Ajax Programme

Debate between Graham Stuart and James MacCleary

Wednesday 14th January 2026 Westminster Hall

[James MacCleary]

My hon. Friend is a committed advocate for his constituents in Yeovil and has raised this on a number of occasions. I absolutely agree: we run a real risk of not only losing the ability to build our own—

[Graham Stuart (in the Chair)]

Order. We will stay focused Ajax, notwithstanding the intervention.

[James MacCleary]

Indeed.

Let me be clear from the outset: the possible collapse of this multi-decade, £6.2 billion programme is deeply alarming. It demands answers, it demands accountability and, most importantly, it demands urgent action. The facts are stark and troubling. Just weeks ago on Salisbury plain, during what should have been a routine training exercise, more than 30 of our soldiers fell ill. They were not injured in combat or facing down an enemy on some distant battlefield; they were training on British soil in British vehicles built with British taxpayers’ money. They were vomiting, and they were shaking uncontrollably. Some spent 10 to 15 hours in these vehicles and emerged requiring urgent medical care.

That is not the first time we have heard such reports. Indeed, the Ajax programme has been plagued by issues of noise and vibration since mid-2020. A stop notice was issued in June 2021 and all dynamic movement was halted. The programme underwent what was termed “a significant reset”. Training resumed in 2023, only to be paused again in 2025. Astonishingly, this programme has been on pause for 20% of its entire life—20%.

What was the response from those in charge? In November, just before the latest incident, we were told that Ajax had achieved “Initial Operating Capability”. The Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry visited the General Dynamics factory in south Wales and declared that the issues were “firmly in the past.” He told us that he had been

“reassured from the top of the Army”

that the vehicle was safe. Indeed, the programme was apparently so successful that the MOD announced in November that it had just won an international award for mega-project of the year.

Three weeks later, the Minister had to return to the House to confess that he had been misled—misled by the Chief of the General Staff and the then acting National Armaments Director. These are not junior officials; they are the most senior figures in our defence establishment providing assurances about safety that have proven to be utterly unfounded.

I must ask, what kind of system allows this to happen? What kind of institutional culture permits such a fundamental failure of honesty and accountability? What does it say about the state of our armed forces that senior officials and officers declared initial operating capability when long-standing problems had merely been mitigated with new seats and earplugs in some cases, rather than actually fixed?

The Minister must now be absolutely clear about what the Government’s contingency plans are if Ajax is deemed unsafe. Moreover, he must explain what the impact will be on our NATO commitments if Ajax is further delayed due to required upgrades or scrapped altogether. Our allies are watching, and our adversaries are watching, and what they see is chaos.

This is not simply about one troubled programme, catastrophic though Ajax’s failures have been; this programme illustrates the deep-seated problems with defence procurement that have plagued our armed forces for years. They deserve better than the endless delays, cost overruns and capability gaps that have become the hallmark of how we equip those who defend us.

Let us consider the litany of failures. Ajax was ordered in 2014. It was supposed to be fully in service by 2019. Here we are in 2026, and not only is it not in service, but we are now investigating whether it is fundamentally unsafe. The vehicle was originally designed for weights of up to 26 tonnes. Through what defence analysts politely call “scope creep”—the Army loading the programme with 1,200 separate capability requirements—the weight ballooned to over 43 tonnes.

A single vehicle can now cost well over £10 million in its most expensive form, and what have we got for this money? We have vehicles that make our soldiers sick. We have a programme that has consumed vast resources and delivered nothing but embarrassment. We have General Dynamics winning awards for project controls while producing vehicles that cannot be safely operated. I note with interest that when asked whether performance bonuses relating to Ajax had been paid to officials over the last three years, the Ministry responded:

“This information is not held centrally and therefore can not be provided without incurring disproportionate costs.”