Ajax Programme

James MacCleary Excerpts

Wednesday 14th January 2026 Westminster Hall

[James MacCleary (Lewes) (LD)]

It is a pleasure to serve under you, Mr Stuart. I congratulate the hon. and gallant Member for Huntingdon (Ben Obese-Jecty) on securing this timely and important debate.

Ajax takes its name from the “Iliad”. In that great epic, there are in fact two Ajaxes—Ajax the Great, the famous hero of Greek mythology, and Ajax the Lesser. I think it is pretty clear, from what we have heard today, which of them this project most resembles. Ajax stands as perhaps the starkest illustration of everything that has gone wrong with defence procurement in this country.

[Adam Dance (Yeovil) (LD)]

The new medium helicopter contract has reportedly been delayed. We now risk losing the site at Yeovil if the contract is not awarded by March. Does my hon. Friend agree that such delays to contracting are undermining our national and economic security, and that the new medium helicopter contract must be awarded as soon as possible?

[James MacCleary]

My hon. Friend is a committed advocate for his constituents in Yeovil and has raised this on a number of occasions. I absolutely agree: we run a real risk of not only losing the ability to build our own—

[Graham Stuart (in the Chair)]

Order. We will stay focused Ajax, notwithstanding the intervention.

[James MacCleary]

Indeed.

Let me be clear from the outset: the possible collapse of this multi-decade, £6.2 billion programme is deeply alarming. It demands answers, it demands accountability and, most importantly, it demands urgent action. The facts are stark and troubling. Just weeks ago on Salisbury plain, during what should have been a routine training exercise, more than 30 of our soldiers fell ill. They were not injured in combat or facing down an enemy on some distant battlefield; they were training on British soil in British vehicles built with British taxpayers’ money. They were vomiting, and they were shaking uncontrollably. Some spent 10 to 15 hours in these vehicles and emerged requiring urgent medical care.

That is not the first time we have heard such reports. Indeed, the Ajax programme has been plagued by issues of noise and vibration since mid-2020. A stop notice was issued in June 2021 and all dynamic movement was halted. The programme underwent what was termed “a significant reset”. Training resumed in 2023, only to be paused again in 2025. Astonishingly, this programme has been on pause for 20% of its entire life—20%.

What was the response from those in charge? In November, just before the latest incident, we were told that Ajax had achieved “Initial Operating Capability”. The Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry visited the General Dynamics factory in south Wales and declared that the issues were “firmly in the past.” He told us that he had been

“reassured from the top of the Army”

that the vehicle was safe. Indeed, the programme was apparently so successful that the MOD announced in November that it had just won an international award for mega-project of the year.

Three weeks later, the Minister had to return to the House to confess that he had been misled—misled by the Chief of the General Staff and the then acting National Armaments Director. These are not junior officials; they are the most senior figures in our defence establishment providing assurances about safety that have proven to be utterly unfounded.

I must ask, what kind of system allows this to happen? What kind of institutional culture permits such a fundamental failure of honesty and accountability? What does it say about the state of our armed forces that senior officials and officers declared initial operating capability when long-standing problems had merely been mitigated with new seats and earplugs in some cases, rather than actually fixed?

The Minister must now be absolutely clear about what the Government’s contingency plans are if Ajax is deemed unsafe. Moreover, he must explain what the impact will be on our NATO commitments if Ajax is further delayed due to required upgrades or scrapped altogether. Our allies are watching, and our adversaries are watching, and what they see is chaos.

This is not simply about one troubled programme, catastrophic though Ajax’s failures have been; this programme illustrates the deep-seated problems with defence procurement that have plagued our armed forces for years. They deserve better than the endless delays, cost overruns and capability gaps that have become the hallmark of how we equip those who defend us.

Let us consider the litany of failures. Ajax was ordered in 2014. It was supposed to be fully in service by 2019. Here we are in 2026, and not only is it not in service, but we are now investigating whether it is fundamentally unsafe. The vehicle was originally designed for weights of up to 26 tonnes. Through what defence analysts politely call “scope creep”—the Army loading the programme with 1,200 separate capability requirements—the weight ballooned to over 43 tonnes.

