perhaps in the other place, and for provision to be made that refers specifically to the offences that I list in new clause 5.

Let me take my right hon. and learned Friend’s point in the spirit in which he made it, and build on it. New clause 5 includes the specification in Law Commission’s option 2B that an

“organisation’s chief executive officer and chief financial officer would always be considered to be members of its senior management.”

We have sought to be faithful to option 2B.