Bank of England and Financial Services Bill [Lords]

Debate between Harriett Baldwin and Mark Field

3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Tuesday 19th April 2016 Commons Chamber

[Harriett Baldwin]

I would like to start by emphasising that the Treasury Committee is an esteemed Committee of this House and provides exceptional scrutiny of the Government and their regulators. Through its programme of pre-commencement hearings, it questions appointees to several posts before they start work. After appointees have started, they can expect to appear regularly before the Committee, and the public can expect the Committee to hold appointees firmly to account.

The Government welcome that scrutiny of appointees—it is a critical democratic function. That is why we have tabled new clause 12 to ensure in statute that the Committee always has the chance to scrutinise a new Financial Conduct Authority chief executive before they start work.

[Mark Field (Cities of London and Westminster) (Con)]

Will this be setting a bit of a trend? For which other important posts—there will be a number of other important posts at not just regulators but other City institutions—does my hon. Friend think it would be appropriate for the Treasury Committee to have a similar approval process?

[Harriett Baldwin]

I am speaking very narrowly to new clause 12. I am sure the Treasury Committee and other Committees will look at the issue again. I expect it to be part of the ongoing discussions between Parliament and the Executive. However, I am speaking to the very narrow characteristics of new clause 12.

Since we tabled our new clause, there have been further discussions with the Chair of the Treasury Committee over its role in the appointment of FCA chief executives. I am pleased to announce that we have found a means of reinforcing its scrutiny role that goes further than the context of this Bill. Indeed, today the Chancellor has written to the Chair of the Treasury Committee, agreeing that the Government will make appointments to the role of chief executive of the FCA in such a way as to ensure that the Committee is able to hold a hearing before the appointment is formalised.

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[Harriett Baldwin]

We tabled our new clause on Thursday and, as I have said, there have been further discussions with the Chair of the Treasury Committee. I am delighted to be able to announce the result of those discussions today.

I also want to take a moment to address the question of dismissals of the FCA chief executive. I can confirm that the Government do not have the power, except in very limited circumstances, to dismiss the chief executive of the FCA during his or her term of office. I refer the House to paragraph 4 of schedule 1ZA to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, which applies to the chair and the external members, as well as to the CEO, and states:

“The Treasury may remove an appointed member from office…on the grounds of incapacity or serious misconduct, or…on the grounds that in all the circumstances the member’s financial or other interests are such as to have a material effect on the extent of the functions as member that it would be proper for the person to discharge.”

The lawyers are clear that the only reasons the Treasury can dismiss an FCA chief executive are incapacity, serious misconduct and conflicts of interest. I hope that offers the House considerable reassurance.

[Mark Field]

It is worth saying a little about what happened in relation to Martin Wheatley. Although he was not technically dismissed, his term was not renewed. The situation was straightforward. In July 2015, it was announced that his term would not be renewed in March 2016. As a result, he left his office six months early. I accept that that may have been a mutual decision between the Treasury and Mr Wheatley, but it certainly gave the impression, at least, that, even if it was not a fully fledged dismissal, it was a non-renewal, and, ultimately, the exit from office came six months before the end of a fixed term.

[Harriett Baldwin]

My right hon. Friend has stated the facts about the term of office to which Martin Wheatley was appointed and the fact that the Government chose not to renew it. It is appropriate to pay what I hope is a cross-party tribute to the excellent work of the acting chief executive, Tracey McDermott, who stepped into the role at that time. She has carried out the role for almost a full year in an absolutely exemplary fashion.

Unless there any further questions on the new clause, I am going to move on to the amendments relating to devolution. I am inviting interventions, but there are none.

The next set of amendments, which stand in the names of the hon. Members for East Lothian (George Kerevan), for Carmarthen East and Dinefwr (Jonathan Edwards) and for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath (Roger Mullin), force us to ask exactly who the Bank works for. The answer must be the entire United Kingdom. Indeed, that is emphasised in the Bank’s mission statement,

“to promote the good of the people of the United Kingdom by maintaining monetary and financial stability.”

To fulfil that mandate, the Bank of England goes to great lengths to ensure that it has a comprehensive understanding of the economic and financial situation across all corners of the United Kingdom. The Bank has a network of 12 agencies, which are located across Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and the regions of England. Each year, those agents undertake some 5,500 company visits and participate in panel discussions with approximately a further 3,500 businesses. In that context, imposing a requirement to have regard to regional representation on the court is unnecessary. A comprehensive framework for regional information-gathering already exists.

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[Harriett Baldwin]

I respect and pay tribute to the fact that the Bank of England was founded by someone from Scotland, so the hon. Gentleman is absolutely right to draw attention to the fact that this is an historical anomaly. I would be the first to accept that the monetary policy of the Bank of England is set for the whole United Kingdom. That does not mean to say that we will accept the new clauses that would change the name of the Bank of England, because we think that its name has been well established over 300 years.

[Mark Field]

I think that the Treasury is right, in this instance, not to change the name. The Bank of England has a brand. I do not need to give a history lesson to the nationalist Members, but the Bank of England was founded in 1694, which was before the 1707 and 1800 Acts of Union that might—for two of the three other parts of the United Kingdom, at least—otherwise have had an impact on its initial name. Its brand is important, and I hope that those from the other parts of the United Kingdom will not feel as though their interests are being downgraded simply because they do not appear in the headline name, not least for the reasons that have been set out. It is important that we recognise that the Bank acts for the entirety of the United Kingdom, and that it therefore pays great attention to the voices of those in all parts of the United Kingdom, not just England.

