Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Helen Jones Excerpts

Tuesday 17th April 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Clarke]

I refute the idea that people will be given an injunction at some hearing in order to enable them to get legal aid, but people might apply. If the evidentiary tests are made too lax, there will be a tendency to fabricate claims or to bring in claims that are old and irrelevant, because it is worth thousands of pounds to the lawyer advising that person if legal aid is granted on that basis.

Far from trying to narrow the scope, let me remind the right hon. Gentleman and others where we have got to and where we are going this evening, by the time we have finished. We have a clear, wide definition trying to catch the variety of circumstances that will evidence recent domestic violence so that the argument that the victim should not have to face her abuser without having legal representation can be countered. But we do not want to shift the vast majority of private family law cases away from mediation into publicly funded adversarial litigation.

[Helen Jones (Warrington North) (Lab)]

Does the Lord Chancellor not accept that the legalistic approach that he is adopting ignores the reality of domestic violence, which is that many women do not report it, sometimes for years on end, and do not go to court to get injunctions, or if they do, are often persuaded to withdraw the proceedings before they come to a conclusion? It is only when the whole situation explodes and they leave the home that the reality of that domestic violence is noted.

[Mr Clarke]

But women will get legal aid for seeking the injunction. The hon. Lady is falling into what has happened throughout these debates. The definition that we are talking about as the gateway to legal aid for all other private family law cases goes far beyond injunctions.

If I may move on, I will remind hon. Members how far we have gone since we started the Bill—far beyond where the Opposition were first urging us to go—and we will go further in response to the debate in the House of Lords. The first issue is reflected in Lords amendment 192—whether or not we should use the definition used by the Association of Chief Police Officers, which we resisted in this House. The Government’s intent is to have a broad and inclusive definition and one that commands widespread agreement. To cut all the pressure, we are happy to support the spirit of the amendment and we are therefore adopting the ACPO definition. I half suspect that if we had offered that when the Bill was in the House of Commons—it was my mistake that we did not—we would have closed the discussion down in the House because that is what everybody was then pressing for.

In their amendment their lordships in their wisdom add words which are not in the ACPO definition. That rather goes against the arguments that have been put forward for one, single, cross-Government definition of domestic violence. We have therefore tabled further Government amendments in lieu of Lords amendment 192 which would define domestic violence in the same way as the ACPO definition as

“any incident of threatening behaviour, violence or abuse (whether psychological, physical, sexual, financial or emotional) between individuals who are associated with each other.”

We think this should satisfy the concerns that have been expressed in both Houses on this point, so I shall ask the House to agree to this Government amendment in lieu of Lords amendment 192.

Amendments 194 and 196 concern the accepted forms of evidence of domestic violence. I have already said that when litigation is about domestic violence, the victims will always have legal aid. The issue is one of balance. Lords amendment 194, led by the learned Baroness Scotland and supported by a number of her colleagues in the other place, has prompted us to look again at other kinds of objective evidence to ensure that the test is as widely drawn as possible.

I have discussed that with colleagues in the House, and I am grateful to the colleagues with whom I had meetings, particularly to my hon. Friend the Member for Maidstone and The Weald (Mrs Grant), who is in her place, for advice on the subject because she knows far more about family law than I do, as I have never practised in this field, and in particular for making the point that we need to take care that the range of evidence does not force victims to take formal court action where it may not be suitable in individual circumstances. We do not want to force people to go to court who would not otherwise do so.

Therefore, in response to this House and the debate in the other House, we intend to accept as evidence—we will reflect this in regulations—the following matters: an undertaking given to a court by the other party in lieu of a protective order or injunction against that party for the protection of the applicant, where there is no equivalent undertaking given by the applicant; a police caution for a domestic violence offence by the other party against the applicant; appropriate evidence of admission to a domestic violence refuge; appropriate evidence from a social services department confirming provision of services to the victim in relation to alleged domestic violence; and appropriate evidence from GPs or other medical professionals.

We are prepared to accept those matters and ask the House to accept them this evening. They are in addition to those forms of evidence that the Government already accepted in our earlier debates. Those are: that a non-molestation order, occupation order, forced marriage protection order or other protective injunction against the other party for the protection of the applicant is either in place or has been made in the previous 12 months; that a criminal conviction for a domestic violence offence by the other party against the applicant is still in place; that there are ongoing criminal proceedings for a domestic violence offence by the other party against the applicant; that there is evidence from a multi-agency risk assessment conference of the applicant having been referred as being at risk of domestic violence from the other party and action has been recommended; and that there is a finding of fact by the courts of domestic violence by the other party against the applicant.