A single vehicle can now cost well over £10 million in its most expensive form, and what have we got for this money? We have vehicles that make our soldiers sick. We have a programme that has consumed vast resources and delivered nothing but embarrassment. We have General Dynamics winning awards for project controls while producing vehicles that cannot be safely operated. I note with interest that when asked whether performance bonuses relating to Ajax had been paid to officials over the last three years, the Ministry responded:

“This information is not held centrally and therefore can not be provided without incurring disproportionate costs.”

[Mr Francois]

Does the hon. Member agree that the Ministry could tell us the bonuses of the head of Defence Equipment and Support, so the idea that it does not know who else got a bonus is totally and utterly laughable?

[James MacCleary]

I do; it is an extraordinary response. All we can conclude is that the Ministry means, “Yes, bonuses have been awarded—some of them quite substantial—but we would rather not tell you exactly how much people have been rewarded for presiding over this disaster.” The senior responsible officer for Ajax earns a salary in excess of £160,000—nearly as much as the Prime Minister—with the potential for bonuses of 25% to 30% on top, so we have people earning £200,000 or more while delivering a programme that has been stopped for a fifth of its existence and is now under multiple safety investigations.

This is not merely incompetence; it is systemic failure. The 2023 review of the programme exposed precisely that—systemic and institutional problems. We need to know what progress has been made in fixing these issues, and we need to know what safeguards are in place to prevent further delays, cost overruns and, most importantly, threats to our soldiers’ safety. I ask the Minister directly: is the Ministry of Defence considering an internal investigation into how the programme could have progressed so far without those major issues being identified? Someone, somewhere, has been signing off on milestones and accepting deliverables when the fundamental problems are still unresolved.

The Liberal Democrats have long argued for a fundamental reform of defence procurement, and Ajax demonstrates precisely why such reform is so desperately needed. We would tackle these long-standing problems by replacing the current system of defence reviews with a more flexible system of continuous review of security threats and evolution of defence plans. As has been dramatically demonstrated in recent weeks, the world does not wait for our periodic review cycles, and neither should our procurement system.

We would ensure that defence procurement is part of a comprehensive industrial strategy, securing a reliable long-term pipeline of equipment procurement. Industry needs certainty, as do our armed forces, but the current approach provides certainty for neither, especially with the continued delay in releasing the defence investment plan. We would collaborate properly with our European and NATO partners on the development of new defence technologies, equipment, systems and training. We would make capital spending allocations more flexible to reduce what is called annuality, and focus instead on meeting the required in-service dates. We would invest properly in recruiting, retaining and training staff with specialist skills at the Ministry of Defence, reducing its dependency and expenditure on external consultants.

The concerns about Ajax should raise alarm bells about the continuing poor state of procurement at a time when Britian must be rearming rapidly. The geopolitical situation demands that we get this right, and Ukraine has shown us what modern warfare requires. Our adversaries are not standing still, and we simply cannot afford these failures.

The fact that the Army has paused the use of Ajax vehicles raises serious questions about the operational readiness of the units that rely on them. How does this disruption affect deployment plans at a time when our armed forces need to be fully prepared? What is the impact on training schedules? What message does it send to our personnel about how we value their safety?

The Ministry of Defence has launched a safety investigation, citing an “abundance of caution”, but the public and this House deserve clarity. What exactly is being investigated, who is involved, and when will the inquiry conclude? The Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry said:

“It will be conducted at pace, but it will not be rushed.”

Which is it? The armed forces deserve transparency and reassurance, and they deserve it now. This all sends a worrying signal to our adversaries, which is why it is vital that the Government outline how they will move quickly to resolve the issues and adopt our proposals for a wider overhaul of the procurement system. We cannot afford to lumber on with a broken system while the world around us becomes more dangerous.

Difficult decisions lie ahead. The Defence Secretary has indicated that scrapping the programme in its entirety is possible. Given what we know—given the years of delays and billions spent, and given that soldiers are still falling ill in these vehicles—it is right to seriously consider that option. The mythological Ajax died of shame; one hopes that those responsible for this modern Ajax programme might feel at least some measure of that emotion. More than shame, we need action. The Ajax programme must not be allowed to fail in silence—too much is at stake. The most important thing of all is the safety and wellbeing of those who serve and being able to depend on them absolutely.