[Harriett Baldwin]

Yes, and on that point I hope that the support of the hon. Member for Edinburgh East (Tommy Sheppard) for the united nature of our kingdom means that the Scottish National party has moved on from the discussions of last year in which it wanted to break up the United Kingdom. I hope that the party will accept the settled will of the Scottish people to continue to benefit from monetary policy that applies right across the country.

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[Harriett Baldwin]

The hon. Gentleman asks an important question. There are many opportunities in Parliament, in the scrutiny of the Bank of England by the Committee of which he is a member, to ask those important questions. The Government choose to use the mechanism of the letter process and the remit. The hon. Gentleman and I are both old enough to know how inflation has changed over the years—[Hon. Members: “Surely not!”] I know; surely we are not. We should all welcome the significant lowering of inflation expectations, and we should all remember how important it is that we continue to ask the Bank of England to keep inflation under control, so that we never return to the kinds of impoverishing inflationary policies that so harmed people—particularly the poorest and oldest in society—during the 1970s.

Price stability must have primacy, because we judge that having a single lever aimed primarily at a single objective is the best way to make sure that the inflation target is credible. That, in turn, anchors all-important inflation expectations and helps us to keep inflation under control. Our system has shown that it produces good labour market outcomes. Despite global uncertainty, we have record numbers of people in work, an unemployment rate that is at its lowest in a decade, and a claimant count that has not been lower for more than 40 years. Moreover, targeting low inflation ensures that hard-earned wages are not eroded by inflation.

[Mark Field]

I must confess that I entirely agree with what the Minister is saying about inflation. I, too, am old enough to remember what inflation was like, particularly in the 1970s. However, it seems to me that the Bank of England’s sole monetary policy lever is to say that we must keep the inflation rate down. Surely we must recognise that inflation has now been well below the 2% target for a long time. I accept that we should never believe that inflation, and all the distortions it makes in our economy, has been entirely vanquished, but should there be a different inflation target, or a different set of remits for the Bank of England, to recognise that it should pay attention to other aspects of the economy in its monetary policy?

[Harriett Baldwin]

My right hon. Friend, who is an extremely wise and knowledgeable person—I will not refer in any way to his age—highlights an important point. He also emphasises the behavioural characteristic of the recency effect. Inflation is well below the 2% target today, but only during the lifetime of the last Parliament it was above 5%. Even during the six years that I have been a Member, we have tested the parameters of the inflation target. I do not think there is any need for us to make any changes to that target this afternoon.

I will conclude by speaking briefly to amendments 6 and 7 and new clause 13. The first part of amendment 6 states:

“The Comptroller may enquire into the Bank’s success in achieving its stated policy objectives but shall not enquire into the desirability of such objectives having been set.”

The Bill, as drafted, will already have that exact effect.

The second part of amendment 6 directs how the Comptroller and Auditor General should submit his reports. Parliament has delegated to the Comptroller discretion over the content of National Audit Office reports and the timing of their publication, and it is important that this independent officer of Parliament is able to use his judgment on how Parliament and the public are best served. The National Audit Act 1983 provides that the Comptroller

“may report to the House of Commons the results of any examination”.

Once he has reported to the House, it is open to any Committee of this House to inquire into matters on which he has reported. There is an in-built incentive for prompt publication as it mitigates the risk of the report’s conclusions being overtaken by events.

Amendment 7 would disapply restrictions in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 on the disclosure of specially protected information in relation to reports by the Comptroller and Auditor General. Information is specially protected under these rules if it is held by the Bank for the purposes of monetary policy, for financial operations supporting financial institutions in maintaining financial stability, or for private banking purposes. Similarly, new clause 13, in the name of the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland (Helen Goodman), would remove three corresponding exclusions in the Freedom of Information Act 2000. I hope I can persuade the House that each of the three categories of protected information is entirely sensible.

The first category applies to the Bank’s monetary policy functions. How we communicate monetary policy is extremely important. It moves markets in substantial ways and every detail of the published minutes is scrutinised for predictions of future changes. Managing disclosure while making sure information is presented in a timely way is vital. That is why the original legislation creating the Monetary Policy Committee in 1998 set out the full range of disclosure requirements, including publication of the minutes and of a quarterly inflation report. Since then, the Bank has implemented the recommendations of Governor Warsh’s review of MPC transparency. Through the Bill, we are supporting full implementation of the recommendations of that review.

The second exclusion applies to

“financial operations intended to support financial institutions for the purposes of maintaining stability”.

Hon. Members will understand that if the Bank has to extend emergency liquidity assistance, very careful communication is a critical element of preserving stability. Any covert assistance will be reported privately to the Chairs of the Treasury and Public Accounts Committees, while broader liquidity schemes for institutions, such as the special liquidity scheme and the discount window facility, may be announced to the markets.

Finally, the Bank’s very limited private banking services are excluded from FOI requests. We often forget that the Bank of England also provides private banking to customers. As I am sure hon. Members will agree, it would be entirely inappropriate to subject ordinary bank customer information to disclosure.