For the best part of 12 months we have reviewed this rather narrow point in one piece of litigation, and that is a fairly formidable list of things we are prepared to accept as evidence of domestic violence. If their lordships consult the people who have been sending them all the e-mails for the past few weeks, I am sure that they will be able to add to the list, as will Members of this House, but if we are not careful we will forget what the objective is: we want more of these cases not to be conducted by lawyers, financed by the taxpayer, who are engaged in adversarial litigation about where the children will live, what maintenance should be paid by one party or the other or what share of the matrimonial home should be owned by one party or the other. The Government have responded pretty generously because of our concern about domestic violence and, as I have already indicated, in key areas we have moved beyond where we were. This evening we have to insist that that is where it will end.

I should also point out that, on the time limits, where I do not think any history of domestic violence can be remembered and invoked, it is a question of ensuring that victims of recent or ongoing violence are protected, drawing a line so that Government regulations do not result in a permanent opening of access to legal aid. We will double the time limit we originally proposed from 12 months to two years, except in respect of a conviction for a domestic violence offence, where the only limit is that the conviction should not be a spent one.

Having moved on all those issues, the Government do not agree that the evidential requirements for those cases should be set out on the face of the Bill; the evidence I have described will instead be set out in regulations. The benefit is that that will allow greater flexibility to amend the scheme if required in the light of experience. If we set it all out in primary legislation, we would find that we had set things in stone for our successors.

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[Mr Djanogly]

Let me repeat what I said: this is not a question of whether the person making a claim has a valid claim but of how much his lawyer gets paid. That is what we are looking at, and that is where the system needs reform. To be clear—I say that because I have heard that some hon. Members are not clear about this specific point—I emphasise that under our proposals the client’s lawyer’s costs will still be recoverable from the losing other side.

However, clauses 46 and 48 abolish the recoverability of the success fees and insurance premiums that have pushed up prices for everyone.

[Helen Jones]

Is the Minister aware that the lead asbestos case was very complicated and took six years to get to the Supreme Court? Does he really think that lawyers will take those kinds of cases without an assurance that their costs will be met?

[Mr Djanogly]

As I have just said, lawyers’ costs will be met in the usual way. What we are talking about is the success fee. That is where the problem has come into the system.

[Helen Jones]

Will the Minister give way?

[Mr Djanogly]

No; if the hon. Lady listens, I will answer the question.

Our reforms are intended to redress the unfairness that exists in our civil litigation system between claimants and defendants. They will move conditional fee agreements back to the position that they were in before the Opposition’s disastrous reforms in the Access to Justice Act 1999. Our proposals are premised on the similar treatment of classes of cases, based on the costs or difficulty of bringing a claim. The Lords amendments would introduce a new unfairness between claimants, based only on the type of disease or illness, and essentially dependent on whether it was caused in the workplace.

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[Mr Djanogly]

I am actually saying quite the opposite. I am saying that damages are going to be increased, not decreased.

The aim of our reforms is to end the current situation whereby legal firms can get away with charging what they want because the claimants do not have a stake in keeping an eye on the bill. At a time when the cases in question are becoming easier to bring, we should not accept amendments that would reduce pressure on legal firms to cut their fees. Instead, our focus should be on cutting inflated margins, not making exemptions for one type of disease.

I understand claimants’ fear of being left liable for high defendant’s costs should they lose, but under our reforms, we are protecting personal injury claimants from the risk of paying such costs, including in industrial disease cases, by introducing qualified one-way costs shifting.

[Helen Jones]

Even if I accepted the Minister’s argument about plaintiffs keeping an eye on fees, which I do not, how would someone with no legal training who was dying of mesothelioma be supposed to keep monitoring their lawyers’ fees?

[Mr Djanogly]

People entering into a conditional fee agreement have a relationship with their lawyer, and it is quite right that someone who employs a lawyer has some idea of what is on that lawyer’s clock and what they are charging. That is very important. If someone is sick, they will have family who can help them through their sickness.

The Government are determined to see more proportionate costs in civil litigation, with greater fairness in the risks borne by parties. Without our reforms, high and disproportionate costs in civil litigation would continue. Moreover, if the Lords amendments were accepted, claimants in mesothelioma cases would have an advantage over others who may be suffering from equally debilitating conditions. That cannot be justified.

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Committee to withdraw immediately; reasons to be reported and communicated to the Lords.

[Helen Jones]

On a point of order, Mr Speaker. During the last debate, many of us were dismayed by the conduct of the Minister, who giggled and grinned through descriptions of people dying of mesothelioma and what they suffered. I have to say that in almost 15 years in this House, I have never seen conduct that so demeans a Minister of the Crown and is so damaging to the reputation of the House. Is there anything that you can do to ensure that in future Ministers pay proper attention to such serious debates and conduct themselves as would be expected from a Member on the Treasury Bench?

[Mr Speaker]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her point of order. The Minister is welcome to respond if he wishes, but he is not under any obligation to do so.